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Thesis Abstract 
In recent philosophy of religion, there has been an increasing interest shown in the analysis of 
theological doctrines. This thesis takes up that approach with regard to Jonathan Edwards' 
metaphysics of sin. The objective is to ascertain whether or not the metaphysics that underpin 
Edwards' theological commitment to a strong doctrine of human depravity forms a coherent 
whole. 
The dissertation deals with this in terms of Edwards' doctrine of the fall, the question of the 
authorship of sin, his doctrine of imputation, his use of a doctrine of temporal parts and his 
espousal of occasionalism. From this analysis it is clear that Edwards' commitment to 
occasionalism proves problematic to his understanding of temporal persistence and human 
action. Moreover, when coupled with his compatibility thesis, this occasionalism undermines 
his attempted exculpation of the Deity on the question of the authorship of sin. Thus, the 
metaphysics underpinning Edwards' doctrine of sin do not yield a coherent whole. 
Nevertheless, Edwards' thinking raises interesting and fruitful philosophical insights into the 
theological problems raised. For instance, if divested of its occasionalistic garb, his theory of 
imputation, taken as part of a perdurantist ontology, could provide a novel solution to this 
traditional theological problem. In a similar way, if his doctrine of the fall were to be 
separated out from his occasionalism, it provides an internally coherent account of how Adam 
fell. 
So, although my conclusions regarding Edwards' hamartiology are largely negative, there is 
reason to believe that Edwards' legacy to contemporary philosophical theologians is a positive 
and potentially fi-uitful one. Not only does he raise the level of debate about harnartiological 
problems. He also shows that it is possible to make real advances on the particularly thorny 
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The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(1) Introduction: The problem of hamartiology 
There has been an increasing interest from among the analytic philosophical community in the 
last two decades in the clarification of theological doctrines using the tools of philosophical 
analysis. ' Alongside this, there has been a renewed interest from among the philosophical 
community in classical theologians (or philosophers with theological interests, such as Leibniz) 
of the past, who have often wrestled with the philosophical issues that their theological 
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commitments raise, with a greater rigor and sophistication than some modem theology does . 
These thinkers have become dialogue partners, and resources for addressing contemporary 
philosophical concerns. This concatenation of philosophical and historiographical interests 
means that the study of Edwards from the perspective of philosophical theology may draw on an 
increasing body of specialized literature which tackles many of the issues Edwards was 
interested in, with a technical rigour that Edwards would have wholeheartedly approved of 
What follows is an attempt to assess Edwards' theological contribution on the concept of sin, an 
area of his work that he thought through with considerable care, from the perspective of this 
particular philosophical literature. What he had to say on the metaphysics of the fall, original 
sin, guilt and the imputation of sin were highly original contributions to philosophical theology 
that are far from being facile or merely antique. ' In each of these areas of hamartiology he 
sought to reformulate traditional Reformed doctrines in light of early Enlightenment philosophy 
in ways that took him beyond the boundaries of his own theological tradition in important 
respects. 
1 Examples abound. Here are a sample of three recent authors: Swinburne's tetrology on Christian 
doctrine: Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Revelation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991); 7he Christian God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and 
Providence and the Problem ofEvil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The 
Problem of Hell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Thomas Morris' The Logic of God 
Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). See Peterson, Hasker et al., Reason and Religious 
Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) for an introduction to some of the major themes in recent 
philosophical treatments of Christian doctrine. 
Once again, there are a plethora of examples. Here is a small sample: Marilyn McCord Adams' work on 
Ockham and Anselm; the renewed interest in Molina from those concerned with issues surrounding 
Middle Knowledge, such as Alfred Freddoso and William Hasker; the theological appropriation of 
Leibniz by Robert Adams; the concern for Augustine across a wide range of fields (see, in this regard, 
The Augustinian Tradition, (ed. ) Gareth B. Matthews (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1999)); and, the use of Edwards in particular by Roderick Chisholm, Philip Quinn, William Wainwright, 
Jonathan Kvanvig, Alvin Plantinga and Paul Helm. 
3 As we shall see, Edwards' thinking in general, and his conservative theology in particular have been 
accused of both of these faults. 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
However, this should not be taken to suggest that Edwards' hamartiology was a break with that 
tradition. What is presented herein is not a 'strange new Edwards'. ' He strove to make the 
puritanical doctrinal legacy relevant in the very different conditions in which he found himself 
That meant reformulation and development, but not, as far as he was concerned, departure from 
that tradition. Nevertheless, the developments he instituted were important, and were linked 
with central tenets of the whole of his philosophical and theological vision, such as his 
occasionalism. and idealism. 
What emerges from this study is a picture of sustained and careful thought about a central and 
defining cluster of philosophical issues pertaining to Christian theology. Edwards' programme 
cannot be regarded as a success, if success is judged in terms of a clear, coherent argument. 
Edwards was not able, in the final analysis, to reconcile different aspects of his view of sin into 
one coherent whole. Nor was he able to resolve to his own satisfaction, problems that remained 
with respect to the content of the doctrines themselves. But what he did do was raise the 
I standard of discussion about this cluster of issues in hamartiology to a new level of limpidity 
and philosophical acuity. In doing so, he clarified the central issues that required resolution for 
future philosophical theologians. And this, I submit, is no small contribution to the ongoing 
discussion. Philosophers and theologians would do well to take the Edwardsian doctrine of sin a 
great deal more seriously. 
(1: 1) The task of the present work 
This is not the first exploration of Edwards' doctrine of hamartiology in the literature. ' But prior 
to this study, there has not been a comprehensive account of the metaphysics that Edwards used 
to underpin his doctrine of sin. The present thesis sets out to remedy this lacuna. However, this 
' At least one recent monograph has sought to demonstrate just this with respect to Edwards' views on the 
unregenerate and their eternal destiny. See Gerald McDermott Jonathan Edwards Conftonts the Gods 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and the review of this by Oliver D. Crisp in International 
Journal of Systematic Theology, forthcoming. 
5 For present purposes, the most important previous study is C. Samuel Storms, Tragedy in Eden: 
Original Sin in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985). 
However, Storms' treatment is almost exclusively historical and theological in content. His work is 
concerned to trace the difference between Edwards' work- in OS and tiat of Ed-wards' opponent Jotin 
Taylor. They are, according to Storms, typical of the debate between New England Calvinistic 
Protestantism and Enlightenment deistic and Arminian thought respectively. (Compare Storms in the 
Preface, p. xi, 'What follows, therefore, is fundamentally a biblical and theological examination of the 
doctrine of the fall of man in the thought of Jonathan Edwards. ') The present study is not concerned with 
the historical detail of Edwards' milieu. It is a philosophical treatment of a family of theological doctrines 
that Edwards spent a considerable amount of his time in defending in his later treatises. 
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is not a simply a critical exposition of Edwards' hamartiology. There are other places that the 
reader may find such an account. ' Instead, this is an analysis of the central structures of the 
metaphysics of sin in Edwards' philosophical theology. These central structures comprise (a) 
the problem of accounting for the first (human) sin, (b) the question of the authorship of sin, (c) 
the origin of a proneness to sin (the doctrine of original sinfulness), (d) the problem of the 
imputation of sin and (e) the question of original guilt .7 
Edwards' discussion of these issues, central to his thinking, yields a traditional Reformed view 
of the vitiation of human nature. Yet our question is not, do (a)-(e) yield the doctrine Edwards 
thinks they do viz. his understanding of human depravity? but rather, can the metaphysics 
Edwards' harnesses to articulate his version of (a)-(e), provide a coherent account of sin that 
might be able to support his contentions about human depravity? For these reasons, the doctrine 
of human depravity shall not feature in this work as a specific focus of attention. ' Instead, the 
central and defining question to which this thesis addresses itself is this: does the metaphysics 
Edwards deploys in his hamartiology form a coherent whole as a piece of philosophical 
theology? These metaphysical issues stand behind Edwards' intuition that all humanity is 
depraved, and infonn the arguments that he brings to bear for the cogency of his doctrine of 
human depravity. 
The present work falls into several parts. To begin with, we shall examine Edwards' analysis of 
the doctrine of the fall and the origin of sin. We then proceed to outline his theology of 
imputation, before assessing the coherence of his doctrines of original sin, original guilt and its 
imputation. In so doing, we shall have to take a tour of the doctrine of temporal parts and recent 
philosophical reflection on this, as well as related issues of personal identity and identity 
through time. All this informs the metaphysics that go to make up Edwards' hamartiology and 
his occasionalism that was a constituent part of that view. The thesis ends with an assessment of 
Edwards' contribution to philosophical theology in this area. 
There are other articles and chapter-length treatments of Edwards on sin, but few of them treat Edwards 
from the perspective of philosophical theology. And to my knowledge, none attempt anything like an 
analysis of the metaphysics of his doctrine. 
6 See, for example, John H. Gerstner The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, Volume I] 
(Powhatan: Berea PublicationsALigonier Ministries, 1992), Chapters XX-MV. 
' Compare Richard Swinburne, who describes the traditional concept of sin under three headings: a 
proneness to sin; the cause of this proneness to sin; and the question of original guilt in Responsibility and 
Atonement, chapter 9. 
8 This may be thought odd, given that Edwards own treatise on original sin begins with the notion of 
depravity and works from there in defence of the traditional doctrine of sin. However, this is to confuse 
methodological with logical priority. Edwards was addressing the first of these (depravity was a given in 
New England culture in the early eighteenth century. The fact that it was being eroded by thinkers like 
John Taylor, against whom Edwards directed his treatise, only underlines the fact that it had been the 
traditional and cultural norm up until that time. ) The question in the present thesis is the logical structure 
of Edwards' thought not his polemical presentation of it in one treatise. 
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(1: 2) Clearing a space in the literature 
We must begin by clearing a space in which our discussion may commence. This is not always 
easy in Edwardsian studies where the secondary literature abounds with different interpretations 
of his work and importance in the canon of ideas. 9 Among these problems are the complex 
historical issues surrounding recent Edwardsian scholarship, which must be briefly addressed 
for the purposes of contextualization, before setting about the subsequent philosophical 
discussion of the problem. 
In recent literature on Edwards there has been something of a quest to pigeonhole Edwards' 
thinking into one or more of the streams of Enlightenment thought in the Eighteenth century. 
Where a previous generation of scholars under the direction of Perry Miller located the source 
of much of Edwards thinking in the empiricism of Locke and the physics of Newton, 10 more 
recent work has tried to present a more rounded account of influences upon him. " Much work 
done on the early Edwards and his philosophical development is of interest here, especially 
9 For a lucid account of several perspectives on Edwards including Preacher, Millennial Writer, Scientist 
and figure of tragedy see Henry F. May's essay in Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, 
(eds. ) Nathan 0. Hatch and Harry S. Stout (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), chapter 2. 
10 Examples of this strand of interpretation in mid-century, include Miller's seminal text, Jonathan 
Edwards (New York: William. Sloane Assoc., 1949) and Ola Winslow's critical biography, Jonathan 
Edwards 1703-1758 (New York: Collier Books, 1961. ) Both represent revisionist accounts of Edwards 
that held considerable sway in Edwardsian studies mid-century, until the 1960s and the advent of works 
like Conrad Cherry's The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, A Reappraisal (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1966). 
There has been considerable debate about the enduring value of Miller's work on Edwards. He was the 
driving force behind the renaissance of Edwardsian studies in the middle of the twentieth century, but has 
been accused of acting as a kind of Procrustes: fitting Edwards to the bed of philosophical 
presuppositions that he had arranged for him. Thus, Miller speaks of Edwards' work as, 'an irnmense 
cryptogram, the passionate oratory of the revival no less than the hard reasoning of the treatise on the 
will', and, 'his writings are ahnost a hoax, not to be read but to be seen through'. Miller himself thought 
he 'saw through' Edwards' work a critique of burgeoning American society and culture in the mode of 
Lockean and Newtonian thought 'Read as a cypher, as all Edwards' writings must be, it [YEI] is a 
penetrating analysis of modem culture, and specifically of the American variants. ' Jonathan Edwards, pp. 
51 and 263 respectively. Of this whole approach to Edwardsian. studies, Michael McClymond comments, 
'Following Miller's lead much of the recent scholarship on Edwards tends towards a secularizing and 
naturalizing interpretation of his ideas. Thus Edwards's Christian simonizing becomes rhetorical theory, 
while his reflections on the beauty of God translate into general aesthetics, and his typological worldview 
becomes semiotics. To some extent it is perfectly acceptable to interpret Edwards in terms of the currently 
regnant academic disciplines ... viewing 
his writings through different lenses. Decontextualizing and 
detheologizing Edwards's ideas may help in understanding the individual segments of the corpus. Yet 
such a procedure fails conspicuously to yield a sense of the whole. ' Encounters With God, An Approach 
to the Theology ofJonathan Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 4. 
" Examples include Robert Jenson's America's Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); John E. Smith's Jonathan Edwards, Puritan, Preacher, 
Philosopher (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992); John Gerstner's The Rational Biblical Theology of 
Jonathan Edwards (in three volumes); and Stephen Daniel's The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, A 
Study in Divine Semiotics (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
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around the time he matriculated to Yale. " There is little by way of a scholarly consensus, except 
for the conclusion that Edwards clearly was influenced by Locke. The degree of that influence is 
debatable, but evidently considerable to anyone with even a pass, g interest in either Edwards 
or Locke. " There has also been much scholarly ink spilt in trying to discern the sources of 
Edwards' thought, particularly with reference to his supposed debt to Locke's Essay. Much of 
this arose out of the account given of Edwards' first reading of Locke during his collegiate years 
at Yale by his contemporary, Samuel Hopkins: 
In his second year at college, and the thirteenth of his age, he read Locke on the Human Understanding 
with great delight and profit ... Taking that book into his hand upon some occasion, not long before his 
death, he said to some of his select friends, who were then with him, that he was beyond expression 
entertain'd and pleas'd with it when he read it in his youth at College; that he was much engaged, and 
had more satisfaction in studying it, than the most greedy miser in gathering up handsful of silver and 
gold from some new discover'd treasure. 14 
This position has been taken up by Perry Miller, since it suited his perspective of Edwards as a 
misunderstood genius in the empiricist tradition, who missed his calling in taking up theology. 
Miller says, 'the boy of fourteen grasped in a flash. Ahat Locke was the master-spirit of the age' 
and that this was, 'the central and decisive moment in his intellectual life. "' Norman Fiering has 
recently pointed out several other noted Edwardsian scholars that have come to similar, or more 
pronounced opinions on the dependence of Edwards upon Lockean thought. 16 But this has been 
largely overturned in more recent, and one may venture to say more careful, study. Fiering in 
the same article states,, 'it is misleading to categorize Edwards as a Lockean, especially when 
this categorization implies - along the lines of the familiar but questionable dichotomy - that 
12 Wallace Anderson's editorial introduction to YE& Scientific and Philosophical Writings, has been of 
considerable importance in this regard. He has spent time trying to redate the supposedly precocious early 
works of the young Edwards and has plotted his early intellectual development. 
13 'Me discussion on the relationship between Locke and Edwards has been interminable, though it has 
abated in the last twenty years or so. Apart from the editorial introductions to almost every volume on 
Edwards to date which has discussed this relationship, and Miller's work, there is an interesting article by 
Helm on Locke and Edwards, entitled "John Locke and Jonathan Edwards: A Reconsideratioif' in 
Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy 7 (1969): 51-6 1. 
14 From Samuel Hopkins's biographical sketch of Edwards, cited in John Gerstner, The Rational Biblical 
Theology ofJonathan Edwards, Vol. 1, pp. 9-10. This aspect of Edwardsian literature has largely run its 
course since the appearance Wallace Anderson's masterly introduction to YE6. Earlier contributions 
include George Rupp's "The 'Idealism' of Jonathan Edwards", in The Harvard Theological Review 62 
(1969): 209-226; and Claude A- Smith, " Jonathan Edwards and the 'Way of Ideas"' in The Harvard 
Theological Review 59 (1966): 153-173. 
15 Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 52. 
14 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
Edwards is allied with the English empiricists as opposed to the Continental rationalists. "' He 
goes on to show that Edwards was at least as dependent upon continental streams of thought 
which probably predated his reading of Locke, especially if it is assumed that Edwards actually 
read Locke much later than was previously thought (thanks largely to Hopkins), in his days as a 
collegiate tutor at Yale in his early twenties. 18 
These are not idle questions: the scholarly dependence or independence of Edwards' work is a 
moot point precisely because it is only as the sources of his thinking can be (albeit partially) 
reconstructed that we may have a picture of where he was original, and where he appropriated 
the thoughts of others. However, for our purposes, it is enough to note that there is strong 
evidence to suggest that Edwards read and was significantly influenced by Locke's Essay 
during the formative period of his early manhood (probably as a Yale tutor). That is not to 
suggest that Locke's influence was as decisive, or as singular as has sometimes been 
suggested. 19 
Moreover, the immaterial realism that Edwards espoused was almost certainly not derived from 
Berkeley, but was developed independently by Edwards . 
20 Norman Fiering in his book 
Jonathan Edwards'Moral Thought and its British Contex? ' and his subsequent article " The 
Rationalist Foundations of Jonathan Edwards' Metaphysics"22 has argued that Edwards was 
substantially dependent upon Malebranchean ideas filtered through the Dummer collection at 
Yale. This position has also been taken by McCracken in his book Malebranche and British 
16 See Fiering's important article, "The Rationalist Foundations of Jonathan Edwards Metaphysics" in 
Hatch and Stout (eds. ), Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, p. 75. Fiering mentions Morton 
White, Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphy by name in this regard. 
17 Ibid. In his study of Edwards' moral thought, Fiering says that Miller's intellectual biography of 
Edwards is, 'rhetorically brilliant but utterly misleading in content, Miller's Edwards can only be judged 
an unaccountable lapse in the scholarship of one of the greatest of American historians. ' This is 
something which recent work on Edwards has only underlined. Fiering, Jonathan Edwards's Moral 
Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 198 1), p. 3 73. 
'8 This is the considered view of Wallace Anderson in his introduction to YE6. However it has not gone 
unchallenged. Gerstner for one feels that the traditional reading of Edwards' discovery of Locke should 
be reinstated, see Gerstner, The Rational Biblical Theology ofJonathan Edwards, Vol 1, p. 10. 
19 An example of his self-confessed dependence upon the theology of continental Calvinism, which, at 
least in the work of Mastricht, seems to have been seminal, may suffice to drive this point home here: 
'Take Mastricht for divinity in general doctrine Practice and Controversie; or as an universal system of 
divinity; & is much better than Turretine or any other book in the world, excepting the Bible, in my 
o inion' YE8: 743. 
2Y This, according to a recent article by Michael McClymond has been one of the few elements of 
consensus among those scholars charting Edwards's early intellectual influences: 'No consensus has ever 
been reached upon the question of Edwards' 'sources', except the negative conclusion that Edwards 
almost certainly did not read George Berkeley before coming to his own distinctive idealist position. ' 
p. 53 n. 40 of "God The Measure: Towards an Understanding of Jonathan Edwards' Theocentric 
Metaphysics" in The Scottish Journal of Theology 47 (1994): 43-59. 
21 Ficring's work on the sources of Edwards' ideas is the standard text in this area. 
22 In Hatch and Stout (eds. ), Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience. 
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philOSO h 23 P Y, where he details a rationalistic strand in Edwardsian thought leading to Edwards' 
occasionalism. 
Finally, there has been the view that Edwards was an idealist, where idealism is taken in its 
Platonic rather than its subjective, Kantian or Hegelian forms (John Gerstner in a bid to rebut 
Anderson's claim that Edwards is an 'empirical phenomenalist' 24 claims that he is an 'empirical 
noumenalist' instead, which seems all the more anachronistic given Edwards's chronological 
prevenience over Kant). 
What all this amounts to are rather unconvincing attempts at pinning Edwards down to one 
particular philosophical tradition which sits rather awkwardly beside Edwards's avowed 
eclecticism. He was substantially indebted to Lockean empiricism and to immaterial and 
occasionalistic ideas that appear suspiciously similar to those of Berkeley and Malebranche 
respectively, but there need not be a causal connection in either of these latter cases. It seems 
most likely in light of the limited present consensus that Edwards was initially influenced by 
If 26 Malebranchean disciples like Norris2' and perhaps Malebranche himse and was also 
influenced by Henry More and the Cambridge Platonists in his idealism through a similarly 
indirect route. As we approach one of the foundational areas of Edwardsian thought (viz. his 
doctrine of sin) it is important to emphasize that any purported dependence upon one particular 
philosopher or theologian is probably an over-blown attempt at what Gerstner has described, 
somewhat sarcastically, as Motivorschung. 27 Such attempts, whilst important in locating aspects 
of the sources of Edwards' thinking, can, if pushed too far, end up in an unwarranted 
partisanship. This is particularly the case with Edwardsian scholarship. Edwards does not 
appear to be dependent upon any one thinker, nor is he clearly a part of any one philosophical 
school in the eighteenth century. Stephen Daniel comments that, 
of the well-known philosophic minds of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Jonathan Edwards 
(1703-1758) is perhaps one of the most successful in escaping the historiographic impulse to 
categorization. With Edwards, many historians are dealing with an unknown quantity, a philosopher 
23 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
24 See Anderson's editorial introduction to YE6. 
25 This is argued by McCracken in Malebranche and British Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), where he maintains that it is entirely possible that Edwards had access to Norris' works in 
the Dummer collection at Yale. See note 37 p. 330, where Townsend's reference to the possibility of 
Edwards' knowledge of Norris is pointed out. 
26 Fiering also notes that Edwards had read Norris (Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought, p. 43, n. 80. ) But 
he claims that the fact that Edwards had crossed out a reference to the SearchAfter Truth in his catalogue 
of reading, and that the Search was available in the colonies at the time, is an indication (Fiering thinks a 
strong indication) that Edwards read Malebranche himself. Ibid, p. 44. 
27 Gerstner, Rational Biblical Theology, Vol. 1, p. 86. 
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whose atomism, idealism, and doctrines of will and beauty frustrate attempts to force him into the 
empiricist-rationalist continuum that characterizes much of the historiography of modem philosophy. 28 
Douglas Elwood, writing in the 1960's remarks in a similar vein, 
Every study of sources, however, has led to the conclusion that Edwards was not dependent on any one 
author or school of thought and that his originality stands out in every comparison. Perhaps the soundest 
judgement on this matter is expressed by H. W. Schneider when he concludes that further discussion of 
the sources of Edwards' thought now seems superfluous. 29 
Therefore, it is perhaps better to allow Edwards to speak for himself, and to assess him on his 
own terms rather than apply a spurious source-critical approach to his work. In other words, we 
shall assess Edwards' views by analyzing what Edwards actually said, not what he might have 
said, or what one might wish him to have said. Consequently, we shall not attempt to trawl 
through the vast swathes of hermeneutical accretion, but shall attempt to deal with Edwards 
directly. For this reason, mention of the vast secondary literature on Edwards will only be made 
where it is germane to the discussion. 
However, the literature that exists on the philosophy of Edwards is of importance to the present 
thesis, in particular, recent work in the analytic tradition on Edwards' theistic metaphysics. 30 
Although there is nowhere near the same amount of material here as there is in the historical and 
theological literature on Edwards, there is a burgeoning body of work that has been dealing with 
some of the key issues in Edwards' thinking on freedom of the will, ontology, immaterialism, 
28 Stephen Daniel, The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, p. 1. It might be worth pointing out in this 
regard that the traditional eighteenth century philosophical distinction between empiricism on the one 
hand, and rationalism on the other, is falling out of favour in contemporary philosophy. E. J. Lowe writes, 
M-ds terminology has begun to fall into disrepute, for the very good reason that it serves to mask quite as 
many similarities and differences as it serves to highlight. On all sorts of specific issues, it is possible to 
find an 'empiricist' philosopher like Locke agreeing more with a 'rational' philosopher like Descartes 
than he does with another philosopher who is supposedly a fellow empiricist. ' Locke on Human 
Understanding (London: Roudedge, 1995), p. 12. 
29EIwood, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1960), p. 170, n. 5 1. 
30 Interest in Edwards' philosophical thought has also come from those working within the hermeneutical 
tradition of philosophy. Stephen Daniel's study, The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards is a recent 
postinodern approach to Edwards. And the present doyen of Edwardsian scholarship, Sang Lee, has 
written the most substaRtial recent work on Edwards, The Philosophical Theology ofJonathan Edwards, 
Expanded Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. ) He sees Edwards as reconceiving 
theistic metaphysics in terms of a dispositional ontology. His views are discussed in more detail in 
chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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original sin and occasionaliSM. 31 It is to some of these articles and the philosophical theology 
that they articulate that the present work looks, for answers to the philosophical problems raised 
by Edwardsian hamartiology. 
Thus, what follows views Edwards as a philosopher-theologian. The extent to which he owed 
allegiance to theology more than philosophy is, it seems, a fruitless and pointless enquiry, since 
we have already noted that Edwards was a thinker who bucked easy categorization. That his 
interests spanned both disciplines is no longer in serious dispute. Whether he was a theologian 
first and a philosopher second or vice versa is to a certain extent still contentious, but this too is 
of secondary interest to the present work. What matters is that Edwards deployed philosophical 
arguments to theological ends. That is enough to warrant calling him a philosophical theologian. 
32 And on that basis the dissertation proceeds . 
31 A forthcoming volume which does do something to redress the balance in favour of philosophical- 
theological accounts of Edwards' work is Paul Helm and Oliver D. Crisp (eds. ) Jonathan Edwards: 
Philosophical Theologian (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming). 
32 in this respect, I concur with the comments of Paul Helm regarding the elucidation of philosophical 
issues in theology. See his Faith with Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 1. There 
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(2) Edwards on the metaphysics of the fall 
The doctrine of the fall is notoriously troublesome. It was an issue that exercised Edwards, and 
over which he spent some considerable time, trying to solve the problems it raised for his 
theodicy. Yet the traditional doctrine of the fall has not been given the attention in the 
contemporary philosophical literature that other aspects of traditional theodicy like, say, the 
doctrine of hell, have. " Of those contemporary philosophers who have dealt with the fall some, 
like Richard Swinburne,, have sought to reinterpret it in ways that are commensurate with 
current thinking in the natural sciences: 
At some stage in the history of the world, there appeared the first creature with hominoid body who had 
some understanding of the difference between the morally obligatory, the morally permissible (i. e. right), 
and the morally wrong; and an ability freely to choose the morally right. So much is obvious, since on 
modem evolutionary views, as well as on all views held in Christian tradition, once upon a time there 
were no such creatures and now there are some, there must have been a first one. It seems reasonable to 
consider such a creature the first man; and we may follow biblical tradition and call him 'Adam'. (The 
Hebrew word means 'man. 'ý 4 
Others, like Eleonore Stump, have sought to work within the traditional framework provided by 
the doctrine of the fall. She claims that there are three important Christian claims that are 
especially relevant to the problem of evil. niese are: 
(1) Adam fell. 
(2) Natural evil entered the world as a result of Adam's fall. 
(3) After death, depending on their state at the time of their death, either (a) human beings go to 
heaven or (b) they go to hell. 
Of these three propositions she says, 'though [(1)-(3)] are controversial and seem false to many 
he says, 'To my way of thinking the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology are two ways of 
saying the same thing', p. 15. 
33 The literature on this subject is considerable. For representative examples, see Jonathan L. Kvanvig The 
Problem of Hell; Jerry L. Walls Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1992); Marilyn McCord Adams Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999) and Thomas Talbott "The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment" in Faith and 
Philosophy 7 (1990): 19-41. 
34 Responsibility andA tonement, p. 14 1. 
19 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
people, they are not demonstrably false. "' In addition, there are ways of understanding (1)-(3) 
such that they are not incompatible with current views on the theory of evolution, should that 
prove to be a true account of biological development. One such way would be the following: 
(1')(a) at some time in the past as a result of their own choices human beings altered their nature 
for the worse, 
(b) the alteration involved what we perceive and describe as change in the nature of human free 
will, and 
(c) the changed nature of the will was inheritable. 
Stump maintains that, 'Nothing in the theory of evolution entails the falsity of any part of [(I')], 
and [(I')] is compatible with any number of interpretations of [(1)] . 
536 1 take it that the three 
claims of (1)-(3) and those contained in (1) are relatively uncontroversial in the tradition (pace 
Swinburne), and have only become controversial since the Enlightenment. Edwards would 
certainly have taken (1)-(3) and (1) as fundamental to his account of the fall and its 
consequences for humanity. 
In what follows we shall concentrate on this traditional concept of the fall, ignoring the issues 
raised for the doctrine by developments in the natural sciences and cognate disciplines, since I 
am interested in the question of the coherence of the traditional account of the fall, not in its 
commensurability with related subject areas. It might claimed that, in light of work in the 
biological sciences and biblical texts, such an undertaking is naive and implausible. How can 
one discuss the fall without reference to these areas of recent discussion? But this thinking is 
confused. Like Stump, I am not making any claims about either the current theories of human 
development in the biological sciences, or the results of biblical studies with respect to the so- 
called primeval prologue of Genesis 1-3. (Moreover, as I far as I can see nothing in the 
biological sciences entails the falsehood of the argument of this chapter). These problems are 
35 From "The Problem of Evil" in Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 398-399.1 have renumbered the 
propositions, originally part of a longer argument But the emphases in the citation are original to the 
author. 
36 "The Problem of Evil", p. 403. In light of several criticisms raised by Michael P. Smith in "What's So 
Good about Feeling Bad? " in Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 424-429, Stump makes the following 
clarifications of her position on the fall: 'Smith also raises a worry over my interpretation of the Fall, 
claiming that it implausibly takes the Fall to be a single datable event and that it espouses a Lamarckian 
view of genetics. But a careM reading of my interpretation, spelled out as [(I'a), (I'b) and (Vc)], will 
show that does not entail anything regarding the dating of the events which resulted in the Fall except that 
they are in the past The claim that the fall was brought about by a single datable event is compatible with 
[(I')]; but so it the claim that the fall was the product of many human actions taking place over a very 
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distinct from what I take to be the traditional theological problem, namely, how could the first 
human (whoever that was) possessed of a complete, unfallen moral nature, have chosen evil 
over the good, leading to the consequences of the fall (as traditionally understood)? It seems to 
me that if this traditional conundrum cannot be solved, then whatever the deliverances of 
biology and biblical studies, the traditional doctrine of the fall is deeply implausible, even 
incoherent. Thus, it is worth assessing the coherence of this traditional version of the problem of 
the fall, since without a resolution to this aspect of theodicy, other parts of a traditional doctrine 
of sin appear to be in jeopardy. 37 
Moreover, following Scott MacDonald, we shall distinguish between primal sin and original 
sin. Primal sin is that first sin, by which evil entered the created order. " MacDonald, following 
Augustine, takes the paradigm case of this first sin from a putative angelic fall. But the human 
fall is also an instance of primal sin. Thus, human primal sin pertains to the free choice of a 
rational human creature prior to the fall that gave rise to the first instance of human sin, whereas 
original sin pertains to the fallen state of humanity in its bondage to sin subsequent to the 
moment of primal sin (as traditionally understood). Edwards' focus is on human primal sin, and 
its consequences in original sin and imputation. He has much less to say about the angelic fall, 
(unlike Augustine). " Nor, like Augustine and MacDonald, does he appear to have taken the 
angelic fall as his paradigm case of primal sin. 40 Therefore, it is human primal sin that is the 
37 It is also worth pointing out that I am not alone in such an enterprise. Peter van Inwagen, in his essay 
"Genesis and Evolution" in God, Knowledge and Mystery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), sets 
out to show that the Genesis account should be taken as a story of human development, not as a scientific 
account of that development. It's use is principally theological, which may explain why it is a story, not 
an abstract account of the development of the creation and humanity (and, says van Inwagen, an abstract 
account of such things may have little pedagogical value anyway, since most humans lack the education 
and intellectual equipment to grasp the detail of such an abstract account (ibid., pp. 139-140)). 
38 See "Primal Sin" in The Augustinian Tradition. MacDonald defines primal sin as, 'a corruption of 
rational nature that gives evil it's first foothold in God's creation', p. 115. 
39 See, for example, Miscellanies 320 and 438 in YE13, and 664b Sections 6-9 in YE18. Edwards' main 
contention seems to have been that those angels that rebelled, did so because they thought that the 
prospect of Christ taking on human nature, would mean that they would have to worship him as both 
human and divine, and this was beneath them: 'God declared his decree to the angels that one of that 
human nature should be his eternal Son, his best beloved, his greatest favourite, and should be united to 
his eternal Son, and that he should be their head and king; that they should be given to him and should 
worship him and be his servants, attendants and ministers ... 
Satan 
... 
being the archangel, one of the 
highest of the angels, could not bear it, thought it below him and a great debasing of him; so he conceived 
rebellion against the Almighty, and drew away a vast company of the heavenly hosts with him. ' 
Miscellany 320 in YE13: 401402. 
40 MacDonald writes, 'unlike primal angelic sin, primal human sin is preceded (by angelic sin), and 
prompted (by angelic malevolence. )' "Primal Sin", p. 114. However, as MacDonald later admits, 
Augustine does not believe that the serpent's temptings brought about the first human sin, but that they 
were the occasion for an already corrupted human will to present itself in overt action. See "Primal Sin ", 
n. 8 on p. 135. Cf. Augustine in City of God, (trans. ) Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 
XIV: 13, 'We can see then that the Devil would not have entrapped man by the obvious and open sin of 
doing what God had forbidden, had not man already started to please himself, p. 573. 
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subject of this chapter. We shall leave the question of an angelic primal sin to one side. The 
question of original sin will be taken up in succeeding chapters. 
(2: 1) The paradox of Eden 
Richard La Croix has suggested that there is a central paradox in the Genesis account of the fall 
of Adam and Eve that yields a particularly thorny problem for divine justice . 
4' This paradox can 
be put in the following way. God creates Adam and Eve (hereinafter AE) and commands them 
not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2: 17). But this means that 
before they ate of the tree of knowledge of good and evil either, 
(a) AE knew obeying God was good and disobedience was evil, or 
(b) AE did not know this (because, say, they were in a state of moral innocence). 
I. T- 
Here is the difficulty: If (a), then AE already knew the difference between good and evil and 
God knew AE would not likely eat the fruit of the tree because they had nothing to gain by 
doing so, since they already knew the difference between good and evil. But if this is the case, 
then God's command not to eat of the tree is inadequate and unfkir, because AE already 
possessed the knowledge the fruit of the tree promised, and God would have known, via his 
omniscience, that AE were unlikely to be tempted by it. It therefore appears that, on (a) Adam 
and Eve have little or no motivation to commit the first sin, and (according to La Croix) God 
behaves unjustly in setting AE a test of their righteousness that is inadequate, since they already 
possess the knowledge the fruit promises them. 42 
Alternatively, if (b), then AE could not have known it was wrong to eat of the tree, since they 
were in a state or moral innocence, knowing neither good nor evil, and therefore not knowing 
that obedience to God was either good or evil. So, God acts unjustly in punishing AE for a 
crime that they could not have known to be a crime prior to eating of the tree. 
It is not clear which party or parties La Croix has in mind when he says that (a) is unjust of God. 
It is not clearly unjust to AE, since they are being given an advantage, rather than disadvantage, 
in understanding that the fruit of the tree is forbidden, and having little or no motivation to sin 
as a result. (This leaves open the question of why they did sin if this was the case, but let us 
41 In "The Paradox of Edeif', International Journal ofPhilosophy ofReligion 15 (1984): 17 1. 
42 La Croix does not stipulate what he means by 'unjust' in this context (unjust to whom? ). Presumably he 
means this is unjust in the same way that it would be unjust to set an exam for a student where they had 
already been given the exam paper beforehand. If AE already possessed the knowledge the fruit 
promised, there was no test involved in presenting them with the fruit in the first place. 
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leave that to one side. ) Nor is it clear how God's action in this regard would be unjust for God 
himself However, it might be unworthy of a perfect being to act in this way, and to set a test the 
answers to which were known in advance by those being tested. 
La Croix thinks his version of the paradox of Eden means that whether AE knew that obey' g 
God is good and disobedience evil or not, God acts unjustly. But then, God is just at one time 
and unjust at another. La Croix draws the consequence: justice is not a necessary or essential 
property of God. However, since it is not clear what he means by construing (a) as unjust, I 
propose to adapt La Croix's version of the paradox for the following version: whether AE knew 
that obeying God is good and disobedience evil or not, God acts in a manner unworthy of a 
perfect being. This may be a weaker version of the paradox, but it avoids the problems of La 
Croix's version, whilst retaining the core problem for a concept of God. 
I want to suggest that Edwards' account of the fall offers a potential solution to this version of 
the paradox, via an understanding of the fall as an instance of self-deception. In a nutshell, 
Edwards maintains that AE fell because they deceived themselves into thinking that eating of 
the fruit was in their own best interests, when it was not. Having provided an Edwardsian 
solution to the paradox of Eden, we shall examine whether this solution is coherent. In keeping 
with one recent commentator (John Kearney), and contrary to the weight of previous scholarly 
opinion, Edwards' account is, I shall argue, internally coherent. But I shall show that, though 
Kearney is right in this (and therefore Edwards' account does work on its own terms as a 
solution to the paradox of Eden), it is not externally consistent. Tliat is, it is not consistent with 
other aspects of Edwards' metaphysics. 
(2: 2) Edwards' account of the fall 
Edwards' articulation of the doctrine of the fall depends upon several related metaphysical 
commitments. The first involves what he believes moral agency consists in, and the second, 
following on from this, deals with what he understands by original righteousness. The substance 
of Edwards' account of how Adam sinned develops out of a distinction between sufficient and 
confirming grace. This leads into the question of how Adam's will was perverted. We shall look 
at each of these aspects to the problem in turn. 
Before this, however, a word about what Edwards thought were the criteria of success for his 
account of the fall. He believed that the doctrine of original sin rested on two key issues: the 
inn-ate depravity of man and the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. 43 Regarding the 
43 See YE3: 107. 
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former, Edwards believed that depravity was the moral condition of humanity post-fall, which 
was, 'to be looked upon as the true tendency of the natural or innate disposition of man's heart, 
which appears to be its tendency when we consider things as they are in themselves, or in their 
own nature, without the interposition of divine grace. '44Regarding the latter, he thought he 
needed to show that the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity was not unfair, nor did it run 
counter to the way things actually are. (We shall examine this aspect of his argument in later 
chapters. ) But with respect to the doctrine of the fall as an aspect of original sin, Edwards 
believed the two key problems were to demonstrate that Adam was culpable for the first sin, and 
to establish that God was not liable for Adam's sin or sin subsequent to Adam's initial, sinful 
action. It is the first of these two points that is at issue here. (The second will be dealt with in 
chapter 3. ) If Edwards is able to give an account of the fall that makes Adam's culpability 
plausible, he has gone a considerable way to ameliorating some of the most significant 
theological problems pertaining to the coherence of the fall. 
(2: 2: i) Moral agency. 
First, to moral agency. Edwards developed this notion in his treatise, Freedom of the Will 
(hereinafter FOW), to the effect that moral acts are acts that are caused by a person's 
dispositions and desires, over and against the libertarian view of the Arminians, that moral acts 
are uncaused, or contra-causal acts. 4' However, the virtue or vice of a person's dispositions or 
acts of will do not, according to Edwards, lie in the cause of those dispositions or actions, but in 
their nature,, 
Thus for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise, according to common sense; not because 
something as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the cause that produced it; but because it is hateful in 
itself, by its own inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable, and worthy of praise, not merely 
because something else went before this love of virtue in our minds, which caused it to take place 
there ... but 
because of the arniableness and condecency of such a disposition and inclination of the heart. 
46 
Axiomatic to this aspect of Edwards' compatibility thesis is the notion that moral actions are 
actions that have a cause, Actions which are said to be contra-causal are not thereby more moral 
(because, say, they are 'free' in accordance with liberty of indifference), but are actually non- 
44 YE3: 109, author's emphasis. 
45 Edwards defines a moral agent as, 'a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, 
and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable 
or faulty. ' YEI: 165. 
46 YEJ: 340. 
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moral, because they have no cause. (In fact, Edwards goes beyond this to show, time and again, 
that the contra-causal account of moral agency and volition taken up by the 'Arminians' ends up 
in contradiction or absurdity): 
That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a 
necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is 
evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever, is excited by some motive: which is manifest 
because, if the will or mind, in willing and choosing after the manner that it does, is excited so to do by no 
motive or inducement then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it aims at 
nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing then it don't go after anything, or exert any 
inclination or preference towards anything. Which brings the matter to a contradiction; because for the 
mind to will something, and for it to go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the 
same thing. 47 
Edwards was convinced that moral agency consists in both a moral faculty, such that a person 
can distinguish right courses of action from wrong ones, and a capacity to reason whereby the 
agent is subject to the influence of moral inducements (such as exhortations to do a particular 
thing, or warnings to refrain from so doing): 
To moral agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or 
worthiness or praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being 
influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and 
reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty. 48 
So it is the agent, not the will, which is free to choose one course of action over another. And 
only an agent who has a moral faculty can be described as making 'free' choices, according to 
Edwards. 
47 YEJ: 225. Here is not the place to pursue what Edwards means here by 'necessary connection of 
consequence'. All that we need for the present argument is the Edwardsian notion that God is the cause of 
all volitions, such that volition x must take place if God has ordained it take place. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, Edwards also believes that all volitions are necessary, because God has ordained them all. It 
is perhaps in this way that necessity of connection should be understood. 
48 YEJ: 165. Edwards believed that this moral agency was what made up the natural endowment of the 
imago dei. The spiritual endowment of moral excellency was lost at the fall. Tbat, according to Edwards, 
is the means by which the natural endowment was exercised effectively according to divine order. After 
the falL the spiritual endowment was lost, or corrupted. Compare what he says in YE2: 256, 'As there are 
two kinds of attributes in God [his moral attributes and his natural attributes of strength] ... so there 
is a 
twofold image of God in man, his moral and spiritual image, which is his holiness, that is the image of 
God's moral excellency (which image was lost by the fall) and God's natural image, consisting in man's 
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Whether this aspect of his compatibility thesis is convincing or not, what is important with 
respect to his doctrine of the fall is that Edwards believed that the actions of moral agents are 
caused by desires and motives,, the very nature of which ensure that the actions they give rise to 
are praise or blameworthy. We may take these notions about moral agency and virtuous action, 
and apply them to Edwards' discussion of original righteousness in his treatise Original Sin 
(OS), as a prerequisite to his doctrine of the fall proper. 
(2: 2: ii) O? Iginal Righteousness. 
In OS II. - T I, Edwards sets out what he means by original righteousness against his opponent, 
Dr. John Taylor. Taylor's criticism of this doctrine appears to have been that it is inconsistent 
with the nature of virtue that it be concreated with a person. For an act to be virtuous, a person 
must desire or choose it over other, less virtuous or vicious alternatives. Edwards takes this to 
mean that, 'its being essential to all virtue that it should follow choice and proceed from it'. 49 
nat is, virtue does not consist in a concreated. disposition that gives rise to acts of a virtuous 
nature. Instead, it consists in the (presumably contra-causal) choice of virtue over vice when a 
person is presented with such alternatives. Edwards qua theological determinist wants to say 
that virtue is concreated with Adam, and that this concreation constitutes the endowment of 
original righteousness, 'the creation of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions'. 50 
'Ile problem with this account of original righteousness according to libertarians like Taylor, is 
that if virtue is concreated, then virtuous choices are not about making a 'free' decision that is 
morally virtuous or vicious. Rather, they are about acting in accordance with one's given moral 
nature or acting against that nature. The general principle Edwards draws out from this is: 
Not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the 
principles whence they proceed. 51 
So, an act is virtuous only insofar as it proceeds from good principles and a virtuous disposition. 
Virtue is not to be had in the acts a person perfonns, but in the dispositions that give rise to 
those acts, as Edwards maintained with respect to moral agency: 'a virtuous temper of mind 
reasoning and understanding, his natural ability, and dominion over the creatures which is the image of 
God's natural attribute. ' 
49 YE3: 225. In fact, according to Edwards, Taylor 'most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection and 
choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. 
This', Edwards observes, 'brings his scheme to an evident contradiction. ' YE3: 226. 
50 YE3: 223. 
26, 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the 
stream which proceeds from it. "' 
With these notions of moral agency and original righteousness in mind, we may consider the 
substantive issue in Edwards' articulation of the fall. 
(2: 2: iii: a) Sufficient and confirming grace in OS 
Edwards actually offers two accounts of the fall in his corpus. In OS JV H, Edwards sets out the 
first of these, in the context of his discussion of the authorship of sin problem. He offers a 
second account in his Miscellanies, to which we shall come presently. In the OS version, 
Edwards begins by arguing that the corruption of Adam's human nature does not require the 
infusion of some 'positive influence'. 53 Rather, it involves the withholding of that special divine 
influence which enables Adam to continue in original righteousness, such that Adam gives 
himself over to his natural appetites, leading to the corruption of his moral nature. Since this 
I foundation of his doctrine is so crucial to what followsl I cite it in full: 
I think, a little attention to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial considerate 
inquirer, that the absence of positive good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine influence 
to impart and maintain those good principles, leaving the common natural principles of self-love, natural 
appetite, etc. (which were in man in innocence) leaving these, I say, to themselves, without the 
government of superior divine principles, will certainly be followed with corruption, yea, the total 
corruption of the heart, without occasion for any positive influence at all: and that it was thus indeed that 
corruption of nature came on Adam, in-unediately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity, as sinning in 
54 him and falling with him. 
By way of explaining how this state of affairs came about, Edwards distinguishes between two 
kinds of principles, inferior or natural principles, and superior or supernatural principles. 
Inferior principles are the natural principles of human nature, including such things as self-love, 
natural appetites and passions, 'which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own 
liberty, honor and pleasure, were exercised'. 55 Superior principles are concreated supernatural 
51 YE3: 224. Edwards' view is in sharp contrast to that of Aristotle in this respect. Aristotle's virtue theory 
as traditionally understood, claims that actions develop character. A person becomes good by doing good. 
See The Ethics ofAristotle (trans. ) I A. K Thomson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), 1: 1, p. 25ff. 
52 YE3: 224. 
53 'he [Taylor] supposes the doctrine of original sin to imply, that nature must be corrupted by some 
positive influence ... 
Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing. ' YE3: 380, 
author's emphasis. 
54 YE3: 381. 
55 YE3: 381. 
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endowments of God, contained in the 'divine nature', meaning, 'the spiritual image of God, and 
56 
man s righteousness and true holiness' . 
Edwards seems to envisage a situation in which Adam was created with both inferior and 
superior principles, with the superior principles ordering and controlling the inferior principles 
of human nature. Thus, Adam was possessed of a desire in the state of original righteousness, to 
love and serve God, and to order his human nature in such a way as to serve this end rather than 
other., lesser, meaner or more base ends, such as that of self-love. But when Adam sinned, this 
concreated ordering of human nature by superior, and divinely constituted principles was 
overturned: 'When man sinned, and broke God's Covenant, and fell under his curse, these 
superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him. ' 57 The immediate result was that 
the inferior principles of human nature became the ruling principles of Adam's human nature, 
and instead of a God-ward orientation in all his actions (as per the superior principles), Adam 
set up the 'objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme'. 58 
I So. the depraved disposition of the human heart arises, according to Edwards, from a privation 
of certain supernatural principles, not from the infusion of an evil principle. This same privative 
state obtains in Adam's posterity. The superior principles withdrawn from Adam at the point of 
primal sin are also withheld from the rest of humanity, so that they are all born enslaved to the 
natural principles of human nature. Adam is, after all, homo primus, the head of the human race. 
God deals with his posterity as he has dealt with Adam: 
And as Adam's nature became corrupt, without God's implanting or infusing any evil thing into his 
nature; so does the nature of his posterity. God dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity (as has 
been shewn) and treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having all sinned in him. And 
therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion and his vital gracious influence from the common head, 
so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they come into the 
world ... entirely under the government of natural and 
inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt, 
as Adam did. 59 
This connection between Adam and his posterity over their sinful state post lapsus is established 
not only via a representational view of imputation, but also to the notion of an, 'established 
course of nature'. This comes to pass, 
56 YE3: 381. 
57 YE3: 382. 
58 YE3: 382. 
59 YE3: 383. 
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As much by the established course of nature, as the continuance of a corrupt disposition in a particular 
person, after he once has it; or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt. After he had once lost 
his holiness. For Adam's posterity are from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according 
to an established course of nature, as much as the branches of a tree are, according to a course of nature, 
from the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree; or... "just as the acorn is derivedfirom the oak. " 60 
Edwards means that God has established that the effects of Adam's primal sin be applied in the 
natures of all his descendents according to a divinely ordered state of affairs. He does not mean 
by this that God ordains a course of nature to take effect from the point of Adam's first sin, as if 
this course of nature were some law or principle that obtains independently of his will once 
instituted. Nor does he mean that this course of nature is like a physical law, which describes a 
physical constant of the universe, such as, say, the laws of thermodynamics. Instead, he means 
that God institutes this course of nature as the occasion of his acting in a particular way towards 
I that hunk of matter that constitutes Adam and his posterity: 'Where the name "nature" is 
allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method and order of events, 
settled and limited by divine wisdom. 61 
At this point a question arises: why is it that if a lack of original righteousness is transmitted to 
Adam's posterity in this manner, principles of holiness are not likewise transmitted? For 
instance, if Gary becomes a Christian, then why is it that the principles of holiness that are 
imputed, or infused into Gary at the moment of his conversion are not carried over to his 
children by an 'established course of nature'? Edwards' reply is simply that that is the way God 
orders things according to his will and wisdom. Indeed, 'Grace is introduced among the race of 
mankind by a new establishment; not on the foot of the original establishment of God, as the 
Head of the natural world, and Author of the first creation; but by a constitution of a vastly 
higher kind; wherein Christ is made the root of the tree, whose branches are his spiritual seed 
and he is the head of the new creation'. 62 There is a similar federal argument applied to the 
related question of why Adam's first transgression alone was imputed to his posterity. Edwards' 
response to this is that it was a condition of the covenant of works that the first transgression of 
the covenant would be the reason for judgement, not subsequent transgressions thereafter: 'But 
of the tree x)f the knowledge of good and evil you shall not cat, for in the day that you eat of it 
you shall surely die. ' (Genesis 2: 17. )6' 
60 YE3: 385. 
61 YE3: 3 86. 
62 YE3: 386, author's emphasis. For more on the imputation of Christ's righteousness, see Appendix A. 
63 'So that the very establishment, or covenant itself, as God revealed and stated it, implied that the first, 
overt, explicit violation should be the abolishing of the covenant as to future proceedings, because that 
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More will be said about this topic in later chapters (including the forensic aspects of this 
arrangement). For now, all we need is the notion that the federal nature of imputed sin does not 
appear to be transmitted as simply a corrupt disposition in all Adam's posterity. Rather, it Is 
transmitted as a divinely established principle, whereby the withholding of superior and 
supernatural properties present in Adam before the primal sin were withdrawn after it, and 
continue to be withheld from all his posterity at all times subsequent to his primal sin. 
(2: 2: iii: b) Sufficient and confirming grace in the Miscellanies. 
Edwards' explanation of how Adam fell in OS is developed and augmented in important 
respects by his discussion of the subject in his Miscellanies. The first significant entry on this 
topic is Miscellany 290. Here a quite different account is given of how Adam sinned. Instead of 
a distinction between the withholding of superior principles, and resulting reign of inferior 
principles post fall, Edwards explains that Adam sinned because God did not give him a deposit 
I of confirming grace, to enable him to withstand the temptation of the serpent. 
If it be inquired how man came to siin, seeing he had no sinful inclinations in hirn, except God took away 
his grace from him that he had been wont to give him and so let him fall, I answer, there was no need of 
that; there was no need of taking away any that had been give him, but he sinned under that temptation 
because God did not give him more. 
Moreover, 
He did not take away that grace from him while he was perfectly innocent, which grace was his original 
righteousness; but he only withheld his confirming grace, that grace which is given now in heaven, such 
grace as shall fit the soul to surmount every temptation. 64 
Here, Edwards says Adam was created in original righteousness. This state did not include a 
deposit of confirming grace. Confirming grace is that grace which enables its possessor to 
withstand any and all temptations, corresponding (one presumes) to the scholastic category of 
non posse peccare (not able to sin). Adam was not in possession of this species of grace in his 
state of original righteousness. Instead he possessed the species posse non peccare (able not to 
sin). So, the withholding of confirming grace (what we might call non posse peccare grace), 
does not mean Adam was in the extremely weak moral state of non posse non peccare (not able 
was in the establishment, that on the first violation God would immediately proceed to judgment. ' From 
Miscellany 717, in YE18: 349. 
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not to sin). Rather, he was in a moderately weak state of posse non peccare. In such a state, 
Adam could withstand temptation to sin (it was possible for him to do so; he was able to do so 
(posse peccare)). But, as a matter of fact, he did not withstand temptation; he sinned. This view 
is confirmed by what Edwards' goes on to say in Miscellany 290: 'This was the grace [non posse 
peccare? ] Adam was to have had if he had stood, when he came to receive his reward. '6'Adam 
could only have stood if it was possible for him to have stood, to be able to have received 
confirming grace. So, Edwards understanding of these matters depends upon issues that pertain 
to his discussion of free will. The question of how Adam sinned depends upon a prior problem: 
in what sense was Adam free ftom sin pre-fall? 
Clarification comes from two further miscellaneous entries. First, Miscellany 291: 
Man has not so much freedom now as he had before the fall, in this respect: now he has a will against a 
will, an inclination contrary to his reason and judgment, which begets a contrary inclination; and this later 
I inclination is often overcome and suppressed by the former. But before the fall, the inclination that arose 
from reason and judgment never was held down by the inferior inclination; so that in that sense he was 
more free, or, as they speak, had more freedom of will. 66 
In this Miscellany, Edwards suggests that man pre-fall was more free than he is now, because he 
was able to make moral choices where reason and judgment were paramount, and subordinated 
the desires of the 'inferior principles'. So, pre-fall, Adam's moral nature was orderly and 
coherent, whereas post-fall it has been vitiated and is therefore disordered. The rational 
67 judgment no longer holds sway in moral choices . 
Then, there is Miscellan 436: y 
And this must be what is meant when we say, that God gave our first parents sufficient grace, though he 
withheld an efficacious grace, or a grace that would certainly uphold him in all temptations he could meet 
with. I say, this must be meant by his having sufficient grace, viz. that he had grace sufficient to render 
him a free agent, not only with respect to [his] whole will, but with respect to his rational, or the will that 
arose from a rational judgement of what was indeed best for himself . 
68 
64 YE13: 382. 
65 YF-13: 382. 
66 YE13: 383. 
67 We shaff see in due course how this compares to Edwards' thinking on the same issues in FO TV. 
68 YE13: 485. 
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Edwards defines the rational will as a 'will arising merely from the rational judgment of what is 
best for him' 
. 
69There is also another aspect to inclination, namely the 'appetite'. This arises, 
'from the liveliness and intenseness of the idea, or sensibleness of the good of the object 
presented to the mind ... which is against the other, rational, will, and 
in fallen man in his natural 
state overcomes it, and keeps it in subjection. '70 He suggests that although both the appetite and 
rational will are two components in the whole will (that is, the inferior principles of the will, not 
the superior, supernatural principles), yet the rational will is not free, but is the 'servant of sin. ' 
It is this vitiation of the rational judgment that is absent from moral choice pre-fall. What took 
place at the fall was a deception of this rational will, so that Adam was deceived into thinking 
that something was best for himself which was not the best, but rebellion against God. This 
point is amplified in Miscellany 43 7: 
The case must be thus, therefore, with our first parents, when tempted: their sense of their duty to God 
and their love to it must be above their inferior appetite, so that that inferior appetite of itself was not 
sufficient to master the holy principle; yet the rational will, being perverted by a deceived judgment and 
setting in with the inferior appetite, overcame and overthrew the gracious inclination. 71 
But all this merely reiterates the question about Adamic deception: how was Adam deceived in 
the first place? If he was concreated with sufficient grace (sufficient to withstand sin), with his 
rational judgment intact and in control of his appetites, then how was he deceived? 
Unfortunately, in this instance, greater reflection on these issues does not yield greater 
perspicacity of insight on Edwards' part. So, for instance, in Miscellany 501, he says, 
Adam had a sufficient assistance of God always present with him, to have enabled him to have obeyed, if 
he had used his natural abilities in endeavoring it; though the assistance was not such as it would have 
. 00 
been after his'confkmation, to render it impossible for him to sin. Man might be deceived, so that he 
should not be disposed to use his endeavors to persevere; but if he did use his endeavors, there was a 
sufficient assistance always with him to enable him to persevere. 72 
So we seem to have the following picture from the Miscellanies. Adam is concreated with a 
deposit of sufficient grace, which enables him to act without sinning (posse non peccare), in 
accordance with an ordered moral nature where his rational judgment orders his natural 
69 YE13: 484. 
70 YE13: 484. 
71 YE13: 486. 
72 YE18: 5 1. 
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appetites. Adam's primal sin occurred because he was somehow deceived. Perhaps this 
deception occurred because he was led to believe that that he did not need to use this sufficient 
grace, and could trust to his own appetites. Edwards is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, Adam 
was somehow deceived and the result was a disordering of human capacities, so that the 
appetites took over the ordering of Adam's moral nature from his rational judgment. 
But, all this amounts to is a description of a model of Adam's state prior to the fall, and his state 
post-fall. It offers no real explanation of how he was deceived into sinning, nor does it explain 
how his moral nature was vitiated in this way. So, the central question raised by the fall remains 
unanswered in the Miscellanies. 
What is more, the account Edwards gives in the Miscellanies differs in important respects from 
the account we have seen him lay out in OS. In OS Adam is concreated with both inferior and 
superior principles. The inferior principles correspond to Adam's natural appetites, the superior 
principles to his true holiness and the presence of the Holy Spirit. But on sinning, the superior 
prmciples are withheld. In the Miscellanies, the emphasis is on the inferior principles. It is 
because Adam allowed his natural appetites to take precedence over his rational will, that he 
succumbs to temptation and sin. 
Edwards does not seem to reconcile the differences between these accounts anywhere in his 
corpus. However, I suggest the following reconstruction. Adam's inferior principles incorporate 
both his natural appetites and his rational judgment. In addition to these two aspects to the 
nature of Adam, there is the supernatural deposit of God's presence, enabling him to live and act 
in a consistently holy matmer. Taken together, these constitute a sufficient grace. This is a grace 
sufficient to withstand temptation, (posse non peccare). Had Adam withstood temptation (the 
particular temptation of the serpent? ), he would have been given, in addition to this initial 
deposit of sufficient grace, a confirming grace, whereby he would have been elevated to a non 
posse peccare state. This would have confirmed the presence of the superior principles in his 
moral nature, and somehow prevented the possibility of Adam ever sinning from that moment 
onwards. However, he is deceived, and sins. At this point, the superior/supernatural principles 
that made up part of Adam's pre-fallen nature (that is, were properties essential to his posse non 
peccare state), are withdrawn. Adam and his posterity are thereafter in a non posse non peccare 
state, since God's superior grace has been withdrawn from them. 
However, this reconciliation of Edwards' two accounts still does not answer the central question 
of how Adam was deceived into sinning. If anything, this version of Edwards' position makes it 
even harder to see how such a deception could have taken place. For if as part of his moral 
condition pre-fall, Adam was supplied with superior principles to enable him to live in a way 
pleasing to God, then how could he have been deceived? 
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At this point, further clarification of Edwards' views in an excursus on three key concepts in his 
account of free will may help understand how Adam could be deceived. The three areas are will 
and preference; will and desire; and the determination of the will. These three concepts occur in 
his initial discussion and definition of terms at the beginning of FOW, where he lays out his 
own position over and against that of Locke. Edwards' concern to delineate his own position on 
these aspects of the will in FOW, have considerable bearing upon our question about how Adam 
sinned. For if he was deceived into sinning, then he must have preferred, (or part of him must 
have preferred) desired and been determined to act in this way, rather than in accordance with 
those superior principles and rational will that governed his moral nature pre-fall. 
(2: 2: iv) Excursus: the preference, desire and determination ofthe will. 
Before plunging into the excursus, a word about Edwards' use of Locke in FOW. The opening 
sections of FO W deal with the explanation of the terms Edwards goes on to use in the rest of the 
I treatise. In much of what he has to say there, he is setting out his own position against that of 
Locke 'On Power', whose work acted as a foil to Edwards' own thinking on the question of free 
will (and was a state-of-the-art text at the time Edwards was writing). Throughout his discussion 
of these issues, Edwards is concerned to show that, contrary to Locke's mature views, will and 
preference and will and desire mean the same thing. 73 Hence, in what follows, I shall contrast 
what Edwards has to say on the matters of preference, desire and determination of the will with 
that of Locke, as Edwards himself does. 
First, to will and preference. As far as Edwards was concerned, 'the will (without any 
metaphysical refining) is plainly, that by which the mind chooses anything. '74Yet Locke in his 
Essay defines the will as preferring or choosing where preference can be taken to mean a desire 
to do something that may actually be outside the agent's volitional capacity, such as a 
preference for flying rather than walking. 7' For Edwards, such a distinction between choice and 
preference was erroneous because what the mind communicates to the body necessarily follows. 
So although a man may vaguely wish to fly, he cannot choose to do so, nor can he prefer to do 
so if preference is concomitant to choice because it is physically impossible. 76 Thus, a person 
may choose only those actions that they are capable of performing. (I may wish to do 
impossible things, but I cannot choose to do them, since they are beyond my powers to do, like 
73 See Ramsey's comment to this effect in his introduction to YEI: 5 1. 
74 yEj: 137. 
75 See An Essay concerning Human Understanding, (ed. ) Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: University Press, 
1975), Bk. II; chapter YM; sect. 17. 
76 yEl: 138. 
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flying. ) Preference for one over another potential action is, in this regard, preference for one or 
other action that a person is able to perform. 
Let us apply this to Edwards' account of Adam's primal sin. According to Edwards in FOW, 
what a person chooses is what he prefers. So what Adam chooses, is what he prefers. And what 
he prefers falls within his volitional capacities, laying aside fancies that a person may have 
about how good it would be to be able to fly, if an intrinsic property of humanity was being 
immune from the law of gravity, or having wings, or whatever. So Adam prefers one action to 
another,, and chooses on that basis to do that action. From this it is clear that, in a particular 
volition, he chooses on the basis of preference. And in the instance of primal sin, he prefers sin 
to obedience. But this raises a ftirther problem for Edwards' account of the fall: how could 
Adam prefer sin, when his desire, according to Edwards, was for God supremely in all his 
choices in his pre-fallen state? 
We turn to Edwards' second distinction between will and desire for an answer to this problem. 
I Locke asserted that the will of a person might be contrary to their desires. A person could will to 
choose that which he did not desire, because it was expedient in a particular state of affiirs: 
The will is perfectly distinguished Erom desire, which in the very same action may have a quite contrary 
tendency from that which our wills sets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use 
persuasions to another, which at the same time I am speaking, I may wish not to prevail on him. In this 
9 case , tis clear the will and 
desire run counter. I will the action, that tends one way, whilst my desire tends 
another, and that the direct contrary. 77 
So a person B could desire that his words do not persuade a second person C, though he phrases 
his speech in such a way that he will persuade C, because he is obliged to do so on the basis of a 
previous obligation to a third person, A, who wishes C to be persuaded by B. But for Edwards, 
this is not possible, since, contrary to Locke, will and desire are a single unit. According to 
Edwards, to desire a thing is to want it, and to want it provides the motivation requisite to will 
78 that thing in volition. To will is to desire, since without a preference for one choice above 
another there can be only equilibrium, and therefore, no volition. In fact, Edwards maintains that 
will and preference are, for all practical purposes, the sarne as will and desire. 
79Yet in this 
discussion of the unity of will, desire and preference Edwards says nothing about the problems 
associated with competing desires, or the relative strength of different desires, or how the mind 
Essa 1L XXI: 30, p. 250. y 
18 YEJ: 13 9. 
79 YEI: 139, Cf. Editor's Introduction, pp. 51-52: 'Edwards argues that on closer inspection it will be 
found that (1) "will" and "prefer" and (2) "will" and "desire" mean the same thing. ' 
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decides upon one desire over another in a particular instance. His concern is rather to see off 
Locke's notion that will and desire may run counter to one another by affirming the unity of 
will, preference and desire. When he moves on to discuss the motivation of the will (in FOW 1: 
2), he allows that there are motives of various strengths, some of which are weaker than others. 
Moreover,, volition depends upon the strongest motive, which results in choice. But his 
emphasis on the unity of the will and preference/desire means he does not deal with the question 
of competing desires in anything like enough detail, which, as Paul Ramsey points out, 'reveals 
in him, a too extreme conception of the unity of human powers or a too monolithic view of the 
motivations to action. "0 It also leaves his own position looking rather mechanistic and wooden. 
The net result of this with respect to Edwards' attack on Locke's view of will and preference, is 
that Edwards is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, he wishes to maintain that will and 
desire are a unit in volition (contra Locke). But on the other hand, he must contend with 
Locke's belief that there can be circumstances in which I might take a choice contrary to my 
desires. We can represent this as follows: 
(1) will and desire are united in volition. 
(2) There may be instances where one is faced with a conflict of interest between desire and 
will in volition. 
This appears to set up a primafacie contradiction, for it seems to involve being able to will what 
one does not will and desire what one does not desire. We shall designate this a second order 
conflict, since it is not that the will and desire in a particular volition are contrary, but that the 
agent is willing what they do not will or desiring what they do not desire. " This can be 
expressed in the following manner, 
(3) Given (2), a dilemma may arise where an agent may be presented with a second order 
conflict in which they will what they do not will and desire what they do not desire. 
Worse still, there may be instances where an agent may be faced with a conflict of interests 
where the will and desire in a particular volition appear to be at odds, as per Locke's example. 
This is where the real problem lies, so we shall designate it a first order conflict. We can show 
this as follows: 
IEI: 52. 
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(4) Given (2), it is conceivable that an agent may be presented with a particular choice where 
any volition would entail a first order conflict between their will and desire. 
However, Edwards can respond with the following argument: 
(5) (1) can be shown to be inconsistent with (2) where the conflict in (4) is only apparent. 
Providing a sufficient reason can be given to demonstrate this, then (4) folds, and so, by 
implication, does (3), since (3) is parasitic on (4). 
This sufficient reason is predicated on a hidden bifurcation in Locke's example. Locke asserts 
that the will and desire are in first order conflict because B desires that he does not persuade C 
whilst at the same time carrying out an action willed because of an obligation to A that will lead 
I to the opposite effect. However, Edwards maintains that in this Locke is obscuring the fact that 
in each volition B is willing according to desire. There are in fact two volitional procedures 
going on in tandem, rather than a single, conflicting one. B's desire masks a suppressed, or 
intentional willing, whilst B's action masks an expressed, or formal desire. To extrapolate: B 
desires that C remains unpersuaded by his conversation. This desire masks a suppressed will; 
were this desire genuine, then B would act upon it leading to a volition consistent with his 
desire. Instead, that will is suppressed in the face of a previous (greater) claim upon B made by 
A. As a result . 13's volition on the 
basis of his expressed desire is withheld. 
This leads into an analysis of B's actual volition. Here B secretly desires to acquiesce to A's 
prompting, leading to B's actual volition (for if he did not, then no volition would result, since 
B is able to make a morally responsible choice free from coercion, and A is not violating this 
condition). And, according to Edwards, this has to be the case, otherwise B would be acting on 
the basis of no desire. Were B acting from no desire, then he would be acting without an 
inclination to choose the action he has chosen, which is patently nonsensical. So, with regard to 
his volition, B is acting in accordance with a second desire whose expression is masked by the 
desire that is expressed. Far from there being a formal contradiction between B's expressed 
desire and will leading to volition, we are faced with a suppressed will (resulting in volition 
being withheld) and a second masked desire, that is expressed in the will that leads to the formal 
volition. Therefore there is a bifurcation of desire and volition at work in Locke's example. 
" In what follows I have adapted the concepts of first and second order conflict from Frankftul's 
discussion of first and second order desires in "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person" in 7he 
Importance of "at We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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Consequently, Edwards' initial premise, that one must desire to act upon a choice, which is 
willed in volition, is reinstated. Otherwise, claims Edwards, we are committed to the view that 
B is acting out of a volitional equilibrium, which would result in no choice, rather than a choice 
contrary to desire. Therefore, Edwards' appeal to (5), on the argument just offered, neutralizes 
the apparent conflict between (4) and (3). 
This applies to unfallen Adam in the following way. Even if Adam is deceived into taking the 
fruit of the tree and eating it, he has to desire to act in accordance with the deception, and his 
desire must be to prefer what is offered by the primal sin to continuing in his state of original 
righteousness. On this basis, what Adam willed in the case of his primal sin, he desired to do, 
preferring that sin to not sinning and therefore acted upon that desire. There is no sense in which 
Adam could have willed the primal sin without desiring it. Nor did he will it because he was 
constrained to do so by the serpent, when he secretly wanted not to desire it, in accordance with 
God's will. For Edwards, will and desire are one on the basis of preference, in volition. What 
I then, of the deception that Edwards speaks of? Up until now, it might be thought that Edwards 
is offering something like the following model of deception to explain the fall. Where A and B 
are moral agents, T is a proposition which captures a non-trivial moral truth and D is 
proposition which expresses the truth of T ambiguously, 82 
(1) A comprehends T. 
(2) A comprehends D. 
(3) A withholds T and explains D to B. 
(4) B believes D to be T (and believes T to express an important moral truth). 
(5) B believes D. 
(6) B acts on the basis of D (that is, in accordance with his belief in D qua T). 
(7) B thereby sins. 
In this scenario, B is not in full possession of the facts. He has been deceived into thinking that 
D is T by A, when in fact the whole truth of T has been withheld from him. As a result his 
culpability is surely diminished. 
82 1 am assuming here that a proposition which is used as the basis for deceiving another is not necessarily 
false, but often trades on linguistic ambiguity. Example: if my wife asks me whether I studied at 
Aberdeen, she might have in mind the ancient university in that city. If I reply 'yes', in the knowledge 
that my wife intends the ancient university, when I have actually studied at Robert Gordon University, 
then I am not lying, but I am not telling the whole truth. My response trades on the linguistic ambiguity 
involved in her question, leaving her with a false belief about where I have studied. 
38 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
In fact, from what we have now seen of Edwards' views on preference, desire and will, the 
correct analysis of Adam's deception is more like this: 
(F) A comprehends T. 
(2') A comprehends D. 
(Y) A withholds T and explains D to B. 
(4') B comprehends the truth of T, but 
(5') B prefers (that which is expressed in) D to (that which is expressed in) T. 
(6') B desires (that which is expressed in) D over (that which is expressed in) T. 
(T) B acts on the basis of his preference and desire in accordance with D, not T. 
(8') B thereby sins. 
IT_ Here, B is culpable. On Edwards account, this occurs because the infierior principles of his 
I moral nature (specifically, his natural appetite), take precedence in the order of his desires over 
that of his rational judgement. The result is sin and the vitiation of his moral nature. But this 
raises a fiuther query. If Adam desired and preferred primal sin (for whatever reason), what 
determined his willing that outcome, rather than another, which would have preserved him in 
original righteousness? 
Thus, we come to the third question of what motivates, or determines, the will. In contrast to 
Thomas Chubb (one of the opponents Edwards has in view in FOW), Edwards contends that the 
will determines upon the strongest motivation in any act of volition. 'It is sufficient to my 
present purpose to say, it is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the 
strongest, that determines the will. "' These motives are graded on the basis of which option 
best suits the mind at the time of choice, with the proviso that no-one willingly chooses evil or 
disagreeable options. According to Edwards, there are immediate and remote motives that affect 
the will. The strongest of these at the time of choice will prevail upon the mind, resulting in the 
desire that the will acts upon in volition. Edwards gives an example of a drunk and his bottle. 84 
The drunk has a variety of potential motivations between which he has to choose. 'Me 
immediate motivation is to feed his addiction,, but there may also be more remote motivations, 
such as considerations about the long-term effects the alcohol will have upon his body, or 
whatever. The strongest motivation in his deliberations will lead to choice. But the object 
83 YEP 14 1. Edwards goes on to explain that there may be many different things which together act to 
motivate the will. So 'the strongest motive' is not an empty tautology: 'when I speak of the "strongest 
motive, " I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular act of volition, 
whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together. ' Ibid. 
84 I-E, 1: 143. 
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proposed to the mind may affect the outcome of a decision in one of two ways. First, by the 
nature and circumstances of the object, and second, by the manner and view of an object. An 
object that is beautiful and pleasant, and the amount of pleasure or discomfort associated with 
an object will affect a choice,, as will the view the mind has of that pleasure; whether it is 
remote, uncertain or future. Therefore an agent chooses on the basis of what seems best to him 
and his well being at the time. 
Naturally, a stated motivation can be disingenuous. For example, the drunk may say that he 
wants to give up his addiction because he is concerned about the effects upon his health, but go 
on drinking anyway. In this instance, according to Edwards, the motivation to give up has been 
overridden by the more immediate need of his addiction. f1is stated motive was not his intended 
motive, since his desire for the bottle overcame all other desires leading to a choice based on an 
immediate gratification, rather than the long-term gains of withholding the immediate motive 
and acting upon the long-term desire he initially stated. 
Here too, Edwards is working out his position in conscious awareness of Locke's arguments. 
The Essay had originally described a position on motivation of will that was the impetus behind 
what Edwards went on to say. The idea was that the will determines upon the greatest good and 
acts upon this, on the understanding that no-one willing acts towards an evil, or perverse end. 
But in revising his Essay in later editions, Locke (as is well known) altered his position. He 
withdrew his earlier view,, and insisted that the will determined its actions on the basis of 
uneasiness: 
The motive, for continuing in the same state of action is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to 
change is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, 
but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for 
shortness sake we shall call determining of the will, 
And, 
I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, 
does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of 
it. 85 
Edwards retained Locke's original view regarding the greater good, declaring that Locke's 
revised view was an unnecessary refinement that could be subsumed under the greater good 
85 Essqy, 11: YM: 29, p. 249. 
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view anyway. T'his could be done by showing that it is better and more agreeable to remove that 
which is disagreeable or causes uneasiness, so that the end or aim of a particular choice 
involving unease must be to remove that unease, and the means to that end is the search for that 
which is more agreeable, i. e. the greater good. 86 87 This point was further elucidated by Edwards 
in The Mind, where he pointed out that even in the case of a voluntary refusal to act, the will of 
the agent was making a choice commensurate with his position and not Locke's: 
That is not uneasiness, in our present circumstances, that always determines the will, as Mr. Locke 
supposes, is evident by this, that there may be an act of the Will, in choosing and determining to forbear 
to act, or move, when some action is proposed to a man; as well as in choosing to act. Thus if a man be 
put upon rising from his seat, and going to a certain place; his voluntary refusal is an act of the Will, 
which does not arise from any uneasiness in his present circumstances certainly. An act of voluntary 
refusal is as truly an act of the Will, as an act of choice; and indeed there is an act of choice in the act of 
I refusal. 
The Will chooses to neglect: it prefers the opposite of that which is reffised. 18 
So, Edwards' objection to Locke's revised view is that Locke's distinction is an unnecessary 
artifice. But according to John E. Smith, Edwards' motivation was not explicitly to combine, 
'the motivations to voluntary action with the appearance of good to the mind. ' Instead, 
'Edwards claimed to be speaking only of "the direct and immediate object of the act of 
volition", which is to say that he brought together what Locke had distinguished. "9 Locke's 
later position was that there was a difference between the greatest apparent good, which may be 
86 See YEJ: 143, and the Editor's Introduction, Part 4: Nos. 3 and 4. There Ramsey echoes Edwards: 
'Thus Locke distinguishes between the greatest apparent good (which, though objectively good, may be 
remote and unappealing) and the good that makes itself felt in uneasiness and dissatisfaction. Edwards 
joins together what Locke puts asunder. He needs only one term to describe the motivations to voluntary 
action and the appearance of good to the mind', p. 55. E. J. Lowe, in Locke on the Human Understanding, 
p. 13 5 asks whether there is really any merit in speaking of greater goods when it is in danger of 
becoming a vacuous tautology: I willed what was the strongest desire collapses into I willed what I 
willed. 'For it is hard to see how one is to identify one desire as being stronger or more urgent than 
others ... save in terms of its being the desire that was acted upon. ' According to Lowe, comparisons between different strengths of desire have an appearance of solving the problem whilst denying the 
substance of it. But this is itself far from clear. When I am faced with a dilemma, do I not choose on the 
basis of alternatives? And do I not choose that alternative which appears the best option at the time of 
choice? And is this not something akin to what the early Locke and Edwards are trying to advocate? 
87 There are other reasons why Locke's revised account is less than satisfactory. Lowe points out that 
Locke seems guilty of allowing second order volitions in by the back door. Previously, Locke had 
disavowed the iterability of volitions: we cannot will to will a thing. This was used as a countermeasure to 
ward off possible infinite regressions of iteration. But here Locke appears to be introducing just this 
conception: we can withhold acting upon inunediate desires for the long term good, on the basis of 
unease. In other words, we can will not to will an action because by forbearing long term benefits accrue. 
See Lowe, ibid. 
88 TheMind in The Works ofJonathan Edwards, Volume I (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth), p. ccxxvii. 
89 Jonathan Edwards, Puritan, Preacher, Philosopher, p. 16. 
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remote and therefore unappealing, and the good that makes itself felt in uneasiness. Edwards' 
conflation of these two things was one of his original contributions to the debate. Smith again: 
'it is the greatest apprehension of the good that determines the will, by which Edwards means 
that good is apprehended not only by a judgement, but by "having a clear and sensible idea of 
any good. ). ). )90 
This can be seen in Edwards' earlier work in The Mind, where he says something very similar, 
'It is not what which appears the greatest good, or the greatest apparent good, that determines 
the Will. It is not the greatest good apprehended, or that which is apprehended to be the greatest 
good; but the greatest apprehension of the good. '9' 
What Edwards meant by this is that the good is apprehended not only by a judgement of the 
understanding, but also by having a clear and sensible idea (qua Locke) about any good. And it 
is only when these are combined, and the agent considers that a particular choice will result in 
what they apprehend (through a judgement of understanding based upon a clear, sensible idea of 
the end in view) to be the greatest good, that the will determines upon that choice. But, these are 
all activities of the agent, not different faculties working in concert. 
Let us apply this last aspect of our discussion to the question of Adam and the fall with the help 
of Miscellany 436, where Edwards takes up some of these themes and applies them to Adam. 
We have already seen that according to Edwards, 'sufficient grace' means that Adam had grace 
sufficient to render him a free agent viz. his whole will, including that rational will arising from 
his rational judgement of what is best for himself. But a rational judgement of what is 'best for 
himself is not what is best absolutely considered, but what the mind's sense of what is 'best for 
itself is. Thisl like Edwards' notion of the drunk and his bottle, concerns the apprehension of 
what is perceived to be lovely in itself being best for the agent. Edwards' argument in 
explanation of the deception of the fall in Miscellan 436 works in this way. The mind's sense y 
of the absolute loveliness of a particular thing (call it x), directly influences only the will of 
appetite. By 'will of appetite', Edwards means, 'if the soul wills it merely because it appears 
lovely in itself, it will be because the loveliness draws the appetite of the SOUI. i, 
92 It may 
indirectly influence the rational will in convincing the person's (call him P) rational judgement 
that that which is lovely in itself is best for P and P's happiness. P could have a rational 
judgment of x in this way (that is, could regard x as lovely in itself and best for P's own good), 
but without a sense of the beauty and pleasantness of x, it will not influence the will in volition. 
90 Ibid. 
91 The A-find, in The Works ofJonathan Edwards, Volume I, p. ccxxvii. 
92 YE13: 485. 
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So, if P has only a rational judgement of the beauty of x, but has no sensibility of the beauty of x 
and doesn't think x is best for himself, then the will (of P) will never choose x. Or again, it 
could be that P is strongly sensible of the beauty of x, and wills x, even though P thinks x is not 
the best for himself. For example, P might will a particular sensual pleasure. P may be sensible 
of the pleasantness of sensual 'judgements' (to borrow Edwards' language), and will the sensual 
pleasure on that basis, though P is convinced that such pleasure is not that which is best for 
himself (it may be immoral, for instance). Hence, P may be free regarding his rational will and 
yet refuse that which he judges to be in itself most lovely and will instead that which he 
rationally knows to be evil. 
It is on the basis of this argument that Edwards believes that deception is a crucial element in 
explaining how Adam fell: 
Therefore man, having sufficient grace as to render him quite free with respect to his rational will (or his 
I will arising from mere judgment of what was best for himself), could not fall without having that 
judgment deceived, and being made to think that to be best for himself which was not so, and so having 
his rational will perverted: though he might sin without being deceived in his rational judgment of what 
was most lovely in itself, or (which his the same thing) without having his conscience deceived and 
blinded, might rationally know at the same time, that what he was about to do was hateful, unworthy, etc.; 
or in other words, though he might know that it was what he ought not to do. 93 
The rational judgement of Adam was perverted by being deceived into thinking that x was best 
for himself, when it was not. This is not to suggest that Adam's rational judgement was 
impaired at the time of his choice for primal sin, but that Adam chose that which was, in itself 
hateful, over that which was absolutely lovely. So, Adam allowed his inferior appetites to 
overthrow his rational judgement, including his sense of duty and love towards God, by 
choosing that which was hateful, but which he had been deceived into thinking was best for 
himself. Flis rational judgement remains unimpaired post-fall, but no longer reigns over his 
inferior appetites. 
(2: 2: v) Summary of Edwards argument 
We are now Mi a position to sum up the content of Edwards' argument. Previously, we saw that: 
(F) A comprehends T. 
(2') A comprehends D. 
93 YE 13: 486. 
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W) A withholds T and explains D to B. 
(4') B comprehends the truth of T, but 
(5') B prefers (that which is expressed in) D to (that which is expressed in) T. 
(6') B desires (that which is expressed in) D over (that which is expressed in) T. 
(T) B acts on the basis of his preference and desire in accordance with D, not T. 
(8') B thereby sins. 
Add to this what we have just seen regarding the determination of the will, 
(9) B determines upon 'the greatest apprehension of the good' in choice. 
(10') The 'greatest apprehension of the good' involves, 
(a) The natural appetites in, 
(i) a sensibility of the absolute beauty of a particular choice ('what is best absolutely 
and most lovely in itself (YE13: 485)) and, 
(ii) an apprehension that the particular choice is the best for B himself as well as, 
(b) a rational judgement that a particular choice is the best. 
These conditions, taken together, yield the motivation for volition. Moreover, according to 
Edwards and contra Locke's revised position, volition is determined by the strongest 
motivation,, resulting in choice. Hence, 
(I F) These conditions, taken together, yield the strongest motivation for B to choose T, rather 
than D (or whatever. ) 
However, as we have seen, B chooses the alternative expressed in D not T. The problem here is 
that, in choosing D over T, B is choosing in accordance with his natural appetites, but against 
his rational judgement. So, although pre-fall Adam did make choices in accordance with (9')- 
(I F), in the case of primal sin, he was determined to act in the way he did by a disordered moral 
nature, in this way (replacing 'B' with 'Adam'), 
(8") Adam determines upon what seems to his natural appetites to be 'the greatest 
apprehension of the good' in primal sin. 
(9") This 'greatest apprehension of the good' involves, 
(a) The natural appetites in, 
an apprehension that the particular choice is the best for Adam himself, 
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over and against, 
(i) a sensibility of the absolute beauty of a particular choice ('what is best absolutely 
and most lovely in itself (YE13: 485)). 
That is, Adam chooses what seems best to himself over and against what is best absolutely 
considered. This takes place where Adam's rational will is cogniscent of the sinfulness of the 
choice proposed, but where his natural appetites are allowed by Adam to override his rational 
judgement, such that, 
(b) Adam's rational judgement that the particular choice for primal sin is not the best 
is ignored. As John Kearney points out, 
a person may also judge that what is best absolutely is not best for himself. When this happens the 
judgment of the rational will is deceived ... Adam judged that something that was in itself most lovely and 
becoming (obeying God's law) was not the best for himself so he chose to sin and break God's law 
(something he knew was hateful and wrong). Thus, he was not deceived about the wrongness of 
disobeying God's law, though he was deceived when he believed that disobeying God's law was best for 
himself. This latter belief reflected an erroneous (though rational) judgment, but not one that blinded his 
conscience. In short, the serpent did not cause Adam and Eve to cast doubt on what God had commanded, 
only on what they judged to be best for themselves. 94 
The motivation that arises for the primal sin is still sufficient for volition, but it arises from a 
disordered moral nature. This needs to be carefully distinguished from a vitiated moral nature. 
Adam's moral nature may be disordered and not vitiated, but it cannot be vitiated without being 
disordered. That is, the notion of a disordered moral nature as I am using the term, is applicable 
to the self-deception that leads to Adam's primal sin. Thereafter, his nature is vitiated, and 
Adam is no longer in a state of grace. 
This should not be taken to mean that post-fall no human being can ever make choices which 
are in accordance with their rational judgement. What Edwards is saying is that post-fall there is 
a disposition to sin which was not present pre-fall. A fallen human being may still make choices 
94 Kearney, "Jonathan Edwards' Account of Adam's First Sin" in Scottish Bulletin o Evangelical 
Theologý 15 (1997): 135-136. 
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that are reasonable, in accordance with the rational judgement. 9' So, for example, a drug addict 
may make a decision to refrain from taking any more drugs, since he recognizes that, according 
to his rational judgement, continued substance abuse will result in his premature death. And he 
may make this decision against his natural appetites (his physical and psychological addiction to 
the drug). 
But whereas before the fall, choice was always according to an ordered 'whole will' of reason 
and appetite, in accordance with the concreated superior principles, post-fall, there is a 
disposition to sin, now that humanity is no longer in a state of (sufficient) grace. So, whereas the 
drug addict may make a particular choice according to his rational judgement, over and against 
his natural appetites, it does not follow that this will occur on every occasion. And according to 
Edwards' account of the fall, it cannot occur on every occasion of choice, since the drug addict 
(or whoever) has a disposition to sin post-fall. Indeed, it is this very disposition to sin that has 
led the addict to become dependent upon the drugs he uses in the first place. So it is not the case 
that post-fall human beings can choose according to their rational judgement on every occasion. 
This is because the introduction of a disposition to sin as a result of a vitiated moral nature 
means that the preponderance of moral choices will be in accordance with the disposition to sin, 
and the vitiated moral nature humanity inherits from Adam. 
(2: 3) Self-deception and the paradox of Eden 
We have seen that a crucial constituent of Edwards' account is his understanding of Adam's fall 
as a species of self-deception, leading to the vitiation of his moral nature. This presents a way of 
solving the paradox of Eden, with which we began the chapter. But before turning to consider 
whether Edwards' account of Adam's self-deception can act as a solution to the paradox of 
Eden, we need to consider the paradoxical nature of self-deception itself. 
Let us begin with the concept of deception, drawing on an article by Samuel Guttenplan in the 
96 
process. Deception would appear to involve something like the following scenario. Trevor 
knows that the Kempton races begin at 3: 30 p. m., but he manages to get Gary to believe that 
they begin at 4: 30 p. m., thus deceiving Gary. Now, what is important in this example for the 
present purpose is that Trevor deliberately sets out to provide Gary with a false belief It will not 
work if Trevor sincerely believes that the Kempton races do start at 4: 30 p. m. If he were to 
95 Or, as Kearney has it, 'the 'whole will' involves either concurrence of reason and appetite, 
subordination of reason to appetite, or subordination of appetite to reason. ' "Jonathan Edwards' Account 
of Adam's First Sin" p. 130. 
' See the account of self-deception by Samuel Guttenplan in A Companion to Philosophy ofMind (ed. ) 
Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994): 558-560. 
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believe this,, though it were a false belief, and though he pass on this false information so that 
Gary also comes to hold a false belief about the time of the races, he does not intend to deceive 
or pass on misinformation. So, what is crucial in the deception of others and oneself, as 
Guttenplan points out, is the connection between how one acts and what one believes. Self- 
deception is not a case of acting paradoxically, such that a person believes both proposition p 
and proposition -p at one and the same time. Instead, it is a case of acting as if one believed that 
p whilst also acting as if p was false. The problem with this is that acting as if p was or was not 
false is not the same as believing that p, or -p. An example: Trevor's wife is having an aff4ir 
with Gary. Trevor suspects that this is going on from the furtive telephone conversations and his 
wife's sudden and unexplained interest in Bingo four times a week, as well as other, incidental 
and anecdotal evidence. However, he loves his wife, and does not want to believe that their 
relationship is a sham or that it is over. So he takes no steps to confirm his suspicions. He 
continues to behave as if nothing is amiss. However, his wife confronts him with the truth one 
evening and Trevor is shocked and appalled by what his wife reveals to him, though, in fact, 
this is not news to him at all. 
1.1- 
Here Trevor acts as if he believes that his wife is not having an affhir, whilst at the same time 
believing that she is having an affair. But he does not believe both contradictory propositions at 
the same time, though he acts as if he does. So, how can this peculiar state of affairs be 
explained? One solution is that Trevor holds one belief unconsciously, such that he is not 
consciously aware that his beliefs conflict, or does not want to bring himself to believe that his 
beliefs conflict. Alternatively, it could be that Trevor has compartmentalized his beliefs, so that 
he acts in certain situations as if one belief is not true and the other is. We would need to flesh 
out these two options with far more detail were they to stand on their own as explanations of the 
paradoxical nature of self-deception. 
However, Edwards' account is akin to both these options without being exactly parallel to 
either. It is similar to the suppression of one belief unconsciously, whilst holding its opposite 
consciously (the rational will and natural appetites serving in these respective capacities). But it 
is not exactly like the psychoanalytic solution, since Edwards does not claim that Adam holds 
one belief consciously, whilst denying any conscious knowledge of the other. (Nor would this 
be a particularly plausible solution to the paradox of Eden. For Adam has to be aware that the 
primal sin is wrong at more than an unconscious level, for the breaking of the covenant in eating 
the fruit to have any real force as an explanation of the curse and original sin. ) Edwards' 
account is much more like the compartmentalization solution. Adam holds the belief of his 
rational will and the desire of his natural appetites in tandem. But he is able to choose to sin 
only because he ignores, or compartmental izes the part of his mind that involves his rational 
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will and opts for the desire of his natural appetite instead. However, Edwards' account is subtler 
than this. He wants to account for both Adam's sinful act and the complex nature of belief that 
went into Adam's fall in such a way that Adam is responsible for his sin, and that sin arises 
from a disordered, but not vitiated moral nature, thereby avoiding imputing Adamic sin to God. 
The question is, will this work as a solution to the problems with self-deception, and as a 
solution to the paradox of Eden? Let us examine Edwards' attempted resolution in more detail. 
Edwards believed that Adam had a moral nature before the fall, but that eating the fruit 
of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil actually brought about an increased knowledge of 
both good and evil, 'without doubt it was a tree of the knowledge of good properly, as much as 
evil. And the lively perception of good so much depends on the knowledge of its contrary, evil, 
that there was as much attained of new knowledge of good, as there was knowledge of evil; and 
97 this was the end of it principally, the knowledge of good'. Thus, with respect to the paradox, 
Adam seems to have been in a state of limited moral knowledge prior to the fall. However, God 
is not unjust in punishing Adam and Eve for their sins, since Adam was fully cogniscent of the 
fact that he should obey the divine command. To put it another way, he had a sufficient grasp of 
the moral payload of the alternatives set before him to make an informed choice. And - 
according to Edwards at least -the net result of his choosing sin was an increase in his store of 
moral understanding, though at the significant cost of being disbarred from fellowship with God 
in Eden. Thus, the fact that he sinned because he deceived himself into thinking that rebellion 
against the divine command was better for himself, means that God is not unjust in his 
punishment of Adam subsequent to the primal sin. 
To make this matter plain, consider the following example, in the style of Richard Swinburne's 
account of self-deception in Responsibility and Atonement. 98 Trevor is caught stealing a watch 
from an old lady. When he is asked to explain himself, he says, 'it is only luck that the woman 
had that watch. And anyway, no-one really loses anything these days, because they are all 
insured against loss. ' This means of self-deception concerning the moral nature of his action 
involves Trevor convincing himself that what he has done is not morally wrong. Instead he tries 
to convince himself that his action is morally indifferent, or good. It is true that in the case of 
Adam there is a significant difference from the case of Trevor the thief. Trevor's moral nature is 
already, according to Edwards, morally vitiated, whereas, prior to his primal sin, Adam's is not. 
Nevertheless, compare Swinbume's explanation of the thief, utilizing Freud's analysis of self- 
deception, 'He [Freud] showed how self-deception was an intentional act of suppressing some 
belief from consciousness, which also involved the act of suppressing from consciousness the 
97 Miscellany 172, in YE13: 324. 
48 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
belief that you were performing that act or any other self-deceptive act. "9 Edwards claims that 
Adam suppresses the rational judgement (conscience) that disobeying the command of God is 
wrong in the particular matter of the fruit of the tree, under the influence of the serpent. Notice 
that it is only in this particular inýstance that his rational judgement is ignored. Edwards' position 
does not require that Adam's conscience/rational judgement to be entirely impaired, only that it 
is ignored in this particular instance (and such instances are not hard to find in human nature. If 
I wn tempted to commit adultery, and am fully aware of the fact that I am married whilst at the 
same time entertaining thoughts of illicit sexual encounters with another woman, and then act 
on those thoughts, I have suppressed my conscience in that one instance. It does not follow that 
my conscience is suppressed in every other area of morality). So, like Swinburne's use of Freud, 
Edwards' account of Adam's fall need only presume that Adam suppresses the particular belief 
of his rational judgement with respect to the fruit of the tree. Edwards' view also means that 
Adam chooses the action he does because he believes it is best for himl and this motivation 
overrides his rational judgement. So, unlike Freud, he does not suppress from consciousness the 
belief that he is performing that act or any other self-deceptive act. Instead he convinces himself 
that what he is doing is for his own good, without recourse to what action would be the best 
course absolutely considered, thereby compartmentalizing his beliefs, and the decisions he takes 
on the basis of these beliefs. Thus, Edwards' account seems to be an interesting and plausible 
way of explaining how Adam acts against his own best interest (absolutely considered), and in 
accordance with what he presumes to be his best interest (in the particular case of the fruit). 
Returning to the paradox of Eden, if Adam acts in a manner consistent with this picture of self- 
deception, then God does not act unworthily in punishing Adam. Adam knew that there was an 
alternative to obedience, though he may not have known the content of that alternative. 100 
Nevertheless, he knew that the alternative was contrary to what God commanded. And he knew 
that he should have acted in accordance with the command. He acted as he did because he 
convinced himself that disobedience was in his own best interest when it was not (and he knew 
it was not. ) Hence, the fact that he sinned is due to an instance of self-deception, not to any 
character flaw in God. 
98 See Responsibility andAtonement, pp. 174-175. 
99 Responsibility andA tonement, p. 174. 
100 That a person may know that there is an alternative to the course of action they are contemplating, 
without knowing the content of that action, is perfectly plausible. Consider the case of a child whose 
mother says, 'don't touch that trifle or there will be trouble. ' The child is in no doubt that there is an 
alternative to the parental imperative, though they may not be clear what that alternative entails for them. 
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(2: 4) Is Edwards' account of the fall coherent? 
We have seen that Edwards is able to resolve the paradox of Eden in his account of the fall in 
his account of self-deception. But is this account coherent? The general consensus in the 
secondary literature is that it is not: 
The sequence of events in Adam's fall leaves Edwards mired in a difficulty from which he never 
successfully freed himself. Once having established Adam's original righteousness, how could he explain 
the take-over of the lower faculties? 101 
However, John Kearney, has recently sought to rehabilitate Edwards: 
I believe Edwards' account of the origin of Adam's first sin is coherent and adequate. God created Adam 
I with sufficient grace, the grace of original righteousness, which inclined him to act rightly and enabled 
him to keep appetite subordinate to the rational will. But God withheld efficacious grace, which he was 
not obligated to bestow upon him, and which, had he granted it to him, would have made Adam a morally 
perfect being able to withstand any and every temptation to sin. The absence of confirming grace 
accounted for the possibility of the first sin. 102 
Kearney's account of Edwards' on the fall is certainly the best, and clearest In the literature to 
date. It has superceded earlier, faulty accounts by John Gerstner' 03 and Clyde Holbrook. '04For 
this reason, I want to focus the following discussion on Kearney's article, taking into account 
the other two authors in light of what he has to say in defence of the coherence of Edwards' 
position. This defence has several aspects. The first is that God was under no obligation to 
provide Adam with confirming grace. The second is that Edwards' account is not guilty of 
circular reasoning. The third claim is that an intrinsic property of creatureliness is having a 
101 Clyde A. Holbrook in his editorial introduction to YE3: 51. Compare James Hoopes' essay, 
"Calvinism and Consciousness from Edwards to Beecher" in Hatch and Stout (eds. ) Jonathan Edwards 
and the American Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 213-214: 'God's only act 
in the chain of events leading inevitably to the Fall was to deprive Adam of the principle of virtue, so that 
he, not God, took the positive action whereby sin came into the world. Even so, God initiated this series 
of events while foreseeing it would result in human iniquity... ' John Gerstner makes a similar point in his 
primer, Jonathan Edwards: A Mini-Theology (Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1987), p. 37: 'Nathaniel Emmons 
says that Edwards on one occasion was like a great horse stuck in the mud The more he struggled to 
extricate himself, the deeper he sank. I am afraid this is the case here. ' 
102 "Jonathan Edwards' Account of Adam's First Siff' p. 140. 
103 In Rational Biblical Theology, Vol. 11, chapter NXIL I will explain why the accounts of both Gerstner 
and Holbrook are faulty on the matter of the fall in the following two sections. 
104Holbrook, editorial introduction to YE3. 
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mutable will. I will argue that although Kearney is able to defend the first two theses, he is 
unable to defend the third, and this alone is fatal to Edwards' Position. 
(2: 4: i) Divine obligation and confirming grace. 
In the first thesis, Kearney is responding to John Gerstner's claim that, 'if the grace is truly 
sufficient it must be efficacious; if it is not efficacious it is not sufficient. "O' According to 
Gerstner, Edwards' use of the notions of sufficient and confirming grace amount to 'a 
distinction without a difference'. What he means is that if the grace Edwards speaks about is 
supposed to be sufficient for Adam to withstand sin, then it is not only sufficient to the job, it 
should be efficacious in enabling Adam to resist temptation and remain in a state of grace. In 
other words, a grace that is truly sufficient is a grace that is efficacious. But this is simply 
muddled. We have already seen that Edwards' distinction between the two kinds of grace are 
concomitant with the scholastic notions of posse non peccare and non posse peccare. The 
distinction does differentiate two quite different moral states, pre and post-fall. 
Gerstner goes on to say that if sufficient grace amounts to a posse non peccare state, then Adam 
is not in a significantly better moral state than his progeny are, since his progeny are able to 
make decisions in accordance with their rational wills just as Adam himself did. All human 
beings have the ability to choose in accordance with their rational wills on at least some 
occasions. When, for instance, the drunk abstains from alcohol on the road to recovery, he is 
choosing in accordance with his rational will over and against his natural appetites. And if all 
humans can choose to act in accordance with their rational wills on some occasions, how is this 
significantly different from Adam pre-fall? 
However, as we have already mentioned, Edwards is clear that the problem lies not with natural 
ability to sin or refrain from sinning, but in inclination to sin. Adam pre-&Il was not inclined to 
sin, yet he chose to sin. Humanity post-fall may choose not to sin on a particular occasion, but 
people are inclined to sin because they no longer possess the property of being in a state of 
(sufficient) grace. It is this distinction that Gerstner overlooks. 106 
Nor is God is under any obligation to keep Adam in a state of grace. In a sermon on The Justice 
of God in the Damnation of Sinners, Edwards makes this plain. In the same sermon he also 
states that it is unreasonable for God to be held accountable for not providing Adam with a 
deposit of grace that would prevent him from being able to break the conditions of the covenant 
of works: 
105 Rational Biblical Theology, Vol. II, p. 306. 
106 See Rational Biblical Theology, Vol. 11, p. 304-306 and "Jonathan Edwards' Account of Adam's First 
Sin", p. 132. 
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Such is God's sovereign power and right, that he is originally under no obligation to keep men from 
sinning; but may in his providence permit and leave them to sin. He was not obliged to keep either angels 
or men from falling. It is unreasonable to suppose, that God should be obliged, if he makes a reasonable 
creature capable of knowing his will, and receiving a law from him, and being subject to his moral 
government at the same time to make it impossible for him to sin, or break his law. 107 
Let us examine the two claims of this passage in more detail. First, God is not obliged to give 
his creatures confirming grace. He is under no obligation because he has not bound himself over 
to provide them with this deposit of grace. In addition, the command forbidding the firuit of the 
tree of knowledge of good and evil was, 'given for the trial of Adam's obedience. "O' 
Presumably, Edwards means that efficacious grace was a reward for obedience to the condition 
of the covenant of works, which Adam failed. Had he prevailed, then he would have been 
rewarded for overcoming the temptation, with confirming grace, and the non posse peccare 
state. So. contra Gerstner, God is not culpable for withholding the deposit of confirming grace, 
since he is under no obligation to his creatures where he has not bound himself over to provide 
such a deposit. And since the deposit was conditional upon successful completion of a period of 
probation provided for under the covenant of works, there is no reason why God might not 
withhold this grace when Adam failed to comply with the provisions of the covenant. '09 
But Edwards' second claim is that it is unreasonable for God to be held accountable for not 
providing Adam with a deposit of grace that would prevent him from being able to break the 
conditions of the covenant of works. For God is not bound in some way to give certain, as yet 
unmade creatures, particular properties. The claim that God should have created Adam with the 
property of confirming grace and that he is somehow culpable for not having done so, is false. It 
appeals to the following implausible principle, 
(P) It is wrong to bring into existence, knowingly, a being less excellent than one could have 
brought into existence. 
'0' "The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinnners" in The Works ofJonathan Edwards, VoL I, p. 670, 
author's emphasis. 
108Miscellany 322, in YE13: 403, cited in Kearney, "Jonathan Edwards' Account of Adam's First Sin", p. 
133. 
109 Kearney cites YE14 in this respect, from a sermon entitled, "All God's Methods Are Most 
Reasonable", p. 168: 'God created man in a state of innocency, and gave him such grace that he was 
perfectly free from any corruption or sinful inclinations; nor did he take away that grace from him. But 
neither did he oblige himself to give him any more, so as certainly to prevent him from giving way to any 
temptation: that was to be given to him when his time of probation was over, if he had continued innocent 
during that probation. ' 
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D- possible world, Robert Adams has used this principle to show that God might not create the best 
a notion that Edwards would have found repugnant. ' 10 Be that as it may, we can still utilize his 
principle for the present argument. All that is needed in the present circumstance is the notion 
that it is not incumbent upon God to create a creature with confirming, rather than sufficient 
grace, not that it is not incumbent upon God to create the best possible world. 
(P) is implausible because there are numerous counterexamples to it. For instance, a person 
breeding peacocks, is not thereby culpable for not having brought about the procreation of a 
more excellent form of life (primates, for example), though it was open to this person to breed 
either creature. Apply this reasoning to Adam. Where creating Adam with sufficient grace 
might be thought to be less excellent than creating him with confirming grace, should God 
create Adam with the latter, rather than the former property? We might answer this question 
with another: in what sense do creatures that have not yet been created exercise moral rights 
over their creator? God could create Adam with only sufficient grace, and this be a perfectly 
moral act. Indeed, taking up Robert Adams' point, God's creation of a creature that was bound 
to fall might be seen as an instance of divine grace, a perfection, rather than an imperfection. ' 11 
So Kearney is right that there is a distinction to be made between the two kinds of grace that 
Edwards outlines, contra Gerstner. And God may supply sufficient, but not confirming grace 
without compromising his integrity. 
(2: 4: ii) Is Edwards'reasoning (viciously) circular? 
Second, Edwards in OS claims that, 'although there was no natural inclination in Adam, yet an 
inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was begotten in him by the delusion and 
error he was led into; and this inclination to eat the forbidden fruit, must precede his actual 
eating. ' 112 Clyde Holbrook, in his editorial introduction to YE3, says that this amounts to 
circular reasoning: 'How could a delusion be "begotten in him" or how could he be "led into" 
delusion without presupposing a sinful propensity to which the temptation could appeal? "" 
Much depends here on what is meant by 'sinful propensity'. Holbrook could mean either: 
an inclination to sin in general, or 
an inclination to commit one particular sin. 
"0 See "Must God Create the Best? " in The Concept of God, 
University Press, 1987. ) 
111 "Must God Create the Best? ", p. 105-106. 
112 YE3: 228-229. 
113 YE3: 5 1. 
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But Edwards is clear that (ii) need not entail W, (as we have already noted in regard to the 
problem of self-deception). That is, a person may be Inclined to commit one particular sin on a 
particular occasion, without having a general inclination to sin on many different occasions. 
Indeed, a person might be inclined to sin on a particular occasion, and that be the first sin that 
establishes a general inclination to sin, or be the first instance of a sin that forms a habit to 
commit such sins again, on other occasions. Take, for example, Edwards' drunk and his bottle. 
There must be a first drink that leads to another, and from thence to eventual addiction. This is 
what happened in the case of Adam's primal sin: 
'Tis true, as was observed before, there is no effect without some cause, occasion, ground or reason of 
that effect, and some cause answerable to that effect. But certainly it will not follow, from thence, that a 
transient effect requires a pennanent cause, or a fixed influence and propensity. 
Yet, 
However great the sin of Adam, or of the angels, was, and however great means, motives and obligations 
they sinned against; whatever may be thence argued concerning the transient cause, occasion, or 
temptation, as being very subtle, remarkably tending to deceive or seduce, or otherwise great; yet it 
argues nothing of any settled disposition, or fixed cause at all, either great or small; the effect both in the 
angels and in our first parents, being in itself transient and for aught appears, happening in each of them, 
under one system or coincidence or Muential circumstances. 1 14 
So. Edwards is not guilty of circular reasoning in this respect. His position is consistent with 
Adam developing an inclination to sin from an initial, primal sin. So, here again, Kearney's 
defence of Edwards holds, whilst Holbrook's criticism folds. 
(2: 4: iii) Is having a mutable will an intrinsic property of creatureliness? 
The third thesis that Kearney defends is that an intrinsic property of creatureliness is having a 
4 mutable' will. (In fact, what he has in mind is more than a mutable will; it is a will that is able 
to mutate in the direction of sin): 
If Adam is created such that he is determined to hold his ground in the face of every temptation, then it is 
as if he has been progranuned by God to be always inclined to do the right thing. in the abstract it is 
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logically possible for God to create a being who is always so inclined, but in the context of Edwards' 
theology, where God is absolutely sovereign and human beings are utterly dependent upon him for their 
very existence, being a creature means having imperfections, one of which is a mutable Will. 115 
Kearney maintains that if such a state of affairs did not obtain in Edwards' thinking, then there 
would be no need for a redeemer, and no need for God to demonstrate his justice and mercy, 
because Adam and his posterity would have remained morally pristine. But this is not an 
adequate justification of Edwards' position for several reasons. First, if it is logically possible 
for God to create a world with creatures that are always inclined to do tile good posse non 
peccare, with sufficient grace, then why did God not actualize such a world? To respond, in 
effect, that this is just the way things are in Edwards' metaphysics, is to concede that Edwards 
presents no compelling argument for his case. 116 In point of fact, as William Wainwright has 
shown elsewhere, Edwards believes that God must create a world, and must create this world, 
two extremely contentious claims that I do not intend to pursue here (though I find them a 
convincing account of Edwards' VieWS). 117 But even if this point is ceded to Wainwright, so as 
to save Kearney further trouble, the fact that Edwards endorses a strong compatibility thesis 
and, as we shall see in succeeding chapters of this thesis, rejects the notion that anything created 
persists through time, defending instead an occasionalism, does not entail that creatures are in 
some way bound to be imperfect. And it certainly does not entail that an intrinsic property of 
creatureliness is having a 'mutable will', if that means a will that is intrinsically liable to 
change. 
But let us even grant this notion to Kearney. If God determines that Adam sins, and if, in the 
final analysis Adam's primal sin obtains because God has ordained (or 'permitted') it to take 
place, then the responsibility for the fall, and the entrance of sin into the world lies not with 
Adam,, but with God. After all, Adam is determined to act as he does by God himself, the 
ordainer and cause of all events that come to pass. However, for the question of culpability to 
have bite, Edwards needs to endorse the view that God is the proximate, not just ultimate cause 
of sin. (And we shall see in the next chapter that Edwards does endorse this view. ) This 
distinction works as follows. God could be the ultimate cause of all things inasmuch as he is the 
creator of all things. But this is not strong enough to demonstrate that he is culpable for Adam's 
114 YE3: 191 and 193 respectively. Cited in Kearney, "Jonathan Edwards' Account of Adam's First Sin", 
p. 13 7. 
15 Kearney, " Jonathan Edwards' Account of Adam's First Sin", p. 13 8. 
116 This is not to say that there may not be an argument for this view, along some greater good theodicy 
line. It is just to say that Edwards does not seem to have such an argument. 
"' See "Jonathan Edwards, William Rowe, and the Necessity of Creation" in Faith, Freedom and 
Rationality (ed. ) Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). 
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sin; only that he is the ultimate cause for Adam existing and persisting long enough to sin, and 
the one who sustains Adam through his sin, and permits his sin to take place. But Edwards goes 
beyond this view of God's involvement in the created order to endorse occasionalism. This 
theory involves two distinct theses. A thesis about creation, specifically, the endorsement of a 
continuous creation thesis with the denial of a doctrine of conservation. And, secondly, a thesis 
about causation, to the effect that God causes all events to take place, coupled with the denial of 
secondary causation. This yields a view of the created order as radically and entirely contingent 
upon God's action at every moment of its existence. Thus, Edwards' endorsement of 
occasionalism means that God is the proximate, not just ultimate cause of sin, because no other 
being has causal power. God alone has causal power, and God alone is therefore the proximate 
cause of Adam's sin. 1" 
Thus, Kearney's defence of Edwards is only partially successful. He has succeeded in showing 
that, contrary to previous opinion, Edwards does offer a carefully nuanced account of how 
Adam first sinned. This account is internally coherent. That is, it is coherent in terms of the 
argument Edwards sets out in its favour. 119 But it is not externally coherent. That is, it is not 
coherent when set alongside other aspects of his metaphysics, particularly, his commitment to 
absolute divine sovereignty, understood occasionalistically. Moreover, his theory raises 
questions that he does not satisfactorily resolve. For instance, on the question of self-deception, 
Edwards' account implies that the property of self-deception is intrinsic to human nature both 
pre- and post-fall. But if that is the case, then Adam had the property (perhaps a dispositional 
property) of self-deception prior to the fall, which calls his moral innocence into question. There 
is also a question as to whether Edwards' account has the consequence that human nature has an 
inevitable tendency to degenerate. And, perhaps most serious of all, it does appear to make God 
the author of sin. But that is the subject of the next chapter. 
118 Edwards' concept of occasionalism is the subject of chapter 6. 
"9 That argument is a species offelix culpa theodicy. See "The Wisdom of God Displayed in The Way of 
Salvation" in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Vol. II, p. 151-2: 'If man had never fallen, God would 
have remained man's friend; he would have enjoyed God's favour, and so would have been the object of 
Christ's favour, as he would have had the favour of all the persons of the Trinity - But now Christ 
becoming our surety and Saviour and having taken on him our nature, occasions between Christ and us a 
union of a quite different kind, and a nearer relation than otherwise would have been. The fall is the 
occasion of Christ's becorning our head and the church his body. And believers are become his brethren 
and spouse, in a manner that otherwise would not have been. ' This leads Edwards to say that, 'Man now 
has greater manifestations of the glory and love of God, than otherwise he would have had. ' (Emphasis 
original). 
56 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(3) Edwards on God's responsibility for sin 
In the last chapter, we saw that Edwards made a valiant attempt at trying to cut the Gordian knot 
that the doctrine of the fall entails. We ended by pointing to the problem of the origin of sin, and 
the question of the authorship and responsibility for its origin. 
In a way characteristic of Edwards, he sought to provide a novel solution to this most difficult 
of theological problems. In so doing, he raises several interesting metaphysical questions which 
refer back to his characterization of the fall, and have implications for what he says regarding 
the imputation of Adam's sin (to which we shall turn in chapter 4), and the metaphysics of 
persistence-through-time that accompany his defence of original sin. 
This chapter seeks to outline and assess the Edwardsian resolution to the authorship of sin 
problem. I shall argue, against one recent exponent of Edwards' doctrine, but in concert with the 
majority of previous interpreters, that Edwards' attempted resolution to this issue fails to give an 
adequate account of the problem. However, Edwards rightly points out that the fact that he is 
unable to resolve this problem (an unhappy state of affairs! ) is common to both theological 
determinists like himself, and to theological libertarians, like the Arminians, whom he opposed. 
To begin with, we shall set out the authorship problem in the context of the wider problem of 
evil. Then we shall focus in on the contours of Edwards' response to this problem. There have 
been several treatments of Edwards' response to this problem. We shall pay particular attention 
to two of the most recent and most thorough of these, that of William Wainwright and John 
Kearney. 120 
120 The authorship problem in Edwards' thought has attracted interest from several sources in recent and 
not-so-recent literature, both theological and philosophical. These include John H. Gerstner, Rational 
Biblical TheoloSVv, Vol. A pp. 149 ff.; Clyde Holbrook's editorial introduction to YEI: 60-64; John 
Kearney, "Jonathan Edwards and the Author of Sin Charge" in The Princeton Theological Review 5 
(1998): 10-16; C. Samuel Storms, Tragedy in Eden chapter 4; Rufus Suter, "The Problem of Evil in the 
Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards" in the Monist 44 (1934): 280-295; and William Wainwright, 
"Theological Determinism and the Problem of Evil: Are Arn-driians any better off? " in International 
Journal for PhilosoPhY of Religion 50 (2001): 81-96. Although this issue is touched upon in other 
57 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(3: 1) The Authorship Problem 
Many, but not all, of the historic formulations of the problem of evil have been set out as 
defeaters to Christian belief 121 in the logical problem of evil, this has characteristically taken 
the following form, 
(1) God exists 
(2) God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent 
(3) Evil exists 
However, 
(4) If evil exists, then where 'God' denotes a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and 
omnibenevolent, such a being cannot obtain in any possible world. 
This logical problem of evil, beloved of recent analytic philosophers of religion, is not an issue 
that detains Edwards (unlike his immediate contemporary, Hume). Instead, he deals with the 
more traditional theological problem of the entrance of evil into the world. Yet, having said this, 
one would expect that the problem of the origin of sin would admit of a similar kind of analysis 
to the logical problem of evil. Where (1), (2)&(3) obtain, (and where a solution to the logical 
problem of (4) is proffered), 
(5) God ordains that no event comes to pass without God willing that it should happen. 
(6) If God does ordain that no event comes to pass without his willing it should happen, then 
God wills and ordains evil. 
The resulting problem is, 
(7) If God wills (3), then he cannot be essentially benevolent. 
secondary literature on Edwards, when it is, it is only mentioned in passing. See, for example, Robert 
Jenson's cornments in America's Theologian, p. 148. 
"' The notion of a defeater originated with Roderick Chisholm in "The Defeat of Good and Evil 
(re)printed in The Problem of Evil (eds. ) Adams and Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Latterly, Plantinga has taken it up in his writings, most recently in Warranted Christian Belief (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), which is what I am referring to here. 
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Now, clearly it is not a necessary truth that God ordains all events that come to pass. He may 
well place restrictions upon the exercise of his power for some perceived benefit that might 
result from this, as is argued by Molinists and libertarians with respect to creaturely volitional 
freedom. But such a picture need not detain us since our concern is with those who stand in the 
Augustinian tradition of theological compatibilism, and with Edwards as a representative of that 
tradition. From Edwards' perspective, God is a perfect being, hence (2). 
In this argument, as before with the logical problem of evil, there appears to be a logical 
component involved. But the question is not directed to the prima facie incompatibility of God 
and evil as the broader logical problem of evil is. The authorship of sin question presumes that 
God and evil co-exist together. Instead of querying how this might logically be the case, the 
authorship question is: if (1)-(3) obtain, then whence evil? Or, to put it another way: The logical 
problem presumes the properties of (2) as an entailment of (1). It is from this conjunction that 
the problem with (3) arises. But the authorship question calls the properties of (2) into question 
where (3) and (1) are given. So the question here is: is (2) an entailment of (1) given (3)? If so, 
how can (3) arise? And if not, then whence evil? 
122 We shall designate this problem of the authorship of sin and evil, the AP. From the foregoing 
it should be clear that, unlike the logical problem of evil, the AP is not a defeater to theism and 
therefore for Christian beliefper se. One could still be a rational Christian theist and not have an 
answer to the question raised by the AP. If anything, it presents an aspect to the problem of evil 
that amounts to a rebuttal of one or more core beliefs within Christian theism associated with 
the nature of God (such as, omnibenevolence, for example). 
(3: 2) The Edwardsian axis 
Edwards' theological determinism yields a particularly difficult version of the AP (made more 
difficult by Edwards' thorough method of approaching the problem. Edwards is a victim of his 
own relentless thoroughness in his dealings with the AP). He believed both that all creaturely 
122 It is worth noting that sin and evil are not synonyms. Sin is usually taken to be something like, 'any 
want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God', (Westminster Shorter Catechism, Question 
14. ) That is, its principal orientation is towards moral evil. Moral evil may well have consequences for the 
natural world (as the biblical account claims is the case with the sin of Adam), but it need not. If I stab my 
grandmother, that has serious moral consequences not just for my grandmother, or myself but for a whole 
range of people, family, friends and authorities, whom it may involve. But natural evil does not result. 
However, if I drown a village of pesky Africans by building a dam ten miles downstream from them, that 
probably will have moral and natural consequences for the environment surrounding the village that is 
flooded. Evil is, by contrast, a much broader term than sin, comprising all kinds of moral and natural evil. 
Nevertheless, the two are intertwined in our problem. For if God is the author of evil, there does seem to 
be an unwelcome moral consequence for the divine nature, namely that this is a sinful act. 
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volitions are necessary, and that God orders and determines all events that come to pass. '23Put 
more formally using the previous argument modified where necessary, Edwards adheres to the 
two following principles: I- 
(P 1) All creaturely volitions are necessary. '24 
(P2) God determines all events that come to pass. 
-LI- 
He also holds a form of occasionalism. This yields an additional principle, 
(P3) God is the sole cause of all events; all mundane 'causes' are merely occasions (one 
mundane event has no power to cause another). 125 
From this the earlier argument can be adapted thus, 
(2) God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. 
(3) Evil exists. 
(5') Given (2), (Pl)&(P2), God ordains that no event comes to pass without his willing that it 
should happen. 
(6') But then, God must will (3). 
Edwards' response to the AP this sets up falls into three parts, each of which shall be examined 
in tUM. 126 The first is a tu quoque argument that he deploys against the Arminians, to the effect 
that whether his response to the AP is adequate or not, this is a problem common to theological 
libertarians as well as determinists. 
123 c every event which is the consequence of anything whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing 
thing or circumstance, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be 
ordered of God; either by a designed efficiency and interposition, or a designed forbearing to operate or 
interpose. But, as has been proved, all events whatsoever are necessarily connected with something 
foregoing, either positive or negative, which is the ground of its existence. ' Moreover, 'as God designedly 
orders his own conduct and its connected consequences, it must necessarily be, that he designedly orders 
all things. ' YEI: 432. See also YEI: 397. 
124 In fact for Edwards, all divine volitions are necessary too: 'How can we prove, that God certainly will 
in any one instance do that which is just and holy; seeing his will is determined in the matter by no 
necessity [as the Arminians claim]? We have no other way of proving that anything certainly will be but 
only by the necessity of the event. Where we can see no necessity, but that the thing may be, or may not 
be, there we are unavoidably left at a loss. ' YEJ: 418, author's emphasis. 
125 See yE3: IV: 111. For a more comprehensive account of Edwards' occasionalism, see chapter 6. 
126 The two places where Edwards discusses these issues in detail are YEI: IV: 9: 397-412 and YE3: HL 
2: 380-388. 
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The second and central issue pertains to whether God is causally and morally responsible for 
sin. This has several parts: the definition of 'author of sin'; the distinction between permission 
and positive agency in sin; and the nature of moral responsibility. In addition, it opens up the 
question of divine justice in the following way. If person P's sin is ordained by God (as per (5)), 
then such a person cannot be held responsible for their sin, since they could not have done 
otherwise. However, according to Edwards, P is responsible and God justly judges P for his sin, 
despite it being theologically determined 
The third problem is the apparent insincerity of divine commands with respect to those who are 
unable to respond to them. (If God commands person P to do action x, but God has already 
ordained that P do action y instead, then his exhortations to do x are insincere. ) This relies on 
the distinction between the hidden and revealed will of God, found in Calvin, Aquinas and 
others. 
Each of these areas of response has problems that Edwards is unable to overcome. But in 
addition to this, his concept of occasionalistic causation, particularly as it is developed in OS, 
means that though the three aspects to Edwards' argument may individually problematic, they 
are jointly incoherent. 
(3: 3) tu quoque 
By its very nature, a tu quoque argument can only point out that the issue under consideration is 
a problem common to all the participants to the debate. 127 That is what Edwards seeks to do as 
he begins his discussion of the AP in FOW IV: 9: 1. Nevertheless, whether it is true that those of 
a theologically libertarian persuasion have as great a burden of proof to overturn as theological 
determinists like Edwards do, is separate from the question of whether Edwards can proffer a 
reasonable defence of his own position in the face of this potential rebuttal of his Christian 
theism. In other words, Edwards' tu quoque does not, and cannot serve to alleviate the burden of 
proof that the AP presents his theological determinism with. All this tactic can hope to do is 
point out that theological libertarians are in the same boat as theological determinists, when it 
comes to solving the AP. 
However, it is relevant to the related, but distinct question of whether theological libertarians are 
any better off than theological determinists with respect to mounting a defence against the 
12' However, it may be that in addition to this, Edwards believes that his tu quoque holds because 
foreknowledge entails the necessity of what is foreknown (as he argues in FOW 11: 12). Therefore the 
Arminian position is unstable because it is as necessitarian as the Calvinists', whether they admit this or 
not. 
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AP. "' If theological libertarians can be shown to be better off than their determinist 
counterparts with respect to solving the AP, then Edwards is not simply faced with meeting the 
AP, he is placed at a significant disadvantage in presenting a solution to it. For if the Arminians 
(or whomever) are able to mount a simpler, more successful defence of their conception of 
God's responsibility for sin because of their libertarianism, then determinists like Edwards need 
to give good reasons for why their position is to be preferred to the libertarian alternative. 
'I'lierefore, although this is not actually part of a solution to Edwards' problem with the AP, it is 
worthwhile ascertaining whether he is disadvantaged by his adherence to theological 
determinism in comparison with the libertarian alternative. If he is, then it is incumbent upon 
him to show why, in addition to solving the AP, his determinism is to be preferred as a solution 
to the AP, to a potentially less complicated, more plausible libertarianism (assuming 
libertarianism is more plausible on balance). However, if he is not disadvantaged - if his tu 
quoque stands - then an Edwardsian defence of theological determinism in the face of the AP 
may proceed on a level playing field, so to speak. 
Edwards' central contention here is that the AP, 'is a difFiculty which equally attends the 
doctrine of the Arminians themselves; at least, of whose of them who allow God's certain 
foreknowledge of all events. ' 129 Hence, this touches upon that staple of contemporary 
philosophical discussion: the question of freedom, foreknowledge and subjunctive conditionals 
of freedom. 130 
William Wainwright claims that Edwards' contention in the tu quoque is only partially 
successful. It fails to establish one central aspect to Edwards' presentation, that the God of the 
Arminians is as equally the author of sin as the Calvinist God. Wainwright's argument turns on 
the difference between the two conceptions of ftee will and divine foreknowledge that underpin 
the Arminian (libertarian) and Calvinistic (determinist) approaches to this issue. lbat is, on a 
libertarian understanding of human free will, it makes no sense to claim that God can make true 
the acts of freely created agents. It does make sense to claim this for the deterministic God. So, 
when Edwards claims that God permits sin (as we shaH see in a moment), he means something 
quite different from a similar, Arminian claim, where such Arminians allow 'God's 
1 "' TI-tis is the question that William Wainwright has recently set out to answer in "Theological 
Determinism and The Problem of Evil". 
129 YEI: 398. 
130 The literature on this topic is, as one would expect, vast. See, for example William Lane Craig, The 
Only Wise God, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), Williani Hasker, God Time and Knowledge, Paul Helm, 
Eternal God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), Edwards Wierenga, Ae Nature of God (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989) and Linda Trinkhaus Zagzebski's The Dilemma of Freedom and 
Foreknowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 1 ornit examples ftom the journal literature. 
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foreknowledge of all events' . 
13' Edwards qua Calvinist means something like, 'God's 
permission of action x is a causally sufficient condition for x taking place'. Whereas, the 
Arminian/libertarian means, 'God's permission of action x is a sufficient, but not causally 
sufficient condition of x taking place. ' 
This is the case, Wainwright points out, because such libertarians believe that God does not 
C produce' sin, nor does he 'bring it about', since sinful actions are actions which are free of 
divine interference. He does bring about the state of affairs in which free agents may exercise 
that freedom in sin. But he is not the causally sufficient condition of that sin. 
The principle at issue is this: 
(A) If a person does action x or brings about x and knows that x is a sufficient condition of 
action y, then he does y or brings about y (is the 'author' of 
Wainwright maintains that (A) is plausible for x, where x is a causally sufficient condition of 
y's obtaining (as with Edwardsian determinism). But it is less plausible where x is a causally 
necessary but not causally sufficient condition of y (as with Arminian libertarianism). And it is 
least plausible where y is a random or contra-causal decision (which Edwards claims is a 
constituent part of Arminian accounts of free will). 
Here is the rub: because the God of the Arminians exercises significantly less control over 
human agents than the Calvinist God does (given the different readings of (A)), it is not clear 
that if the God of the Calvinists (and Edwards in particular) is responsible for sin, the Arminian 
God is too. 132 
However, all is not lost for Edwards, even if this is granted, which, I think, it must be. 133 For 
Wainwright goes on to point out that the central contention behind Edwards' tu quoque 
argument is successful. This contention is that even if the Arminian God does not have the same 
problem with (A) that the Calvinist does, because of their libertarianism with respect to the 
counterfactuals of freedom, nevertheless,, this does not mean that the Arminian God is less 
responsible for sin than the Calvinist's God. God could still be responsible for sin, though he is 
not its author. And if this can be demonstrated, then Edwards has gone a considerable way 
towards showing that he is not at a theological disadvantage in holding to a Calvinistic 
compatibility thesis with respect to creaturely freedom. 
This caveat is important in light of current discussions of 'Openness of God theism', for instance. 
wainwright goes one step further by claiming that, 'the God of the Calvinists is the author of sin while 
the God of the Arminians is not. ' "Theological Determinism and The Problem of Evil" p. 87. 
133 Whether the libertarian thesis of such Arminians is more coherent than the compatibilism of Calvinists 
like Edwards is a separate question, and one that Edwards contests with great rigour in FOW. 
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Wainwright examines the doctrine of double effect (DDE) as a means to drawing this out with 
respect to the Edwardsian tu quoque. According to the DDE, 'there is a morally relevant 
difference between the harmful consequences of our actions which we intend and those we 
merely foresee. '134This involves four notions: 
(1) The action itself is good. 
(2) Only a good, not an evil effect, is intended. 
(3) A good effect is not produced by an evil effect. 
(4) There is a proportional reason for permitting the evil effect. 135 
Some contemporary proponents of this principle even claim that harmful actions that are 
foreseen, are always to be preferred to intended hannful actions, even when such foreseen, but 




'Me application to the AP is as follows. Artninians typically suppose that the alternatives facing 
God with respect to the fall were, 
(AI) Respect Adam's autonomy, not interfere in his choices and allow the resulting sin to occur. 
(A2) Prevent Adam's sin, forestalling sin and its evil consequences for humanity. 
Clearly, (A I) corresponds to a situation foreseen but not intended by God (intended, instead, by 
Adam's libertarian free choice). (A. 2) corresponds to an intentional situation, where God acts to 
prevent a certain outcome, violating Adam's freedom in the process. It is this kind of scenario 
that leads Arminians to believe their God is less blameworthy than the Calvinistic Deity. 
However, this is a false belief, because it does not pick out the relevant choices. Those choices 
that are relevant in this regard pertain to creation rather than the fall, since in (A l)&(A2) at least 
one human moral agent, Adam, is presupposed. Instead, the question is between something like 
the following, 
(A V) Not to create libertarianly free being(s). 
134 Wainwright, "Theological Determinism and The Problem of Evir p. 87. However, as Wainwright 
admits, this is a notoriously difficult distinction to draw. 
135 Adapted from Wainwright, ibid., p. 87. He takes it from I T. Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the 
Principle of Double Effect", Theological Studies 10 (1949): 43. 
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(A2') To create libertarianly free beings knowing that at least one of them will sin. 
W) To create libertarianly free beings every one of which will not sin. 
(M) depends upon there being a contingent, not just logically possible world, where no beings 
suffer from transworld depravity. 
Arminians think that something like (AT) obtains. This is a scenario in which sin is foreseeable, 
but not intended by God, (though, of course, the libertarian human agents intend it). With 
respect to the principles behind the DDE, 
(I') The creation of libertarian beings is in itself a good action (qua (1)). 
(2') Only a good (creation), not an evil effect (sin), is intended (qua (2)). 
(3') A good effect (libertarian freedom) is not produced by an evil effect (sinful actions) (qua 
(3)). 
(4') There is a proportional reason for permitting the evil effect: the good effects of creation 
significantly outweigh harmful ones (qua (4)). 
This might seem to demonstrate that the Arminian is better off than the Calvinist on DDE 
principles. But this is not the case. Closer analysis shows that the Arminian position has parity 
with the Calvinist in this aspect of the tu quoque. 
First, the Arminian's God intends, rather than merelyforesees creaturely sin, iff. for any world 
God could weakly actualise (granting that, following Plantinga, God cannot strongly actualise a 
possible world of libertarian creatures), that world contains creatures who have the essential 
property of transworld depravity. Were this the case, then any libertarian world such a God 
created, would be a world where he intended to actualise individuals with transworld depravity, 
since his actualization of a creature must include his intention to actualise all the essential 
properties of that creature, since without those essential properties, the creature in question 
could not be actualized. 137 
Moreover, if (A3) is a possible world (presuming transworld depravity is not a necessary 
property of all world-indexed individuals for a moment, and that such a world is a contmgent, 
not merely logically possible world -a notion Plantinga rejects), then the Arminians have an 
136 Wainwright cites Phillipa Foot in this regard. See, for example, her "The Problem of Abortion and the 
Doctrine of Double Effect" in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978). 
137 We could adjust this, qua Plantinga, such that every creaturely essence suffers from transworld 
depravity. A creaturely essence denotes the set of all properties a person or thing possesses in every 
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even greater problem to overcome. Although such a world might be deontologically less good 
than a world where evil is actualized for a greater good (as Edwards' argues with respect to the 
doctrine of the atonement), it may still be such that no individual in that world ever sins, and no 
morally detrimental effects result from this. 
So, on two counts, it is not clear that the Arminians are able to satisfy the qualifications of the 
DDE without cavil. If God creates an (AT) world, then he intends to create creatures with 
essences, or essential properties including transworld depravity. The other options are not to 
create any libertarian world, as Per (Al'), or to create a world of libertarian creatures none of 
whom will ever sin, as per (M). But (M) is not logically possible, as Plantinga has shown in 
his Free Will Defence. And even if it were, as we have seen, it would create even more 
problems for the Arminian to deal with. Finally, it might be noted in passing that the Arminian 
is no better off with respect to at least one construal of (Y). Like the Calvinist, if the Arminian 
believes that a good effect (salvation) is produced by the evil of sin, then, though as (3') stands 
the Arminian is correct, as applied to the soteriology of Arminianism, it is false. 
The Calvinist option, in light of our four DDE principles fares similarly, 
(1 ") The action itself is good: the creation of compatibilist humanity is necessary for the 
actualization of the elect (qua (1)). 138 
(2") A good and an evil effect are intended, since God is the cause of all volitions (denial of 
(2)). 
(3 ") A good effect (actualization of the elect) is not (directly) produced by an evil effect (sin). 
(Nevertheless, it is produced through the medium of an evil effect, which means that (3) as it 
stands is not met by the Calvinist. ) 
(4") There is a proportional reason for permitting the evil effect: the greater good (qua (4)). 
So. on the Calvinistic picture, (2) and (3) cannot be endorsed unequivocally. But this means that 
on this crucial element of the Arminian defence, the Arminian is on something like a par with 
the Calvinist. Both parties are unable to satisfy (2) and (3) of the DDE. The fact that there are 
different reasons for this result is irrelevant. What matters is that both the Arminians and the 
Calvinists struggle to meet the same criteria of the DDE. So the DDE cannot be used to support 
possible world in which it exists, not just one of those properties a person possesses essentially. See The 
Nature ofNecessity, Pp. 72 ff. 
138 The phrase, 'actualization of the elect' refers to the bringing into existence of a number of humanity 
whom God has elected to eternal life according to his eternal decree, understood in terms of the 
theological framework of Calvinism. 
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the claim that the Arminian Deity is less blameworthy than the Calvinist God, because he is not 
causally responsible for all events, due to libertarian freedom. 
In sum, Edwards' initial claim that the Arminian God is on a moral par with the Calvinist's 
regarding responsibility for sin appears to be false. Arminian libertarianism yields a different 
state of affairs from the determinism of Calvinism, and this affects the level of culpability 
involved in permitting sin (the difference between whether an agent will or must sin). But this 
does not enable the Arminian to escape the force of Edwards' tu quoque. The notion that there is 
a significant moral difference between intended harm and foreseen harm which would feed into 
the Arminian (libertarian) idea that an agent will sin, but may not sin, actually leaves the 
Arminian in much the same situation to the Calvinist. Neither party can credibly claim to be 
able to show that their Deity intends only the good, and not the evil effect of his creating this 
world. Nor can they show that the good effect of creating this world was not produced by means 
of an evil effect, such as sin. 
I Thus, Edwards is wrong in one respect, but right in another: wrong that there is a strict Parity 
between his Calvinism and the Arminians, but right that the Arminian position does not insulate 
them from parallel problems for moral responsibility. By contrast the Arminians are right, but 
wrong. Right that there is no strict parity between themselves and Edwardsian Calvinism. But 
wrong in thinking that this entitles them to invoke a moral principle like the DDE in their 
defence. Thus, Edwards is not handicapped by his determinism. The Arminians are not, as 
Wainwright concludes, significantly better off than the Calvinists, with respect to the AP. With 
this result in place, we may address the substance of Edwards' defence against the AP. 
(3: 4) Three problems for the Edwardsian AP 
Given Edwards' theological determinism, expressed in part in (P 1)&(P2) (we shall come to (P3) 
in due course), the first part of Edwards' defence proper pertains to moral responsibility. In light 
of (Pl)&(P2), God appears to be ultimately causally and morally responsible for Adamic sin. 
We shall focus on three aspects to this problem that have been drawn out by Edwards and his 
critics. These we shall call the problem of defining 'author of sin', the permission and positive 
agency problem, and the proxy problem respectively. 
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(3: 4: i) On defining 'author ofsin'. 
In FO W IV: 9: 11,1'9 Edwards distinguishes between two ways in which the term 'author of sin' 
may be construed. The first, common use is, 'the sinner, the agent, or actor of sin, or the doer of 
a wicked thing; so it would be a reproach or blasphemy, to suppose God to be the author of sin. ' 
But a second use is, 'the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin; and at the same time, a disposer of 
the state of events, in such a manner, for wise holy and most excellent ends and purposes, that 
sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow'. 140 Edwards 
endorses this second way of thinking about God as the author of sin over the former. Let us 
designate these two senses of 'author of sin' AS I and AS2 respectively. 
Wainwright points out that AS I has two conditions which Edwards seems to conflate. 14' These 
are, ASI(a) that God must be the agent/actor/doer of action x, and ASI(b) that God's 
performance of x must be sinful. 142 It may be that God is the AS I (a) but not AS I (b) agent of 
action x. If he is, then God is not clearly the author of (all) sin. Edwards can argue that God is 
I the actor in the sense of AS2 in a way compatible with AS I (a) without incurring AS I (b). And 
that is exactly what AS2 sets out to demonstrate: God can permit the sin of an agent for some 
greater, holier, good. In this way, God may be the author of sin (he permits it) but not the one 
who sins. An example Edwards uses is the crucifixion of Christ. God permits the sin of those 
who murder Christ, for the greater good of humanity in the salvation of the elect. But, although 
he is the author of the sin that leads to Christ's death (qua AS I (a)), he is not the one who sins in 
killing Christ (qua AS I (b)). 
So. in summary, Edwards makes clear that God need not be the author of sin in the conventional 
sense of the word (i. e., AS I). But he may be the author of sin in the AS2 sense he sets out, viz. 
as the permitter of sin (although there are considerable questions about some of the assumptions 
lurking behind these claims, as we have shown). However, this raises further questions with 
respect to the distinction that Edwards' seems to be making between permission and positive 
agency in a particular action. 
(3: 4: ii) Permission andpositive agency. 
With AS2 informing our notion of the divine authorship of sin, we turn to FOW IV: 9: 111. 
There, Edwards says this: 
139 YEI: 399. 
140 YEI: 399. 
141 See "Theological Determinism and The Problem of Evil" 
142 Ibid., p. 83. 
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There is a great difference between God's being concerned thus, by his perniission, in an event and act 
which in the inherent subject and agent of it is sin (though the event will certainly follow on his 
perniission), and his being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of sin; or between his 
being the orderer of its certain eýdstence, by not hindering it, under certain circumstances, and his being 
the proper actor or author of it, by a positive agency or efficiency. 143 
We shall designate the difference between these two kinds of act as permitting (as per AS2) and 
positive agency. Permission carries the meaning (for present purposes at least) of non- 
interference, or forbearance, as when Trevor does not interfere in Wayne's fight with Gary, 
though (perhaps) he could have done so. '441n the case of God, such permission is, as Paul Helm 
has pointed out, for a particular purpose, rather than a general permission. And this particular 
purpose is, according to Edwards, to the holy end(s) of the divine plan. 14' Positive agency, by 
contrast, means an agent's actual causal involvement in a particular act (whether as a partial or 
I total cause we leave open at present). Thus, if Trevor were to punch Gary and Wayne in the 
face, he would be exercising a positive agency in bringing about physical damage to both Gary 
and Wayne. 
Wainwright proceeds to use this distinction to demonstrate that Edwards' view entails that God 
exercises positive agency, not merely permission in the origination of sin. 146 The idea that 
underlies Edwards' notion is that person A permits person B to do action x. But this has 
consequences that Edwards cannot approve of For if this is a correct description then, 
(i) A's non-interference is a causally necessary condition of B doing action x, but 
(ii) A's non-interference is not a causally sufficient condition of B doing action x, 
since A permitting B to do x is not necessarily the only causal reason why B does x. To go back 
to our previous protagonists, if Trevor forbears from interfering in Wayne's fight with Gary, 
then it may be that his forbearance is a necessary condition of Wayne fighting Gary (perhaps 
Wayne has such a high regard for Trevor that if he told him not to fight Gary, he would 
certainly not fight Gary). But it is not clear that this non-interference on Trevor's part is a 
causally sufficient condition of Wayne fighting Gary. It is, after all, Wayne's decision to hit 
143 YEI: 403. 
144 The point here is to do with non-interference, not with the principle of alternate possibilities, that this 
example invokes, and which we shall return to in due course. 
145 See Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Leicester: lVP, 1993), chapter 7, p. 173. There Helm sets out 
several models of God's action in the world, including one similar to that outlined here. On the question 
of God's end in creation in Edwards' thought, see YE8: 526 ff. 
146 Wainwright, "Theological Determinism and The Problem of Evil", pp. 82-83. 
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Gary, not Trevor's. The situation is perhaps different with a deity; a deity might be causally 
responsible inasmuch as he creates and conserves Wayne in being at all those times in which he 
is thinking about and acting upon his desire to fight Gary. But even this is not enough to ensure 
that a deity is a causally sufficient condition of Wayne's action. There may be mundane 
causation involved. For God to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of 
sin, some other condition needs to be added to (i) and (ii); a condition like (M) (though not 
necessarily as strong as (P3)). 
Edwards claims that God's permitting x is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
occurrence of sin. But even if he can find an argument to substantiate this (using, say, (P3)), this 
only generates another problem. For if this is the case, then God does more than merely permit 
sin; he is a positive agent in bringing it about. 
But Edwards' point in all this appears to be something slightly different. What he seems to be 
getting at is this: A is the author of B's being (or doing) x only if A brings about B's being (or 
doing) x by acting on B, or bringing about some positive influence to bear upon B. 147 
As it stands, permission would not fall under this rubric, whereas positive agency would. 
Edwards maintains that in this way, God is not morally responsible for the sin of moral agents, 
though he is causally responsible. That is, he causes the state of affairs and desires of the 
particular moral agent to obtain such that Wayne will necessarily hit Gary, and God is causally 
responsible for this. But given Edwards' endorsement of the compatibilist principle of liberty of 
spontaneity, God is not morally responsible for Wayne hitting Gary, since it is still Wayne who 
chooses to do the hitting. He is not forced to hit Gary, though, of course, he is constituted so that 
he will hit Gary given a certain state of affairs determined by God. 
Thus, God is the author of Wayne's hitting Gary, since, according to Edwards, God brings about 
Wayne's hitting of Gary by acting upon Wayne. 
But will this work? Does it stay within the parameters Edwards sets himself, viz. permission 
rather than positive agency? Take the example Edwards uses of the sun (FOW. 403-404). The 
sun is the positive agency that brings about the heat and light that brightens our planet. But 
when it is withdrawn during the night, the darkness and frost that result are not brought about by 
the positive agency of the sun. They occur, as the sun's rays are withdrawn. Unfortunately, this 
analogy will not yield the analysis Edwards needs. For the sun, unlike God, is not a moral agent. 
147 Adapted from Wainwright, "T'heological Determinism and The Problem of Evil", p. 82. This may 
seem a rather strong principle to deploy - why accept it? But of course, as we have already had cause to 
note, Edwards was defending a species of theological determinism. It is in against this backdrop that his 
account is developed. 
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And if it were, then it would be the author of the resulting cold and dark, since it would be 
acting as a voluntary agent in bringing about the state of affairs where darkness and frost obtain. 
Or take another example, this time involving a moral agent: Judas' betrayal of Christ. 
According to Edwards' argument, Judas' betrayal depends entirely on God's ordination (given 
(Pl)&(P2)). That he does this by permitting Judas to sin, rather than acting positively to bring 
this about does not alter the fact that the moral responsibility for this action, given (Pl)&(P2) is 
God's alone. So although Edwards may be able to find a way to preserve his distinction between 
permission and positive agency, this does not seem to be able to bear the weight of absolving 
God of the moral responsibility for sin that Edwards thinks it should. We shall return to this 
with respect to the proxy problem. 
Matters are complicated by the fact that Edwards maintains more than a theological 
determinism (viz. causation), as has already been hinted at. He was an occasionalist, as per (P3). 
But his occasionalism means that any distinction between permission and positive agency is 
undermined. For if there are no real causes apart from God's causal agency, then God's 
permission of x cannot mean anything less than his bringing x to pass, since any agent other 
than God (A, or B or whomever) has no ability to act as a cause whatsoever. But if it means this, 
then there is little or no difference between permission, on an occasionalist view of God's causal 
action in the world,, and positive agency. For God is the only causal agent. 
(3: 4: iii) The proxy problem. 
The third aspect to this problem is drawn out by John Kearney in a recent article on Edwards 
and the AP. 148 Given (P 1), (P2) and the permission and positive agency problem, God is clearly 
causally responsible for all events that come to pass. Moreover, all such events are necessary. 
But the question we have already seen this raises with respect to the AP is whether God is also 
morally responsible for all events. If he is, then he is the author of sin. We left the permission 
and positive agency problem with this issue of divine moral responsibility regarding the AP 
unresolved, taken on (P 1)&(P2) only; the addition of (P3) is, as we have seen, fatal to Edwards' 
argument. This is what the proxy problem addresses. 
Kearney defends Edwards against the charge that his theological determinism entails that God is 
morally responsible in this respect. Hs argument relies upon a second Edwardsian distinction 
(or a second distinction within the same problem) between the expression of an agent's will (in 
148 "Jonathan Edwards and the 'Author of Sin' Charge" in The Princeton Theological Review 5 (1998): 
10-16. What follows draws on pp. 15-16 in particular. 
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an action), and that expression of an agent's will in another agent's (sinful) choices. Put more 
formally, 
(PX) if A wills action y, (where A is also the necessary and sufficient causal condition of y 
obtaining) and y is brought about by agent B, is A still morally responsible for B's action? 
We shall call (PX) the proxy problemfor moral responsibility, orproxy problem for short, since 
it involves once person acting as the agent for another, in this case, B for A. This problem poses 
the following two interrelated questions: 
(PX I) Can A be causally responsible and not morally responsible for y? 
(PX2) Can A be morally responsible and not causally responsible for y? 
Both of these are interesting questions, and both will be addressed in the course of the following 
argument, although it is (PXI) that is the principal object of our analysis. For (PXI) is the 
question before Edwards with respect to this aspect of the AP, in light of the findings of the 
permission and positive agency argument. If God can be shown to be causally but not morally 
responsible for sin, then there may be grounds for Edwards to build a defence against the AP 
from the perspective of the theological determinist. 149 
We come to the argument for the proxy problem. In Edwards' thought, moral responsibility is 
tied to the related notion of praise and blameworthiness. He expounds his views on this matter 
in FOW., IV: U. "O There, Edwards makes the claim that praise and blameworthiness lie in the 
nature, not the cause of volitions and dispositions. "' That is, an action x, may be the result of 
my causing x to come about, but it does not follow that I am morally responsible for x if I did 
not choose to do x. 
This may seem obscure, but can be elucidated with the help of the following example. Imagine 
that Trevor is hypnotized by a master hypnotist, the Great Suprendo. Whilst in a hypnotic 
trance, the Great Suprendo suggests to Trevor that when he awakes, he should find his friend 
Wayne and throttle him. Trevor awakes from the trance, locates Wayne and promptly begins to 
149 This crucial distinction is overlooked by C. Samuel Storms in Tragedy in Eden. There he claims that 
for Edwards to avoid the force of the AP, he must construe the divine permission of sin as having no 
causal influence in the inception of an evil disposition (p. 216. ) Otherwise, God is the immediate cause of 
all sin, and therefore the author of sin in the sense of AS 1. But this is only the case if God is both causally 
and morally responsible for sin. If he is causally but not morally responsible - which is exactly what 
Edwards claims is the case - then Storms' criticism has no force. 150 YEI: 427428. 
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throttle him, as the Great Suprendo suggested he should. 152 Now, as Trevor begins to throttle 
Wayne it is clear that he is causally responsible for closing off Wayne's trachea by choking him. 
(The hypnotist does not do it. ) But it is not clear that he is also blameworthy for this action, 
since he does it under hypnotic suggestion. Thus he is causally, but not necessarily morally 
responsible for throttling Wayne. "' 
Edwards makes a similar distinction when he speaks about a person's will being in an action 
(and therefore blameworthy), and not in an action (and therefore not blameworthy). Insofar as 
the nature of the act derives from the choice of the moral action, that agent is culpable. But 
insofar as the voluntary nature of that choice is diminished (as with the hypnotism), just so far is 
that person not culpable for their action. So the question of whether an act is from a person is 
secondary, with respect to blame, to the question of whether choice was involved in the 
performance of it. It is, 'not so much because they are from some property of ours, as because 
they are our properties. ' 154 So external, (. overt' actions are not a reliable guide to moral 
responsibility. Only choice is. 
The application of this to Edwards' solution to the AP is as follows. If God is responsible for 
my sinful volitions, this is because they are the expression of his will. But, of course, on 
Edwards' compatibilist thesis, my choices are mine and therefore blameworthy. After all, God 
does not choke Wayne; Trevor does. So it is not God who is culpable for throttling Wayne; 
Trevor is. (But this - as we shall see in a moment - involves a sleight of hand on Edwards' part 
that cannot work. ) 
Edwards adduces further grounds for his argument from the Calvinian distinction between the 
hidden and revealed will of God. 
151 6 natural sense don't place the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but the 
nature of them. ' YEI: 427. 
152 The fact that hypnotism does not necessarily work in this irresistible fashion need not concern us; a 
popular picture of hypnotic arts will suffice for the purposes of the thought experiment. 
153 Mark Nelson has suggested to me that this scenario is not to the point since it is about the cause, not 
the nature of Trevor's volition. If person G hypnotically induces person T to have a desire to kill person 
W, then Trevor seems morally responsible on Edwards' account of the importance of the nature of the act 
in determining moral responsibility. However, it is not clear in the hypnosis case that T chooses to kill W, 
since his will is not involved; he acts like an automaton (assuming, that hypnosis might work in this way). 
T does not choose to so act. So though he is causally responsible (or partly thereof) for throttling W he is 
not culpable (or not completely, solely culpable), since he did not choose to so act. That is the point. And 
it is a point about the nature of the action; whether it was chosen or not and therefore whether T is 
culpable or not Nor is this example parallel to Edwards' theological determinism. God may implant a 
desire for T to kill W. But in Edwards' view, God's willing T to so act and T desiring to so act happen at 
the same time (in fact, God gives T this desire to so act). The same cannot be said for the hypnotist. The 
whole point of the folk-picture of hypnosis at work in this example is that T acts without consenting to his 
actions, simply because ordered to do so by the hypnotist whilst hypnotized. 
154 YEI: 428. 
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With respect to the divine hidden will, God cannot be morally responsible for my actions 
because his hidden will determines all things for a greater good, not for some other, evil 
outcome. Yet my actions - where they are actions of my choosing, not constrained by things 
outside myself - are orientated towards an evil end, such as Trevor choking Wayne, or 
whatever. 155 So God is not morally responsible for my choice here, though (via his hidden will), 
he is causally responsible for my choice. 11is causation of my action is motivated by a greater 
good, an end which presumably outweighs or balances off the evil of my act for some greater 
good. And since he does not commit the act itself, I do, he cannot be morally responsible for 
it. 156 
A similar case is made for God's revealed will. But here God expressly forbids evil M what he 
has revealed (in Scripture, for example). The problem with this is that it makes God's revealed 
will seem disingenuous, in light of his hidden will (more on that presently). Edwards claims that 
his revealed will is not disingenuous because, once more, the choice is mine, not God's. Thus 
God may expressly forbid murder, whilst being the necessary and sufficient cause of my 
murdering Wayne, and no contradiction result because the choice to murder Wayne is mine, not 
God' 
(3: 5) Comments on the proxy problem 
So much for Edwards' defence against the proxy problem. Does it work? Here Antony Flew's 
classic essay, "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom" 157 offers several helpful pointers by 
way of assessing Edwards' proposal. 
1-" This skates over several important ethical points it is worth pausing to mention. First it does not 
account for altruistic action, if there are any such. Even if there are not, it does not account for human 
actions that are either (a) evil for a greater good (e. g. killing Hitler), or (b) of mixed motives (such as so- 
called crimes of passion). It does not establish that a person is morally culpable for all kinds of actions, 
nor for actions that may be culpable in one respect, but not in another, as with the murder of Hitler (where 
a person may be culpable for murder, but not for killing a mass murderer). Actions whose moral 
orientation is unclear, like crimes of passion, are also not accounted for here. 
156 Is this a violation of premise (3) of the DDE, outlined earlier? This was that 'a good effect is not 
produced by an evil effect'. In this context, that translates as, 'God violates (3) if he causes my sinfid 
choices and causes them for a greater good end, since this involves producing a good effect via an evil 
effect (my sin)'. As I mentioned earlier in the context of the Calvinist construal of the DDE, it is not clear 
that Calvinist's, Edwards included, have an adequate response to this problem. 
157 See New Essays in Philosophical Theology (eds. ) Antony Flew and Alasdair ý&clntyre (London: 
SCMý 1955), chapter VIIL especially pp. 162-164. 
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(3: 5: 0 Volitions, praise and blame. 
First, some comments on Edwards' distinction between the nature and cause of volitions with 
respect to praise and blame. His distinction does not necessarily remove all moral responsibility 
from the actor(s) involved. In the case of the hypnotist, for example, if a person is discovered to 
have been acting under hypnotic suggestion, as in the case of Trevor throttling Wayne, we 
would normally want to reconsider Trevor's culpability in light of this fact. Nevertheless, he 
would not necessarily be without blame for such an action. For Trevor had submitted to the 
hypnotism in the first place. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for similar thought experiments 
where mind-altering drugs, or other stimulants take the place of hypnotism (alcohol, for 
instance). In these cases too, the person involved is not blameless for actions committed whilst 
4 under the influence' of some particular stimulant. Quite the opposite. If a man who is 
intoxicated smashes a shop window in an uncharacteristic display of violence, his moral 
responsibility may be diminished by the fact that he acted under the influence of alcohol, but it 
is not negligible. Although he may have not been able to make a rational decision in those 
circumstances, such that his action whilst drunk was not clearly voluntary, 158 this does not mean 
that he bears no responsibility. In fact, he was irresponsible in his use of alcohol and is therefore 
culpable, whatever his state of mind may have been whilst he was inebriated (even if he cannot 
recall his action afterwards). 
But what about situations where the influence a person is under is irresistible like the hypnotism 
example? The same reasoning obtains. The point is that I have chosen to submit myself to the 
conditions that brought about the diminishment (or obliteration) of my moral responsibility for 
the particular act in question. Insofar as my choice leading to that state was voluntary, just so far 
am I responsible for what comes after, where what comes after is dependent upon my initial, 
voluntary choice. But if I was force-fed alcohol or drugs, or strapped down to the hypnotist's 
chair, then my culpability is diminished, viz. any actions I perform whilst under the influence of 
that particular thing. But that is not the point here. The point is that Edwards claims that the 
nature not the cause of a person's volitions affect their culpability in the choice of a particular 
action. What he does not take into account is the fact that choices leading up to that choice are 
crucial in determining the amount of culpability on the event itself. "' 
158 In the sense of being an action that is informed by a rational decision where that agent was presented 
with no coercion or obstacle to their choice as opposed to, say, a physical reflex, which is not the result of 
any voluntary choice on the part of the human agent. 
159 Of course, it may be argued that Trevor makes a choice to go to the hypnotist and submits to his 
ministrations, but only for benign purposes, never with the intention that he be instructed to throttle 
Wayne. In such instances a person's moral responsibility is diminished, to be sure, but is it negligible? I 
think not. The case for alcohol and mind-bending drugs is easier to discern, since their unpleasant effects 
would usually be known in advance of taking them. 
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It may be that I make the choice, and that is what counts. But there are circumstances in which 
my moral responsibility diminishes or increases depending upon actions I take before my 
present action, as in the case of the hypnotist. So it is not clearly the case (pace Edwards), that I 
may be the cause of an action and not morally responsible for that action if, mi choosing to place 
myself in the circumstances that lead to that particular choice, it is I who voluntarily take the 
choice that leads to the subsequent choice of the action in question. 
In short, Edwards' distinction does not take account of what action has gone before, that brings 
about the present state of affairs with respect to my present volition. 
(3: 5: ii) Causal and moral responsibility. 
The second comment on Edwards' argument is actually a comment about the case of the 
hypnotist (obviously, not a thought experiment used by Edwards). As Flew points out, this 
example does not adequately capture the relation between God and human moral agents. Unlike 
the analysis just presented, there are no prior choices that may affect the causal and moral 
responsibility I bear with respect to God. A person does not choose to come under the influence 
of God as one might the hypnotist, drugs or alcohol. This means that there is a significant 
disanalogy between human choice and moral responsibility and God's choice and moral 
responsibility. However, far from vindicating Edwards' analysis of nature and cause, this means 
that the argument he presents in FOW 427-428 relies on a false analogy between divine and 
human actions and volitions. But does it mean, in addition to this, that no one is completely 
morally responsible for their actions, whether they are their choices or not? Not necessarily. 
And here Edwards' argument may begin to make some headway. 
Whether compatibilism is true on predestinarian grounds, or just because this is the way things 
are 160 does not alter the fact that if a species of compatibilism obtains, then Edwards is right to 
insist that moral responsibility only applies where a person has made a voluntary choice. The 
question of whether I acted in a certain way is, as Edwards claims, a secondary matter. 
Moreover, causal responsibility and moral responsibility are thereby distinct, but related 
matters. I may - on a compatibilist account - be causally but not morally responsible for a 
particular act as per (PX 1). Indeed, the converse holds: I might be morally responsible for 
inciting a crowd to riot through my speech, for instance, but not causally responsible (at least, 
not in terms of Edwards' positive agency) for the individual actual acts of violence members of 
viz. the compatibilist account of the liberty of spontaneity over indifference. 
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the crowd carry out after listening to my speech. And this, of course, is one example of how 
(PX2) might obtain. "' 
This means that the compatibilist core of Edwards' distinction between the nature and cause of 
voluntary acts regarding culpability, remains intact. Whether the compatibilism in question is 
theologically motivated, or simply a form of atheological soft determinisn-ý the nature and cause 
of an act are distinct issues with respect to volition and moral responsibility, as Edwards 
contends. 
However, the fact that Edwards defends a theological determinism is not without significance. 
As has already been pointed out, there is an important disanalogy between human and divine 
moral agents and their choices. This means that the position seems to be that, 
While there is no 'contradiction in speaking of God as so arranging things that all men always as a matter 
of fact freely choose to do the right'; the ideas of God arraigning and punishing anyone who freely chose 
the wrong, if he so arranges things that his victim does so act, 'outrages ... the most ordinary 
justice and 
humanity. ' 162 
In other words, Edwards may be right regarding theological determinism, but wrong regarding 
the justice of God's eternal decree. Put another way, God may not be morally responsible for 
my actions, though he is causally responsible for them. But the justice of condemning me for a 
sin he has ordained - though it is mine - seems skewed, to say the least. Ordinarily, if a person 
were to be causally, but not morally responsible for another person's crime, only to condemn 
that person for their crime having been causally responsible for it coming to pass, such a person 
would be considered UnjUst. 163 
161 However, as with the earlier example, this is too simple. My moral responsibility may increase or 
decrease according to circumstances, just as my causal responsibility may too. For instance, I might be 
the one who incites the crowd to riot, but that does not absolve the members of the crowd from 
responsibility for their actions, nor does it mean I am wholly or completely morally responsible for what 
they do as a result of my inflammatory speech. That is, I might be a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition of the rioting and subsequent moral culpability. Nevertheless, the point about being morally but 
not causally responsible for an action, with these qualifications, holds. 
162 rc Flew, Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom", p. 164. The citations are from John Stuart Mill's 
Three Essays on Religion (bibliographical details not supplied. ) 
163 This presumes that human and divine justice is, to some degree at least commensurable. However, I 
take it that a constituent of the perfect being tradition to which Edwards belonged was that God was 
essentially just and that his justice is reflected, albeit incompletely and falteringly, in the notions of justice 
he has bequeathed to humanity in divine revelation and conscience. In addition, Edwards thought that the 
punishment of sin finthered the greater glorification of God, the aim behind all God's works. See End of 
Creation in YE8. Edwards believed that an essentially just and holy God not only may, but must punish 
the sin of his creatures. The fact that they have been predestined to do this sin is irrelevant. For it is not 
the cause but the nature of the will that matters, as we have already established from Edwards. 
77 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
Flew maintains that Calvin for one saw this implication and decided to bite the bullet '[for 
Calvin] the damned were damned "by a just and Irreprehensible, but incomprehensible 
judgment. " In thus seeing and accepting the implications of omnipotence he showed himself to 
have both a clearer head and a stronger - shall we say? - stomach than most bellevers. "64 
Edwards, however, did not do so; he maintained that God's justice is inviolable. A thumbnail 
sketch of why Edwards believed this should make this point plain. 
Edwards' argument for divine justice in the damnation of sinners is to the effect that God is just 
in so acting because the creation and reprobation of the damned are one aspect of the divine 
programme of self-glorification. As his dissertation on the End of Creation makes clear, God's 
'great and last end' is but one, 'and this one end is most properly and comprehensively called, 
"the glory of God"' . 
16' The damned glorify God through demonstrating God's inviolable justice: 
He will deal with sin and punish it infinitely in hell. But he manifests his grace and mercy to the 
elect who will enjoy the infinite pleasures of his presence in heaven eternally. Thus, on 
Edwards' picture, God's great and last end in creation is his self-glorification in the display of 
his righteous anger in the punishment of the wicked, and his grace and mercy in the saving of 
the saints. 
The problem with this is that it begs the question. Divine justice is displayed in the damnation 
of the wicked, by the ordination and causation of the existence and persistence of the wicked 
through time. God is not morally responsible for the sins which they voluntarily choose, but he 
is the necessary and sufficient cause of their existence and persistence, through his direct action 
in creation and conservation. But this is to return to our initial problem: God causes the wicked 
to act wickedly but without moral culpability for their individual actions, only to blame them for 
actions he caused them to perform! 
This brings us back to Wainwright's analysis of permission and positive agency. If Edwards is 
to use this as a means of evading the unpalatable consequences of this aspect of the AP in his 
determinism, he is left with the claim that God's permission (but not his positive agency) in sin 
is a necessary but not causally sufficient condition of sin, which is exactly what he denies with 
respect to praise and blame. 
164 "Divine omnipotence and Human Freedom", p. 164, n. 28. It need hardly be said that this is a 
controversial reading of Calvin. 
165 End of Creation in YE8: 5 30. 
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(3: 5: iii) The transitivity principle. 
66 Third, there is an issue with respect to the transitivity principle that (PX) entails. If A Wills 
action y and y is brought about by B, then A wills y (via B). It is not just that A wills y and B 
wills y on behalf of A, therefore y obtains. (Example: Trevor wants to punish Gary for injuring 
him. Wayne wants to punish Gary on behalf of Trevor. So, Wayne punishes Gary on behalf of 
Trevor. Gary is thereby punished according to Trevor's wishes and at his instigation, but not by 
Trevor; by Wayne. ) With respect to divine volitions, Edwards surely means A wills y and (in 
order to bring about y) A wills that B wills that y. This much Edwards is willing to concede. 
God is causally responsible for all actions on the basis of (P 1)&(P2). In fact, I take Edwards to 
mean by this that God is the necessary and sufficient cause of y obtaining or of -y obtaining. 
The sticking point is his distinction between this causal determinism and moral responsibility. 
The sleight of hand at work here depends upon his view that God may will Trevor to hit Wayne, 
and be the cause of this act, but not the one morally responsible, since it is Trevor, not God, who 
hits Wayne (that is, instantiating (PXI)). Whereas the transitivity principle obtains with respect 
to causal responsibility, it does not, according to Edwards, obtain for moral responsibility. 
Trevor is a moral agent, he acts on his desire to hit Wayne; God does not force him to do so. But 
of course, it is God who has willed Trevor to have the desire to hit Wayne in the first place. 
Trevor's agency in the matter of hitting Wayne does not absolve God of blame, since God not 
only wills that Trevor hit Wayne. Ms causal responsibility means that he also supplies the 
desire to do so, and sustains Trevor at all those times at which he is engaged in the 
premeditation and action that result in the bringing about of Wayne's being struck by Trevor. 
Trevor may be the moral agent who makes the choice to hit Wayne, but all those desires, 
motives and dispositions that go into the choice and resulting act are supplied by God, such that 
Wayne is struck. 
What this means is that God's causal responsibility appears to entail his moral responsibility. If 
God's causal responsibility is the necessary and sufficient causal explanation of Trevor's sin, 
what more is required for this to entail that God bears moral responsibility for that sin too? 
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(3: 5: iv) The principle ofalternate possibilities. 
This brings us to the fourth comment on the proxy problem. Edwards' discussion of this matter 
has much in common with the contemporary debate about the principle of alternate possibilities, 
initiated by Harry Frankfurt. 167 
To return to our example of Trevor. Contemporary compatibilists usually defend their 
compatibilism by using a conditional analysis of a particular action to explain what they mean 
by the notion, 'person x could have done otherwise than in fact he did'. This is particularly 
important for the question of moral responsibility. If x is determined by something (whatever 
that may be) to act in this way, rather than that, how can he be held morally responsible for the 
actions that follow from this? Applying this to our present concern: does it have application in 
Edwards' case,, with respect to the AP and moral responsibility for sin? We have already seen 
that there is one sense in which Trevor could not have done otherwise than in fact he did 
according to Edwards, since Trevor is constrained by his desires and motives to choose to hit 
Wayne rather than to refrain from doing so. Moreover, on (Pl)&(P2) God supplies all these 
desires. This means that a conditional of the form, 
Trevor could have refrained from hitting Wayne 
actually means, according to compatibilists who use conditional analysis in explaining 
responsibility, 
If Trevor had chosen to refrain from hitting Wayne, he would have reftained from hitting 
Wayne. 
What is crucial here is whether the first part of this conditional - that he could have so chosen - 
makes sense. That is, was Trevor in a position to choose such that he could have acted 
differently and would have done so had he so chosen? Laying aside complications, such as the 
possibility, in Lehrerian terms, that Trevor has a pathological fear of violence, or of blood, or of 
166 A similar use of a principle of transitivity is deployed by William E. Mann in "God's Freedom, 
Human Freedom, and God's Responsibility for Sirf', p. 202. 
16' The material on this issue is considerable. In addition to Frankftirt's contributions, there have been 
rejoinders from van Inwagen, Fischer and many others. See, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility", "Coercion and Moral Responsibility" and "What We are Morally Responsible for", 
(re)printed in The Importance of "at We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) as 
chapters 1,3 and 8 respectively. Van Inwagen's comments can be found in "Ability and Responsibility" 
in Philosophical Review LXXXVII (1978): 201-224; Fischer's writings on this subject are numerous. 
See, for example the anthology, Moral Responsibility (ed. ) John Martin Fischer (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1986. ) 
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cutting his skin, or whatever that would mean he could not have so chosen, 168 the point here is 
that Trevor could not have chosen to do other than he did, unless God had ordained that Trevor 
did other than he did. Or, to return to our A's and B's, B could not choose -y, unless A wills B 
to -y and A ordains B to -y, where A represents God, and B some other, human moral agent. 
This is because, on Edwardsian compatibilism, divine will, and divine ordination are one and 
the same in effect: necessarily, for any y, ifA ordains y, then A wills y. And, ifA wills y, then A 
brings y about. This is the case because, for Edwards, God's will is unimpedible: what he wills 
will inevitably come to pass, since there is nothing that can frustrate the divine will. 
This presents problems for Edwards' concept of the liberty of spontaneity. Let us formulate this 
principle. Where, as before, A is a moral agent, ta particular time and x an action, 
(LS) A is free at t with respect to x iff. either A brings it about at t that x because A wants at t to 
bring it about that x or A refrains from bringing it about at t that x because A wants at t to 
refrain from bringing it about that x. 
169 
As Mann points out, 170 this is attractive to compatibilists (like Edwards) because (LS) presumes 
three things: that a person's wants are themselves causes; that a person's wants are caused; and 
to be free is to have a harmony between a person's wants and actions. The problem for a 
theological compatibilism. like Edwards', especially with respect to our present concern, is that 
a person's wants are supplied by God (the causal responsibility thesis). And God not only wills, 
he ordains that at tA will x. as opposed to -x (or either (x v -x)). 
So. an Edwardsian conditional analysis of actions like Trevor's actually turn not on what Trevor 
(or whoever) might have done if they had so desired it, in conformity to the principle of liberty 
of spontaneity. Instead, they turn on what God wills and ordains Trevor to have done. Trevor 
himself would and could have chosen differently if and only if God willed and ordained that 
Trevor chose differently. This may seem a mundane implication of Edwards' position for those 
familiar with the structure of a theological (LS) and its philosophical implications. But it is 
crucial to his bid to absolve God of moral responsibility. Edwards' central claim here hinges on 
being able to distinguish causal from moral responsibility with respect to God permitting, but 
not positively acting as agent in the sin of Trevor (or whomever. ) But it is not clear how he can 
168 1 refer to Keith Lehrer's "Cans without Ifs" reprinted in Free Will (ed. ) Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982. ) 
169 Poached from William E. Mann in "God's Freedom, Human Freedom, and God's Responsibility for 
Sin", pp. 184-185. 
170 Ibid. 
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make this distinction work. For causal determination of the sort that Edwards endorses in 
(Pl)&(P2) appear, even without the complications of (M), to leave no room for Edwards to 
distinguish the two. Causal determination entails moral responsibility, for Edwards. 
An Edwardsian might respond by saying something like the following: God may be causally but 
not morally responsible for sin because the sinner is the one who does the sinful act, not God. 
Just as, with the example of the hypnotist, hypnotized-Trevor is causally, but not morally 
responsible (or not altogether morally responsible) for throttling Wayne, so God may be the 
causal agent of an act, but not the one morally responsible for that act. 
But, of course, this only underlines why Edwards' analysis will not work. For Edwards' view to 
be viable, it needs to distinguish between causal and moral responsibility, such that agent A is 
causally but not morally responsible for the act carried out by agent B. The problem is, on what 
basis can Edwards make such a distinction? This point can be illustrated with reference to the 
debate about the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) in the contemporary literature. 
Frankfurt defines PAP as, 
(PAP) a person is morally responsible for an act only if they could have done otherwise. 
This principle has two elements: the conditional analysis, '(s)he could have done otherwise'; 
and the problem of moral responsibility. It is the latter notion that we are after, in connection 
with the former. Frankfurt's well-known and much debated thesis, is that the PAP is false. 
There may be circumstances that are a sufficient condition for an act to be performed by a 
person, and that make it impossible for that person to do otherwise, but do not impel that person 
to carry out that act, or in any way produce the persons' action. An example: Trevor wants 
Wayne to fight Gary. If Wayne does not fight Gary, Trevor will intervene and force Wayne to 
do so. However, it so happens that Wayne wants to fight Gary anyway. Although Trevor's 
intervention will inevitably intimidate Wayne into fighting Gary if need be, in point of fact, 
Wayne fights Gary because of his prior desire to do so, without knowing that Trevor will take 
steps to ensure this outcome anyway, if he does not decide to fight Gary. Here is an example of 
a situation in which Wayne could not do otherwise than fight Gary (presuming Trevor's 
intervention would be irresistible), but in point of fact, he does not act as he does because he 
cannot do otherwise. He acts as he does in ignorance of the fact that he cannot do otherwise, and 
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P-. 
- from a desire to act as he does. Yet he is still morally responsible for the outcome (or so says 
Frwikfurt). 171 
So PAP does not work as it stands: 
To the extent that the principle of alternate possibilities derives its plausibility from association with the 
doctrine that coercion excludes moral responsibility, a clear understanding of the latter diminishes the 
appeal of the former. 
Moreover, PAP is mistaken because, 
It asserts that a person bears no moral responsibility - that is, he is to be excused - for having performed 
an action, if there were circumstances that made it impossible for him to avoid performing it But there 
may be circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid performing some action without those 
circumstances in any way bringing it about that he performs that action. 172 
In its place, Frankfurt proposes a revised version of PAP, 
(PAP') a person is not morally responsible for an action if that person did the action only 
because they could not have done otherwise. 
The question with respect to Edwards then, is this: does Trevor (or whoever) act as they do only 
because they could not have done otherwise? If they do so act, then it appears that Trevor (or 
whoever) is absolved from moral responsibility, and God is morally culpable for Trevor's 
action, as well as being causally responsible. 
To make the point that God is morally and causally responsible given Edwards' compatibilism, 
let us explore one more F-style counterexample to PAP. 173This time, Trevor wants Wayne to 
fight Gary and threatens Wayne with an irresistible threat to the effect that if he does not fight 
Gary there will be serious and violent consequences for him. However, unbeknown to Trevor, 
Wayne had already decided to fight Gary anyway, before the threat was issued by Trevor. 
"' It seems a crucial constituent of Frankfint's analysis here depends upon how one construes the 
ignorance of the moral agent involved. Frankfurt thinks that in this kind of example the ignorance of 
Trevor's threat and prior desire for the same course of action, means that Wayne is still culpable. But van 
Inwagen takes the opposite view in "Ability and Responsibility". There he claims that ignorance of 
factors outside one's control usually diminishes culpability in the case of a person who refmins from 
doing an action. 
172 "Alternate possibilities and Responsibility", pp. 5 and 8-9. 
173 'F-style counterexamples' is the term used by van Inwagen to define Frankftul's counterexamples to 
PAP. 
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Instead of acting on the basis of the threat offered him, Wayne acts on the basis of his own 
desire to fight Gary, a desire which predates the threat. Here, Wayne could not have done 
otherwise (because of the threat), but he acts as he does through a prior decision and desire to 
fight Gary anyway. 
In this scenario Wayne can do otherwise than act on the basis of his desire, or Trevor's threat: 
he can bite the bullet and take the consequences of Trevor's threat to his person. For this reason, 
this second scenario is not an effective counterexample to PAP. But moral agents are not in the 
same situation in the case of God's irresistible ordination. A moral agent in a parallel situation 
where A is a divine agent taking Trevor's place, and Ba human moral agent taking the place of 
Wayne, cannot bite the bullet and choose to take the consequences of divine decisions against 
him, the reason being that B has no power to resist the will and ordination of A. B would only 
be able to resist in this way if A ordained and willed that B resist. That is, for B, A's coercion 
does entail (unlike our Wayne and Trevor F-style counterexample) that B must act as (s)he does 
I if God ordains it. In fact, the very ability to even conceive of acting contrary to a divine agent, 
on Edwards' scheme, is caused by the divine agent in question. 
Nor is the situation more like our initial characterization of the Wayne-Trevor scenario, where 
A ordains that B does action x at t, but if B does not do x at t, then A will interfere to ensure that 
B does x coercively. Edwards' theological determinism precludes such a scenario. God cannot 
be reactive in this way, for B cannot do other than x where A ordains and wills x of B, since 
God is the necessary and sufficient cause of B doing x. 
But then, B is not morally responsible for doing x, and the distinction Edwards' attempts to 
make between causal and moral responsibility will not work. 
One further scenario, this time from van Inwagen. He presents his own F-style counterexample 
to Frankfurt's counterexamples to PAP (! ). One of them, the principle ofpossible action, runs as 
follows: 
(PPA) a person is morally responsible for failing to perform an action only if they could have 
performed that action. '74 
van Inwagen has the following kind of situation in mind: Trevor sees a crime committed, and 
goes to telephone the police to report it, but then decides not to. However, unbeknown to him, 
the telephone exchange is out of order, so even if he had tried to report the crime by telephone, 
174 "Ability and Responsibility", p. 204, cited in "What We are Morally Responsible For", p. 97. 
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he would not have been able to do so. In this situation, Trevor is not culpable for failing to 
report the crime, since he could not have done so, though he did not know at the time that he 
could not have done so. Once again, Trevor is causally responsible for withholding the action he 
was going to perform, but did not; but he is not morally responsible for having done so. The 
simple reason being, that he could not have done so, even if he had tried. So causal and moral 
responsibility are distinct issues in this scenario too. 
However, this principle will not help Edwards either. 175An action that an agent performs or 
withholds, is, on Edwards' scheme,, due not to what Frankfurt calls personal reasons (I could 
have done x, but did not), but impersonal (I could have done x only if God ordained that I do x. ) 
For if God is the sole causal agent in all events, then an agent does (or does not do) what they 
do, solely because they are caused to do so by the action of God, not themselves, or perhaps 
better, through God acting in and through the moral agent, in their own desires, habits and 
choices, in the states of affairs and circumstances into which God places a particular agent, and 
in the events that he brings about. Whether this obtains because a particular moral agent 
withholds, or refrains from a particular action, or carries it out, makes no significant difference 
in terms of distinguishing God's moral and causal responsibility. 17617or in both instances, if God 
is causally responsible for every volition and event, then he is morally responsible too. 
In summation: Edwards seeks to drive a wedge between casual and moral responsibility with 
respect to divine action in the world. But F-style counterexamples show that this can only obtain 
in states of affairs that involve non-divine agent(s). If one of the agents involved in a particular 
action is divine, and if a theological determinism such as Edwards' obtains, then the distinction 
between causal and moral responsibility cannot hold. God is the causal and moral agent 
responsible for that action, and therefore, for sinful actions. 177 
(3: 5: v) The problem of (P3). 
We come to the fifth and final comment on Edwards' argument against God's moral 
responsibility for sin. Up until now, we have assumed that on (Pl)&(P2) Edwards has 
insurmountable problems with the AP. But he has even more serious problems than (P 1)&(P2) 
yield for him, because he adheres to (P3) too. This means that there are two separate issues at 
17 -5 Leaving aside the question of whether this could help Edwards at all, since van Inwagen thinks it will 
only work where incompatibilism. obtains. 
176 Nor does it matter whether the state of affairs in question involves external acts, or internal ones. That 
is, whether it involves states of mind, (or brains states, or whatever), or volitions involving bodily 
movements. Whether Trevor thinks about a particular action, but discounts it, or whether he thinks of it, 
and acts upon that making external, bodily movements to achieve it is immaterial. God is the direct and 
immediate cause of his mental and physical states on (Pl)&(P2). 
85 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
work here. On the one hand, Edwards has a problem on (P 1)&(P2) if God is the sole ordainer of 
all that comes to pass (which does not entail occasionalism). On the other hand, God is the sole 
cause of all things that come to pass, entailing occasionalism as per (P3). 
This means that even if Edwards is able to counteract those arguments brought against him thus 
far ((Pl)&(P2)-style arguments), his adherence to the occasionalism of (P3) is fatal to his 
analysis of divine moral culpability. For on occasionalism, God is the only real cause of all 
things. He causes my temporal parts to exist in contiguous sequence, 178 giving the appearance of 
causal connection from one part to the next. But the fact that they are not, and that no one 
temporal part of me persists long enough to actualise a choice (let alone whether T persist as a 
discrete concrete particular across time), means that Edwards' finely crafted distinction between 
causal and moral responsibility collapses. If God alone causes all things, then he is both causally 
and morally responsible for all events that come to pass, since he alone has directly caused all 
those events to come to pass. 
Of course, Edwards himself does not make this connection. But it is there to be made, even if he 
himself does not make it. (Pl)&(P2) together present considerable difficulties to Edwards' 
analysis of God's moral responsibility for creaturely sinful actions. But together with (P3) they 
defeat Edwards' argument against the proxy problem, laid out in (PX). 
(3: 6) Divine commands and insincerity 
There is one other aspect to the Edwardsian AP that we need to consider, that depends upon the 
Calvinian distinction between the secret and revealed will of God. 179 In FO W IV: IL Edwards 
says, 
there is no repugnance in supposing it may be the secret will of God, that his ordination and permission of 
events should be such that it shall be a certain consequence, that a thing never will come to pass; which 
yet it is man's duty to do, and so God's preceptive will, that he should do; and this is the same thing as to 
say, God may sincerely command and require him to do it. 180 
177 Of course, this is not to say that a species of theological compatibilism might not be able to overcome 
thi s problem; only that Edwards' version appears not to be able to. 
178 More on the doctrine of temporal parts in chapter 5. 
179 Althougj-ý of course, this distinction between the hidden and revealed will of God predates Calvin. 
180 YEI: 415. 
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Edwards believes that God secretly wills an agent (say, Judas Iscariot, the example Edwards 
uses) to do x, where x is to betray Christ. But God's revealed will is that Judas does -x. This 
seems insincere, and raises a question regarding God's moral character. 
But we need to distinguish between these two kinds of willing in God. The secret or disposing 
will of God is what God wills for the greater good, all things considered. By contrast, the 
preceptive or revealed will of God is what he commands as being agreeable to his moral nature, 
that is, what is good and what he loves (FOW. - 415). So the two wills are consistent because 
they have different objects. "' In the case of Judas, God may ordain his sin for the greater good 
- here, the salvation of the elect - whilst decrying the act of betrayal itself, as contrary to his 
own moral nature. So, the secret, disposing will corresponds to the divine decrees, whilst the 
revealed, preceptive will corresponds to divine (moral) commands. 
The problem seems to devolve upon several moral intuitions. These are: 
(S 1) that there are certain activities, particularly moral activities, that are inherently teleological 
(that is, aim at a particular outcome), for example commands, exhortations and counsels. 
Example: 'I insist that you tell me the truth! ' 
(S2) engaging in such moral activities for some other reason than the stated one (such as 
personal gain, power, and so on) without declaring this to the parties concerned, opens one to a 
charge of insincerity and deception. 
(S3) if a person knows that their moral aim Will not be achieved by a certain action, that person 
cannot sincerely engage in that action towards their stated moral aim. 
We can put this in tenns of God and Judas, 
(1) God has disposed things (secretly) such that his exhortations and commands to Judas 
(revealed/preceptive will) will be ineffective. 
(2) God does not reveal this to Judas. 
181 However, from this it seems to follow that what is agreeable to God and what is for the greater good 
are not necessarily consistent, a problem that Edwards does not seem to deal with. (Edwards is not alone 
in this. Compare Heppe's Reformed Dogmatics V: 25, (trans. ) G. T. Thompson (London: Wakeman 
Trust n. d. ), pp. 85 ff. Heppe's compendium of Reformed thought does not appear to turn up any more 
promising ways of dealing with this problem either. ) One possible way of addressing this issue might be 
to use Frege's distinction between sense and reference. God's secret and revealed will have different 
senses, but one reference: God. And as with Frege's example of the morning and evening star, the 
morning star does not have the same sense as the evening star, though both refer to the same object, 
Venus. In a similar fashion, it may be that the two wills of God are different in sense, but not in 
reference, and thus not contradictory, though they may appear to be contradictory. However, further 
elucidation of this point would take us away from Edwards' discussion of it. 
87 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(3) God cannot address moral exhortations to Judas in order to initiate penitence and a change 
of heart (from (S2), (S3) and (I)). 
(4) Judas assumes God's moral commands are addressed to him for this purpose ((S I)). 
(5) God is thereby open to the charge of insincerity and deception (from (S3), (1) and (2)). 
(6) God has addressed certain commands to Judas. "' 
From here, Edwards mounts a second kind of tu quoque, in order to deflect attention away from 
the fact that he has no answer to this argument. It is important to bear this in mind: Edwards 
offers no response to this argument beyond claiming that it is a problem common to Arminians 
as well as Calvinists. 
Wainwright points out that Arminians might respond with the following refinements to our 
second moral intuition. First, ifa person knows E will not be achieved by doing x, he cannot do 
x to achieve E And second, if a person knows E cannot be achieved by x, he cannot do x to 
I achieve E Edwards' adherence to (P I), (P2) and (P3) means that there is no chance of Judas 
being penitent. He must do x, he is determined to do x. Therefore (3) obtains. 
Not so the Arminians. They are not committed to (3), because they are not committed to 
Edwards' deterministic premises in (Pl)-(P3). They do not believe that Judas must do x, only 
that he will do x. How does this contrast between 'must' and 'will' help? Nelson Pike initially 
introduced this distinction into the modem literature. "' He differentiates between these two 
kinds of proposition: 
Judas will do x. 
Judas must do x. 
On Edwardsian determinism, Judas must do x. because God ordains (according to his secret 
will) that this be the case, even though God's moral nature commands Judas to do -x (according 
to his revealed Will). 184 But on Arminian libertarianism, Judas will (but not must) do x, because 
God foresees x. Judas still has the power to refrain from x, even though, in point of fact, he will 
not refrain from x. If he were to refrain from x (because he has a libertarian free will), then God 
would not have foreseen x. Instead, he would have foreseen -x, because Judas would have done 
182 Taken, with minor adjustments, from Wainwright "Theological Detenninism and the Problem of 
Evil", pp. 16-17. 
183 1 refer to Nelson Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action", in Philosophical Review 74 
(1965): 27-46. A useful summary and discussion of this argument and the distinction between 'will' and 
4 must' is given in William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), chapter M. 
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-x, rather than x. That is, if Judas had chosen to do -x, rather than x, then God would have 
believed a different proposition from the one he did believe, because he would have foreseen 
that Jones would have done -x rather than x. 
So. it appears that the Arminian God is not exposed to the charge of insincerity, in the same way 
that Edwards' God is. 
(3: 7) Edwardsian co unter- arguments 
LY- 
HLowever, there are several counter-arguments to this claim that could be brought to bear at this 
point. We shall look at six. To begin with, we shall examine Wainwright's argument against 
there being parity between the Arminian and Calvinist's God with respect to the charge of 
insincerity. As it stands,, his argument is flawed. Edwards shows that, given a particular 
understanding of the freedom and foreknowledge debate, the Arminian God is in a similarly 
problematic situation, since the Arminians cannot maintain this distinction between Judas may 
do x and Judas must do x. He achieves this by recourse to the notion of accidental necessity. 
Having seen this, we will turn once again to the question of whether this gets Edwards off the 
hook with respect to the insincerity charge. We shall see that, although he does establish (contra 
Wainwright and Plantinga) that there is parity between Arminian and Calvinist on this charge, 
Edwards' defence of his own position is not able to get beyond this second line of tu quoque, on 
several counts. Therefore, his argument succumbs to the problem set by the insincerity charge. 
However, there may be a way forward for an Edwards-style argument that is successful in 
overcoming these problems. 
(3: 7: i) Foreknowledge and accidental necessity. 
Edwards' argument to this end can be found in FOW H: 12. There Edwards endorses a version 
of what Alvin Plantinga (following William of Ockham) has called accidental necessity, or 
necessity of the past. ' 85 Edwards' argument for accidental necessity in FOW 11: 12 incorporates 
both 'hard' and 'soft' facts. That is, temporal (or tensed) facts which may be entirely about the 
past and therefore 'hard', or partially about the past, but with reference to the present or future, 
and therefore 'soft'. 
184 Wainwright maintains that it is not necessary on Edwardsian principles, that Judas die in mortal sin, 
i. e. a denial of (3) But this is not the case on (Pl)-(P3). 
185 Accidental necessity, or necessity per accidens, is discussed by Alvin Plantinga in "On Ockham's 
Way out", in The Concept of God 
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According to Plantinga, Ockharn thought that only hard facts were genuinely and strictly about 
the past, and therefore necessary per accidens. Soft facts, contrary to Edwards and theological 
determinists, are not necessary in this sense. So Edwards' argument for a species of necessity of 
the past (particularly with reference to divine foreknowledge) fails. 186 Let us examine 
Plantinga's contention. If he is correct, then this Edwardsian response to the Arminian argument 
regarding freedom and foreknowledge, fails. 
In FOW 11; 12, Edwards claims that past events are accidentally necessary (though, of course, 
accidental necessity is not an Edwardsian term). Citing his earlier section of the treatise 
Edwards says, 
I observed before, in explaining the nature of necessity, that in things which are past, their past existence 
is now necessary: having already made sure of existence, 'tis too late for any possibility of alteration in 
that respect: 'tis now impossible, that it should be otherwise than true, that that thing has existed. 
He goes on to enumerate the same kinds of temporal philosophical necessity which he had 
delineated earlier in FOW, viz. temporal ('hard') accidental necessity, and consequential ('soft') 
necessity, in the context of the divine foreknowledge-human freedom debate, 
If there be any such thing as a divine foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that foreknowledge, 
by the supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence; and so, now its existence is 
necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise than this foreknowledge should be, or should have 
been. 
And, 
'Tis no less evident, that if there be a full, certain and infallible foreknowledge of the future existence of 
the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain infallible and indissoluble connection between those 
events and that foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are 
186 Plantinga claims that Ockham's way of disarming theological detern-tinists like Edwards relies upon a 
denial of the following premise, 
(16) If p is about the past, then p is necessary. 
'therefore, the general claim that all facts about the past are accidentafly necessary, is seen to be false [on 
Ockham's rendering of things] - or, at any rate, there seems to be no reason at all to believe it. And this 
dissolves any argument for theological determinism which, like Edwards's, accepts (16) in its full 
generality. ' Ibid., p. 183. 
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necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that whose eýdstence already is, and so 
is now necessaU, and can't but have been. ' 87 
Plantinga, recognizes that this argument relies on two intuitions. The first is that, although the 
past is not necessary in some broadly logical sense, it is nonetheless necessary in some sense, in 
that it is fixed and outside the control of agents to change it after it has happened. Second, 
whatever is necessarily connected with something which is necessary, is itself necessary as a 
consequence of this connection. This Edwardsian notion invokes a transfer of necessity 
principle: Where p is accidentally necessary after tI, and p strictly implies q, then after tI, q is 
also necessary per accidens. 1" 
With this information, we may now express Edwards' version of accidental necessity as 
follows: 
I (N I) A proposition is accidentally necessity necessary iff. the sentence that denotes it refers to, 
(Nla) something which has already come to pass, and is therefore a completed, past action (a 
'hard' fact. ) 
(Nlb) something which has already some to pass and continues to be at the present time, and is 
therefore a continuing object or action (a 'soft' fact). 
And, 
(N2) Consequential necessity (using the transfer of necessity principle): Where p entails or is 
strictly implicated by q, and p is accidentally necessary after tI (according to (1)), then after tl,, 
q is necessary per accidens - 
So why is Edwards' argument untenable according to Plantinga? In subsuming what I have 
termed 'consequential' necessity and both 'hard' and 'soft' facts under necessity per accidens, 
Edwards commits himself to the view that all facts about the past are necessary. Furthermore, 
his view of God's foreknowledge is such that what God knows, has to come to pass, even if it is 
still fititure. If God is omniscient, then this means that God knows all future actions, and that 
these future actions must, of consequential necessity, come to pass. Therefore, no action of any 
agent is ever free. All actions are determined in advance by the fact that God knows they will 
187 YEP 257-8, cited in Plantinga, "On Ockhain's Way Out", p. 173-4. A detailed analysis of this earlier 
section of FO PV would take us outside the bounds of the present discussion. See FO W 1: 3. 
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occur. This is his deterministic thesis, and he deploys this aspect of that thesis ad hominem 
against Daniel Whitby, one of the antagonists in view in FOW H: 12. Whitby distinguished 
between foreknowledge and predestination, arguing that the former is compatible with 
libertarianism, whereas the latter is not. Edwards, in stating this aspect of his deterministic 
thesis, sought to respond by showing that such a distinction between foreknowledge and 
predestination is untenable, if all that God knows, he knows in a 'hard' way. 
But Ockham and Plantinga claim that there are both hard and soft facts about the past, which 
Edwards' argument cannot accommodate. For, according to the deterministic strand of the 
Edwardsian compatibility thesis, all facts are known to God (from eternity past, one presumes), 
and because all temporal facts known to an omniscient being must come to pass, (that is, they 
cannot fail to obtain, if an omniscient being knows them), all facts, at whatever temporal index, 
are hard. 
It may be thought that this does not do enough to stave off the criticism that the temporal 
relation involved between present and past and present and future is essentially asymmetrical. 
The past is determinate in relation to the present, but the future remains essentially 
indeterminate,, and therefore not 'there' to be known by any agent, even God, until and unless it 
takes place. However, Edwards has two interesting arguments to counter such an approach. The 
first is this: foreknowledge may show a future event is necessary even if it does not cause that 
event to take place, making it necessary. He reasons that it is absurd to say that a future event 
will certainly and infallibly obtain because it is foreknown, and yet that event turn out not to 
obtain, So if God forcknows that event x. will obtain, there is no way that x may not obtain, even 
if God is not the direct cause of x obtaining. For instance, God may infallibly foreknow the 
outcome of the election, and that outcome be necessary, by virtue of his foreknowledge, without 
causing the outcome of the election. A second argument is this: if God foreknows that a future 
event will occur, then that future event already has an existing effect, namely God's 
foreknowledge of that event. If God's prescience of event x is an effect of x that exists prior to x 
obtaining, then it would be strange indeed to claim that the effect of x obtains but the cause of 
that effect, x itself, may not obtain, since it is a future event which is still contingent. "9 
In addition, Edwards is committed to an W, rather than an '0' view of foreknowledge. A- 
foreknowledge is a strong thesis, corresponding to a causal kind of knowing (or of bringing 
188 See Linda Zagzebski, "Foreknowledge and Human Freedom" in A Companion to Philosophy of 
Religion, (eds. ) Quinn and Taliaferro (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. ) 
189 Both of these arguments are discussed by Hasker in God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press), pp. 72-73. They occur in YEI: 11: MI: 263 and 265 respectively. If it is claimed that 
there are just no facts about the future to be known, because the future is essentially 'open', Edwards 
would simply have denied this view. He was, after all, a theological determinist. 
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about that a thing takes place at a certain time and place). 0-foreknowledge is weaker, 
describing the more notional idea of knowing a thing. Paul Heim points out that most 
discussions of this foreknowledge-human freedom problem in the recent literature typically 
assume 0, rather than A foreknowledge. '90 Edwards, by contrast assumes A rather than 0 
foreknowledge, in keeping with his theological belief in the absolute sovereignty of God. '9' 
But to return to the central issue regarding hard and soft tensed facts, there seems to be 
considerable problems with the very distinction which Plantinga and Ockham want to make 
against Edwards. For instance, quite what it means for a proposition to be entirely 'hard' is not 
clear, as Plantinga himself admits. 192 Propositions which appear to be entirely about the past, 
and therefore 'hard'. on closer examination seem to entail 'soft' facts about the present and the 
future, some of which are not merely ersatz, or Cambridge notions. So, for example, the 
proposition, 'Caesar was murdered on the Ides of March, in 44 BC',, whilst apparently past and 
therefore 'hard', and perhaps even accidentally necessary, entails at least the following 'soft' 
propositions, (where these propositions are uttered in 2000 AD), 'Caesar will not eat breakfast 
this morning' and 'Caesar will not cross the Rubicon in 2020 AW Thus, propositions entirely 
about the past appear to entail propositions about the present and future, which lead Helm, in 
commenting on this distinction, to say, 
perhaps it is true of any action completed in the past that it entails the non-occurrence of some state of 
affhirs at a time future to the action's completion-date. If so, then any completed action is 'soft', since 
completion implies truths about the future. But if completed actions, the most promising candidates for 
'hard' facts, are in fact 'soft' facts, what is the distinction worth? 193 
Plantinga believes that the 'hard' and 'soft' fact distinction made by Ockham in his defence of 
accidental necessity can be reformulated so that it works, and is a useful concept in the 
philosophical annoury. Let us allow that Plantinga can refurbish the Ockhamist vocabulary in 
190 This 'A'-'O' distinction comes from Helm, Eternal God, p. 129 ff. If God 0-foreknows that event p 
will happen, then God knows that p, but not as a result of bringing it about that p is true. In this sense 0- 
foreknowledge is 'notional'. As Helm puts it, 'There is a contingent connection between the 
foreknowledge of p and the making of p true; 0-foreknowledge results from possessing evidence which 
ensures the truth of p, or from some other factor. ' God A-foreknows that p as a result of ordaining that p 
is true. Helm again: 'At the very least [God's] A-foreknowing that p is causally necessary for the truth of 
and perhaps it is causally sufficient as well. ' Eternal God, p. 129. 
91 See, for example, Miscellany 490, in YE13: 533-34. 
192 'It is extremely difficult, however, to say precisely what it is for a proposition to be strictly about the 
past, and equally difficult to say what it is for a proposition to be accidentally necessary. ' Plantinga, "On 
Ockharn, s Way Out", p. 185. Nevertheless, Plantinga. does believe that by the end of his essay he has 
located a form of accidental necessity which depends upon an explanation using the power of agents 
(ibid., p. 199-200). 
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such a way as to make sense of these terms. Nevertheless, in so doing he makes a number of 
assumptions which can be successfully challenged by Edwards, or an Edwardsian determinist. 
The first of these involves the assertion that if accidental necessity can be explained in terms of 
the power of agents, then there are some tensed facts that not even a divine agent can make 
hard, and therefore, candidates for accidental necessity. These include propositions specifying 
God's past foreknowledge of human actions, and his past beliefs about future human actions. 
The problem with this is that it assumes that God's foreknowledge is exactly that: fore- 
knowledge. Plantinga maintains that Edwards' takes a temporal view of God's eternity qua 
everlasting, and works on that basis. However, later in the very section which Plantinga, cites as 
the basis of his own attack upon theological determinism, Edwards states in an unequivocal 
way, his endorsement of a timeless view of God's eternity, 
If. strictly speaking, there is no foreknowledge in God, 'tis because those things which are future to us, I 
I are as present to God, as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to say, that future events are 
always in God's view as evident, clear, sure and necessary, as if they already were. 
Moreover, 
Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed, by the succession of time; 
who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; so that 
his whole eternal duration is vitae interminabilis, tota, simul, and perfecta possessio. 194 
It would be difficult indeed to find a more definite endorsement of divine timelessness with 
respect to knowledge. The fact that Edwards speaks of God in a tensed way (which seems to 
have misled Plantinga), is merely a demonstration of the inadequacy of human language in 
capturing aspects of divinity, and should be treated anachronistically, 195 
when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent fundamental and dependent determining 
and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent independent of perfect and absolute simplicity 
and inunutability, and the first cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in such 
193 Helm, Eternal God, p. 134. 
194 YEI: 267 and 268 respectively. 
195 And one might add, that was the whole point of Edwards' ad hominem argument against Whitby, 
anyway. On some of the problems for Edwards' notion of God as actus purus see Oliver D. Crisp, 
"Jonathan Edwards and Divine Simplicity" in Religious Studies (forthcoming, 2003). 
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representations, than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable to 
perpetual mutation and succession-' 96 
This puts things with respect to accidental necessity in quite a different light. Rather than 
arguing that God foreknows (in some tensed way) that if it will dawn tomorrow (hard fact, via 
divine knowledge), then necessarily it will dawn tomorrow (consequential necessity), Edwards 
is claiming that God's omniscience is complete and immutable precisely because it is 
atemporal. So all God's knowledge is hard; there can be no soft aspects to God's knowledge 
because it is timeless. Tberefore, all events, past, present and future, are 'accidentally' 
necessary, because all events are known to the mind of God according to A 'fore'knowledge. 
But can this stronger, timeless version of Edwards' temporal necessity work? The answer, under 
the terms which Plantinga sets out, is that it can. 
Plantinga's critique of theological determinism relies upon a particular understanding of what a 
I proposition is, which need not be assumed by defenders of a timeless God. In particular, 
Plantinga's argument is only plausible because what God foreknows is relativized to some observer or 
agent in the present and so the tiuth of what God foreknows is not a timeless proposition. But what is past 
(and so accidentally necessary) is God's knowledge of what Paul is doing at a particular date, regardless 
of whether that date is not past, present or future relative to some moment in time. The propositions 
which are the objects of God's knowledge do not become true or false, they are timelessly true. 197 
This can be shown as follows: '9' If truth refers to tensed sentencesl then those sentences have 
some of the characteristics of an event, and events happen at a particular time. But Hehn shows 
that a proposition can be true or false without the sentence expressing it being assertable, for 
example, 
all human life is annihilated. 
Plantinga uses propositions in a tensed way, (i. e. expressible in tensed sentences). But those 
who defend a timeless view of God's omniscience need not believe that propositions are tensed. 
They can hold that propositions are timeless, having precisely the same truth-value at any 
particular time index. What God knows when he knows proposition p is that p is true 
irrespective of any temporal index. It is accidentally necessary just because it is true that God 
196 YE, 1: 376-7. 
197 Helm, Eternal God, p. 13 8. 
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knew p yesterday, and the fact that God knew it in the past ensures the accidental necessity of 
what is known. So the 'hard' and 'soft' facts of Ockham's Way Out have no purchase where 
propositions are understood in a timeless way, because the Ockhamist view relies on a tensed 
view of propositions and their sentence tokens. 
But, as even the previous paragraph has shown, referring to God in a consistently tenseless way 
is a difficult exercise to maintain. Edwards (following Aristotle's maxim), thinks with the wise 
and speaks with the common people when he refers to God in this matter. And Helm observes 
that what God knows tenselessly, is ontologically prior to any recognition of that knowledge by 
time-bound creatures, 'For God to foreknow that p is not for him to know that p expresses an 
event that will happen in his future, it is for us to ascribe to God a knowledge of the truth of p 
which may contain within it the description of some event which is due to occur after the time 
we ascribe that knowledge to God. "99 
This leaves us with the problem of the ambiguity in Edwards' exposition of temporal necessity. 
I (Nla) is 'hard' on an Edwardsian timeless model. What of (NIb)? Arguably, it too is hard, 
given the timeless model, in which case, the parenthetical suffix can be dropped, since it is not a 
soft fact. For if Edwards understands God's omniscience in timeless, A-foreknowledge terms, 
then this is a necessary and sufficient condition for a particular proposition which God knows, 
being true. 
Similarly, (N2) follows on a timeless view of propositional truth and divine omniscience. The 
transfer of necessity principle provides the required justification for (N2) to obtain given the 
conjunction of (N 1) and timeless propositions. 
Aspects of Edwards' formulation of this problem might still be unclear. But it seems that the 
central thrust of his articulation of temporal necessity as a species of accidental necessity with 
respect to divine foreknowledge is coherent, contrary to claims by Plantinga, via Ockham. And 
this provides a counter-argument against the Arminian notion that all that foreknowledge 
implies is that Judas may choose x, not that Judas must choose x. For, according to the 
Edwardsian argument in FO W IL 12, Judas must choose x because x is a hard fact, 'fore'known 
by God. 
But this is not all. William Wainwright in his recent article on this issue claims that, although 
Edwards is right about this in one respect (the Arminian is not much better off than Edwards, 
since his God is still morally if not causally responsible for sin, a problem we will come to in a 
moment), he is wrong in another sense. The An-ninian God does not determine the sin of Judas 
198 What follows is drawn from Helm, ibid. 
199 Ibid., p. 140. 
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as the Calvinist's God does. '00 But we have seen in the foregoing argument that Edwards has a 
response to this criticism, in his use of accidental necessity. Edwards' argument demonstrates 
that, on his 'A' foreknowledge view, the Arminian's God is as culpable as the Calvinist's God. 
The Arminian will not accept such a view of divine foreknowledge, to be sure. But the point is 
this: if the Arminian accepts the substantive issue of Edwards' use of accidental necessity in 
defence of foreknowledge ((Nl)), then s/he is committed to the view, via the transfer of 
necessity principle of (N2), that apparently 'soft' facts are, on closer inspection, 'hard' facts. 
And if they are hard facts, then the Arminian appeal to '0' foreknowledge folds since, 
according to Edwards, there is no metaphysical distinction to be made between 'hard' and 'soft' 
facts, or between foreknowledge simpliciter and determinative foreknowledge. If Edwards is 
right about this, then the metaphysics that underpins the Arminian understanding of freedom 
and foreknowledge is unstable and the Arminian is far worse off than the Calvinist. This 
argument is a substantial response to the Arminians, tu quoque, and to Wainwright and 
Plantinga who have defended them in different respects. 
(3: 7: ii) Moral inability and responsibility. 
Be that as it may, this does not let Edwards off the hook on the charge of divine insincerity with 
respect to the distinction between the secret-revealed will distinction. Edwards may be right that 
on an accidental necessity-style understanding of the Arminian argument, Judas must do x. But 
this only reinforces the problem of divine insincerity. For, if it is not the case that Judas may do 
x, but that he must do x, and that he must do x on an 'A' foreknowledge view of divine 
omniscience, then God is responsible for bringing it about that Judas does x, rather than -x. 
Edwards has two further arguments to try to diminish this problem of divine insincerity. Though 
they are not entirely successful, a third argument that has much in common with Edwards' view 
may have some success where the other two Edwardsian arguments fail. 
In FOW Edwards makes much of the notion that 'moral' necessity is requisite to praise and 
blame, contrary to libertarianism. 'Ol Part of this involves a distinction between moral inability to 
respond to the commands of God, and natural ability to do so. Take his example of a king and 
his imprisoned subject. In the first of mo scenarios, Edwards says that a common 
misrepresentation of Calvinism is, 
200 "Theological detenninism and the problem of evil", p. 92. 
201 We shall have to take Edwards at his word on this notion of 'moral' necessity. He distinguishes 
between several kinds of necessity in FOW 1: IR and IV, but not altogether clearly. An examination of 
these concepts would take us outside the present issue. 
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that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison; and after he has lain there a while, the 
king comes to him, calls him to come for to him; and tells him that if he will do so, and will fall down 
before him, and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at liberty, and also be greatly 
enriched, and advanced in honor: the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence 
against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himself, and accept the king's offer; but confined by 
strong walls, with gates of brass, and bars of iron. 202 
Clearly, in such a case, there is no way that the felon can fulfil the commands of the prince; he 
is literally barred from doing so, even if he wants to do so. Even if he is (in some dim sense) 
morally aware of his crime and of the need to repent, he is naturally unable to do anything about 
it, because of his natural state of spiritual torpor. 
The second scenario better represents the Calvinist position. A similar situation obtains. A 
prisoner, rightly convicted and of a 'haughty, ungrateful, willful disposition', 'brought up in 
traitorous principles', and with a heart, 'possessed with an extreme and inveterate enrnity to his 
lawful sovereign' is confronted by his prince, as in the previous scenario. But unlike the first 
situation, this prince has the man unchained, and the prison doors thrown wide open. From 
outside the prison, he exhorts the prisoner to repent and come to freedom. But the prisoner is so 
full of 'haughty malignity' that he refuses to come out of his cell and accept the offer, preferring 
instead to remain where he is. 
Edwards claims that this illustrates the difference between moral inability to turn to God, 
because human nature is vitiated as a result of the fall, and a natural ability to do so. There is no 
natural impediment to the felon leaving his cell and following his prince, but he so hates and 
despises the king who has rightly convicted him, that he refuses this offer. So it is only this 
second scenario that adequately captures the difference between the moral inability and natural 
ability of fallen man to turn towards God for salvation. 
We may apply this to the insincerity charge in the following way. Judas is morally, but not 
naturally vitiated. This means that Judas could naturally choose -x, but will not do so, because 
of his morally vitiated nature. But this does not help Edwards to absolve God. The divine secret 
disposing and ordaining of Judas' moral nature means that Judas must do x. It is not that the 
imprisoned felon could have walked free; his moral nature, determined by God's disposing will, 
means that he must remain in his cell. The illusion that Edwards' second scenario creates in 
favour of the Calvinistic picture in this regard is just that: an illusion. It does no work in getting 
the Deity off the hook, because all he has done is transfer the problem from the natural to the 
moral nature. The point is that the felon still must remain in his cell, because he has been caused 
202 YEI: 362. 
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to have the moral nature he does, which means he will inevitably reject the advances of his 
prince, however winsome. So Edwards' refinements to the Calvinistic picture of depravity, 
locating the vitiation in the nature of humanity to the moral, rather than 'natural' faculties does 
not present a more promising solution to the insincerity charge. 
(3: 7: iii) The parent-teenager analogy. 
A third counter-argument to the Arminians is articulated by Wainwright, on behalf of Edwards. 
The question is whether the principle if a person knows E will not be achieved by doing x, he 
cannot do x to achieve E (mentioned earlier in connection with divine commands and 
insincerity), is false as the Arminians claim it is. Wainwright thinks not. There are 
circumstances in which I think a person will do y (where y is some undefined, but immoral 
action), but nevertheless try to persuade them against this. I only try to persuade such a person 
because I believe there might be a chance that the other person might heed my exhortations and 
not do y, as a parent might, with a recalcitrant teenager. 
But surely, this will not work in the case of the Deity. He is not in a position of ignorance with 
respect to the desires and motives of any agent, whether Judas, or a recalcitrant teenager, or 
whomever. After alt, he is omniscient and the determiner of the very dispositions any particular 
agent might exhibit at any particular time. This means that the analogy between a parent and a 
teenager will not work in the case of God and some other moral agent. God, unlike the parent, is 
never in a position where he thinks a person will do y, but nevertheless could try to persuade 
them otherwise, believing there might be some chance that this person will heed his exhortation, 
and refrain from y. God could only be in such a position if he was not sure that the agent would 
do y or -y, or neither y nor -y. But, Edwards' God is clearly not in this situation, because he has 
dctcrmincd that y will obtain. So this defence of Edwards' position will not work either. 
(3: 7: iv) Moral responsibility and the Arminian God, 
The fourth counter-argument involves the most serious version of the insincerity charge. This is: 
God's secret will determines Judas will not respond whilst at the same time, God's preceptive 
will commands Judas to respond This is the position Edwards finds himself in, and from which, 
I have argued, he has no escape. But, by way of ameliorating the situation, are the Arminians 
also exposed to problems which, though not exactly the same, have a similar outcomel in being 
similarly grave for their conception of God's sincerity? The answer is affirmative. 
Let us take a simple Arminian model regarding freedom and foreknowledge, to demonstrate this 
point. It may be, that God puts Judas (or whomever) in circumstances where he knows that 
Judas will not respond to his preceptive will. God has not determined Judas' response (he will 
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do x, but might not have done so; it is not that he must or necessarily will do x, as per Edwards). 
But God foreknows that given state of affairs S, Judas will not respond to his moral exhortations 
and commands. (A standard libertarian rejoinder is this: if Judas would have responded, God 
would have believed differently, because he would have foreknown different actions on the 
basis of the counterfactuals of freedom that obtained. ) So, although the Arminian God is not 
guilty of insincerity on the same (deterministic) grounds as Edwards' God is, he is still guilty. 
For the Arminian God is guilty of putting Judas into circumstances where he foreknows that 
Judas will do -x, rather than x. In this way, God may be morally responsible for the actions of 
Judas (or whomever), even though he is not causally responsible for their actions, since they 
arise from a libertarian freedom. (This is another application of our earlier examination of the 
constituents of the proxy problem, and in particular, (PX2). This asked whether A can be 
morally responsible and not causally responsible for y. Clearly, according to Arminianism, the 
answer is yes . )203 
(3: 7: v) Divine duty and inýffectual commands. 
Wainwright offers one more possible way out for both Edwards and the Arminians. It relies 
upon God having a duty to offer moral commands and exhortations even when he knows that 
they will be ineffectual. Parallel cases are not hard to find: a parent and teenager (again); a 
counsellor and addict; a platoon leader to a shell-shocked soldier, and so on. The trouble here is 
that for Edwards, God knows that his commands will be ineffectual because he has ordained 
this, not because other circumstances have intervened, as is the case with all the other 'parallels' 
(the addict, the soldier and the teenager. ) There are no other causal factors to account for, as 
there are in all these other cases. So. God is still insincere. Although, at least - but for different 
reasons - the Arminians are in a similarly unenviable situation to Edwards on this particular 
charge. 
203 This is presuming that the libertarian account of freedom and foreknowledge is coherent. That is, I am 
criticizing the Arminian view on its own terms, not from an Edwardsian perspective. However, it might 
be that the concept of foreknowledge proves a harder nut to crack for contra-causal freedom (pace van 
Inwagen) than libertarians think it is. For instance, how can a person whose choices are contra-causally 
free make choices which may be foreknown by anyone, even an omniscient agent? If they are truly 'free' 
choices (free in the libertarian sense, that is) up to the point of choice, then how can anyone know in 
advance what another agent will choose, until they have chosen it? The point that compatibilists like 
Edwards make is that the libertarians presume too much when they claim that Judas will betray Christ, but 
that this does not mean he niust betray Christ. Surely the very notion that he may do x rather than y is 
precisely what cannot be known before the event, otherwise, in what sense is the action in question, an 
exercise of the liberty of indifference? This skirts big issues on the nature of time (McTaggart's 
'A' and 
V series), the nature of God's relation to time and the propositional expression of truths about time 
(either 'tensed' or 'tenselessly') about which, I shall say no more here. My central point the query about 
the coherence of libertarianism, must, for now at least, remain no more than that: a query. 
100 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(3: 7: vi) The 'whole will'response. 
There may be one final defence of Edwards on the sincerity issue, which I owe to Paul Helm. " 
It could be that Edwards' use of the 'secret-revealed will' distinction could be taken in toto, as a 
solution to the insincerity charge, rather than as two parts of a whole. On this reading of the 
distinction, God intends the whole of his secret and revealed will for some greater good (a point 
Edwards makes so eloquently in his essay on The End of Creation2o). If God intends the whole 
of 'secret-revealed will% it does not follow that the insincerity issue can be raised of each 
separate component of that whole. If we were to ask the question, 'did God expect Judas to 
heed the commandment, "thou shalt not kill"T, as if an answer to this aspect of God's revealed 
will can be assessed in isolation from the question of his secret purposes in his eternal decrees, 
then, on this view, one could rule the question out of court. The reason being, that God does not 
intend this commandment independently of his whole will (hidden and revealed). What he 
intends is the entire decree which embraces issuing commands to Judas (revealed will) and his 
use of Judas for the purposes of salvation (hidden will). A homely illustration of this will help to 
clarify this. If I own a tartan tie, every thread of my tartan tie is not tartan (individual threads 
may be crimson, or cobalt, or navy blue). But every thread is a thread of my tartan tie (whatever 
colour they are individually, taken together, and only taken together, they form the weave of the 
tartan plaid). Tbus, there may yet be a way in which a contemporary Edwardsian might be able 
to defend the secret-revealed will distinction, against its detractors. 
(3: 7: idi) Summary ofthe counter-arguments. 
To sum up: Edwards is unable to escape the whole force of the conclusion that God is insincere 
in some way. I-Iis distinction between the hidden and revealed will of God does not do the work 
he wants it to, in absolving God of the charge as it stands on his deterministic principles. But 
there may be the beginnings of a response in an Edwardsian spirit, that utilizes this distinction to 
show that God may be sincere if his purposes are taken together, rather than separately. Whether 
this works or not (and I am optimistic about its prospects), the Arminians have problems of their 
own, generated by their account of the counterfactuals of freedom. Though Edwards does not 
see that there is a distinction between his own, and the Arminans'case in this regard, he is right 
in one central point: their conception of freedom and divine foreknowledge does not present a 
more feasible solution to the problem of divine insincerity. 
204Suggested in a private communication, 2 1/11/0 1. 
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(3: 8) Conclusion: does Edwards solve the AP? 
It should be clear from the foregoing that Edwards' argument does not solve the AP. Crucially, 
he cannot demonstrate a plausible scenario in which God might be causally but not morally 
responsible for the sin of a particular agent. This means that his distinction between divine 
permission and positive agency cannot work. If God is causally responsible for every event that 
takes place, then he is morally responsible too. There are plausible scenarios in which such a 
distinction may work between two human agents. But such scenarios work because one agent 
cannot be both the necessary and sufficient cause of another's doing x. Clearly this is exactly 
what Edwards does affirm about God on the basis of (P I)-(P3). Hence, when this distinction is 
applied to God, it fails. This does not mean that there are no such plausible scenarios where a 
compatibility thesis might be able to work. But it does mean that the compatibilism that 
Edwards deploys cannot work in this regard. God is still the author of sin, on Edwards' 
construal of this particular aspect of the problem of evil. 
206 
William Mann observes that, 'the distinction between passivity and activity does no moral work 
in the case of God. -)207 That is, an attempt to circumvent problems of moral responsibility via an 
appeal to God's permission, rather than positive agency in an action, does not yield the required 
result: God is still responsible. But even if this is the case, Mann thinks that God may be 
insulated from the charge of wrongdoing if he b? Ings about, but does not actually do any evil. 
This might be a promising route to solving the problem. However, it is not a route open to 
Edwards,, on the basis of (P I), (P2) and (P3). That is, there are no circumstances according to 
(P I)-(P3) where the following claims might all be true: 
(1) A knowingly and willingly brings it about that B knowingly and willingly brings it about 
that S. 
(2) A knowingly and willingly brings it about that S (from (1)). 
(3) S is a situation that is evil. 
(4) In knowingly and willingly bringing it about that S, B does something that is wrong. 
205 in YE8. 
206Even Edwards' recent defender, John Kearney, concedes that, 'Edwards's replies to the Arminian 
"author of sin" charge rely heavily, then, on his use of tu quoque arguments, the distinction between 
causing evil and permitting evil, and the distinction between the revealed and secret will of God. ' 
"Jonathan Edwards and the 'Author of Sin' Charge", p. 15. My point is that the tu quoque does no work 
in defending the coherence of Edwards' account. The insincerity charge, utilizing the secret and revealed 
will distinction turns out to be another tu quoque, so fails for the same reasons. And the substance of 
Edwards' defence, viz. the causing-permitting notions actually do not deliver the required distinction 
between causation and permission for God to be absolved of responsibility on the AP. 
207 See "God's Freedom, Human Freedom, and God's Responsibility for Sin", p. 207. 
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(5) In knowingly and willingly bringing it about that S, A does nothing that is wrong. 208 
The strength of (P I)-(P3) mean that together, there is no possibility of (5) obtaining, where A is 
God and B is some other agent. The reason being that Edwards' God does not just bring about 
certain states of affairs, he directly causes all events to take place. Mann claims that what is 
important in view of the AP is to justify God's bringing about sin, rather than excusing his 
doing so. Edwards thinks he has done just this in terms of a greater good argument. 209 But this 
cannot work where (5) cannot obtain. Edwards cannot claim that God merely brings about a 
state of affairs in which an agent sins (qua Mann), though his argument for divine permission 
seems to point in that direction. For, given the premises of his argument, God is causally 
responsible for every event that takes place, not just for a state of affairs that obtains, as might 
be the case for the libertarian. So Edwards can neither excuse God of sin, nor provide a 
justification for his permission of sin, since Edwards' God is the necessary and sufficient cause 
of sin. Clearly, this raises considerable problems for Edwards' concept of God. For if God is the 
author of sin, then he appears to lack what is usually taken to be a defining characteristic of God 
in the western tradition, namely, benevolence. At the very least, this raises questions about the 
theistic acceptability of Edwards' concept of God. 
Nevertheless, Edwards is right to point out that some version of the AP is a problem common to 
210 Arminianism. as well . Indeed, 
Edwards' use of accidental necessity shows that, contra 
Wainwright and Plantinga, Arminians do have the same problems as the Calvinist regarding 
foreknowledge and creaturely freedom. If Edwards is right in this respect, then, although he has 
not solved the AP, he can at least console himself with the thought that he is not alone in having 
no feasible solution to it that absolves God of moral responsibility for sin. 
Having looked at the Fall and the AP with respect to the origination of sin, we may now turn to 
consider another implication of the fall, and one crucial to classical theology: the imputation of 
Adwn's sin. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Mann suggests that another route towards theodicy lies in claiming that God has a unique position as 
our Creator which invests him with peculiar rights, responsibilities, privileges and immunities over us. 
The analogy he offers in this respect is that of a parent allowing a child to sin to teach them some lesson. 
Such parental permission would not be extended, he thinks, to others acting in loco parentis. Ibid., pp. 
208-209. 
210 And I think that, with modifications, it could be shown to be a problem common to libertarians like 
Molinists, who try to marry a strong doctrine of divine providence (and onuiiscience) to a libertarian 
thesis. But space prevents a fuller elaboration of this. Thankfully, this has been done by Hugh McCann in 
his "Edwards on Free Will", in Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian (eds. ) Paul Helm and 
Oliver D. Crisp (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming. ) 
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(4) The theological pedigree of Edwardsian imputation 
The argument put forward by Edwards in OS has both a theological and philosophical axis. The 
substance of the treatise is theological, being a trenchant defence of the coherence of the 
Calvinistic concept of depravity and its roots in the (as Edwards sees it) Biblical doctrine of 
original sin. But in so doing, Edwards is drawn into controversy over the nature of imputation, 
and it is this issue in particular that is of interest in the present thesis. Since the philosophical 
issues arise out of the theological concerns that Edwards has, it is important to see how this 
occurs and why one feeds into the other. To begin with, we shall elucidate the theological issues 
pertaining to Edwards' view of imputation, before moving in chapters 5-9 to examine the 
problems that this throws up for his philosophical defence of imputation, and more specifically, 
his occasionalism. In so doing, we will have to make a largely (though not exclusively) 
historical tour through detailed interpretations of Edwards' theology of imputation raised by 
some of the foremost Calvinistic divines of the nineteenth century. This chapter is therefore 
something of an excursion into historical theology. 
(4: 1) Edwards' argument for original sin 
The context of the debate into which Edwards wrote is now largely a matter for the history of 
211 ideas 
. 
At the time of writing his treatise, Edwards believed that he was contributing to a 
crucial argument which was being fought over the integrity of the Calvinistic doctrine of 
depravity. His particular antagonist was one Dr. John Taylor, whose volume entitled The 
Scripture Doctrine of Original SW212 sounded a note of what Edwards perceived to be 
'Arminianism' in New England. "' 
Axiomatic to his whole discussion are the pre-critical assumptions of the plenary inspiration of 
scripture, and in particular, the historicity of the creation and fall narratives of Genesis 1-3. 
Edwards chose to deal with the threat Taylor posed, by approaching hamartiology through 
experience and Scripture before adducing metaphysics in defence of key areas of dispute. As a 
consequence of this, OS follows an inductive structure, which falls into four parts. Edwards 
211 Clyde Holbrook's Editor's Introduction to YE3 is invaluable on the historical background to the 
context of Edwards' writing of OS. See especially pp. 1-26. 
212 This is the version of the title given by John E. Smith in his discussion of these issues in Jonathan 
Edvvards, Puritan, Preacher, Philosopher, chapter 5, p. 82. It is a truncated version of a far longer title, 
which it is unnecessary to reiterate here. 
213 To my knowledge EdNiards only makes one Passing remark about Taylor's Arrninianism (YE3: 375. ) 
But it is tacitly assumed throughout OS that Taylor's position is Arminian. 
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begins the first section by laying out the evidence from observation and experience, which tends 
to support the biblical doctrine he goes on to delineate. The scriptural data supporting original 
sin are then brought to bear upon the arguments in section two of the treatise. In the third 
section, Edwards deals (rather briefly) with the application of original sin to soteriology in 
redemption. Family, in section four he lays out several refutations of common objections to 
original sin on metaphysical grounds, including his discussion of imputation. 
Robert Jenson has observed the fact that the whole edifice of this work rests upon two theses 
which were responses to the 'Arminian' perspective represented by Taylor: The defence of the 
Calvinistic understanding of innate depravity and the defence of imputation, each of which - 
according to Taylor - were separate theological offences which needed to be abandoned. These 
two theses stand at the beginning of OS as points of departure for what follows in the treatise: 
'By original sin, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the innate 
sinful depravity of the heart. But yet when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly 
understood in that latitude, as to include not only the depravity of nature, but the imputation of 
Adam's first sin 7.214 
With regard to these theses, Cherry has noted that Taylor's attack upon the tenets of New 
England Calvinistic orthodoxy to which Edwards was responding, devolved upon the difference 
between the effects of the fall and the imputation of the guilt accrued by the fall. According to 
the 'Arminian' position Taylor was defending, Adam's posterity were subject to the effects of 
the fall including physical frailty and death, but were not subject to eternal death or personal 
guilt simply on account of the imputation of Adam's guilt to his progeny. 'For Taylor, not only 
is grace conditional upon the self-determining natural human faculties; when Scripture speaks 
of the imputation of righteousness, it refers to the person's own act in itself, operating according 
to the exercises of the natural faculties, as righteous. "" It was the view of Taylor and his 
sympathizers that the position to which Edwards clung was fatally pessimistic in its perspective 
on human nature. But in Cherry's view, what Edwards actually intended to do in OS was offer a 
version of Calvinism which endorsed a kind of 'tragic optimism' sometimes overlooked by his 
detractors: 'His [Edwards'] conviction about the human fall was matched by a buoyant 
confidence in God's power to deliver man from that fall. The doctrine of original sin was not for 
Edwards an end in itself but the supposition - certainly an indispensable supposition - for 
comprehending the full meaning of man's higher possibilities. 216 
214 YE3: 107. The importance of these two points has also been noted by Holbrook in his editorial 
introduction in YE3: 27, where he says, 'According to Edwards, there are two parts to the doctrine of 
original sin: the depravity of the human heart and the imputation of Adam's first sin to his postenty. ' 
215 Conrad Cherry, The Theology ofJonathan Edwards, p. 198. 
216 Ibid., p. 197. 
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The theological net result of Taylor's doctrine was twofold: its inherent optimism led to a 
replacement (or displacement) of confidence in God's redemptive power with confidence in 
man's power to fulfil the moral law himself. This meant that the Reformation doctrine of sola 
fides was in danger of being undermined. It was because of this that Edwards felt the need to 
act. Hence the direction Edwards' thinking took in OS, namely, to outline and correct Taylor's 
doctrine from Scripture and experience before dealing with the metaphysical issues. For 
Edwards,, what was at stake was more than a dogmatic quibble: the entire evangelical legacy of 
his Puritan forebears was in question. Thus Cherry notes, 
Central to Edwards' interpretation [of original sin] is his attempt to show how original sin illuminates the 
Pauline "justification by faith alone ...... The abandonment of the Calvinistic doctrine that all men are 
totally corrupt coram deo has as its counterpart that abandonment of the doctrine of justification by grace 
through faith. For the depravity of man and the glorious majesty of God's saving grace mutually 
I illuminate each other. That is why Edwards insists that sin is a fall of the race in Adam (the continuity of 
guilt being maintained by the direct power of God) and not simply a series of separate human acts. It is a 
corruption of heart that reaches deep into the human subject, a corruption to be estimated primarily by 
comparing the selfishness of man with the overflowing love of the infinite God. The divine deliverance 
appears in its true light when one acknowledges that man cannot lift himself out of the mire of his own 
Sin. 217 
Clearly, Edwards' rationale in completing OS was primarily an apologetic one, as had been the 
case with FOW21' But here, even more than in FOW, Edwards directed his thinking along 
apologetic lines. 
(4: 2) Edwards' theology of imputation 
Thus far we have seen that Edwards' doctrine in OS is directed to the goal of defending the 
traditional dogma of original sin as it has been classically construed. T'hat is to say, the idea that 
Adam passed on to his progeny some terrible vitiation of moral nature due to the fall, resulting 
in its propagation to his posterity. However, there are two broad streams of thinking regarding 
the means by which this original sin is imputed to Adam's children, (that is, each of these two 
positions outlines the kind of union that is established by God in imputing Adam's sin to his 
217 Ibid., p. 201. 
218 Edwards' position in apologetics has been charted by Michael McClymond, in chapter 6 of Encounters 
with God, where he places him firn-fly in the mainstream, 'Edwards fits into the Augustinian or Anselmian 
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progeny). The question of the union established by God in original sin is clearly related to, but 
separate from the problem of the nature of the imputation involved in the transmission of 
original sin. Whereas the problem of the union established by God in imputation deals with the 
way in which God sees the relationship between Adam-plus-his-progeny, the nature of that 
union deals with how the resulting original sin is passed on to Adam's posterity. This is either 
immediately in virtue of some metaphysical unity that is established between Adam and his 
posterity, or mediately, through some hereditary corruption which is passed down the 
generations from Adam onwards. It is this union established by God in original sin that is of 
primary interest to Edwards in his discussion of imputation in OS. Flis views on the nature of 
imputation arise out of his thinking on precisely how God establishes a union between Adam 
and his progeny, that is a just reflection of the holiness of his character. We shall outline each of 
the two views involved in the question of union first, before moving to comment on the nature 
of the union that has been established. 
(4: 3) The union established by original sin 
The first conception of this metaphysical union is the Realist view of the Augustinian school. 
Adam is seen here as the concrete universal of humankind, and humanity are dealt with 'in 
him'. This means that Adam's nature, whilst individual, in some way can also comprise the 
whole race in a metaphysical unity where they are dealt with by God as a corporate unity. 
Adam's progeny are somehow present in Adam at the point of original sin; according to the 
traditional interpretation of Augustinian realism, this presence is to be understood seminally. 219 
Thus Augustine in City of God comments on the natures of Adam and Eve that they were, 
Deteriorated in proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of their sin, so that what existed as 
punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural consequence in their children ... as man the parent 
is, such is man the offspring ... what man was made, not when created, 
but when he sinned was punished, 
this he propagated. 220 
pattern of "faith seeking understanding, " hence there was no contradiction in his reliance on reason 
combined with his assertion that reason is no substitute for revelation' p. 95. 
219 1 have deliberately sidestepped this issue of the mechanism of imputation, which has caused not a little 
embarrassment to some theologians after Augustine. This pertains to the material cause of imputation 
(how the condition was passed on), whereas we are concerned with the formal cause (why it was passed 
on in the first place). 
220 City of God Bk. XIH, 111, pp. 413 -414. 
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J. N. D. Kelly's account of the matter makes a similar point. According to his reading of 
Augustine, 
he [Augustine] expresses it, "in the misdirected choice of that one man all sinned in him, since all were 
that one man from whom on that account they all severally derive original sin. " Sin is a matter of the will 
(nusquam nisi in Voluntate esse peccatum) and "all sinned in Adam on that occasion, for all were already 
identical with him in that nature of his which was endowed with the capacity to generate them". Others 
before Augustine had stressed our solidarity with Adam, but none had depicted so vividly our complicity 
with him in his evil willing. 221 
This realist position on original sin had something of a revival of interest in the nineteenth 
century when Calvinistic divines such as William G. T. Shedd defended it as the classic 
theological and biblical model for articulating a doctrine of original sin. 222 Thus, in his 
I Dogmatic Theology, he writes, 
Scripture is clear that the sin of Adam is the sin of us all, not only by propagation and communication 
(whereby not his singular [individual] fault, but something of the same nature [with it] is derived unto us), 
but also by an imputation of his actual transgression unto us all, his singular [individual] transgression 
being by this means made ours. 
Yff- 
He goes on to clarify this position, 
221 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, Fifth Edition (London: A&C Black, 1977), p. 364. Augustine's 
doctrine is not always easy to discern, as Berkhof points out in his Systematic Theology, p. 237, 
jAugustine's] doctrine of original sin is not entirely clear-While he stresses the fact that all men were 
seminally present in Adam and actually sinned in him, he also comes very close to the idea that they 
sinned in Adam as their representative. ' The same idea is found in John Murray, in his volume on The 
Imputation ofAdam's Sin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), who argues that Augustine did not hold to 
realism in the sense outlined above. See p. 3 1, where he cornments, 'when he [Augustine] defines more 
specifically the sin by which all sinned in Adam and through which death passed to all he does so in 
terms of original sin or hereditary depravity passed on from Adam to his seed by propagation. The reason 
why posterity is said to have sinned in Adam is that the "seminal nature", from which all were to be 
propagated, had been defiled in Adam when as yet it existed only in him-when this is recognized it is not 
so apparent that Augustine's thought follows the realist pattern. In the last analysis he falls back on the 
notion of original sin as propagated. ' Further comment would take us beyond the bounds of this thesis. It 
is noted simply to show that Augustine's thought is plastic enough to admit of these competing 
definitions over the nature of original sin. For our purposes, it is enough to be able to maintain that 
Augustine has traditionally been thought to be an exemplar of realism, though perhaps this is not as clear 
cut as is sometimes thought. 
222 This position was also taken by, amongst others, the Baptist theologian Augustus Strong in his 
Systematic Theology (Westwood: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1963, reprinted firom 1907 edition), pp. 619 ff. 
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The grounds of this imputation are: 1. That we were then in him and parts of him. 2. That he sustained the 
place of our whole nature in the covenant God made with him. When divines affirm that by Adam's sin 
we are guilty of damnation, they do not mean that any are damned for his particular act, but that by his sin 
and our sinning in him, by God's most just ordination we have contracted that exceeding pravity and 
sinfulness of nature which deserveth the curse of God and eternal damnation. 223 
The central idea here is that human nature for the purposes of imputation is treated generically 
and numerically as one metaphysical unit, that is as Adam-plus-progeny. This means that Adam 
and his posterity are not separate individuals but participate in one common substance. 
Therefore, if this human nature is corrupted by Adam in an act of original sin, then it is 
corrupted in the subsequent individualization of that nature in an infralapsarian state. 
Consequently, all humanity actually, or really sinned in Adam, since all humanity actually or 
really share in this one substance of human nature. " 
The second view is the Reformed, or federal view (sometimes called the representational view, 
because of the emphasis on Adam as the representative of humanity) with which Edwards was 
fwniliar through his Puritan heritage. Here Adam is regarded not so much as in mystical union 
with humanity in one substance, as a federal representative of his race, just as Christ was a 
federal representative of mankind before God on the cross. Indeed, the whole federal tradition in 
theology turns on the identification of Adam and Christ as the two 'Adams' (see Romans 5 and 
I Corinthians 15: 20-28). One, the father of humanity whose actions as representative led to the 
imputation of original sin; the other the saviour whose actions, culminating in his death and 
resurrection, led to the profferment of salvation upon Adam's race, by a similar federal, that is, 
covenantal relationship. 225 Thus Calvin says, 
There is nodiing absurd, then, in supposing that when Adam was despoiled, human nature was left naked 
and destitute, or that when he was infected with sin, contagion crept into human nature. Hence, rotten 
branches came forth from a rotten root, which transmitted their rottenness to the other twigs sprouting 
from them. For thus were the children corrupted in the parent, so that they brought disease upon their 
children's children. That is, the beginning of corruption in Adam was such that it was conveyed in a 
perpetual stream from the ancestors into their descendants. For the contagion does not take its origin from 
the substance of the flesh or soul, but because it had been so ordained by God that the first man should at 
223 Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, Vol. III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), p. 348-9. 
224 For a standard theological recapitulation of this point see Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 241. 
225 For a recent and illurninating account of the Biblical data perWining to the federal position, especially 
Romans 5, see Henri Blocher's Original Sin, Illuminating the Riddle (Leicester: 1VP, 1997), chapter 3. 
There he outlines two positions on Romans 5 which roughly correspond to the realist and federalist 
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one and the same time have and lose, both for himself and for his descendants, the gifts that God had 
bestowed upon hiM. 
226 
This embryonic federalism in Calvin's thought was developed into a full-blown covenantal 
theology during the so-called protestant scholastic period following the Reformation in the late 
227 
sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. Francis Turretin, a scholar of this period and theologian 
with whom Edwards was familiar, expressed the federalist position on original sin in these 
terms, 
For the bond between Adam and his posterity is twofold: (1) natural, as he is the father, and we are his 
children; (2) political and forensic, as he was the prince and representative head of the whole human race. 
Therefore the foundation of imputation is not only the natural connection which exists between us and 
Adam (since, in that case, all his sins might be imputed to us), but mainly the moral and federal (in virtue 
I of which 
God entered into covenant with him as our head). Hence Adam stood in that sin not as a private 
person, but as a public and representative person - representing all his posterity in that action and whose 
228 demerit equally pertains to all . 
Forensic representationalism went hand-in-hand with covenantal theology, the idea here being 
that God made several covenants with humanity down through the ages by which means biblical 
and Church history were divided UP. 229Adarn stood as the natural head of the race as the first 
man and father of his progeny, but he also stood in a covenantal relationship to his posterity 
which was instituted by God, whereby Adam was deemed the federal representative of the 
whole race. This supralapsarian covenant was called the Covenant of Works, and the terms of 
interpretations, before trying to put forward a via media. However, his view appears on closer 
examination, to be more like a soft-federalism than a true third option. 
226 InSt. U: 1: VII, (trans. ) Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia:, Westminster 1960), p. 250. Edwards himself 
uses an organic analogy for imputation similar to that employed in tWs context by Calvin. 
227 In more recent literature a distinction is usually made between covenantal theology pertaining to 
federalism, and protestant scholasticism as a whole. The former tends to be seen as a more strictly biblical 
theological construct, whereas scholasticism tended towards abstraction and casuistry (in a logical rather 
than pejorative sense of that word. ) 
228 Turretin, institutes ofElenctic Theology, Vol. 1, p. 616. 
229This covenantal theology appears to lie behind what Edwards says in works like The History of the 
Work ofRedemption, in The Works ofJonathan Edwards Vol. 1, pp. 532 ff. He endorses the covenantal 
scheme in no uncertain terms (pace Miller et al. ) in the Appendix to Observations Concerning the Trinity 
and the Covenant ofRedemption in Treatise on Grace, (ed. ) Paul Helm (Cambridge: James Clark, 1971. ) 
Carl Bogue investigates Edwards' covenantal thought with reference to his sermons and Miscellanies, in 
Jonathan Edwards and the Covenant of Grace (New Jersey: Mack, 1975), chapter 8. By contrast John E. 
Smith in his otherwise clear and concise account of Edwards' thought makes a rather peculiarly outdated 
claim that Edwards' famous Boston Lecture of 173 1, entitled "God Glorified in Man's Dependence" was 
a direct attack upon covenant theology. 'niis view, espoused by Perry Miller, has been shown by more 
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the covenant were that Adam would continue as the steward of the garden as long as he did not 
eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2: 16-17. Eve was clearly 
aware of the terms of the covenant although she herself was not present when they were set, as 
evidenced in her response to the serpent in Genesis 3: 2-3. ) Hence Adam's sin was imputed to 
all his posterity on the basis of this second, covenantal relationship. For if Adam was the 
divinely inaugurated representative of the whole race, then when Adam sinned God would be 
covenantally bound to impute his vitiated state to all members of his race (this thought is taken 
up in Romans 5: 12 .) 
230 
(4: 4) The nature of the transmission of original sin 
On this federalist view, the means by which original sin is imputed is usually construed as being 
immediate. That is, Adamic sin passes immediately to all his posterity in such a way that all his 
posterity are born with the inherited condition of a vitiated nature. But there is another possible 
view of the nature of the union achieved in imputation, known as mediate imputation. This view 
was first propagated at the French Saumur school of Theology in the Seventeenth Century by 
Placaeus (Josue de la Place, 1596-1655). 231 Placaeus claimed that Adam's progeny were not 
born cursed with Adam's sin. Instead, his posterity inherited only Adam's corrupt nature and it 
is this nature alone, and not the imputation of Adam's original sin itself, which is the ground of 
the subsequent condemnation of humanity by God. Hence, there is no immediate imputation of 
Adam's sin to his posterity as with traditional Calvinism. Imputation is only mediate, and 
indirect,, located in the fact that we share the same moral nature as Adam, which since the fall, 
has been vitiated. His posterity are not born corrupt because they are guilty in Adam; rather, 
they are guilty because they are corrupt. Philip Quinn makes this point clear when he says, 
recent research to be without foundation, and nothing Smith says in the text amounts to the attack he 
claims Edwards is making. See Jonathan Edwards: Puritan, Preacher, Philosopher, p. 141. 
230 Paul Helm sums up the central distinction between realism and federalism when he says, 'the 
Augustinian view original sin is a matter of metaphysics, the metaphysics of person and nature, on the 
federal view, a matter of divinely instituted arrangement. ' Faith and Understanding (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 161. See also Stephen H. Daniel's The Philosophy of Jonathan 
Edwards, p. 132, where he utilizes the same distinction between Augustinian and federalist interpretations 
of Edwards' thinking (but to quite different effect). 
231 The theological intricacies of this debate are convoluted and not always clear. Placaeus, on being 
charged with the Mediate view at the Twenty-Eighth Synod of the Reformed Churches in France, 
apparently declared that this condemnation did not represent his own views, and that he did not deny 
inu-nediate imputation, instead he believed that the imputation of Adam's first sin was mediate not 
immediate. John Murray explains, 'Immediate and antecedent imputation, he contended, must be 
distinguished from mediate and consequent. The former takes place immediately and is not mediated by 
hereditary corruption; the latter takes place mediately and is mediated by this corruption ... In a word 
his 
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'According to the theory of immediate imputation the guilt of Adam's first sin is directly 
imputed to his posterity, and in them guilt logically precedes and is the ground of inherent sin or 
corruption. Adam's descendants are corrupt because they are guilty. According to the theory of 
mediate imputation, which originated with Josua Placaeus, the order is reversed; corruption in 
Adam's descendants logically precedes and is the ground of imputed sin or guilt. They are 
-) 232 guilty because they are Corrupt . 
Although this view had a vogue in the seventeenth century, it failed to establish itself as an 
effective alternative to the immediate way of understanding the nature of imputation. 
Having outlined the different theological views on the union involved in imputation and the 
nature of that union, we may now consider which of these views best represents Edwards' 
thinking on the subject in OS. 
There are those who have taken the view that Edwards does not adhere to Federalism in his 
doctrine of imputation. Helm is among these: in Faith and Understanding, he does not 
incorporate elements of a federalist reading of this aspect of Edwards' doctrine. Others have 
taken the view that Edwards was more orthodox in his Calvinistic understanding of imputation 
and that what he says on this subject can be squared with apparently federalist elements in his 
thinking elsewhere. Still others have claimed that Edwards was substantially federalist in his 
thinking on original sin, but that his discussion of imputation represents a kind of hiatus in this 
federalism; an internal inconsistency upon Edwards' part which remained unreconciled within 
the argument of OS. There was considerable debate on these issues in the nineteenth century, 
particularly in relation to where Edwards stood on the union and nature of imputation, which 
centred upon Princetonian Calvinism and its appropriation of Edwards' thought. 233 In particular, 
Charles Hodge took issue with the consistency of Edwards' federalism in his doctrine of 
position was that the imputation to posterity Of Adams first sin was mediated through the inheritance 
from him of a corrupt nature. ' The Imputation ofAdam's Sin, p. 43. 
232 The Augustinian Tradition, (ed. ) Gareth B. Matthews, p. 239. A similar point is made by Storms in 
Tragedy in Eden, p. 228. 
233 For more on the Princetonian theologians and their relationship to Edwards, their absorption of 
Scottish commonsense realism in their methodology, and the way that this mitigated against their 
wholesale approval of Edwards, as well as their antagonism towards the New England theologians who 
claimed Edwards as their mentor, see, Mark Noll's essay, "Jonathan Edwards and Nineteenth Century 
Theology" in Hatch and Stout (eds. ) Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, pp. 260-8 1. Noll 
states (on p. 268) that, 'The clash between Princeton and New England over Edwards continued until the 
late 1860s. But the basic positions remained constant. Princeton held up Edwards as a great exponent of 
orthodox Calvinism, in spite of his lack of caution concerning revivals and religious experience and in 
spite of his foibles on virtue and unity with Adam. By contrast, New Englanders held from first to last 
that Edwards belonged to them. ' He concludes his argument with the claim that the close of the 
nineteenth century marked the passing of Edwards as a serious theological force. Thereafter, theological 
interest in his corpus was more historical than dogmatic. 
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imputation, whilst B. B. Warfield defended Edwards as consistently federalist even in his 
exposition of imputation. Other divines were also drawn to take issue with Edwards, including 
Robert Dabney and William Cunningham. 234 
In order to understand the position Edwards takes in OS and the reasons why he is driven to 
espouse a form of occasionalism in his view of imputation, it is important to be clear where 
Edwards stands on the nature of the theological question under consideration. To this end, we 
shall examine several readings of Edwards' theological stance on imputation with a view to 
drawing out whether he stood in the realist or federalist tradition,, and whether his view on the 
nature of imputation was immediate or mediate. 
(4: 4: i) The realist-mediate interpretation. 
Charles Hodge maintained that Edwards' view of imputation was unclear, vacillating between 
federalism,, which was Edwards' considered view in the majority of his work, and realism which 
Edwards takes up in his defence of imputation in OS, coupled with a mediate view on the nature 
of imputation. 235 From the Saumur school (Placeaus), Hodge traced the influence of this mediate 
doctrine through Stapfer to Edwards, 236 claiming that it was an 'excrescencel, not part of the 
body of Edwards' work in general and not affecting the other parts of his work on original sin in 
particular. However, on closer examination, Hodge believed that Edwards' view of imputation 
apart from his explicit endorsement of Stapfer's mediate position, appeared instead to be more 
consistent with a peculiar version of the realist view of imputation. What is more, Hodge 
maintained that Edwards defended an orthodox view of federalism in one of the earlier sections 
of OS. In a citation I have been unable to trace, he claims that Edwards teaches federalism in the 
context of his exposition of Romans 5: 12-2 1: 
In his exposition-he expressly teaches the common doctrine [meaning federalism], and says, "As this 
place in general is very full and plain, so the doctrine of the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, 
and also the imputation of his first sin, are both clearly taught in it. The imputation of Adam's one 
transgression, is indeed most directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured that by one man's sin 
death passed to all; all being adjudged to this punishment as having sinned (so it is implied) in that one 
"' See Hodge, Systematic Theology, Volume 11 (London: James Clarke, 1960), pp. 205-208 and 216-22 1; 
Warfield, Works Volume LK, Studies in Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), chapter 
XVIII; Dabney, Lectures in Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1972 (reprint)) p. 338 ff.; 
Cunningham, The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1989 
(reprint)), pp. 384 ff. 
23S What follows utilizes Hodge's Systematic Theology, Vol. A pp. 205-208 and 216-22 1. 
236 Edwards himself cites Stapfer with approval at one stage of his discussion in YE3: 391-393, n. 1. It is 
this extended footnote to which Hodge is referring. 
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mall's sin. And it is repeated, over and over, that all are condemned, many are dead, many are sinners, 
etc., by one man's offence, by the disobedience of one, and by one offence. 237 
Moreover, 
This is the current representation throughout the work on original sin. It is only when in answer to the 
objection that it is unjust that we should be punished for the sin of Adarn, that he enters in an abstruse 
metaphysical discussion on the nature of oneness or identity, and tries to prove that Adam and his 
posterity are one, and not distinct agents. It is, therefore, after all, realism, rather than mediate imputation, 
that Edwards for the time adopted. 238 
A similar reading of Edwards was also taken by William Cunningham who believed that 
Edwards had imbibed a version of mediate imputation from Stapfer, and that his view was 
I 
inconsistent with other remarks elsewhere in his writings which endorsed 'the common 
Calvinistic doctrine'. 239 
The idea that Edwards' argument for imputation appears to be internally disordered, (vacillating 
between some form of mediate and realist view,, whilst elsewhere in OS Edwards defends a 
traditional version of federalism) seems rather implausible. However, Hodge does raise serious 
questions about the consistency of Edwards' doctrine, which require a considered response. 
Such a response has been provided in outline by B. B. Warfield, and in detail by John Murray in 
his study of original sin, The Imputation ofAdam's Sin. 
(4: 4: ii) The federalist-immediate interpretation. 
Unlike his erstwhile mentor, B. B. Warfield evidently believed that Edwards' view of 
imputation was consistent with his other writings; that is, Edwards maintained a consistently 
federalist view of imputation which was immediate. In his Studies in Theology he has this to say 
of Edwards' position: 
in answering objections to the doctrine of original sin, he appeals at one time to Stapfer, and speaks, after 
him, in the language of that form of doctrine known as "mediate imputation". But this is only in order to 
illustrate his own view that all mankind are one as truly as and by the same kind of divine constitution 
that an individual life is one in its consecutive moments. Even in this immediate context he does not teach 
237 Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 11, p. 208. 
238 Ibid. 
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the doctrine of "mediate imputation, " insisting rather that Adam and his posterity being in the strictest 
sense one, in them no less than in him "the guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition" 
cannot at all be distinguished from "the guilt of Adam's first sin"; and elsewhere throughout the treatise 
he speaks in the terms of the common Calvinistic doctrine. 240 
This has been taken up in more recent times by John Murray, who explicitly endorses Warfield 
over and against Cunningham and Hodge. 24' His particular interest is in whether Edwards 
maintained mediate imputation, which, with Warfield, he denies categorically, for several 
reasons. Firstl in OS Edwards makes clear and unambiguously federalist statements that can 
only be understood in the context of an immediate view of imputation. Thus, 
God, in each step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established 
with him, looked on his posterity as being one with him ... 
And though he [God] dealt more immediately 
I with 
Adam, yet it was as the head of the whole body, and the root of the whole tree; and in his 
proceedings with hiný he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been existing in their root. 
From which it will follow, that both guilt or exposedness to punishment and also depravity of heartý 
came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like 
a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam 
stood in, as head or root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with, and most 
immediately acting and suffering. 242 
Elsewhere in the earlier discussion of OS, Edwards makes even stronger federalist claims as part 
of his defence of his doctrine against his protagonist, Dr. Taylor. In light of an exposition of the 
creation and fall narratives of Genesis 1-3, Edwards says, 
It may be proper in this place also to take some notice of that objection of Dr. Taylor's against Adam's 
being supposed to be a federal head of his posterity ... I think, a very 
little consideration is sufficient to 
shew, that there is no weight in this objection 
and later in the same discussion, 
23' Cunningham, The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, p. 384. His explanation for this 
lapse in Edwards' thinldng was that Edwards had simply not investigated this topic of imputation 
carefully enough! 
240 Warficld, Works Vol. N, Studies in Theo7ogy, p. 530, emphasis added. 
241 See John Murray, The Imputation ofAdam's Sin, pp. 52 ff. The following argument uses much of the 
material that Murray here sets forth. 
242 YE3: 389. 
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And the honour of these two federal heads arises not so much from what was proposed to each for his 
trial, as from their success, and the good actually obtained; and also the manner of obtaining: Christ 
obtains the benefits men have through him by proper merit of condignity, and a pure purchase by an 
equivalent: which would not have been the case with Adam, if he had obeyed 243 
Furthermore, in light of what Edwards' sees as Taylor's misunderstanding of the key passage on 
imputation in Romans 5: 12, Edwards has this to say, 
in the eye of the Judge of the world, in Adam's first sin, all sinned; not only in some sort, but all sinned so 
as to be exposed to that death, and fmal destruction, which is the proper wages of sin. 244 
These passages, taken together, constitute a considerable body of evidence that Edwards was 
defending some kind of federalist interpretation. To derive from this the notion that Edwards' 
I view of the transmission of original sin was mediate rather than immediate would require 
considerable textual evidence to the contrary. The burden of proof appears to lie with those who 
claim that Edwards'view is other than immediate federalism. 245 
Secondly, it is clear that Edwards was aware of, and endorsed the distinction between the union 
involved in original sin and the nature of that union in imputation which we have already drawn. 
In referring to the whole passage of Romans 5: 12-19, he says, 
As this place in general is very plain and full, so the doctrine of the corruption ofnature, as derived from 
Adam, and also the imputation of hisfirst sin, are both clearly taught in it. The imputation of Adam's one 
transgression, is indeed most directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured, that "by one man's 
sin, death passed on all"; all being adjudged to this punishment as having sinned (so it is implied) in that 
one man's sin 246 
This is important since, as noted earlier, those who defend a mediate view of imputation believe 
that the whole nature of original sin consists in that corruption which is hereditary to all 
humanity because of the fall, and that alone. It denies the actual imputation of Adam's sin to all 
men. In so doing, it affirms only one of the two aspects to original sin which Edwards here 
243 YF-3: 259 and 260 respectively. 
244 YE 3: 3 46. 
245 Murray comments, 'the most conclusive evidence in support of a doctrine of mediate imputation 
would have to be presented if the priina facie import of such statements is to be ruled out; the account 
given is altogether similar to that which we might expect in an exponent of immediate imputation. 
' The 
Imputation ofAdam's Sin, pp. 55-6. 
246 YE3: 348, emphasis added. 
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enunciates, viz.,, the 'corruption of nature' resulting from the fall, and 'the imputation of 
Adam's first sin' to all humanity. 
But, thirdly, there is a difficulty over one passage where Edwards appears to conflate this 
corruption of nature derived from Adam with the imputation of his first sin to his posterity, 
which could be construed as an endorsement of some form of mediate view of imputation, or at 
least an inconsistency in his view, which is expressed in quite different, federal terms elsewhere 
as we have already noted. " In the passage in question Edwards argues that the notion that 
Adam's progeny are all born with a double guilt is fidse. This double guilt ostensibly stems 
from the conjunction of the imputation of original sin with the additional guilt each person 
accrues by being in possession of a corrupt heart from the moment they are born (as a result of 
bearing the marks of original sin. ) Edwards opposes this bifurcation of guilt, but in so doing 
appears to be rescinding upon his earlier comments regarding the distinction between the 
corruption of nature as a result of Adamic sin and the imputation of that first sin. In fact, as 
I Murray argues, Edwards manages to maintain that humans are doubly guilty, but only as a 
result of their forensic status subsequent to birth (they are not born with this double guilt. That 
is the crucial distinction that he is here making). Moreover, they are only doubly guilty on 
grounds which distinguish between the corruption of the heart as first existing of a depraved 
disposition'and the corruption of heart which becomes a 'confirmed principle' through acting 
upon it inclinations. Edwards' maintains that on the grounds that individuals continue in having 
corrupt hearts and acting upon them after their birth, this 'confirmed principle 'of a corrupt heart 
represents reasonable grounds for additional guilt to be imputed to humanity. However, this is 
to be carefully distinguished from the initial corruption of heart which, along with the 
imputation of original sin, is treated as one for the purposes of guilt. Two crucial passages 
makes this plain: 
Indeed the guilt, that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it remains a confirmed principle, and 
appears in its consequent operations, is a distinct and additional guilt: but the guilt arising from the first 
existing of a depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their guilt of 
Adam's first sin. 
And, 
The depraved disposition of Adam's heart is to be considered two ways. (1) As the first rising of an evil 
inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of shi, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2) An 
247 YE3: 3 90. 
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evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle, that came by God's forsaking 
him; which was a punishment of his first transgression. This confirmed Corruption, by its remaining and 
continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul. 248 
It is this second citation which is the foundation for what he goes on to say about the theological 
nature of the transmission of sin from Adam to his posterity. Later in the same discussion 
Edwards says that the evil disposition of heart in man is prior to any charge of guilt by God, 'the 
evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent; as it was in the case of Adam 
himself. '249 It was largely as a result of this passage that Hodge charged Edwards with 
defending a mediate view on transmission of sin . 
2'0 But this is to misunderstand Edwards' 
distinctive contribution to the discussion on the means of transmission. Edwards was actually 
saying that in the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, the two elements which apply to 
Adam's sin viz. the evil disposition of heart which gave rise to the act and the act itself are 
distinct elements in time,, but are treated as parts of one action. Tbus, 'The first evil disposition 
or inclination of the heart of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his first act of sin, but 
was included in it. -) 
251 Similarly, where Adam's sin is imputed these two elements are present, 
such that the evil disposition to sin comes first (as it did with Adam) and the charge of guilt 
consequent upon that disposition, comes after, as the person continues in that disposition which 
becomes a confirmed principle. As Adam was charged on the basis of the initial disposition plus 
the act (which is treated as one action which deserves punishment), so this is imputed to his 
posterity in such a way that they too are charged as a consequence of having an evil disposition 
which is part of the vitiation of original sin. As that disposition becomes a confirmed principle 
which is worked out in the life of the person, they are liable to accrue additional guilt. But that 
additional guilt is subsequent to the initial charge of guilt which incorporates both the 
disposition given in Adam as well as the vitiation of the person in original sin. 
This is not mediate, since Edwards is nowhere denying the immediate imputation of Adam's 
sin, he is merely distinguishing the succeeding elements that make up the original action of 
Adam, which are also transposed onto his posterity in original sin and as such result in 
condemnation. Sinful actions after the original condemnation are treated as separate grounds for 
further condemnation and guilt giving rise to his peculiar understanding of double guilt. So, this 
whole exercise in distinguishing the elements which make up Adam's sin and the means by 
which it is propagated is a judicial, or forensic analysis of the parts of original sin which make 
248 Ibid. 
249 YE, 3: 391. Author's emphases. 
250 See Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 207. 
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up the whole action of Adam, and the whole imputation of the state which follows from that 
action along with the penal consequences of Adam's sin for his posterity. 252 
Murray contends that although this appears superficially to be rather similar in tone to a Mediate 
view of imputation, on closer examination of the distinctions which Edwards is employing, it is 
evident that he is not guilty of endorsing a mediate view, nor of inconsistency with regard to his 
distinction between the union of Adam and his progeny on the one hand, and the means of 
imputation on the other. And, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, that verdict has been 
sustained. Edwards' view on the means by which imputation occurs can now be summarized as 
followsý, 
(a) Adam's disposition to sin and the (original) sin itself are treated by God as one 
forensic unit. 
(b) Adam's ongoing evil disposition subsequent to his original sin (Edwards' 
'confirmed principle') is a consequence of that first sin and constitute grounds upon 
which God imputes additional guilt (since the 'confirmed principle' is a distinct, 
subsequent action from his first sin). 
(c) This twofold understanding of the forensic nature of Adam's sin has application 
through imputation to his posterity such that, 
(d) Adam's posterity all partake of the original sin of Adam, and 
(e) the participation of Adam's posterity in Adam's sin involves both Adam's 
disposition to sin and his sin itself, which are treated as one forensic unit by God, and 
(f) this initial disposition to sin is temporally prior to the charge of guilt which accrues 
to the whole forensic unit of imputed original sin as it did with Adam. 
251 YE3: 390. 
252 It may still be asked how Edwards can apparently endorse the view of Stapfer in his discussion of the 
means of imputation if his view does not support a mediate position, as Stapfer is traditionally thought to 
have done. To this several things can be said by way of response. First, it is not entirely clear that Stapfer 
did endorse the mediate view. Murray maintains that such a judgement is at least uncertain, (see Murray, 
The Imputation ofAdam's Sin, p, 63, note 114. ) Second, although Edwards does endorse Stapfer's views, 
it is not clear that in so doing he is endorsing a mediate view. In the context of the passage, Edwards' use 
of Stapfer is primarily as a means to bolster his contentions about the identity between Adam and his 
posterity in imputation. Even when Stapfer does deal with immediate and mediate views, his view in 
Edwards' citation is not clearly or categorically mediate: '" The whole of the controversy they have with 
us about this matter, evidently arises from this, that they suppose the mediate and immediate imputation 
are distinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reality. And so indeed 
they consider imputation only as immediate, and abstractly from the mediate; when yet our divines 
suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. "' YE3: 393. At most this is 
confused, and one may legitimately ask why Edwards chose to cloud his own careful exposition of the 
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(g) In addition, Adam's posterity all continue in sin as a 'confirmed principle' leading 
to further condemnation and double guilt. 
It should now be clear that Edwards' position with regard to the nature of imputation was not 
mediate, but immediate. Moreover, Murray has made a strong case, contra Hodge and 
Cunningham for the coherence of Edwards' position as a unified presentation of a federalist 
position. 
However, although Edwards stood within the federal tradition of Puritan covenantal theology, 
his federalism was not conventional. Nor did he find traditional federal arguments sufficient to 
the purpose of defending the justice of the union instituted in imputation. Although Murray's 
discussion of Edwards' position on the immediacy of imputation is clear and insightful, he fails 
to make any mention of the way in which Edwards found himself compelled to revise federal 
notions on the metaphysics behind the unity established between Adam and his progeny in 
I imputation. Edwards did retain aspects of federalism even here, but his apologetic purpose in 
establishing the reasonableness of imputation was not served by the bald representational 
premise underlying the traditional federal argument. Edwards felt that more was needed by way 
of metaphysical arguments to defend the traditional understanding of the unity established by 
God in the act of imputing Adam's sin. 
(4: 4: iii) A nonfederalist-immediate interpretation? 
Paul Helm has recently argued that Edwards' theory of imputation is not beholden to 
federalism. In fact he believes that Edwards' worked out his view in conscious opposition to 
what he perceived to be the failings of both the traditional realist and federalist understandings 
of imputation. He maintains that it was the perception that neither of these traditional 
alternatives satisfactorily explained the metaphysics of imputation that led Edwards to develop 
his own view, which falls into neither traditional perspectives on the problem. Helm comments, 
'As a result of the deep conviction he had about the immediate dependence of the creation upon 
the Creator, Edwards did not accept either of these views, the realist or the federal view. Instead 
he developed an account of the relation between Adam and his progeny in a different direction 
as part of his overall defence, both philosophical and theological, of the Christian doctrine of 
original sin. -)253 
matter with this apparent obfuscation of the issues. But that is not the same as calling Edwards' entire 
exposition of this aspect of the doctrine into question. 
253Faith and Understanding, p. 161. 
120 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
It is the conviction of the present author that this understanding of Edwards is wrong in its 
denial of any federalist elements in Edwards' view of imputation, but right in pointing out that 
Edwards' solution to the problem of imputation did not fall into either traditional federalism or 
realism. The reason why this whole area of Edwards' thought has caused such controversy and 
misunderstanding is because his proposal was such a careful, subtle reorientation of a traditional 
theological issue along new metaphysical lines. 
Edwards was driven to formulate a view which did not follow the traditional alternative because 
he was aware, through his reading of Taylor and others, that the traditional options on 
imputation did not adequately explain why God imputed Adam's sin to all his posterity, given 
that his posterity were not one and the same as Adam. For this reason, the subject of OS IV. - III, 
is the great objection that 'imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his 
posterity are not one and the same. ' 
Thus far, Helm appears to be correct. But it is not the case that this meant that in his search for 
an alternative solution, Edwards jettisoned all the material from both alternatives available to 
him. Instead, it seems evident (or should become evident in what follows), that he took up 
elements of both and fused them together with his own occasionalistic reading of persistence 
through time and the doctrine of temporal parts, to provide a novel solution to the problem. 
From realism he appropriated the notion that there must be some ontological reality behind the 
idea of Adam and his progeny being treated as one, and that this reality must have a 
metaphysical explanation. From federalism he took the idea that Adam stands in a special 
relationship to his posterity by virtue of being the first man, or homo primus, and that it is in this 
function of homo primus that God treats Adam and his posterity for the purposes of imputation, 
as one. -4But his solution to the ontological problems underlying the doctrine of imputation 
went beyond both federalism and realism, since he felt that the metaphysics underpinning 
realism was false and the representationalism of federalism failed to take sufficiently seriously 
the ontological union which God institutes in imputation. Edwards rejected both alternatives as 
they stood, choosing instead to reformulate elements of each in his own answer to the problem, 
with the addition of an occasionalistic understanding of the doctrine of temporal parts . 
25' He 
was determined to show that, contra Taylor et aL, the doctrine of imputation was not only 
theologically as well as philosophically coherent, but also eminently reasonable. To this end, he 
254 See. Altiscellany 717 in YE. 18: 348-9. There, Edwards speaks of why Adam's first sm is imputed to 
humanity in a way which is commensurate with seeing Adam as homo primus. 
255 Thus Jenson's contention that Edwards method in OS was 'first to establish a prima facie case for an 
Augustinian doctrine of original shi, from scripture and experience' America's Theologian, p. 144, is 
erroneous. "Ist Edwards saw himself as an inheritor of the Augustinian-Calvinistic 
legacy of his 
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sought to establish his apologetic in OS IV. - Iff on grounds independent of authority so as to 
force the burden of proof on to detractors from the traditional doctrine of imputation. 116 
It is the philosophical aspect to this problematic view of imputation, which is of particular 
interest in the context of Edwards' hamartiology. This raises two questions that govern the 
following five chapters which deal with the argument of OS: first, does Edwards present a 
largely consistent argument in OS? And second, is this argument coherent? 
Edwards' account in OS focuses upon the concepts of identity-through-time and the 
concomitant doctrine of the temporal parts. Both of these concerns have remained central to the 
modem debate over these issues. Consequently, it is to the current debate that we turn first in 
order to set the exposition of Edwards' view into a contemporary philosophical context. Having 
delineated the contemporary nomenclature, we shall be in a position to consider Edwards' own 
views alongside those of two of his contemporaries: Locke and Reid. These two act as a foil to 
Edwards' own position. Then, having outlined Edwards' own view in brief, we turn to consider 
the nature of the occasionalism he espoused, before coming to several recent criticisms that 
have been made of his metaphysics of imputation. These comprise Roderick Chisholm's 
critique of the ontology of Edwardsian imputation; William Wainwright's attack upon Edwards' 
views on original guilt; and Philip Quinn's argument against Edwards' occasionalist theory of 
persistence-through-time. 
Puritan fathers, he did not develop his doctrine along entirely traditional lines, especially regarding the 
fall and imputation, as we have shown. 
256 It may be thought that this reading of Edwards' eclecticism in his doctrine of imputation is inconsistent 
with what has been already said about the considerable evidence of Edwards' federalism. However, it 
must be emphasized that the point here is to do with the nature of the ontological union established in 
imputation rather than the means of transmission, which has been dealt with in the previous argument. 
Edwards was a federal theologian in his conception of the covenant and in his acceptance of an immediate 
understanding of the nature of imputation. It is on the matter of the precise nature of the union established 
in imputation that he took a new approach, and one which owed much to both federalism and realism, but 
went beyond both into occasionalism. That is the point being made here and it is consistent with what has 
already been argued. 
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(5) Edwards and the doctrine of temporal parts 
We have spent some time trying to explain the theological views Edwards was defending in his 
doctrine of imputation. Now, with his theological view clarified, we may turn to the 
metaphysical issues that underpin Edwards' theological concerns. Central to these concerns are 
the cluster of issues around the doctrine of temporal parts, to which we now come. This chapter 
is particularly concerned to set forth the philosophical parameters to Edwards' thinking on 
persistence, personal identity and identity through time, before analyzing them in detail in 
subsequent chapters. In order to do so, we shall need to examine these metaphysical issues first, 
before applying them to Edwards' arguments in OS. 
(5: 1) Temporal persistence and identity-through-time 257 
We begin with perdurantism and endurantiSM. 258 Perdurantists claim that it is impossible for an 
individual to be numerically identical through time. Instead, a concrete, persisting individual is 
an aggregate of discrete, temporal parts which have some qualitative identity. In this way, 
perdurantists in particular treat time as a fourth dimension alongside the other three dimensions 
of space, leading to talk of spacetime worms, that is, individuals which persists through 
spacetime. "9 By contrast, endurantists claim that a concrete particular can only persist through 
time if it exists wholly or completely at different times, that is, it is numerically the same 
through different times. To illustrate this point, imagine a person named Dean. The endurantists 
claim that the Dean of yesterday, to be considered contiguous with the Dean of today must pick 
out something that makes both Deans the same individual. This, they claim, is possible where 
the name Dean picks out the same concrete individual on both occasions. For this to be the case, 
Dean must persist through time as the same individual thing, possessing substantially the same 
257 The following discussion draws on NEchael J. Loux's treatment of the issues in particular. See Loux, 
Metaphysics, A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1998), chapter 6. 
258 It was David Lewis who introduced the terms 'perdurantist' and 'endurantist' to the debate in his book 
on the modalities On the Plurality of Worlds, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 202-205. However, he 
attributes the terrns perdurantist and endurantist to Mark Johnson. Lewis maintains that endure and 
perdure are terms specific to the two different views on persistence, which is itself, a notion common to 
both positions. 
259 This is not to suggest that endurantists cannot or do not use a similar four-dimensional notion of 
spacetime. it is simply that perdurantism requires it, a point made particularly clearly in Heller's opening 
gambit in his The Ontology of Physical Objects, Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 1. Nor do I mean by this use of time as a fourth dimension 
that only Einsteinian views of spacetime apply. An 'absolutist' view of space and time, such as that of 
Newton, could be used here, and presumably would have been used here by Edwards. 
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properties260 (some endurantists would say, exactly the same number of properties, but at the 
very least those properties which constitute the individual's individuality), 261 at each temporal 
slice. 
By contrast, perdurantists claim that the diachronic sameness of concrete individuality assumed 
by endurantism does not assert literal identity between two temporally scattered instances. For 
the perdurantist, the idea that the Dean of yesterday is one and the same individual as the Dean 
of today, or tomorrow, is a crude misunderstanding. In fact, Dean persists through time as an 
aggregate of temporal parts, or slices. Dean exists yesterday and today; but his persisting from 
one slice to another is not based on his enduring as a complete individual whose properties 
remain intact throughout the period described, rather he persists because he has parts, or phases 
which exist at each temporal index. So the individual Dean exists at 10.00 yesterday, and is 
contiguous with the individual Dean who existed at 10.0 1 yesterday and 10.02, and so on, where 
such an individual picks out someone who has parts at temporally contiguous indexes. (Or, 
perhaps, temporally scattered indexes, given the perdurantist claim that all temporal worms 
exist in four dimensions, time being the fourth, in which it is conceivable for an entity to be 
scattered. ) 
For the perdurantist, temporal parts are just as much a part of a concrete particular as are spatial 
parts. Dean's existence yesterday and contiguity with his existence today, are just as much a 
part of the individual picked out by the name, 'Dean', as is this individual having a right hand 
on both occasions. Both his physical parts and his temporal parts pick out different properties, 
which properly pertain to one concrete individual, Dean. From this it follows that the Dean of 
yesterday is no more numerically identical with the Dean of the present than is Dean's foot with 
Dean himself. Both his foot and his existence at a previous index are parts of a whole, nothing 
more. But these temporal parts are not mere abstractions. Temporal parts are as concrete and 
particular as the physical parts of Dean. Both are aggregates that make up the whole concrete 
individual. 
This raises a related issue which it is worth pausing to consider, namely, whether whatever parts 
an object possesses are essential to that object (as it perdures/endures through spacetime), or 
whether an object can gain or lose parts over time, whilst remaining the same object. There are 
260 Caveat: depending, of course, on what in their view, constitutes the bearer of identity. 
261 in his Metaphysiav (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964), chapter 6, Richard Taylor speaks of the passage 
of an object through time as ýpure becoming', noting that it is possible to speak of a thing passing through 
time without a change in physical properties, but changing in its temporal status (past, present and 
future). 
Thus something can conceivably age without change in its physical parts (although, such a statement 
is, 
presumably, only an approximation. There will always be subatomic changes to anything which persists 
through time). The present discussion presupposes, with Taylor, that changes through time are real 
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those endurantists who claim that parts of an object must be essential to that object for the 
object to remain the same object through spacetime. 262 This doctrine is usually called 
mereological essentialism. It is the notion that any thing has all of its actual parts essentially, or 
necessarily, not merely accidentally or contingently. Such endurantists take the numerical 
identity of a part of a thing existing at one time, with another part of the same thing existing at 
another time to be a constituent of a thing's persisting through time. However, although this 
argument has been favoured by some endurantists, it does not preclude use by perdurantists. In 
what follows we shall presume that perdurantists have every right to maintain some form of 
mereological essentialism, and that this position is defensible in terms of what Edwards has to 
say on the matter. 263 But this assertion requires justification. 
So. let PD refer to a perduring object, and P and D separately refer to two parts which make up 
that perduring concrete particular. What happens if PD loses one of its parts, say P? Does the 
loss of P mean that PD no longer exists, or that PD has changed its parts such that mereological 
essentialism is false? The answer to these questions is that if PD loses part P it still has the same 
number of parts, which may seem peculiar. But on a perdurantist ontology, the parts making up 
PD may be scattered through spacetime and PD still perdure as a whole without loss. 
To illustrate: if Trevor buys a Ford Capri and leaves it in the garage overnight, but during the 
night, Dean and Wayne break into the garage and steal the wheels from Trevor's car, selling 
them on at the earliest opportunity, does that mean that Trevor's car no longer has the same 
parts that it once did? In a 'loose' or 'pre-philosophical' sense, we might think that it does, since 
the tyres are no longer on the car; in fact they have been sold to someone else and are on that 
person's car instead. But in a 'strict' or 'philosophical' sense, Trevor's Capri still has the same 
parts that it had prior to the theft of the tyres, since the fact that the tyres now make up part of 
another car are - in this strict sense at least - irrelevant. They may be spatially separated from 
the car,, but they still occupy a region of spacetime which make up the concrete particular 
'Trevor's Capri'. It is just that the space that they previously occupied has been vacated by 
them. But they are still parts of the concrete particular that we began with. Hence, a perdurantist 
can affirm a form of mereological essentialiSM. 264 
changes (whether of person stages, or spacetime worms), and that time is a concept which has a 
meaningftd content over and against arguments to the contrary by philosophers like McTaggart. 
262 For example, Chisholm in Person and Object (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976). 
263 Notice that we are not making the stronger claim that perdurantists should hold this view, only that 
they may. Similarly, the claim about Edwards is not that he does hold to this doctrine (he does not 
explicitly endorse it to my knowledge since it postdates him), but that the structure of his metaphysics 
allow him to do so, or at the very least, provide no obstacle to doing so. 
264 See Roderick Chisholm's Person and Object, Appendix B, for a discussion of mereological 
essentialism. The terms of reference in the above argument, in particular the notions of the 'strict or 
philosophical' and 'loose or pre-philosophical' persistence of parts have been taken from Chisholm. 
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(5: 2) Dense and Discrete time 
265 
Most perdurantists go on to assert that it is coherent to believe that for a particular individual, 
Dean, that Dean can be divided into a smallest part, namely instantaneous temporal slices of 
three dimensions. 266 Some philosophers, such as Richard Swinburne, have contested that such a 
conception is unhelpful; that the notion of a temporally durationless slice is problematic, and 
should be abandoned in favour of a more endurantist approach utilizing temporal periods 
instead. Tbus Swinburne argues that when we ascribe properties to an object,, we do so to an 
object over a period of time, and when we do refer to instants, they are usually in the context of 
ascribing to the object properties which the object has over a period of time including the instant 
in question. Hence, 
It is difficult to see what would be meant by an object being green at 2 p. m. although it was not green 
either before or after 2 p. m. It was green for a period of zero duration, and how could that diffi rom its er f 
Michael Jubian in his Contemporary Metaphysics, An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), chapter 9, 
section 9.2, p. 160 ff., maintains that the question of whether or not one holds to mereological 
essentialism is a modal issue only. It does not represent a prior commitment to whether things change 
their parts over time, or not. That is, it does not commit the philosopher at the outset to a particular view 
of identity-through-time: 'it would be a very awkward to accept a liberal view of physical objects ... while 
rejecting mereological essentialism. It is very important to notice that this does not commit us to any 
particular view about change of parts "over time. " It's strictly a modal principle. The issue, therefore, was 
whether things could have had different parts, not whether things gain or lose parts' (p. 163). 
265 It might be thought odd that I do not discuss contemporary views of the fall in chapter 2, but take 
account of contemporary views of time in this chapter. However, as I pointed out in chapter 2, the idea 
there was to isolate and analyze the traditional conception of the fall, to see whether the philosophical 
problems it raises for theodicy (specifically, how an unfallen, morally responsible individual can fall into 
sin) can be resolved. However, on the matter of persistence through time, it is important to have some 
parameters to the discussion before setting about trying to assess whether Edwards' account represents a 
coherent position. This state of affairs is also a reflection of Edwards' own interests. His concern with the 
fall had to do with the traditional question pertaining to its coherence (he assumed that it was historical 
too, of course). But his interests in scientific questions was far more 'modem' than 'medieval', as 
Wallace Anderson points out: 'In is basic conception, Edwards' theory of the nature of physical world 
belongs decidedly to the modem rather than the medieval age. Throughout his scientific writings, his 
masters were Descartes, Gassendi, Boyle, and Newton, though in most cases he knew their contributions 
through secondary sources. For all his failures to grasp the full ramifications of their theories, to master 
the necessary mathematical tools for modem physics, and to submit his various hypotheses to 
experimental tests ... 
he nevertheless adopted with a whole heart their conception of a scientific 
explanation of the phenomena of nature. ' YE& 47. 
266 Loux points out that there are those perdurantists who are agnostic about this smallest divisible part of 
a concrete individual - Heller, for example. He says, 'One question about four-dimensional objects is 
whether it is possible to have zero extent along the temporal dimension - Can there be instantaneous 
objects? I do not have a strong opinion about this one way or the other. ' The Ontology of Physical 
Objects, p. 6. It may be that for any temporal part there is a temporally smaller part, as shall be made clear 
in the following discussion. See Loux, Metaphysics, p. 206. In this regard, we could distinguish between 
temporally durationless time-slices, and instantaneous slices. Whereas temporally durationless slices are 
3-D slices of a 4-D temporal worin, instantaneous slices may simply be slices of the smallest possible 
duration. 
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not being green at all? Certainly, things like winning a race or becoming 60 years old can happen at an 
instant. But one becomes 60 at an instant if and only if that instant is the bounding point of a period of 
sixty years during which one has lived. And one wins a race at a certain instant if and only if one has run 
it for a period ending at that instant and there is a final segment of that period (however small) during all 
of which one is ahead of the field. These things apparently happening at an instant are thus analyzable in 
terms of things happening over periods of time. 267 
The distinction being made here turns on whether time is discrete or dense. Swinburne 
maintains a version of discrete time, which means that he thinks time has no smallest instant. 
Instead, there can only be shortest lengths of time. 268 Most perdurantists want to hold a dense 
view of time, where time is composed of instants, such that where there are any two instants 
there is a third between them. This means that for any period bounded by two points, that period 
must have a third point between the two; it must be divisible. Thus, for a period of a second, or 
even a fraction of a second, that time must be divisible still further, to the point of infinity. Any 
given period of time on the dense theory is made up of an infinity of instants contiguous with 
each other in sequence. 
But this raises an important question for the perdurantist: how can a series of durationless 
instants be added together to form a period, however small? To put it another way, the 
perdurantist is claiming that spacetime can be sliced up into zero duration moments (even this 
use of 'moment' is anachronistic in this regard). But this means that no matter how many such 
4 moments' are added together, even an infinite number of them, will only = 0, since none of 
them have any duration and 0=0. Not even an infinite number of these slices can perdure for 
even a nanosecond; so the notion of durationless slices appears to present enormous conceptual 
difficulties. 
267 The Christian God, p. 72. 
2611 Some physicists, who apply the findings of quantum mechanics to relativity in a bid to find some 
common ground between the two, believe that the shortest period of time is 10 to the power 43 of a 
second (the so-called Planck time). Below that smallest period, it is argued, measurements of time may 
well become meaningless. However, those who oppose this view and maintain a dense view of time do so 
on the basis of Einstein's Theory of Relativity which seems to imply that there is no shortest interval 
between periods, only instants. The problem, well known and mooted in popular science literature, is that 
these two theories are incompatible, but that both are confirmed by the observational evidence. Until they 
can be reconciled in a 'theory of everything' (pace Stephen Hawking), if such a theory ever arrives, or 
until such time as one or either is superceded by some other, better theoretical explanation, (such as 
super-string theory is attempting) the two theories of time are deadlocked. Until this issue is resolved, it 
appears to be scientifically justifiable to hold either view of time. For the present purpose, it is important 
only to note that the perdurantist tradition, of which I am claiming Edwards is a member, takes up the 
dense view, over and against the endurantist, discrete view of time. 
The modem debate is particularly important for the question of whether time had a point of origin. For an 
accessible introduction to these issues see Quentin Smith and L Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and 
Freedom (London: Routledge, 1995), Dialogues I and 2. 
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The problem lies with assuming that a number of instants can be added together to form a larger 
whole. Any period if it is composed of instants of zero duration, must contain an infinite 
number of such instants. The period between two seconds has an irifinite number of instants, as 
does the sixty minutes that make up an hour, or the twelve months which make up a year. In 
dense time a period between tI and t2 is made up of an infinity of instants, but that set of 
instants is not countable. And if it is not countable, then the concept of addition with regard to 
adding up all the instants to make duration, or period, is redundant. The mathematical notion of 
countablility assumes that the number of items to be added together can be placed *in a one-to- 
one relation with all the positive integers that exist. But an infinite number of instants over a 
period (of whatever duration) is too great to be placed in such a relation, on the basis that the 
infinity involved in any period of such instants is an uncountable infinity, that is, it exceeds the 
amounts of positive integers in the infinite set of positive integers and as a consequence, cannot 
be put in a one-to-one relation with them to be countable. So such periods cannot be countable 
in principle. 
This requires some explanation. Mathematicians since Georg Cantor 269 speak of different kinds 
of infinity, and this is the distinction upon which the argument hangs. The infinite number of 
positive integers represents a countable infinity. The totality of real numbers is not. The reason 
for this is that the set of real numbers, by contrast to the set of positive integers 11,2,3,4 ... 
1, 
includes all those numbers which can be expressed in a decimal form, including irrational 
numbers like 3.1475939... as well as all those numbers which come between any two integers, 
such as 1.11111 L. 1,1.111111121.. 7 
1.11111113 1... and so on. The point is that the uncountable 
infinity of real numbers is more numerous than the infmity of positive numbers, though both are 
infinite. And because this is the case, an infinite which is uncountable is more numerous (where 
emore numerous' in this context refers to the fact that an uncountable infinity cannot be put in 
one-to-one correspondence with a countable one) than an infinite which is countable. In a 
similar way, the infinity of moments involved in any period (tI to ta) are more numerous than 
the infinite number of positive numbers. Hence they are uncountable infinities. 
But this raises a further objection: if each interval is made up of an infinite number of 
instants, 
then each interval (however long or short) must be of the same length. Clearly each 
interval is 
269 Regarding Cantor (1845-1918), see The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. ) Ted Honderitch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), entry "Cantor, Georg" , p. 119. 
It says this of his work on 
infinities: 'A set has the same number of members as another if each member of either set can be paired 
with a unique member of the other. If a set can 
be put into such a one-to-one correspondence with the 
integers it is said to be denumerable. Cantor demonstrated the denumerability of algebraic numbers... and 
the non-denumerability of real numbers, numbers whose 
decimal expansion need not repeat or terminate'. 
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not the same length (a year is longer than a second). Therefore, the theory of dense time seems 
to be false. 
In response to this, an analogy can be made with two line segments of unequal length. If a 
person were to ask how many spatial points there are on the shorter line segment, the answer 
would be the same as for the longer line segment (no matter how much longer it is), namely, an 
infinite number. Any line of whatever length can be divided into an infinite number of points 
along that line. In a similar way, there are just as many instantaneous temporal points in a period 
of short duration (a second) as there are for a period of much longer duration (an hour), because 
both are made up of an uncountable infinity of instants. 270 
This problem echoes Zeno's paradox of the arrow, and its solution is in many ways parallel to 
the present problem. 271 Zeno maintained, as a follower of Parmenides,, that all change is illusory. 
This has application to motion too, against which his famous paradoxes were directed (of which 
we have only Aristotle's recollection extant). The point of the arrow paradox was to show that 
I an arrow at each stage of its flight is at rest. And if it is at rest at each moment (here read 
durationless instant), then it does not move at all; the motion of the arrow through the air is an 
illusion. Aristotle, who defended a discrete view of time,, complained that this was no real 
paradox, since 'time is not composed of indivisible instants' . 
272However, this is no solution for 
the defender of dense time. Another solution needs to be sought. If Zeno's argument is set out in 
the following fashion: 
(1) At each instant, the arrow does not move 
270 In a similar way Loux comments, 'An intriguing question is whether we can suppose that a temporally 
extended object like me is an aggregate made up exclusively of instantaneous slices. One might think not. 
Here, it is tempting to argue that just as we cannot construe three-dimensional solids as made up 
exclusively of their two-dimensional slices (on the grounds that no matter how many two-dimensional 
slices one "stacks up, " one will never produce a three-dimensional object), so one cannot get a four- 
dimensional object out of merely three dimensional parts. ' This point is also made by Heller in The 
Ontology of Physical Objects, p. 6. However, the idea that one can slice a three-dimensional solid into 
two-dimensional slices is an abstraction. Though logically possible, it is impractical. But the question of 
whether a period of time can be similarly sliced up into durationless instants is not a simple abstraction. 
For the occasionalist, like Edwards, and for certain defenders of Einsteinian Relativity, such a notion is 
basic to their understanding of how time works, without which their metaphysical superstructure would 
collapse. 
271 It might be thought that this problem better iniffors Zeno's first argument against (Pythagorean) 
motion, that is, the paradox of (crossing) the stadium. However, as Guthrie points out, this is not the case 
since the first two arguments against motion (the Stadium Paradox and Achilles and the Tortoise), 
'depended on the assumption that a spatial length could not be reduced to minimal units but was infinitely 
divisible. This one [The Arrow Paradox], on the other hand, is only effective on the premise that time 
consists of indivisible minimal instants. ' A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), p. 93. It is this problem which has application to perdurantism. 
272 physics Z9.239b 5, cited in R. M. Sainsbury's Paradoxes, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 2 1. What follows reflects Sainsbury's treatment of these issues. 
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(2) A stretch of time is composed of (durationless) instants 
(3) Ergo, In any stretch of time, the arrow does not move 273 
then a solution presents itself which has obvious parallels to the problems of perdurance. it is 
this: the arrow is 'at rest' in any one durationless instant of its flight, between two points in its 
flight, say, tI and t3. But this does not mean that it cannot move. What is important here, as 
Mark Sainsbury points out, is not that the arrow moves at an instant, but that it is at different 
places at different times, which it can be on a dense view of time. Sainsbury maintains that, 'An 
instant is not long enough for motion to occur, for motion is a relation between an object, places 
and various instants. -)274 When this is taken seriously, then the claim of the first premise is seen 
to mean not that the arrow is at r"est, but that it occupies a particular space at a particular instant. 
It would only be at rest if it occupied the same space in the instants contiguous with the one 
under consideration,, that is,, if the arrow was in the same place at Q as well as tI and t3. No 
single instant can fix the arrow in one spatio-temporal location such that (3) is an entailment of 
(1). So the argument is fallacious. The premises do not contain enough information to tell the 
reader what is required if the conclusion is to follow. 
The crucial distinction is between the arguably true claim (on the dense view of time) that the 
arrow does not move at one durationless instant of its flight, and the false claim that it is at rest 
at each moment of flight. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. But 
although the conclusion is false, the two premises - on the dense view of time at least - are true. 
(5: 3) Temporal parts and the ontology of persistence-through-time 
Thus far, we have seen that the perdurantist notion of persistence through time entails the idea 
of a concrete individual having many different temporal parts. What needs to be made clear is 
that these temporal parts can overlap. So, the Dean of yesterday and the Dean of today overlap 
in the proposition, 'the Dean who exists from noon yesterday to noon today', and so on. This is 
not, as Loux points out, metaphysical 'gerrymandering'. The overlapping temporal parts are as 
objectively real as a person's physical parts, and can be divided in similarly diverse ways. For 
example, I can cut up Dean's bodily parts into any number and size of overlapping parts, all of 
273 This version of Zeno's argument is found in Sainsbury, ibid. The actual structure of Zeno's argument 
has been debated in the literature, and this is not the only possible reading of it. For an interesting analysis 
of several readings of this particular paradox, see Vere Chappell's article, "Time and Zeno's Arrow" in 
The Journal ofPhilosophy, LIX (1962): 197-213. He points out that the indivisible time slices utilized in 
the paradox are capable of several interpretations: 'the indivisibles in question may be taken to be either 
(a) extended and (in any stretch of finite length) finite in number, or (b) unextended and infinite in 
number' (p. 199. ) It is this latter view which the present argument takes up, because it is commensurable 
with the dense view of perdurantist time. 
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which are objectively real. If I were to take a chunk of Dean's body from his elbow up to his 
clavicle, cutting his sternum in two, and taking half his internal organs with it, I would have a 
physical part of Dean including part of his arm and part of his torso. This would be a physical 
part of his body that overlapped his arm and his torso, having chunks of both these physical 
parts. The same goes for temporal parts. I can carve up a temporal chunk of Dean across two 
overlapping periods, such as the Dean that existed yesterday and the Dean who exists today, and 
so on. The divisibility of temporal parts does not mean that they are any less ontologically real. 
One ramification of the doctrine of temporal parts endorsed by (most) perdurantists is that 
temporal indexicals all have the same ontological status. That is, the Dean of yesterday or 
tomorrow is no less real than the Dean of the present moment. Time is expressed by relations 
which are indexically tensed so that we may speak of the Dean that has existed,, does exist and 
will exist, but none of these relations is ontologically more real than any other: all pertain to the 
one space-time worm, Dean. This position is called eternalism (sometimes it is called the 
tenseless view of time, and its advocates 'detensers -)). 275 Perdurantist etemalists claim that all 
tensed propositions can be translated, without loss of meaning into tenseless propositions, which 
better express the ontological parity between different indexes. This is possible because tensed 
relations are indexicals. So the concept of the present expressed in the term, 'now' is not an 
ontologically privileged utterance; it is merely a tensed indexical. It is tensed with reference to 
other relations such as 'a moment ago', and 'two minutes hence'. So, the eternalist claim to 
tenseless ontological relations between temporal parts could be expressed in the following 
proposition: 
Dean's grandfather and Dean exist. 
Or, perhaps better, 
Oliver Cromwell and Oliver Crisp exist. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Smith and Oaklander spend some time dealing with the differences between tensed and tenseless 
theories of time. Detensers at one point thought that all tensed propositions could be translated, without 
loss of meaning, into tenseless ones, giving credence to their position. Lately this has been challenged. 
See Time, Change and Freedom, Dialogues 6 and 9. Oaklander summarizes the detenser's position as 
follows: 'The essence of the tenseless theory is that time consists solely of the temporal relations of 
succession and simultaneity between events. in other words, for the detenser, there are no monadic 
properties of pastness, presentness and futurity that events don and doff with the passage of time. 
Linguistically, this view has been expressed by claiming that all temporal statements are B-statements (or 
"eternal sentences"), that is, statements whose truth or falsity is independent of the time of utterance or 
inscription' (p. 119. ) 
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Both express this notion of the eternalist nature of temporal parts in their relation to temporal 
indexicals. 
By contrast, endurantists, tend to take a presentist position regarding indexicals (sometimes 
known as the tensed theory of time and their advocates, 'tensers -3). 276 For the presentist, relations 
expressing the present tense do have an ontologically privileged position, since the past and the 
future do not exist. The past has ceased to exist, and the future is yet to exist; consequently, the 
277 present constitutes the only temporal state that is ontologically real. 
Having outlined the content of each of these two notions on persistence-through-time, their 
ontologies can be examined in more detail. The perdurantist ontology is a generous one, in 
which ontologically real things can be constructed from the fabric of spatially and/or temporally 
scattered items and properties, as well as from the more familiar things which make up the more 
I commonsense world of perception. This apparently counterintuitive result of the perdurantist 
ontology needs some explanation (since, as we shall see, is an important constituent in 
Edwards' understanding of the doctrine of imputation. ) 
The notion of moving from the more familiar commonsense objects of perception to their 
temporal parts under the perdurantist scheme may be characterized as ontological analysis. This 
is what has been outlined thus far. But perdurantists want to go further than this in their 
dissection of spacetime worms into their spatial and/or temporal parts to delineate an opposite 
movement of ontological traffic from the smallest parts to new ontological entities. This is 
called ontological synthesis, and involves the perdurantist in describing those parts of any 
region of filled spacetime (which parts may make up any number of other discrete individual 
objects) and fitting them together into a new - and sometimes temporally and/or spatially 
scattered - individual. 
276 1 have deliberately avoided claiming that endurantism entails presentism, or that perdurantism entails 
eterrialism. I do not believe that there is an entailment here, but, as Loux highlights in his text, this is a 
moot point (Metaphysics, p. 23 1, note 5. ) In any case, the precise status of the relationship between 
endurantism and presentism, or perdurantism and eternalism, beyond their use as the nomenclature of the 
present discussion and a basic grasp of their philosophical import (viz. their conception of time and their 
analysis of persistence respectively), is irrelevant. It is sufficient to the purpose that their most natural 
expressions are in the couplings outlined in the text above. 
277 it is worth pointing out Loux's observation that most philosophical discussion does not elaborate upon 
endurantism, for die simple reason that it is the received pre-philosophical view to which endurantists 
must respond. Consequently, it is often only sketched out as a means to detailing the reasons why a 
particular philosopher cannot accept this pre-philosophical position and has opted for perdurantism 
instead. See Loux, Metaphysics, p. 23 1, note 2. 
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To illustrate: imagine an individual spacetime worm called Athanasius . 
27' The parts which make 
up Athanasius might include a biscuit from noon today, a fossil from the Precambrian period 
and a locomotive from 195 1. But taken together as a whole, these temporally and spatially 
scattered parts form a new and real, ontological whole. This appears bizarre, but perdurantists 
contend that once the basic structures of their position are in place (that is, ontological analysis 
and synthesis), this is no more bizarre than cutting up an individual, Dean, into slices of 
different durations and/or parts. This is because the same principles - namely that an individual 
is a spacetime worm whose parts can be scattered along this continuum - obtain. Consequently, 
this is not a matter of gerrymandering objects and their properties, but reflects the ontological 
status quo (if such a term is itself not an oxymoron in perdurantist terminology. ) 
But this illustration points to a more basic ontological notion for the perdurantist, which follows 
on the heels of explicating ontological synthesis: that the metaphysical constituents with which 
philosophers have to work are all derived from the four-dimensional spread of matter in 
spacetime. Any material object which is construed from that matter, be it a temporally scattered 
spacetime worm like Athanasius, or a temporally contiguous individual like Dean, or whatever, 
is no more than a region of spacetime filled with matter. Neither Athanasius nor Dean (or 
anything else) has any ontological privilege over the other, nor is one thing more ontologically 
real than another, since all that any individual thing is made up of is a region of space time filled 
with matter. Consequently, perdurantists commonly claim that any filled region of spacetime no 
matter how gerrymandered, is a material object . 
279As a result of this it is no surprise to learn 
that the perdurantist ontology routinely supposes that there are actually far more objects than is 
commonly recognized to be the case, and that all these gerrymandered objects are as 
ontologically real as any other. 
But all this merely raises a question: given the perdurantist view of spacetime matter, why are 
commonsense individuals usually believed to be ontologically privileged, such that pre- 
philosophical intuitions would recognize a 'Dean' but balk at the idea of an 'Athanasius'? In 
other words, why is there this pre-philosophical prejudice in favour of commonsense items 
rather than gerrymandered things like Athanasius? 
There are several reasons which perdurantists may give in defence of their own position over 
and against the pre-philosophical intuitions which endurantists rely upon. First, the concept of 
Dean (or any other item or individual which may belong to our pre-philosophical intuitions 
about ontologically privileged parcels of matter) picks out an individual whose temporal parts 
278 'Athanasius' is taken ftom Loux, ibid, p. 212 ff. 
279fleller dubs this the 'Fusion principle'. See The Ontology ofPhysical Objects, chapter 2, section 9, pp. 
49-51. 
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are sequentially contiguous with one another, giving rise to the commonsense presumption of a 
single continuous spacetime worm (made up of spatio-temporally contiguous parts). But once 
the contiguity of Dean at 10.00 and Dean at 10.01 is seen in terms of perdurantist ontological 
synthesis, the apparently ontologically privileged position occupied by Dean disintegrates, since 
all Dean is actually made up of is an area of filled spacetime, just as is Athanasius. The fact that 
Dean is made up of matter which occupies contiguous spacetime does not mean that it is 
thereby any more real than an Athanasius which does not, since perdurantists simply deny that 
contiguity is basic to persistence through time. So, the fact that Dean occupies spacetime which 
is contiguous in its parts does not make Dean any more real an object than another, like 
Athanasius, which is not. 
Second, and following on from this, the spatio-temporal parts of Dean (or whatever) appear to 
be similar (they share many or most of the same properties for example. ) But once again, if the 
premise of ontological synthesis is allowed, then there appears to be little reason to grant this 
I peculiar property of a Dean (which is spatio-temporally contiguous), any privileged status over 
and against an Athanasius which does not. A similar argument may be used mutatis mutandis in 
understanding why an individual Dean who changes gradually over time reinforces the notion 
that one individual is in view throughout the particular index indicated, whereas the same is not 
typically granted to an Athanasius. 
Third, the temporal parts of Dean (or whatever), unlike Athanasius, are causally responsible for 
the existence and character of the temporal parts which succeed them. This cannot be the case 
with an Athanasius,, since such an individual is temporally scattered. But once more, when 
scrutinized under the lens of ontological synthesis, this actually turns out to mean that one 
individual, Dean, has spatio-temporally contiguous parts which give rise to the parts which 
280 follow in a partial, INUS, or complete causal explanation of those parts which follow. Clearly 
this cannot be said of an Athanasius, but that does not invalidate the supposition that Athanasius 
is real, it only points to the fact that Athanasius is a different kind of spacetime worm from 
Dean. That is, a spatio-temporally scattered worm, which is precisely what the perdurantist is 
seeking to unpack in the first place. Hence this series of questions are guilty to a greater or 
lesser extent of petitio principii, since once the initial perdurantist premise is granted regarding 
the ontological status of any filled region of spacetime, the important pre-philosophical caveats 
advanced by endurantists are largely redundent. This is the case because along with the initial 
280 1 refer to Mackie's notion of an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition, which is itself 
Unnecessary but (exclusively) Sufficient as a cause of a particular thing, (hence INUS condition). See his 
article, "Causes and Conditions" in Causation (eds. ) Sosa and Tooley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993): 33-55. 
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premise, is removed a reason for the idea of ontologically privileged things like Deans, rather 
than spatially and temporally scattered things like Athanasius's. 
Clearly, this runs counter to the whole endurantist project, which endorses our pre-philosophical 
intuitions about the ontologically privileged status of Deans over AthanasiUs's. The principle 
reason behind this is the endurantist's rejection of the perdurantist depiction of the four 
dimensions of spacetime. With a more parsimonious view of three dimensions and the rejection 
of the doctrine of temporal parts, endurantists are unable to make sense of objects in the inflated 
perdurantist ontology like Athanasius. The reason being, that endurantists see the notion of 
temporal parts as a species of category mistake, the metaphysical upshot of which is the 
'multiplication of entities beyond necessity'. For the endurantist, the three-dimensional 
perspective on persistence through time is ontologically fundamental, which is why pre- 
philosophical intuitions about ontologically privileged individuals like Dean are so entrenched. 
They reflect the way things are. Hence the perdurantist premise is gerrymandering of the worst 
kind, leading to a hopelessly inflated ontology and counterintuitive results like Athanasius. 
However, in the defence of perdurantists, the endurantist application to commonsense notions, 
whilst appealing in its intuitive simplicity, may not on those grounds alone be correct, any more 
than a person's pre-philosophical belief that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west 
(typically giving rise to further naive beliefs which make up the geocentric view of the cosmos) 
will render a correct representation of reality, though it appeals to similar kinds of pre- 
philosophical intuitions. So the common-sense argument alone, though it may be entrenched 
(as, in medieval thought, the geocentric view of the world was) does not necessarily in-and-of- 
itself provide sufficient grounds for accepting the endurantist position. And if the perdurantist 
ontology provides important reasons for rejecting the endurantist perspective, then there may be 
reasons for moving beyond pre-philosophical intuitions to accepting an ontology which appears 
to be primafacie counterintuitive. 
On the basis of this orientation in the concepts which make up the contemporary landscape of 
the persistence-through-time debate, it is now possible to turn to Edwards' intellectual context 
and his own elucidation of perdurantism. 
(5: 4) Locke, Reid and Edwards on persistence and identity-through-time 
Paul Helm's account of Edwards' view of imputation in OS, is a good place to commence a 
detailed examination of Edwards' concepts of persistence-through-time, picking up from where 
we left off at the end of the last chapter. He advocates an interpretation of Edwards' view that 
is 
similar in detail to a perdurantist approach to the topic. 
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Heim points out that the problems of temporal persistence highlight two conflicting intuitions: 
that people change though time, whilst remaining recognizably the same person (or 
individual). 281 These two qualities he terms the phenomena of difference and sameness 
respectively. 282 The problem is how to reconcile these two elements in one view. Edwards' 
attempt to do so within the perdurantist stream marks a radical move beyond even those with 
whom he shares a natural affinity. Helm places Edwards within a continuum of philosophical 
thought on the matter. A modem perdurantist like Quine shares with Edwards the view that 
individuals do not persist through time, but unlike Edwards, Quine sees this as merely a useful 
way of understanding how the phenomena of difference and sameness can be reconciled. His 
view is de dicto perdurantist . 
2" By contrast, Edwards' version of perdurantism is de re. That is, 
Edwards believes that his version of persistence is actually the metaphysical truth of how 
individuals actually perdure through time. It is not merely a model for better understanding what 
we know at present. 284 This is because for Edwards, the relation between God and individuals is 
unmediated by any other secondary causes. Even the physical laws that appear to govem the 
cosmos are simply the manifestations of God's wise conservation of events moment-by- 
moment. The appearance of the persistence through time of such 'laws' is simply that: an 
appearance, not the metaphysical reality which underpins all events which take place. Similarly, 
individuals exist, and continue to exist, simply by the arbitrary fiat of God, not because they 
281 This distinction and some of the following line of argument follows that of Helm's chapter 7 on 
Edwards' doctrine of original sin, in Faith and Understanding. 
282 See Hume with whom this observation originates at the outset to his discussion of identity, 'We have a 
distinct idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro' a supposed variation of time; 
and this idea we call that of identity or sameness. We have also a distinct idea of several different objects 
existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation; and this to an accurate view affords as 
perfect a notion of diversity, as if there were no manner of relation among the objects. ' A Treatise of 
Human Nature (ed. ) Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 1; IV-, VL p. 253. 
283 Helm cites Quine to this effect from Methods ofLogic, pp. 222 ff. and From a Logical Point of View, 
p. 65, in Faith and Understanding, p. 155. In the latter of these volumes, Quine outlines an argument 
contra Heraclitus, that you can step into the same river twice, but not in the same river stage, since each 
stage of the life of the river is constantly changing as the waters it contains pass through the particular 
stage on the way to the ocean: 'A river is a process through time, and the river stages are its momentary 
parts. Identification of the river bathed in once with the river bathed again is just what determines our 
subject matter to be a river process as opposed to a river stage. ' p. 65. Accordingly, Quine with tongue 
planted firmly in cheek says, 'You may bathe in the same river twice without bathing in the same water 
twice, and you may, in these days of fast transportation, bathe in the same waters twice while bathing in 
different rivers. ' Ibid, p. 66. He goes on, 'The important point to observe is merely the direct connection 
between identity and the positing of processes, or time extended objects. ' p. 67. On the basis of the 
contiguity of momentary objects which exist in successive moments we postulate identity between 
different moments and individual things via induction. So, 'from our grouping the sample momentary 
objects a, b, c, g, and others under the head of Cayster [a river], he [the hypothetical interlocutor in this 
discussion] projects a correct general hypothesis as to what further momentary objects we would also be 
content to include. ' From a Logical Point of View, p. 68. 
284ThiS is not to suggest that Edwards is somehow more of a perdurantist than Quine. The point is just 
qiat Quine and Edwards defend versions of perdurantism for quite different reasons. 
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actually do persist through some agency of their own. This view goes a considerable way 
beyond Quine, and other like-minded modem perdurantists. 
Similarly, Edwards' view is considerably different to endurantists contemporary with him, like 
Locke and Reid. Helm characterizes Locke as a kind of 'soft' endurantist, and Reid as a 'hard' 
endurantist. We shall consider each in turn as foils to Edwards' own position, before outlining 
Edwards' own view on the matter. 
(5: 4: i) Locke's soft endurantism. 
Locke's views on persistence through time are well known. 285 He believed that an individual 
can persist, and have additional parts added to, or subtracted from it whilst remaining 
recognizably the same individual. However, this bald statement of his position needs some 
unpacking: under this endurantist rubric, Locke distinguished between the persistence of 
physical and mental objects. In the case of both types of individual thing, he began with a 
synchronic account of the object at a particular index, before applying that to a diachronic 
account of persistence through time. And in each case, his discussion of these two types of 
account feed into how Locke dealt with personal identity and persistence. 
To begin with, we shall examine his account of physical objects. Take a tree for example. The 
shoot that originally appears above the soil grows and changes, dividing into different branches 
and a trunk as it does so, yet it is still recognizably the same individual thing. It is, according to 
Locke, even the same tree if a limb is lopped off as it grows, or is grafted in. To make this 
clearer, a distinction may be made here between two types of general term applicable to an 
individual thing, (and here, the type of general term under consideration is one which, whether 
simple or complex, may be applied univocally to a number of different individuals). There are 
those things which describe or characterize a tree as an individual tree which we may describe 
as being adjectival (its 'greenness', or the fact that a particular tree is deciduous, or coniferous, 
or its having branches) and those things which are substantive about this particular tree: that it 
has had a limb removed, or grafted in, and so on. This latter group of properties are usually 
called sortals in the current literature, since they pick out properties that are ontologically 
necessary for the particular individual under consideration to be considered that individual 
thing, rather than another, similar individual (in this case, another tree). 
116 The same is not true 
of adjectival general terms since knowing the 'greenness' of something in a persons line of 
285 See Locke, Essay, 11: XXVII, "Of Identity and Diversity", pp. 328-348 (Nidditch edition). 
286 Tlis distinction between characterizing and sortal general terms is made clear by Lowe in his 
exposition of Locke's Essay, in Locke on Human Understanding, p. 93. The term 'sortal' taken up by, 
among others, Strawson in Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 168, was apparently coined by Locke 
himseff See Essay III: III: XV- 
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sight, does not say whether that thing is a green ball, apple or tree. So green things do not 
constitute a 'sort' in the way that substantive or sortal terms do, since there is no single criteria 
of identity governing all the green things in a person's field of vision. In other words, our tree, 
apple and ball all share that characteristic which means they can be described as appearing to be 
green, but they do not share any substantive properties, in the way that two birch trees would, 
since both trees have sortals that are similar which means they can be identified as a certain type 
of thing, namely two trees of the genus Betula. 
However, Locke was also careful to acknowledge that different sortals have different criteria of 
identity. A criteria of identity is the 'principle determining the conditions under which things to 
which the same sortal term is applicable are the same or different. -)287 This is not merely an 
heuristic or epistemic principle, it has metaphysical import too. Thus a tree may persist through 
time from a shoot to a massive oak, and change considerably, but still be the same tree in some 
sense. Conversely, it would not make sense to talk of tectonic movements forming a mountain 
in one place and then moving it over a period of time until it rises again in another location. 
Mountains, as E. J. Lowe points out, are geographical fixtures in the landscape that cannot move 
in this way and remain the same mountain. Such tectonic shifts would ordinarily be taken to 
connote a change from there being a mountain in one place to its disintegration and another 
mountain appearing somewhere else through further plate movements. 288 
Locke, being an atomist, maintained that physical things are made up of particles which, when 
taken together in a mass or lump, form parcels of matter. So, our oak tree may be made up of a 
number of parcels of matter that may change over time as one limb of the tree is lopped off, or 
another is grafted in. And in so doing, parcels of matter are added to and subtracted from the 
whole tree. The problem with this is that the removal of one atom from a body, or parcel of 
matter, means that the body in question is no longer strictly identical with the one prior to the 
loss of the atom or parcel. This synchronic analysis of physical objects means that matter alone 
cannot be the means by which identity through time is established (diachronically), since any 
object will lose and gain matter over time, even if it is only at the atomic level. Therefore, 
Locke distinguishes between two kinds of sortal here: material objects, and living organisms. 
These two things have different criteria of identity distinguishing them: the former includes 
those properties which are material (the number of atoms and parcels of matter an object has), 
whilst the latter involves those properties distinct from the material which pick out that which 
persists through the loss and gain of physical parts. It is because of this distinction that Locke 
feels able to talk about the persistence of living organisms though they may lose or gain parcels 
287 Lowe, Locke on Human Understanding, p. 96. 
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of matter across time. So,, our tree which exists after limbs have been lopped or grafted is the 
same living organism as the one which existed prior to these changes, just as long as the tree 
which persists through these changes 'partakes of a common life' throughout, despite the fact 
that it is not the same material object at the different indexes. Let us tabulate this in a simple 
model: where T is our tree, Pa, Pb, Pc and Pd are parcels of matter which make it up, and t 
primed as necessary stands for a time index, 
(1) T comprises parcels Pa, Pb and Pc at tI 
(2) at t2 T loses Pa 
(3) at 0 Pb withers 
(4) at 0 Pd is grafted onto T 
The question for Locke is whether T persists through each stage of (1)-(4) and if it does, in what 
I way, given that several of its parts have changed in the process. For, given a long enough 
timeframe, as Locke himself points out, the parts of T would all change viz. the matter of which 
they are made up. Here Locke's distinction between the material object and the living organism 
becomes clear: through stages (1)-(4) the matter which comprises T changes in such a way that 
by (4) the T with which we began is hardly recognizable, since it has had parts added to and 
subtracted from it. So the material object has not persisted. At each index there is a synchronic 
entity which is distinct from the object which existed at the previous index. So the material 
object cannot persist through time; it does not endure. But the same is not the case for T as 
living object, since there is something which links (1)-(4) together apart from the fact that each 
temporal slice is contiguous with the previous one: namely that at each stage, there is a living 
object which comprises T, and which has grown, and had parts added to and subtracted from it. 
In Locke's terms,, there is aT throughout, which partakes of a common life, but which changes 
physically at each stage, such that, taken synchronically as a physical aggregate, T does not 
appear to persist, but taken diachronically as a temporal worm, T does endure as a living 
organism. 
Having laid out this important distinction between the changing parts of a material object and lcwý 
the persistence-through-time of the living organism these parts make up, the question of 
personal identity arises. Locke distinguishes between the identity of plants, animals and 
humans, showing in each instance that they all participate in his distinction between their 
288 lbid, p. 95. 
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material parts and their participation in a continued life, such that they may be understood to be 
the same living organism, enduring through physical change. 
With respect to humans,, Locke observes that the terms 'person' and 'man' are not the same 
thing. A man may persist as recognizably the same man, but not be the same person. This is 
because 'man' has biological connotations, viz. the necessity of a body by which we may pick 
out a particular man in a crowd as recognizably the individual to whom we want to refer. But a 
person carries no such specifically biological overtones; that is, no specific body is required for 
a particular person to be that person rather than another, although, probably some bodily form is 
necessary. Moreover, according to Locke, the appellation 'person' is a forensic term, 
'appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents, capable of a 
Law, and Happiness and Misery. , 289 This means that sameness of person carries moral 
responsibility of action which is why this can only be predicated of intelligent agents. A thought 
experiment may make this central point clear: a person may migrate from one man to another 
I (in metempsychosis, for example) such that one person may have existed in two or more men. 
Or as Locke would have it, 
should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and infonn 
the Body of a Cobbler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he would be the same Person 
with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? The 
Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every Body determine the Man in this case, 
wherein the Soul, with all its Princely Thoughts about it would not make another Man: But he would be 
the same Cobbler to everyone beside himself . 
290 
Locke makes a similar point with his celebrated example of the Rational Parrot, who appears 
291 
capable of holding a conversation in 'Brasitian' (although it is reported to Locke in French) . 
Under Locke's rubric, the parrot might well constitute a person, but clearly, not a man. 
In turning to outline what the importance of this distinction is for his account of personal 
identity, Locke first outlines what he thinks a person is synchronically, 
which, I think is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it 
self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, 
289E., VSay, 11: XXVIL 26, p. 346. 
290 Ibid, Section 15, p. 340. 
291 lbid, Section 8, pp. 333-4. 
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which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to 
perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. 292 
With this working definition, Locke contends that personal identity consists in a rational person 
who has consciousness - specifically self-consciousness - and a memory of their past states as 
the same person. This diachronic account of personal identity treats the enduring person as an 
aggregate of person-stages (although Locke did not use that term) . 
293 At each person-stage, the 
person in question, to remain recognizably the same individual (such that the person persists 
through time diachronically) must remain a rational being with self-consciousness and a set of 
memories which pick out the person who existed at the previous person-stage(s). Thus, for 
Wayne to be the same person at noon today as he was at noon yesterday, or noon ten years prior 
to that, he must be able to recall being Wayne at those indexes in a self-conscious fashion. In 
this way the Wayne of the person-stage ten years ago at noon is 'connected' to the Wayne of 
noon today through his memories of the previous person-stage. His capacity to rationalize that 
memory in a self-conscious way, mean that he can acknowledge that memory as his own of 
himself. 
So Locke maintains that personal identity consists principally in a unity of (self) consciousness 
(plus memory and rationality. ) But this raises the problem of memory loss, familiar to students 
of Locke: what if a person, say Wayne, loses their memory of being the Wayne of a previous 
person-stage? Does that mean that the Wayne of noon today is no longer the Wayne of the 
previous noon since he has lost his memory of being that person-stage? Locke appears to 
respond in the affirmative. If Wayne loses his memory of a previous time index, he may well 
not be the same person as the one who existed at that time index, since, as Locke has already 
pointed out, it is possible for more than one person to inhabit the same body at different times. 
Locke explains that this goes back to his distinction between a man and a person, 
. we must here take notice what the word 
I is applied to, which in this case is the Man only. And the same 
Man being presumed to be the same Person, I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. 
But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it 
294 
is past doubt the same Man would at different times make different Persons... 
292 lbid, 11: XXVII: 9, p. 335. 
293 These person-stages were basic to Locke's thinking, unlike Hume, whose analysis of person-stages 
goes back even further to perceptions which give rise to mind stages which give rise in turn to minds, 
which is where Locke picks up his own account from. For a useful summary of this see Jonathan 
Bennett's useful article on "Locke's Philosophy ofMind" in, The Cambridge Companion to Locke, (ed. ) 
Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 105. 
294ESSay, Section 20, p. 342. 
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As is well known, T"homas Reid took Locke to task over precisely this point in his account of 
personal identity. 295 
So Locke rejects the idea that personal identity might consist in the persistence through time of 
bodily parts, insisting instead upon his criterion of consciousness. But he also distances his own 
position from a second possible misunderstanding: that to be the same person that person must 
be or have one persisting immaterial substance/soul. Utilizing another thought experiment, he 
points out that the identity of such an immaterial substance (whether they persist or not), is 
beside the point. Personal identity, when viewed in terms of the unity of consciousness, is 
distinct ftom that of the persistence or otherwise of a soul or other immaterial substance. So. the 
present Mayor of Quinborough may or may not have the same soul as Socrates (through 
metempsychosis for example). 296 But if the Mayor has no conscious recall of the memories of 
Socrates as his own, then he is not the same person as Socrates. He is another person, though he 
shares the same soul as Socrates. For if there were the conscious thoughts of both the Mayor 
and Socrates inside the Mayor's head, than there would be two distinct persons existing within 
the space of one body, with one soul. So it is conceivable for Socrates and the Mayor of 
Quinborough to share the same soul, but different bodies with different consciousnesses (either 
successively or concurrently). Hence, according to Locke, sameness of immaterial substance, 
like sameness of bodily parts, is no guarantee of continuity of personhood, and consequently, of 
identity. Continuity of consciousness is the only secure ground for persistence through time. 
So. according to Locke, an individual may persist through time having parts added or subtracted 
from it and remain recognizably the same individual providing there is a continuity of 
295 Some commentators, such as Roger Scruton, maintain that the criticism of Bishop Butler is far more 
difficult for Locke's account than that of Reid, since it claims that Locke's criterion for personal identity 
in the unity of consciousness is viciously circular. Scruton's version of Butler's argument runs as follows: 
(1) 1 have a thought of standing in this room once before 
(2) What makes (1) into a memory? 
(3) That I identify myself as standing in this room (qua Locke's continuity of consciousness criterion) 
(4) Problem: how do I know that the identification of (3) is correct? (that is, what grounds do I have for 
saying that I stood here previously rather than another person, or no persons? ) 
(5) The only grounds are genuine memories of (1) 
(6) But the veracity of (5) depends upon the truth of (1) and it is precisely this which is in question (given 
(2)-(4)) 
(7) Ergo, the criterion proposed by Locke is (viciously) circular. 
The question is whether this is vicious or not, a point which Scruton for one believes is moot. (It is also 
worth pointing out that (5) is a controversial take on Butler. ) See A Short History ofmodern philosophy, 
Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 93. 
296 This example is used by Locke in the Essay, IL XXVII: 19, p. 342, and is picked up by Mackie in his 
Problemsfrom Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p 174. 
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consciousness. Hence the designation 'soft' endurantism. An individual thing may change to 
some degree in its material parts and still be deemed the same individual thing on Locke's 
account of persistence-through-time. 
(5: 4: ii) Reid's hard endurantism. 
Thomas Reid,, as is well known, took a different endurantist stance in conscious opposition to 
Locke's view. He maintained that personal identity could not be adequately defined, since it 
was too simple or basic an intuition to be subject to definition in terms of something else. 
However, he was willing to hazard a working concept of what identity in general is, 
a rclation between a thing which is known to exist at one time, and a thing which is known to have 
existed at another time. If you ask whether they are one and the same, or two different things, every man 
of common sense understands the meaning of your question perfectly. Whence we may infer with 
certainty that every man of common sense has a clear and distinct notion of identity. 297 
T. Y- 
Flu goes to point out that although he cannot state exactly what is meant by identity as a 
relation, because it is too basic a notion to be given definition, he can say that, 
it is a relation; but I cannot find words to express the specific difference between this and other relations 
though I am in no danger of confounding it with any other. I can say that diversity is a contrary relation, 
and that similitude and dissimilitude are another couple of contrary relations, which every man easily 
distinguishes in his conception from identity and diversity. 298 
Reid believed that an individual is a metaphysically simple entity that cannot be divided or 
added to without changing the substance of the individual in question. As a consequence of this, 
identity was demonstrated in individual substances that persisted through time without 
interruption, (such as ceasing to exist at one time index, only to begin to exist at a later index. ) 
So, if an individual begins to exist at a certain index, t I, only to cease to exist at a later index, 
Q, that individual cannot be said to begin to exist again at t3, since it has already ceased to exist 
at Q. Furthermore, if an individual exists at tt, then ceases to exist only to reappear at t3, then 
for this person to be considered the same individual, that individual would have to have existed 
(at tl) before it began to exist (at 0), which, Reid believed to be a manifest contradiction. As a 
297 Reid, Inquiry and Essays, (eds. ) Beanblossom and Lehrer (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 213. What 
follows is taken from Reid's argwnents in chapters 4 and 6 of Essay Three: OfMemory, pp. 212-218. 
2"8 Ibid, p. 213. 
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result of this, 'Continued uninterrupted existence is therefore implied necessarily in identity. 1299 
The notion here is one of numerical identity, rather than simply qualitative identity between two 
things at different times. An individual tree, to remain the same tree must endure through time 
as a numerically immutable entity. It cannot change its parts without a corresponding change in 
what it is sortally. When applied to humans, this leads to substance dualism since, according to 
Reid and modem endurantists like Chisholm and Swinbume,, the human body can and does 
change. So, for a person to remain the same individual, that individual must pick out something 
beyond the physical: a soul (or, in Reid's terms, a personality) which is the metaphysically 
simple, immutable part of the individual. Once again, Reid finds some difficulty in delineating 
exactly what is meant by personality beyond a commonsense notion that is intuitive, because 
basic. But it cannot include operations of the mind which are inherently mutable such as 
emotion and pain, since the pain suffered today by a person may not be the same pain as was 
suffered last week. Thus., 
My personal identity therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call 
myself. What ever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, 
and suffers. I am not thought, I a-in not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks and acts, and 
suffers. My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment - they have no continued, but a 
successive existence; but that self or 1, to which they belong, is permanent and has the same relation to 
all the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings which I call mine. 300 
Reid argues that the evidence for his hypothesis is manifest in an individual's memory of (past) 
events, and infers from such events the individual's contiguity with what is remembered, and 
thus, what has gone before. Reid also allows that there may be other evidence besides memory 
of past events that have happened to the individual, but which the person retains no conscious 
memory of, such as being suckled by one's mother. 
It is important to note that he is not arguing that remembrance of a particular event makes a 
particular individual (Dean) the person who did the action (A) at the time index tri. Instead he is 
arguing only that Dean did do A (as a matter of contingent fact) and this is evident from his 
ability to recall this instance from memory. Dean may also have done A at tn and have no 
recollection of A, or tn, or both, although it was truly Dean who carried out A. Reid is adamant 
that to misconstrue his position as meaning simply that Dean believes he did A at tn because he 
299 lbid, p. 214. 
'00 lbid, p. 214-5. 
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can remember having done so, is as absurd as saying that Dean's belief that the world was 
created means it was created. 
Reid also took issue with Locke's account of persistence. He believed that by correlating 
persistence and identity with consciousness, Locke had undermined his own position. As a 
demonstration of why this was the case, Reid applied three lines of argument. Assuming with 
Locke that identity resides in the consciousness of an intelligent individual, it follows that while 
the intelligent individual persists in both intelligence and consciousness, that individual is 
demonstrably the same person. However there are two problems with this (which Locke was 
apparently aware of). First, there is the problem of the transference of consciousness. Where 
Dean is one individual, Wayne is another, and Trevor is a third, it could be argued that Dean's 
consciousness could conceivably be transferred from Dean to Wayne, with the result that two 
individuals would share the same consciousness, and therefore, the same identity. Moreover, 
where transference could take place between two individuals it could take place between more, 
including Trevor, and any amount of other individuals too. There is a second line of attack upon 
Locke that is less counterintuitive: 
(1) Dean is an individual whose identity consists in his contiguity of consciousness 
persisting through time 
(2) Dean commits A at t2 
(3) Dean loses consciousness of (2) at t3 
(4) from the conjunction of (1)-(3) it follow that the Dean(s) of (2) and (3) cannot be the 
same Dean given (1) 
(5) Consequently, the Dean of (2) is a different Dean from the Dean of (3). 
We shall designate this the problem of interrupted consciousness. But Reid mounts a third line 
of attack upon Locke, which Locke had not anticipated. This is the problem of being-and-not- 
being the same individual, and strikes at the heart of Lockean 'soft' endurantism: 
(6) Given (1), imagine that Wayne is a temporal worm. 
(7) At tI Wayne was flogged as a boy for stealing apples in an orchard. 
(8) At t2 Wayne was a soldier who took the standard from the enemy during his first 
campaign. 
(9) At 0 Wayne was made a general for outstanding leadership in the field. 
A series of possible inferences follow: 
145 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(10) Suppose the Wayne at t2 is conscious of being the flogged Wayne at t 1, and 
(11) suppose the Wayne at 0 is conscious of being the Standard bearing Wayne of Q, 
but 
(12) the Wayne of 0 has lost consciousness of being the flogged Wayne at t I. 
From this inference it follows that, 
(13) the flogged Wayne at tI is the same individual as the Standard bearing Wayne at 
U, and 
(14) the Standard bearing Wayne at t2 is the same individual as the General Wayne at 
t37 
(15) ergo, the General Wayne at 0 must be the same individual as the flogged Wayne 
at t I. 
(16) But, the consciousness of the General Wayne at 0 does not go back as far as the 
flogged Wayne at t 1. 
(17) Ergo, the General Wayne at 0 cannot be identical with the flogged Wayne at t 1. 
All of which results in the patently illogical conclusion that, 
(18) the General Wayne at 0 is at-one-and-the-swne-titne identical and non-identical 
with the flogged Wayne at t I. 
As a consequence of this reasorung, Reid felt compelled to advocate an endurantism which took 
into account the shortcomings of Locke's account and identified persistence with a simple non- 
reducible entity rather than the idea of sameness of consciousness that Locke defended. Hence 
the appellation of 'hard' endurantism to Reid's position. 'O' 
301 'Mere are, of course, counter arguments to those brought by Reid against Locke, which defend a more 
Lockean position. But these are not necessary to our present concern which is simply to locate Edwards' 
thinking in some kind of continuum of contemporary Eighteenth century thought which both Reid and 
Locke represent. For a short, but lucid account of a rebuttal of Reid's argument of being-and-not-being 
the same individual, see Lowe's Locke On Human Understanding, p. 112 ff. He maintains a defence of 
Locke based upon the transitivity of the memory (or consciousness) relation which Reid deploys. Instead 
of using the first-person memory relation, Lowe advocates the use of an ancestral relation of this first 
person memory relation, since such ancestral relations are always transitive where they supervene upon a 
non-transitive relation such as first person memory of consciousness. Hence Lowe postulates a further 
individual (say, a distant aunt of the General) who herself remembers someone in the family who 
remembers someone ... who remembers 
the deeds of the General Wayne when he was die flogged Wayne. 
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(5: 4: iii) Edwards' occasionalist ýperdurantism'. 
Here as in the FOW, Edwards is cogniscent of Locke's views in particular, and it is his 
endurantism that marks Edwards' point of departure towards a more radical perdurantist 
perspective. Locke applied his thinking on persistence through time to consciousness, where he 
felt there was evidence that a sortal persists as a discrete individual substance. Edwards was in 
agreement with Locke over the need for sameness of consciousness to constitute an individual. 
But whereas for Locke this sameness was the necessary constituent for his form of endurantism, 
Edwards believed that consciousness was not enough to ensure the persistence of the individual 
(and in this he echoes something of Reid, though for considerably different reasons): 
And if we come to the personal identity of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist 
wholly in that which Mr. Locke places it in, i. e. same consciousness; yet I think it can't be denied, that 
this is one thing essential to it. But 'tis evident, that the communication or continuance of the same 
consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a 
divine establishment. There would be no necessity that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should 
continue to exist, but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator. 302 
Y I- Hence, Edwards parts company with Locke once again. In his earlier work on The Mind, 
Edwards even went as far as claiming that 'Identity of person is what seems never yet to have 
been explained. 1303 He then proceeded in OS to apply the thought experimentation which Locke 
himself had used in the Essay to show that the idea that identity could consist solely in 
consciousness as Locke had claimed,, was incomplete as a criterion of personal identity. If, as 
Edwards' appears to claim, all things appear to persist through time only as long as they are 
held in the mind of God as ideas, then God may annihilate Wayne at tl only to recreate a 
(The intervening ancestral gap can be infinitely long, and the point remain the same. ) With this ancestral 
transitivity in place, the memory relation of consciousness that Locke utilizes can be reinstated contra 
Reid. However, as Lowe himself adn-tits, Locke might not have approved of the rebuttal that Lowe 
marshals in his defence: 'I think it must be doubtful whether Locke himself would be happy with this 
revision, even though it helps to bring his theory more into line with common sense. For he really does 
seem to be quite strongly cornmitted to the view that if you cannot currently recollect the past thoughts 
and deeds of some person, then you are simply not the same person as the person who had and did them. ' 
V 113. 62 YE3: 398. In The Mind, Edwards also takes issue with Locke's notion that the identity of a person is 
not the same as the persistence of an immaterial substance like a soul. Instead, Edwards appears to claim 
that the soul and self-consciousness refer to one and the same thing: 'Well might Mr. Locke say, that 
Identity of a person consisted in identity of consciousness; for he might have said that identity of spirit 
too, consisted in the same consciousness. A mind or spirit is nothing else but consciousness, and what is 
included in it. The same consciousness is, to all intents and purposes the very same spirit or substance, as 
much as the same particle of matter can be the same with itself, at different times. ' YE& 342. 
303 YE& 386. 
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facsimile of Wayne at Q with all Wayne's memories and consciousness but who has no concern 
for the original Wayne. 
Or God could make several such facsimile Wayne's all of whom have commulucated to them 
the ideas of the original, and yet be ignorant of the existence of each other, the one being in a 
state of pleasure and enjoyment from t2 onwards, whilst the other is in a state of torment from 
Q onward, in another part of the cosmos. 
Or again, God could create a facsimile of Wayne which co-exists with the original from Q 
(where the original remains intact through tl- Q and beyond) but exists at a distance without 
knowledge of each other, yet having the same consciousness and memories. Edwards asks, 
'Will any one say, that he, [the Wayne facsmile(s)] in such a case,, is the same person with me, 
[that is, Wayne] when I know nothing of his sufferings and am never the better for his 
joys? "04For Edwards, Locke's account did not take seriously enough the counterfactual 
possibilities that his own position raised regarding the unity of consciousness in the context of 
I the Edwardsian defence of a strong (occasionalistic) version of creation and conservation. 305 
(But the problem with this line of argument is obvious: a facsimile of Wayne that has all the 
same memories and conscious experiences of Wayne up to a certain time index, is not therefore 
the recipient of the same consciousness as Wayne, but of an identical, or facsimile 
consciousness, a point that seems to have eluded Edwards. ) 
Thus the line that Edwards took against Locke's view stemmed from his belief that no 
individual thing could persist for long enough to affect, cause or in any way instrumentally to 
act upon another thing. God alone is the sole causal agent in all events. There could be no room 
in Edwards metaphysics for secondary causation, and hence, no room for a diachronic causal 
nexus of some description where a is a casual factor in the bringing about of b at a subsequent 
time. But why not? Why could an individual P not causally affect, or instrumentally act upon a 
second individual QT Edwards marshalled two arguments to defend his form of persistence 
from Locke's form of endurantisn-1, which presupposed that an individual could be a causal 
agent through time. In both, his objective is to demonstrate that this idea of a diachronic causal 
nexus is impossible. 306 For this argument, T (primed where necessary) refers to a temporal 
slice, and the letters T' and 'Q' refer to individuals at particular temporal indexes: 
304 Ibid. 
305 Storms points out the progression in Edwards' thinking on this matter in greater detail. He observes 
that Edwards began in his notes on The Mind with an endorsement of Locke's position, but in the later 
entry (cited above) distanced himself from Locke as he came to realize that Locke's position could not 
account for the kinds of counterfactual problems which Edwards laid out. See Tragedy in Eden, pp. 238- 
9. 
306T'hiS kind of argument against the possibility of a diachronic causal nexus has been defended recently 
by Kvanvig and McCann in their essay, "The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism" in 
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(1) P exists at tl 
(2) P ceases to exist at t2 
(3) Q begins to exist at 0 
Thus, P ceases to exist before Q comes into existence. It follows that, 
(4) P cannot have any instrumental effect upon temporal slices after t2 
and as a consequence of this, 
(5) P cannot cause Q to begin to exist ((2), (3) and (4)) 
A second line of argument follows from this. Even if Edwards' first line of attack folds, the 
term P>Q is equivalent to P causing Q to exist ex nihilo, thereby undermining God's 
sovereignty (since, as we have already noted, Edwards' believed that God's sovereignty is 
absolute, and admits of no secondary causation just in case of this kind of diminishment of his 
power and authority. ) So, ignoring the results of (4) and (5), a second line of argument follows: 
(6) P causes Q to exist at t3 
(7) P has an instrumental effect upon the endurance of Q after 0 
(8) the conjunction of (6) and (7) means that P creates Q at 0 such that P ensures the 
conservation of Q after 0 
but this argument seems dangerously close to, 
(9) P creates and conserves 
which is a prerogative reserved for divine fiat only, according to Edwards' view of sovereignty. 
Thus, on two fronts Edwards rejects the conception of endurantist causation advocated by 
Locke, since it is insufficient to ensure the ongoing integrity of the divine fiat. In its place, he 
posits an immediate moment-by-moment causation of all things by divine fiat. The problem 
with this argument is, as Helm points out, that it seems to lead to the view that there are no real 
Tomberlin (cd. ), Philosophical Perspectives, 5: Philosophy of Religion (Califomia: Ridgeview, 1991), 
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moral agents other than God himself. 307 But more fundamentally, it leaves Edwards' position in 
a quandary regarding temporal persistence and the integrity of human action, something that we 
shall come back to in greater detail in chapter 9. 
Helm detects two distinct accounts of conservation in Edwards' perdurantism that Edwards 
apparently uses interchangeably. The first of these is a weaker version of persistence, and stands 
alongside the position espoused by Descartes. Edwards claims that an individual contingent, 
temporal object cannot persist for a moment longer than God wills. This claim involves a 
commitment to the absolute and immediate ontological dependence of all individuals upon God 
for their conservation. It also involves the view that any individual picked out by this view, 
either in part or whole, may persist along a temporal continuum. Where such an individual has 
no parts, they may be considered numerically identical with the preceding individual. 308 
The second, stronger view is that an individual can only persist if God re-creates them for that 
particular moment and continues so to do for all succeeding moments. An individual at t2 is 
thus numerically distinct from an individual at tl, though both may be qualitatively similar in all 
their properties, and perhaps even identical. This means that no parts of an individual can persist 
beyond a particular index, and if there are no parts to the individual, then individuals at different 
time indexes, though identical in all their properties, cannot be numerically identical with each 
other (that is, p at tI and p at t2 cannot be the same p, though they appear to be exactly the same 
in all other respects than their temporal location). '09 
Helm remarks that Kvanvig and McCann make claims in their work which sound very similar 
to the weaker of these two arguments (they certainly do not endorse the stronger form of 
Edwards' occasionalism. ) But it is this stronger version of persistence that Edwards requires to 
deal with the problems associated with imputation in OS. Edwards' argument for imputation, as 
summarized by Helm, runs as follows: 
(1) The identity of a contingent individual depends entirely upon the arbitrary will of 
God. 
(2) Tberefore there is no 'natural' identity through time of anything. 
t)D. 598-605. 56 nus, Weddle's claim that Edwards accepted Locke's view of personal identity as consisting in 'same 
consciousness' with the qualification that, 'personal identity is not exclusively a fimction of the 
individual's mental operations, but is also a product of divine creativity', fails to take the radical nature of 
Edwards' continuous creation doctrine seriously enough. See Weddle, "Jonathan Edwards on men and 
trees, and the problem of solidarity" in Harvard Theological Review 67 (1974): 166. 
308 This weaker account can be found in YE3: 400-40 1. 
309 I'lic stronger account is found in YF-3: 402-406. 
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(3) Therefore, it is Possible that Adam and his posterity be, for certain purposes, 
constituted a unity by God. 
(4) God has in fact constituted a unity between Adam and his posterity, as shown in 
Scripture, and by the consent we give to the sin of Adam. 
(5) Therefore, the objection that the divinely-constituted unity between Adam and his 
310 
posterity contradicts the true nature of things is invalid. 
Helm claims that this strong form of Edwards' argument does not mean that God constitutes 
any several things together in an arbitrary manner. Instead, Edwards' use of the terms 
'arbitrary'and, 'God treats them as one' referring to different individuals at different times, 
especially Adam and his posterity, are, according to Helm, unfortunate anachronisms, which 
must be understood in their historical context so that Edwards' thinking is not unwittingly 
distorted. And in this context, it is clear to Helm that the term 'arbitrary' derives from the Latin 
arbitrium, meaning, 'dependent upon the will' (usually, as in this context, of God). Moreover, 
rather than being an indication of caprice, the phrase 'treating them as one' refers to treating 
individuals things as one that share certain properties which means that God may justly treat 
discrete individuals of a particular group as though they were one. 
But is this what Edwards says? Let us see: 
When I call this an arbitrary constitution, I mean, that it is a constitution which depends on nothing but 
the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing but the divine wisdom. In this sense, the whole 
course of nature, with all that belongs to it, all its laws and methods, and constancy and regularity, 
continuance and procceding, is an arbitrary constitution. 311 
This does accord with Helm's insistence on the derivation from arbitrium. However, it says 
nothing about Helm's views on 'treating them as one'. This is an important point. For on 
Edwards' strong view of perdurantism, there is no metaphysical basis that he can appeal to apart 
from God's choice in ordaining this, rather than another particular organization of matter. Thus, 
Helm is wrong to suggest that Edward's strong perdurantist argument means that there are 
underlying metaphysical facts about objects that mean God can treat scattered objects as one for 
the purposes of imputation, because they all share certain moral properties. There simply are no 
moral properties apart from those ordained by God. So it appears that Edwards (and Helm) 
310 Slightly adapted from Helm, Faith and Understanding, p. 169. 
311 YE3: 403-4. Author's emphases. 
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cannot sidestep the charge of arbitrariness with respect to the strong perdurantist understanding 
of Edwards' doctrine. 
Let us unpack this point. On the stronger version of Edwards' doctrine, Helm states, 
'[ilmputation is a reckoning of what is true, and what is true is the union of Adam and the race. 
Imputation is not therefore a fiction, nor an arbitrary act, but is founded on the nature of 
things. -) 312 But, of course, such a 'nature of things' depends upon the weaker reading of 
Edwards' perdurantism. For on the stronger version, nothing persists through time, and no 
underlying metaphysical fact about a particular state of affairs can obtain apart from God's 
willing it to be one way rather than another at each moment of its existence. There simply is no 
(nature of things' to which Edwards can appeal on the strong argument, apart from divine 
ordination. 
It appears that, at this point in his reading of Edwards' argument, Helm conflates elements of 
the weaker and stronger arguments in Edwards. Helm obscures the fact that, on the stronger 
argument Edwards has no grounds independent of divine will to which he can appeal against the 
charge of divine megrim. (This, it must be remembered, is the argument Edwards needs for his 
version of imputation to withstand the criticism that imputing sin to Adam's posterity seems 
false because it contradicts the nature of things. ) Helm's unwitting obfuscation of this fact 
seems to derive from his claim that Edwards 'oscillates' between the stronger and weaker 
version of the argument. He cites as evidence of this, Edwards observation that, 'the established 
course of nature is sufficient to continue existence, where existence is once given. ' (YE3: 40 1. ) 
This does sound like the weaker, more Cartesian argument that Helm lays out. And were it the 
case that Edwards himself is confused about the matter, not making clear where his 
commitment to the weaker argument ends and the stronger one begins, Helm might be forgiven 
for having failed to take account of this second version of the arbitrariness problem. 
But in the context of what Edwards is saying this is a misunderstanding of Edwards' intent. He 
is not oscillating between the stronger and weaker arguments. Instead he is pointing out that 
those who might dissent from his own (stronger) position, could criticize his view along the 
lines that once the established course of nature is set, that is sufficient to maintain existence 
without the continuous intervention of God in continuous creation. But Edwards goes on to say, 
'but then it should be remembered, what nature is, in created things: and what the established 
course of nature is; that, as has been observed already, it is nothing, separate from the agency of 
'313HenCe God. , 
Helm's reading of this apparent oscillation in Edwards' view is mistaken. The 
context is clearly a rebuttal of a potential criticism of his stronger view. And if this is the case, 
312 Hchn, Faith and Understanding, p. 169. 
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then Edwards is open to the arbitrariness charge, since his view does depend on the stronger 
version of perdurantism, and this version of the doctrine does mean that there are no 
metaphysical facts to which Edwards can appeal, apart from those very facts that God 
constitutes 'arbitrarily'. This is the conclusion reached by, (amongst others) Wallace Anderson, 
who observes that, 'in Edwards' own view, the identity of a self or spirit, and indeed of any 
other created thing, depends entirely upon the arbitrary constitution of God by which he 
determines the order and course of successive ideas and states of consciousness. -)314 
However, this does not mean that Edwards is also committed to the idea that any amalgam of 
temporally dispersed objects could be thought of as a single gerrymandered unit by virtue of 
)31 some divine act (such as a biscuit, a fossil and a locomotive. ' Even on his stronger 
perdurantist argument, Edwards is not necessarily committed to accepting an egalitarian view of 
316 the ontology of physical objects . What an egalitarian view of the ontology of physical objects 
means,, is that any gerrymandered part of matter and spacetime could be cut up to form a 
I physical object, comprising a biscuit, fossil and a locomotive, or whatever. It is egalitarian in 
that it does not privilege certain hunks of matter over others. So the hunk comprising Wayne, or 
Trevor is no more privileged or natural than, say, Athanasius, or our biscuit-fossil-locomotive. 
Edwards need not subscribe to such a view. Instead, he could maintain that God does privilege 
certain hunks of matter over others. This still leaves open the question of why God privileges 
one sort of hunk over another. (Presumably, God thinks this bunk of matter is better for his 
purposes, on the strong perdurantist argument, than another, similar hunk of matter. ) And it 
does nothing to lessen the apparent arbitrariness of God's decision to privilege one sort of hunk 
over another (say, Adam and his posterity, instead of Wayne at tl, the biscuit at Q and the 
313 YE3: 401. 
314 YE6: 116. Compare Stephen Daniel: 'From the standpoint of natural reason, the existence of 
individuals is purely arbitrary', and 'Through God's arbift-, uy union of one individual to another, the 
unintelligibility of individual existence is supplanted by the rationality of natural laws, constituting the 
possibility of retrieving meaning in nature, in spite of the isolation embodied in individual subjectivity' 
The Philosophy ofJonathan Edwards, p. 146-7. We will return to this problem, in terms of the apparent 
voluntarism it sets up in Edwards' account of imputation, at the end of chapter 8. 
315 Nor is it the case, according to Edwards, that God can impute guilt indiscriminately. For instance, God 
could not constitute an ontological unity such that Cain's knife was at fault for his brother's murder, or 
Adam's tongue was responsible for his he. In these examples, it is the imputation of Adamic guilt which 
is at issue. An object used by a person in committing an action, or a part of their person which is 
instrumental in that act, cannot be blamed for the consequences of that act, since they are merely the 
instruments by which the action is carried out by the individual willing them. This point is explained by 
William Wainwright in his essay, "Original S&' in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, (ed. ) Thomas V. 
Morris (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 51. (For further discussion on Wainwright, 
see chapter 8. ) 
316 1 say this cautiously. It may well be that Edwards does endorse a view of perdurantism that is 
cegalitarian' with respect to hunks of matter. My point is that, as a perdurantist, he need not. For a 
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locomotive at t3). But it does go some way to show that even if Edwards' God does act in an 
arbitrary fashion in constituting the state of affairs he does, this in and of itself does not 
necessarily mean that God just happens to privilege one hunk of matter over another. God could 
have a reason for so doing. But even if he does have a reason, this is not dependent on anything 
other than the divine will and wisdom in such matters (a matter to which we shall return in 
chapter 8). So this caveat does not ameliorate the problem of arbitrariness that Helm tries to 
solve, on Edwards' behalf. 317 
Chapter 7 takes this problem up and develops it in the context of Chisholm's (and Helm's) 
critique of this aspect of the Edwardsian doctrine of temporal parts. But before that, more needs 
to be done to discern whether Edwards' doctrine of temporal parts is indeed a species of 
occasionalism, or merely a defence of a continuous creation doctrine. It is to this point of 
clarification that we turn first in the following chapter, before taking on Chisholm's critique of 
the Edwardsian ontology of imputation in chapter 8. 
contemporary perdurantist who is egalitarian in this respect, see Heller, in The Ontology of Physical 
Objects. We shall return to the ontology of perdurantism in chapter 7. 
317 Compare Katherine Hawley in How Things Persist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 202- 
203, the naturalness or otherwise of a series of stages [of a persisting object] is not fully determined by 
the intrinsic properties of the stages concerned ... To oppose endurance theory is not to be a 'reductionist' 
about persistence, and nor is it to believe that all ways of 'tracing out' objects over time are on a par. ' 
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(6) How 'occasional" was Edwards' occaslonalism? 
A distinction can be made between a strong conservation thesis, a continuous creation thesis, 
and an occasionalistic thesis regarding God's activity in creating and conserving the world. 
Thus far, we have assumed that Edwards is an occasionalist, and that the reader understands the 
connotations this involves. However, since the nature of Edwards' occasionalism is a basic 
constituent of the argument of what follows, it is important that something more is said about 
what Edwards' occasionalism entails. Moreover,, since we have presented Edwards as a species 
of perdurantist, it is also important to describe the relationship that might exist between these 
two aspects of an Edwardsian ontology. 
This chapter is an attempt to make clear where Edwards' doctrine should be placed along the 
continuum of views on the relationship between creation and conservation. First, we shall 
examine the three potential candidate theories enunciated above. Then, Edwards' view will be 
placed alongside these others. In the process, we shall also have cause to note that this reading 
of occasionalism is compatible with several central aspects of a version of perdurantism. 
Finally, we shall turn to consider a recent objection to the notion that Edwards' was an 
occasionalist, from Sang Lee's monograph, The Philosophical neology of Jonathan 
Edwards. '" All this will clear the way for a detailed examination in succeeding chapters, of 
Edwards' views on persistence through time, and how they correspond to his occasionalism 
with respect to his doctrine of imputation. 
(6: 1) Three views on creation and conservation 
To begin with, let us take each of the three theses on creation and conservation in turn. Each of 
these views has received a considerable amount of attention in recent literature. "9 In what 
318 Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theology ofJonathan Edwards, Expanded Edition (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. ) 
31 9 Those essays which arise out of the present discussions, include Kenneth Clatterbaugh, The Causation 
Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739 (London: Routledge, 1999); Harry Frankfurt, "Continuous 
Creation, Ontological Inertia, and the Discontinuity of Time" in Necessity Volition, and Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alfred J. Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with 
Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not EnougW' in Philosophical Perspectives 5, (ed. ) James E.. 
Tomberlin (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing, 1991) and "Medieval Aristoteleanism and the Case 
against Secondary Causation in Nature" in Thomas V. Morris, (ed. ) Divine and Human Action, Essays in 
the Metaphysics of Theism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Jonathan L. Kvanvig, and Hugh J. 
McCann, "The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism" in Tomberlin (ed. ) Philosophical 
Perspectives, 5; Hugh J. McCann, and Jonathan L. Kvanvig, "Divine Conservation and the Persistence of 
the World7' in Morris (cd. ) Divine and Human Action; Andrew Pcssin, "Does Continuous Creation Entail 
Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000): 413440; 
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follows, I shall assume,, unless otherwise stated, that a time index refers to a particular time 
slice, as do related terms like 'moment' and 'instant'. The notion of a time slice reflects that 
developed in the previous chapter, that is, a temporally durationless moment. 'x' refers to any 
given concrete particu ar, and t, refers to a time index, primed as required. 
A thesis which renders a creation + conservation doctrine I take to be a conjunction of the 
following two premises, 
(C 1) for all x, if x is contingent, then God creates x 
with,, 
(C2) for all x, if x is contingent, then God conserves x (at each time index at which x persists 
after creation). 
Premise (C 1) precludes the possibility that there are backwardsly everlasting contingent things. 
We do not make any claim about whether they begin to exist in time, though Edwards would 
have understood all contingent things as things which are created by God with or in time. "0 
I take it that (C2) is a conservation thesis which assumes that if x is a dependent, concrete 
individual existing in time, then x will not continue to exist for a moment longer unless God 
wills its continued existence. Hence, (C2) could be co-joined with a ffirther premise to make this 
strong conservation element explicit, 
(C2') for all x, if x is contingent, then x cannotpersist through time without the conservation of 
God at all those temporal indexes at which it exists after tI 
and Philip Quirm "Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and Occasionalism" in Morris (ed. ) Divine 
and Human Action. There are a number of other treatments of these issues, which it would be tiresome to 
footnote. Thankfully, Pcssin has listed some of them in "Does Continuous Creation Entail 
Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)", p. 418, n. 9. 
320 This skirts considerable issues about the nature of time and its relation to the created order, which 
would lead beyond the purview of this thesis. The phrase, 'with or in time' refers only to the point at 
which a given thing is created. At creation, Edwards would have understood that God creates time at the 
point of his initial fiat (Genesis 1: 1). Presumably - taking the Biblical flat literally - Edwards means 
something like light is created, in rather crude terms, 'with' time. Thereafter, for any given object which 
is created, that object is created 'in' time, that is, at a moment after the initial moment of time. Edwards 
makes this plain in his work on 'The Mind', where in the course of dealing with a section on the nature of 
space in relation to God he says, 'There is, therefore, no difficulty in answering such questions as these: 
What cause was there why the universe was placed in such a part of space, and why created at such a 
time? For if there be no space beyond the universe, it was impossible that the universe should be created 
in another place; and if there was no time before the creation, it was impossible that it should be created 
at another time. ' YE, 6. - 343, Corollary to [ 13]. 
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where tI expresses the first instant at which x is created. This excludes deism, which for present 
Purposes I take to be the doctrine which involves the conjunction of (C 1) with the idea that 
though any given x might be contingent, that contingency, though ontological, is not radically 
ontological. By that I mean that for any given x, if that x is contingent, then x is dependent for 
its existence upon God (given (Cl)), but it is not immediately, constantly or continually 
dependent upon God's conservation at all times thereafter, at which x exists. At those 
subsequent indexes, x remains contingent, and therefore ontologically dependent upon the fiat 
of God. (God may decide to destroy the world in which x exists, or x itself, at some later index). 
But x is not radically dependent upon the fiat of God after its initial creation. God empowers x 
to persist through time at all subsequent indexes at which x persists, such that God does not 
have to conserve x in existence at all those time indexes. 
The conjunction of (C 1) & (C2) (or, indeed, (CT)), also precludes a further possibility, that 
I God may create an x which has the property of self-sustenance essentially (this might be taken 
to be a strong Deist thesis). That is, it precludes the possibility that in creating x, God could give 
x the property of being able to continue to exist without the immediate conservation of God, 
moment-by-moment. Jonathan Kvanvig has recently provided an argument against the notion 
that God might create x with the essential property of self- sustenance. He claims that, 
The property of self-sustenancc cannot be essential to God's creation. If the property of self-sustenance is 
essential to a thing, then that thing cannot exist without bearing some special relation to its continued 
existence. Yet nothing can bear any kind of relation to its continued existence without continuing to exist! 
So the very fact that God could destroy the universe shows that neither it nor anything else in it has the 
property of self-sustenance essentially. 321 
So self-sustenance must be a contingent property of x. Even if God could have created x, with 
this property contingently, this does not alter the need for (at least) a conservation thesis. For if 
this property is contingent, then some explanation needs to be given as to why it was originally 
endowed with this property, but also, more importantly, its continuing to possess that property. 
God might create x with the contingent property of self-sustenance, but that is no guarantee that 
x will continue to enjoy this property at all times subsequent to its creation, since God could 
withdraw it, because it is contingent. 
321 Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Problem offIell, p. 38. The argument that follows draw upon his discussion 
of conservation in this passage. 
157 
'Me metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
Nor is it possible to claim that the contingent sclf-sustenance of x is a continued effect of God's 
original creation. Kvanvig observes that without some medium in which the effects of an action 
can carry over to a later time, no sense can be given to the notion of a latter effect of an earlier 
action. There is such a medium in the created order itself, namely laws of nature. So. Kvanvig 
maintains, lighting a match can be causally responsible for the subsequent forest fire, because of 
a sequence of temporally overlapping events, which are bound to the next event by laws of 
nature. The match bums, causing a leaf to smoulder, and in turn to flame, which falls to the 
ground, causing the grass to smoulder, and so on. But, there is no such medium between God 
and creation. There are no laws of nature to which God is responsible, or which act as a medium 
for his actions in creation. The only way in which God's actions can be said to have later 
effects, is if God acts to bring these actions into effect at that later time. And once the causal 
medium is in place in the governance of creation, God can only ensure that the initial creative 
act is carried through to later times by sustaining the medium itself at the same time. So God's 
sustenance of the world still occurs at every instance of its existence as per (C 1) & ((C2) v 
(C2')). 
Descartes appears to have endorsed a position similar in strength to the conjunction (C 1) & 
(C2)7 
But though I assume that perhaps I have always existed just as I am at present neither can I escape the 
force of this reasoning, and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn from this is, that I need not seek for 
any author of my existence. For all the course of my life may be divided into an infinite number of parts, 
none of which is in any way dependent on the other-, and thus from the fact that I was in existence a short 
time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, 
produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. 
However, as his argument proceeds, it has often been seen as endorsing a continuous creation 
doctrine,, 322 
322 See, for exarnple, Frankfurt "Continuous Creation, Ontological Inertia, and the Discontinuity of time", 
p. 55 ff., where lie discusses the question of whether Descartes was advocating continuous creation or a 
strong conservation thesis. He uses the term 'ontological inertia' to describe the need of a contingent 
concrete particular to be constantly acted upon from without (by God), in order that it continue in being. 
However, this reading of Descartes is not the only one possible. Clatterbaugh shows that Descartes' 
thinking on causation has been subjected to several interpretations in the literature, and three in particular: 
that he was a failed interactionist (viz. his philosophy of mind); that he was an occasionalist, or proto- 
occasionatist of sorts; or that his views are simply too muddled to admit of a single coherent reading. See 
The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, p. 26 ff. Be that as it may, all that matters for the present 
purpose is that Descartes' work in this area can be understood in terms of a strong conservation thesis, or 
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It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of 
time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same 
power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it did not yet exist, so 
that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a 
distinction of the reason. 323 
In keeping with this reading of Descartes, the strong conservation thesis of (C I) & (C2) could 
be developed into a doctrine of continuous creation in the following fashion, 
(0) for all x, if x is contingent, then God continuously creates x at each time index that it 
obtains. 
The difference between (0) and (C2) (and (C2')) is that a strong conservation doctrine does 
not mean that at each index at which an object obtains after its initial creation, God recreates 
that ob cct ex nihilo. On (C2) and (C2'), although God conserves x after x's creation he does 
not recreate x at each moment after his creation. That is, a strong conservation thesis preserves 
this notion of temporal persistence whereas a continuous creation thesis denies conservation, 
since nothing persists through time. Put more formally, the distinction between (0) and (U), 
is that if x is a dependent concrete individual, then x will continue to exist for a moment longer 
iff God recreates xfor that moment, and continues to recreate xfor all succeeding moments of 
its existence. This requires some explanation, not least because, if God recreates an object at 
different time indexes, then the following question could be asked: in what sense is the object 
recreated at Q the same object as the one created at tl? Perhaps, taking up our earlier discussion 
of persistence-through-time, we can speak of different parts of the one spacetime entity existing 
at different time indexes. In this way, x would refer to all the aggregate parts of the whole 
spacetime entity. To refer to the different spatio-temporal parts of x would involve priming x at 
each index, such that at tI God creates xI and at t2. x2 and so on, in a way commensurate with 
the discussion of temporal parts in the previous chapter. (0) could be re-phrased to capture this 
important point thus: 
perhaps a continuous creation thesis. Frankfurt's use of Descartes shows this is not without precendcnt in 
the literature. 
323Dcscartcs, Works I, (trans. ) Haldane and Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 
168. 
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(CY) for all x, if x is a contingent spacetime entity, then God continuously creates those spatio- 
temporal Parts of x at each time index that parts of x obtains, such that God creates xI at tI and 
x2 at Q and so on, for every slice at which parts of x obtain - 
Edwards also endorses this kind of thesis at one point in his discussion of creation and 
conservation in OS IV: III. 32413ut Edwards goes beyond a doctrine of continuous creation to 
advocate occasionalism. The difference between a doctrine of continuous creation simpliciter, 
and a doctrine of occasionalism, is that occasionalism involves an additional premise (or 
perhaps premises) regarding the nature of secondary, or mundane causation. 325 As Philip Quinn 
has shown, 326 the doctrine of continuous creation does not commit its defender to the additional 
claim (made by occasionalists) that there can be no secondary causes, (because, say 
occasionalists, God is the sole cause of all things, and all mundane causation is merely the 
occasion of God's activity. No created thing has the causal power to affect another). In fact, 
I according to Quinn, continuous creation can be held alongside a commitment to the reality of 
secondary causes. He demonstrates this firom an analysis of how his own continuous creation 
doctrine is compatible with several notions of what secondary causation involves, notions that 
are live options in the contemporary philosophical debate. These comprise Humean regularity 
theory; counterfactual analysis; and a necessitarian understanding of secondary causation. 
Since all that is needed here is an indication that continuous creation does not entail 
occasionalism, we pause to consider one version of Quinn's theory, compatible with a Humean 
analysis, since this has the advantage of the weight of philosophical tradition behind it. We 
adapt Quinn's argument to the present purpose. Using a familiar analogy (familiar that is, in the 
causation literature) of a match being struck leading to the match being lit, we may formulate a 
continuous creation doctrine using Quinn's analysis thus, 
324 He also defends an unambiguous continuous creation thesis in Miscellany 346, 'It [is] most agreeable 
to the Scripture, to suppose creation to be performed new every moment. The Scripture speaks of it not 
only as past but as a present, remaining, continual act. Job 9: 9; Ps. 65: 6; 104: 4; Is. 40: 22,44: 24; Amos 
5: 8; and very commonly in the Scripture. ' YE13: 418. 
325 Pessin makes this point in his discussion of continuous creation and occasionalism in Malebranche's 
work. There he says that the causal theses required to yield occasionalism from continuous creation 
simpliciter are twofold: (a) that God sustains completely every mode of every substance (or that God is I&IWII the necessary and sufficient cause of all things in all substances), and (b) that there is no 
overdetermination. By this he means that 'God continuously creates, therefore no creature can exercise 
any causal power over bodies that conflicts with God's. This, on its own, allows the possibility that 
creatures could exercise causal powers over bodies as long as they are in agreement with God's; in other 
words, it is consistent with causal overdetermination', "Does Continuous Creation Entail 
Occasionalism? ", p. 432. 
326 In his essay, "Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and Occasionalism" in Divine and Human 
Action, (ed. ) Morris. Pessin argues for the saine claim (in a very different way) in Malebranche. See, 
"Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism? " p. 432. 
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(i) God willing that match I is struck at tI brings about match I being struck at ti. 
(ii) God willing that match 2 is lit at t2 +a slight temporal increment, brings about match 2 
being lit at t2 +a slight temporal increment. 
This leads to the conclusion, 
(iii) For all t, if, for some match, God willing that match exists at tn obtains and God willing 
that match is similar to match I obtains and God willing that match is struck at tn obtains, then, 
for some burning match, God willing that burning match exists at W+ temporal increment 
obtains and God willing that burning match is similar to match 2 obtains and God willing that 
burning match is lit at tn + temporal increment obtains. 
So. God wills the existence of the match at each index of its existence (or, in keeping with 
(0')), wills the existence of each temporal part of the match at each instance at which a 
temporal part of that match obtains), rendering a continuous creation argument similar to (0) 
and (C3'). But if this is coupled with the regularity view of causation stemming from Hume, 327 
all secondary causation amounts to, is the constant conjunction of a particular x, or stage of x, 
with a particular (stage of) y. 
Tbe problem with this reading of continuous creation is that it seems to mean that natural 
causes, understood in this Humean way, in conjunction with a doctrine of continuous creation, 
involves occasional rather than true (that is, efficient) causes. In other words, how can there be 
room for secondary causes if a continuous creation thesis obtains, and all mundane causation is 
merely regularity as per Hume? 
In answer to this, Quinn claims that his view entails nothing about whether or how events like 
the match being lit at tl+ temporal increment are brought about. It simply stipulates that if or 
when they do, they do so according to a Humean analysis. And though this may well mean that 
such events have only Humean rather than 'true' causes, in the sense understood by - for 
... The regularity view of causation is the traditional view of Hume's view of causation, which has been 
challengcd in the contemporary literature by writers like Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion: 
Causation, Realism and David TIume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) and John Wright's The 
Sceptical Realism of David IIume (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983). They claim Hume 
was a realist, not a reductionist, with respect to causal facts. Nevertheless, even the revisionists admit 
that, 'The fact remains: the view that Hume held a Regularity theory of causation is still the standard 
view' preface to The Secret Connection. 
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example - Malebranche, Quinn feels this is sufficient to his purpose, and is a result theists of an 
empiricist bent can live with. 328 
It may well be that this question of whether and how such causal events are brought about for 
theists like Malebranche and Edwards, is precisely the point at issue (as far as they are 
concerned in the development of their own causal views). However, strictly speaking, Quinn 
has shown that continuous creation could be compatible with secondary causation on at least 
one reading of the matter, and that is all we set out to show. What Quinn's analysis 
demonstrates is that an important distinction can be drawn between continuous creation, 
understood as per (0) and (C3'), and the notion that divine volition also brings about (i. e., is 
the necessary and sufficient cause of) events in nature. The conjunction of these two things is 
not a consequence of his view as he sets it up in this argument, but is not precluded by it either, 
although Quinn himself does not subscribe to such a Malebranchean, or Edwardsian view. 
Continuous creation does not entail occasionalism if Quinn et aL, are correct. And up until this 
point, none of the theses we have outlined entail an occasionalistic view of causation. But if an 
additional thesis concerning the nature of causation is required to yield occasionalism, what 
might that thesis be? Such an occasionalist causation thesis involves the following line of 
argument (the argument applies equally to (0) or (C3')): 
(C4) x has no causal efficacy or agency, since, 
(C4a) God alone is sole causal agent at all time indexes and for all contingent concrete 
particulars, 
(C4b) x, being contingent, does not persist through time long enough to have any causal 
influence on any other contingent concrete individuals. 
And, 
(C4c) x is mcrely the occasion of God's activity at cach timc indcx. 
(TIat is, x has no capacity for mundane, or secondary causation. God alone causes all things. x 
is merely the occasion of God's causing things to be as they are. ) 
Thus on (0), xI at tI is numerically distinct from x2 at t2, though qualitatively similar, or 
perhaps identical with the previous x. But when conjoined with (C4), the continuous creation 
thesis of (0) becomes an occasionalist thesis, since in addition to this, it claims that A at tI 
328 "Divine Conservatiorý Secondary Causes, and Occasionalisnf', p. 60. 
162 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
cannot be the (partial or complete) cause of x2 at t2, since xI and x2 do not persist long enough 
to affect adjacent temporal parts of x, and in addition, are merely the occasions of God's action. 
(We have already had cause to note that Edwards also believed that nothing persists long 
enough to affect another thing in the previous chapter. ) 
'Mis leads us to consider the most controversial aspect of the foregoing, viz. (C4b). In light of 
(CO) the following question arises: why cannot x have a causal influence on any other 
contingent concrete individual? The answer of (M) is that, 
(C4b) x, being contingent, does not persist through time long enough to have any causal 
influence on any other contingent concrete individuals. 329 
It seems to me that the answer to this query is best found where the occasionalism outlined is 
understood to be compatible with a dense view of time. To extrapolate: 
(0) each index at which any given x exists is a temporally durationless slice. 
This could be applied to, 
(C6) For any x existing at tI in a diachronic causal nexus, that x cannot persist long enough to 
have any causal influence upon y (or any other contingent individual in that nexus). 330 
This is because, 
(C6a) if time is a densely ordered continuum (that is, an ordered continuum with no gaps), then 
either, 
(C6ai) an earlier event has an interval between it and a later event, or 
... This does not preclude the possibility of instantaneous causation. However, Edwards clearly forecloses 
this possibility, as well as that of backwards causation in YEP 185: 'But that which in ajkv respect makes 
way for a thing's coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be 
prior to the existence. ' it is clear from the context that he means temporally prior. Moreover, 'The 
distinguished nature of the cf[ect, which is somediing belonging to the effect can't have influence 
backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can have no 
influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its influence: for then the thing has made sure of 
existence already, without its help. ' Hence, I shall not develop a defence against these two potential 
alternatives here. 
330 The following argument can be found in Kvanvig and McCann's essay, "The Occasionalist 
Proselytizer", p. 598. 
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(C6aii) there is no interval between the two events. 
(M) If (C6aii), then the two events occur at the same time and are in fact one event, so the 
question of one event causing another cannot arise, whereas, 
(C6c) if (C6ai), then x at tI occurs before x at Q and the two events are not temporally 
contiguous, such that the earlier cannot cause the later event. 
Sol, 
(C7) x cannot have any causal influence on any other contingent concrete individual. 
Now, provided the dense view of time is coherent, (which on current cosmological and 
mathematical theories it is), then the occasionalistic thesis appears to stand, and can be clearly 
distinguished from a continuous creation thesis, and indeed, from a strong conservation thesis. 
But another, related question arises at this point. How does the occasionalistic thesis relate to an 
understanding of persistence-through-time, given that it appears to deny any persistence per se? 
Another way of putting this might be, is occasionalism consistent with either perdurantism or 
endurantism (as they are construed in the current literature)? 
At this point we pause to recapitulate what each of these terms means, in as cursory a fashion as 
space allows: 
(D I) Perdurantism is the doctrine that all concrete individuals are made up of temporal parts 
that together constitute a whole individual. Thus all individuals are 4D spacetime worms which 
are aggregates of their temporal parts. 
(D2) Endurantism is the doctrine that all individuals exist wholly and completely at each index 
of their existence. And all individuals are numerically the same at each time index at which they 
obtain. 
As we saw in the last chapter, (D 1) is usually taken to be compatible with a dense view of time; 
(D2) with a discrete view (though this should not be taken as an argument for entailment in 
these respects). So, (D2) references to time indexes need to be modified accordingly. 
Now, according to the foregoing argument, is the occasionalist thesis compatible with either 
perdurantism or endurantism? Initially, it appears that if it is compatible with either, it is 
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compatible with (D2) rather than (D 1). 331 However, I want to argue that it is in fact compatible 
with (D 1) more than, or perhaps in a way that is more congruent than, with (D2). Let us explore 
this: 
(C 8) for any x to be x at t L, as well as x at t2,, means that x perdures as an aggregate of temporal 
slices which God recreates ex nihilo at each index. 
This is the case since, on a perdurantist ontology, temporal parts/slices are as much a part of a 
concrete individual as spatial parts, unlike (at least some forms of) endurantism. 
But a case could be made to endorse a 'hard' endurantist ontology where nothing persists for 
more than a moment ('a moment' taken either densely, or discretely), and where at that moment 
x is numerically identical with all previous times at which it has obtained. This form of 
endurantism could be compatible with a dense view of time, provided that at each temporal slice 
Ix is numerically the same as at the previous time slice. But I think that endurantism better fits a 
discrete view of time, qua Swinburne. 
Nevertheless, the point of (0) is that occasionalist ontology could fit the context of dense time 
along perdurantist lines, not that it could also fit a form of endurantism, though it might. The 
problem for this current ontology is that the occasionalistic thesis goes beyond perdurantism, 
making it redundant (at least, it does in Edwards' rendition of it in OS IV: M. ) This is because, 
on occasionalism, nothing perdures save God. All perdurance is an illusion. 
So, would occasionalism better fit a hard endurantism of the 4D variety? Only if at each time 
slice x remains numerically the same, and at each slice x exists wholly and completely. Both 
these theses are contentious, to say the least. Taking them in reverse order, 
(El) If x exists wholly and completely at each index that God recreates x according to (C3)- 
(C7), then at each instant in the sequence in which God recreates x, he recreates x completely 
and wholly ex nihilo. 
And, 
331 it might be thought obvious that if occasionalism, is consistent with either of endurantism or 
pcrdur, tntisrn, it is could only be consistent with pcrdurantism. However, Mark Heller makes 
just this 
point vvitli respect to 
Chisholm's view of Edwards in his The Ontology of Physical Objects, p. 22.1 
postpone discussion of Heller's argument on this until the next chapter. 
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(E2) If x exists as numerically the same (in all its parts and properties) at each time slice that 
God recreates x, then x cannot appear to change across time in an occasionalistic-endurantist 
ontology (where such change involves a loss, or replacement of at least some parts and 
properties of x). 
So, on (E2), the endurance conditional of (E I) is made explicit. And it seems to me that given 
(E2), (El) is highly unlikely for all the reasons that Reid's Whipping Boy and the Ship of 
Tbeseus thought experiments make plain. 
Moreover, it seems to me that Jonathan Edwards endorses occasionalism on a perdurantist 
332 background. We may now turn to consider this view. 
(6: 2) Edwardsian occasionalism in OS 
What then, of Edwards' views in all this? Edwards developed a version of occasionalism in his 
defence of a traditional notion of the imputation of original sin from Adam to his posterity, in 
OS IV: Ill. That Edwards is led to espouse a form of occasionalism in his defence of this 
doctrine can be demonstrated by several citations from the text of OS, and applying the 
apparatus of the previous discussion on conservation, continuous creation and occasionalism to 
these texts. First, Edwards shows that persistence through time and personal identity are 
dependent upon divine constitution: 
Identity of consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature; and so, on the sovereign will and agency of 
God; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in 
the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution ... For if same consciousness be one thing 
necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's sovereign constitution, it will still follow, that 
personal identity depends on God' sovereign constitution. 333 
He then shows that God's constitution of things is such that all things continue to exist by the 
immediate power of God, upholding all created substance in being. This might be understood as 
a strong conservation thesis, similar in tone to a Cartesian view, or (Cl)&((C2) v (C2')). 
However, Edwards goes beyond this. He maintains that preservation is a continuous creation ex 
nihilo by God of all created things, 
332 Much of the foregoing uses both Philip Quinn's essay, "Divine Conservation, Continuous Creation, 
and Human Action7' and Paul Helm's reading of Edwards' occasionalism in chapter 7 of Faith and 
Understanding. 
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CJOd's Preserving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation, or to his creating 
those things out of nothing at each moment of their existence. 334 
Moreover, 
It will follow from what has been observed, that God's upholding created substance, or causing its 
existence in each successive moment is altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing, 
as each moment. 335 
This is compatible with (0) and (C3'). This is a constitution which depends entirely upon the 
will of God, and is therefore arbitrary (viz. the divine arbitrium, once again. ) 
Edwards even goes as far as to say that, 
All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning-, renewed every 
moment, as the colour of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them; and all is 
constantly proceeding from God, as fight from the sun. 
In addition, 
It appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created 
objects, existing at different times, but what depends on God's sovereign constitution... for it appears, that 
336 
a divine constitution is the thing which makes truth, in affairs of this nature. 
This goes beyond (0), towards endorsing a position similar to (C4)-(C7). For if all created 
bodies are in a constant state of flux, and are constantly being renewed by God, then Edwards is 
certainly subscribing to a strong continuous creation doctrine. But if in addition to this, God 
ordains the truth of the appearance of persistence through time for any concrete particular, then 
no thing actually does persist, or is able to act as an agent in any respect, unless God makes this 
the 'truth' of the matter. The divine constitution ordains it all. This goes a considerable way 
towards demonstrating that Edwards was an occasionalist. The clincher is that Edwards' view of 
causation in FOW denies that a cause is ontologically more than an occasion: "nerefore I 
sometimes use the word "cause, " in this inquiry [FO91, to signify ... any antecedent with which 
333 YE3: 3 99. 
334 YE 3: 40 1, author's emphasis. 
335 YE3: 402, author's emphasis. 
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a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which 
affirms that event is true'. But the relation that exists between the antecedent and its consequent 
'is perhaps rather an occasion than a cause, most properly speaking. 5337 Elsewhere, Edwards 
denies that any contingent thing can exist for long enough to act upon a contiguous object as a 
cause. This point (iterated in the last chapter) is reiterated in Miscellan 267, where Edwards y 
says, 'The mere exertion of a new thought is a certain proof of a God. For certainly there is 
something that immediately produces and upholds that thought; here is a new thing, and there is 
a necessity of a cause. It is not antecedent thoughts, for they are vanished and gone; they are 
past, and what is past is not. P338 
Edwards does not get much clearer than this on the sub ect of the nature of causation. However j :1 
this seems to provide good evidence that Edwards endorsed a version of occasionalism, at least 
in OS coupled with FOW. But there is one other Miscellany, No. 1263, where Edwards takes up 
this theme, which needs to be examined to establish this position. 
(6: 3) The problem with Miscellany 1263 
In turning to Miscellan 1263, we come to one of the disputed passages that Sang Lee bases his y 
argument upon in his monograph on Edwards' philosophical theology. "9 Lee uses several key 
passages from the Miscellanies in the course of his argument for a dispositional Edwardsian 
ontology, '40 but his criticisms of those who believe Edwards endorses occasionalism depend for 
much of their argumentative force, upon his reading of Miscellany 1263. In that Miscellany, 
Edwards appears to believe that God creates 'arbitrarily', and then conserves his creation in an 
occasionalistic manner, but according to established physical laws. This sounds both confused 
and confusing. If this is Edwards' view, (and on the basis of the argument mounted thus far, that 
has to be quite a sizable conditional), then it needs investigation, since this new perspective 
would tend to throw much of what has been developed thus far into disarray. 
The context of Edwards' words in Miscellan 1263 seems to be the (then) recent developments y 
on aspects of the doctrines of creation and conservation with which he wished to take issue. 
Edwards recognized that the discoveries of 'natural philosophy' had meant that there were 
many who were willing to allow, 'a present, continuing, immediate operation of God on the 
336 YE3: 404. A similar reading of OS IV: 111 can be found in Paul Helm's Faith and Understanding, 
chapter 7. 
337 YEJ: 180-181. 
338 YE. 13: 373. 
339 The Philosophical Theology ofJonathan Edwards. 
340 in particular, lie uses Miscellanýy 241 to ground his dispositional reading of Edwards, and several 
exerpts from Edwards' early philosophy, in particular Edwards' OfA toms and The Mind, in YE6. 
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creation 34' But, these thinkers claimed that God operates in his immediate conservation of the 
world according to fixed laws, laws which he himself determined from the beginning of 
creation, and according to which he must act in conservation, 
So that, though they allow an immediate divine operation in those days, yet they suppose it is [now] 
limited by what we call laws of nature, and seem averse to allow an arbitrary operation to be continued or 
even to be needed in these days. 342 
Edwards comments on this, 
But I desire that it may be well considered whether there be any reason for this. For of the two kinds of 
divine operation, viz., that which is arbitrary and that which is limited by fixed laws, the former, viz., 
arbitrary, is the first and foundation of the other and that which all divine operation must be finally 
resolved into, and which all events and divine effects whatsoever primarily depend upon. Even the fixing 
of the method and rules of the other kind of operation is an instance of arbitnary operation. When I speak 
of arbitrary operation, I don't mean arbitrary in opposition to an operation directed by wisdom, but only 
in opposition to an operation confined to, and limited by, those fixed establishments and laws commonly 
called the laws of nature. 343 
Edwards then goes on to use this distinction between what he calls a 'natural operation' and an 
'arbitrary operation' to show that arbitrary operations are more glorifying to God, since God is 
an arbitrary being (that is, one who acts according to his own will and is not subject to the 
constraints of physical laws). So, the more nearly arbitrary a particular operation is, the more 
closely it resembles the activity of God because such an operation does not utilize physical 
laws. In this respect arbitrary operations are more glorifýýing to God than natural operations. He 
goes on to say that after creation (an arbitrary operation), God conserves the world in being in 
secondary operations which make use of physical laws such as resistance and attraction (a 
natural operation) brought into being at creation: 'in these secondary operations ... some use was 
made of laws of nature before established, such, at least, as the laws of resistance and attraction 
341 Miscellany 1263 in Harvey G. Townsend (ed. ), The Philosophy ofJonathan Edwardsfrom His Private 
Notebooks (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1955), p. 185. It is not clear whom Edwards had in 
mind, though these views were being discussed in continental post-Cartesian philosophy at the time. See 
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or adhesion ... that are essential to the very 
being of matter, for the very solidity of the particles 
of matter consists in them'. 344 
Such sentiments do not sit easily with what has been said previously in this thesis. Indeed, 
interpreters of Edwards who have followed Sang Lee's treatment of Edwards' ontology have 
tended to take up such aspects of Edwardsian thinking for the development of an Edwardsian 
'dispositional ontology'. According to this view of Edwards, 'Being is, for Edwards, essentially 
a network of laws that prescribe certain actions and events to take place on specified occasions. 
These laws are active and purposive tendencies, or dispositions, that automatically come into 
345 exertion" when the specified circumstances are met . 
In regard to the use Edwards makes of laws of nature in his metaphysics, Lee says, 
A law of nature, as Edwards uses the term, is a dispositional force or a habit with a mode of reality apart 
from its exercises. Thus, when God causes resistance, God follows the law that God had fixed: that a 
I particular sort of resisting occurs at a particular point in space at a particular time. To put it differently, a 
body is essentially and abidingly a disposition - to have a particular Idnd of resisting caused by God to 
occur at a parti ar space time. 346 
Our interest is not in the structure or detail of Lee's argument, or of any of those who have 
followed in his footsteps in the last few years, but in whether what Edwards says in Miscellany 
1263 is commensurate with the development of an occasionalism. Nevertheless, the fact that 
there has been a recent school of 'Edwardsian' thought, which has taken what Edwards says in 
places like Miscellany 1263 347 as an endorsement of some kind of 'modified' occasionalism, 348 
344 Ibid. 
345Anri Morimoto, Jonathan Edwards and the Catholic Vision of Salvation (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1995), p. 6. His book is a development out of Lee's work. 
346 Lee, "Edwards on God and Nature: Resources for Contemporary Theology" in Edwards in Our Time, 
(eds. ) Sang Hyun Lee and Allen C. Guelzo (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 1544. 
347 And elsewhere: see YE& 391, where Edwards says in a plan for "Subjects to be treated in a treatise on 
the Nfind7' (never written), 'how it is laws that constitute all permanent being in created things, both 
corporeal and spiritual. ' As we shall see, this too can be understood from within the occasionalistic 
framework of Edwards'mature thought. 
348 it is not clear how a 'modified' occasionalism, such as Lee and his disciples advocate, can be made to 
work. Since occasionalism means that there are no causal agents apart from God, and that all things are 
recreated at each time index, one is at a loss to know how Lee's interpretation of Edwards remains within 
the bounds of Edwards' avowed occasionalism. Nor does Lee himself appear to be consistent on this 
point. In The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, chapter III Lee says, 'it is God who 
constantly preserves the established general laws and causes actual existences according to those laws. 
But it is not a continual creatio ex nihilo in a simple sense. The divinely established general laws are 
given a permanence, and are in a sense not created ex nihilo every moment. Edwards' view is an 
occasionalism only in the sense that God moves the world from virtuality to fidl actuality every moment 
through an immediate exercise of his power. Edwards' view in not an unqualified occasionalist position, 
however, since the world has an abiding realism in a virtual mode, p. 63. But in the following chapter, he 
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is worth bearing in mind. If Edwards does develop a consistent occasionalism, one which is 
commensurate with a form of temporal parts doctrine, then a Lee-style reading of Edwards is in 
trouble, at least with respect to their understanding of the occasionalistic aspects of Edwards' 
ontology. (And, of course, the same could be said by Lee, vice versa. ) 
Let us begin to examine this problem in Miscellany 1263 in more detail. The argument Edwards 
presents here could be construed in three forms. In each proposition, where a word is enclosed 
in speech marks, it indicates a peculiar understanding of that term: 
(Al) God creates 'arbitrarily' (i. e. according to his will and fiat), and conservation is God's 
acting at each successive moment mediately through physical laws he has established. 
(A2) God creates 'arbitrarily' (i. e. according to his will and fiat), and all conservation takes 
place according to the immediate occasions of God's activity coupled with 'physical laws' 
themselves instigated by divine fiat at the point of actualization, which persist through time 
I alongside the creation, and are co-dependent with creation upon God. 
(M) God creates 'arbitrarily' (i. e. according to his will and fiat), and conservation is an illusion: 
God recreates all things ex nihilo each moment, including the 'laws' themselves, which appear 
to be physical constants at each index merely because God 'arbitrarily' deigns that they operate 
in such a fashion. 
These three propositions would need to be more rigorously articulated if they were to stand as 
they are, but they will not need to. It is sufficient that they capture the essence of the three 
possible understandings of this Miscellany. 
They are organized in order of strength. (Al) is the weakest reading, which is an 
uncontroversial version of creation and conservation as two distinguishable phases in God's 
activity (as per (C 1)&((C2) v (C2')) - (A2) is the reading of Miscellany 1263 that 
best comports 
with Sang Lee's understanding of Edwards' ontology. However, it is not quite the same as 
Lee's view. Lee appears to want to preserve some kind of 'occasionalism' in his dispositional 
ontology (how that might be achieved is less clear). 49With this in mind, (A2) could be made 
more explicitly Lee-like with an additional premise to that effect. At the very least it could form 
the basis of a Lee-type reading of Edwards' ontology, which is sufficient to present purposes. 
say, s, 'Edwards avoids deism as well as occasionalism. God's direct involvement [in the world] precludes 
deism, and Edwards avoids occasionatism because God's continuous creative activity is in accordance 
, vith his preestablished and abiding 
laws', p. 107. 
349 in fact this sounds more like some form of concurrence, coupled with a continuous creation thesis, 
than occasionalism. 
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(A3) is, or could be understood to be, consistent with the reading of Edwards as an 
occasionalist. It is also the strongest of the three versions of his argument from Miscellany 
1263. Its claim for the physical laws Edwards makes such use of in his 'natural operations', is 
that these are themselves dependent upon the 'arbitrary operations'. This obtains in such a way 
that, although they can be distinguished for the purposes of argument, they are ontologically 
indistinguishable in terms of their immediate and constant dependence upon divine fiat for 
continued existence ex nihilol as is the case in occasionalism. So, on (A3) the use of 'laws' in 
Miscellany 1263 serves merely an heuristic and descriptive purpose. It has no ontological 
payload (there are no laws that persist through time independent of divine fiat). 350 Natural 
operations depend immediately upon arbitrary operations for their continued existence, and 
arbitrary operations are themselves the products of God's continued creation of the cosmos out 
of nothing, the distinction between arbitrary and natural operations of divine power serve 
merely to describe different levels of operation within the immediate dependence upon God of 
all created things, concomitant with Edwards' occasionalism. In short, for ontological purposes, 
both natural and arbitrary operations of God in 'conservation' are aspects of his moment-by- 
moment re-creation of the world out of nothing. In reality, nothing is conserved, everything is 
re-created at each moment by divine flat, and even natural operations are the occasions of God's 
actions. 
The problem of adjudicating between these three version of the argument of Miscellany 1263 is 
that all three readings appear to have some textual support in what Edwards says (at least, as far 
as this particular Miscellany goes). At times he speaks as if physical laws in their natural 
operations are somehow entirely separate secondary causes that persist through time once they 
have been created, as physical constants, as per (Al). "' At other times in the Miscellan , 
he y 
writes as if he envisages some form of (A2). And at still other points, what he says sounds like 
the developed occasionalism of OS, reflected in (A3). 352 It appears that it is precisely this 
plasticity in Edwards' thought that has led Lee astray. 
That said, I do not propose to adjudicate this matter at all. It is sufficient for our discussion that 
(A3) be both commensurate with the argument for Edwards' occasionalism mounted thus far, 
and that (A3) is a legitimate reading of this Miscellany, such that it can be understood in a way 
which does not conflict with the mature Edwards in OS. To make this reading of the Miscellany 
clear, consider the following argument, where WI refers to a particular world (which happens to 
be the actual world) along (A3) lines: 
350 As is Edwards use of 'imputation' as we shaH see in due course. 
351 Townsend, The PhilosophY ofJonathan Ftdwards, p. 188. 
352 Ibid. p. 185. 
172 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(1) God creates WI 
(2) In actualizing (1), God inaugurates a set of physical laws, L which governs Wl. This could 
mean: 
(3) God conserves WI according to L (strong conservation thesis), or 
(Y) God "occasionalistically' conserves Wl according to L (which persist through spacetime), 
or 
(3 ") God occasionalistically 'conserves' WI commensurate with (the appearance of) L. 
(3") would better accord with Edwards' strong argument in OS outlined previously. But from 
Miscellany 1263 (3), (3) and (3") seem plausible renderings of Edwards' thinking (alongside 
those outlined in (AI) and (A2)). Let us assume that (3") is a legitimate rendering of the 
Miscellany 1263 argument, since it better accords with Edwards' argument In OS previously 
I outlined. I take it to be a fairly uncontroversial presupposition in textual scholarship (of 
whatever kind) that, ceteris patibus, where an author is unclear, their work should be compared 
with other instances where they speak of the same issues with greater clarity. If so, it would 
V- follow that, 
(4) The occasionalistic 'conservation' of (3") means that God recreates WI ex nihilo at each 
successive time index (tl... tn), but in such a way as to conform (or, more precisely, appear to 
confonn) to L at each index. 
Clearly, if 'conservation' here refers to an occasionalistic constant re-creation ex nihilo, then 
strictly speaking, any set of laws pertaining to WI is itself arbitrary and 'persists' only in such a 
way that God's creation appears to exhibit consistency at different time indexes. (That is, so that 
WI does not at one moment work according to a strong law of gravity and the next a weak law, 
or whatever. ) 
So. if Dean throws a ball at tI and at Q it is caught by Trevor as it falls to the ground, according 
to the law of gravity at work in WI, this is because God re-creates Dean, Trevor and the ball in 
their respective relations and states of afthirs at both time indexes. This means that the illusion 
of physically persisting laws is preserved throughout the throwing and catching of the ball. Or, 
to return to the Edwardsian nomenclature of Miscellany 1263, for the purposes of natural and 
arbitrary operations, natural operations appear to persist through time (to any person who 
(apparently) persists through a particular period and observes Trevor and Dean's ball game). 
But in point of ontological fact, any such natural operations are entirely dependent upon 
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arbitrary operations at every time slice in that period. To recapitulate: on the (A3) and (3") 
combination, natural and arbitrary operations merely describe different levels of divine activity 
in the ontology of Edwardsian occasionalism. Both are immediately dependent upon God's 
constant re-creation ex nihilo, and are, ultimately, divine actions. 
Consequently, on at least one plausible reading of Miscellany 1263, Edwards' understanding of 
the role and function of what appear to be 'physical laws' is compatible with occasionalism, 
such as he develops elsewhere in OS and FOW. That this can be derived from the text of 
Miscellany 1263, and that this is a plausible understanding of what Edwards says there (as well 
as elsewhere), are all that needs to be satisfied, pace Lee, for the argument to proceed. 
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(7) Adversus Edwards: Chisholm and the ontology of imputation 
Chapters (7)-(9) set out three criticisms which have been brought against Edwards' argument 
for imputation. They all deal with different aspects of the metaphysics which ground his 
theological re-reading of the doctrine. Roderick Chisholm has criticized the ontology of 
Edwards' doctrine of imputation; William Wainwright has called attention to problems in his 
understanding of inherited guilt; and Philip Quinn has outlined central and apparently 
insurmountable problems in Edwards' occasionalism with regard to persistence-through-time. 
These critiques have been organized in order of strength, beginning with the weakest of the 
three. The first two arguments can be combated by Edwards, but the third appears to undermine 
Edwards' position, which can only be redeemed by excising his occasionalism from his doctrine 
of temporal parts. "' 
(7: 1) Chisholm's argument 
Helm claims that the mistaken view of Edwards outlined at the end of chapter 5, can be found in 
Roderick Chisholm's Person and Object where he states that Edwards, 
appealed to temporal parts to show that it is as just to attribute Adam's sins to you and me now as it is to 
attribute any other past sins to you and me now. 
Iff- 
He goes on to outline how Edwards substantiates this, 
God, according to Jonathan Edwards, can contemplate a collection of objects existing at different times 
and 'treat them as one. ' He can take a collection of various individuals existing at different times and 
think of them as all constituting a single individual. Edwards thus appeals to a doctrine of truth by divine 
convention; he says that God 'makes truth in affairs of this nature'. God could regard temporally scattered 
individuals - you this year, me last year, and the vice-president the year before that - as comprising a 
single individual. And then he could justly punish you this year and me last year for the sins that the vice- 
354 
president committed the year before that . 
353 The reader may be wondering how Edwards accounts for the imputation of Christ's righteousness, 
given the argument for the imputation of sin on a doctrine of temporal parts, outlined thus far. For a brief 
summary of Edwards' position on this related issue, see Appendix A. 
354 Person and Object, p. 138-9, partially cited in Helm, Faith and Understanding, p. 170, (author's own 
emphasis. ) This discussion is in Appendix A of Person and Object, where Chisholm seeks to deal with 
possible rejoinders to his own doctrine of identity-through-time, which he outlines in chapter III of the 
book. ffis position there is akin to the endurantist view outlined above. The appendix is an attack on 
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However, this argument appears to be slightly different from the one that Helm criticizes, since 
Chisholm is citing temporally scattered individual humans rather than arbitrarily chosen items 
with no specific genus. As was pointed out in chapter 5, Helm mistakenly believes Edwards' 
notion of an 'arbitrary' unity refers to individuals that share significant (moral) properties: 
Edwards did not hold that just any set of things whatsoever could, by the divine will, be constituted into a 
unity ... the phrase 'treats them as one' may suggest either whimsy or even mindless tyranny, but Edwards 
makes clear the sense in which he intends his readers to take this phrase by adding that God can only treat 
new effects as one 'by communicating to them like properties, relations and circumstances'; in the case of 
Adam and his posterity, the properties include significant moral properties. 355 
We have already examined reasons why this understanding of the arbitrariness problem in 
Edwards' argument for imputation is defective. In any case, even if Helm were right about 
Edwards' 'arbitrary' unity, his point actually obtains in the case of Chisholm's example, since 
the individuals concerned are all human, as is the unity constituted by Adam and his posterity. 
So Helm's criticism appears to be wide of the mark even if it a correct understanding of the 
arbitrariness problem. 
Nevertheless, Chisholm's argument raises an important question for Edwards' perdurantism 
regarding the precise nature of the unity constituted by God between Adam and his progeny. 
The question is this: if God can take Adam and his posterity and treat them as one although 
they are temporally scattered individuals, then what prevents him ftom doing so with any set of 
temporally scattered individuals? That is, what gives Adam-plus-progeny any greater 
ontological privilege than, say, the constituting of an object made up of you this year, me last 
year and the vice-president the year before? Why should Adam's sin be imputed to me rather 
than, say, those of the vice-president, or someone else? 116 
Clearly the basic point around which these related issues cluster involves the apparently 
'arbitrary' nature of Edwards' perdurantist argument. To re-cap, this was summarized by Helm 
in chapter 5 as follows, 
potential reformulations of perdurantisn-ý particularly the doctrine of temporal parts as found in Edwards 
(OS) and Quine (From a Logical Point of View). 
355 Heim, Faith and Understanding, p. 171. 
356 A line of argument similar in some respects to Chishohn's, but coming firom within Reformed 
Theology, is mounted against Edwards' position by Robert L. Dabney in his Lectures in Systematic 
TheoloSov, pp. 338-339. Unlike Chisholm, he is keen to defend a form of federalist imputation against 
theological detractors 'Pelogians and Skeptics', but fmds Edwards' doctrine of temporal parts unpalatable 
as a means to that end. His main contention appears to be that Edwards' view is counterintuitive and 
therefore improbable. He says, 'I will venture the opinion that no man, not Edwards himself, ever 
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(1) The identity of a contingent individual depends entirely upon the arbitrary will of God. 
(2) Therefore there is no 'natural' identity through time of anything. 
(3) Therefore, it is possible that Adam and his posterity be, for certain purposes, constituted a 
unity by God. 
(4) God has in fact constituted a unity between Adam and his posterity, as shown in Scripture, 
and by the consent we give to the sin of Adam. 
(5) Therefore, the objection that the divinely-constituted unity between Adam and his posterity 
contradicts the true nature of things is invalid. 
The offending, apparently 'arbitrary' nature of Edwards' perdurantism can be seen in premise 
(1) above. But even if Chisholm is willing to allow (1) with the proviso that 'arbitrary' is being 
used to refer to the wise ordering of God according to his divine justice, he can still ask whether 
this ordering is not merely an ontological fiction (a development out of (2) and (3)). And more 
broadly, he may ask whether on the Edwardsian scheme, such ordering of personal identity 
along perdurantist lines does not lead to personal identity being a similar, grander ontological, 
fiction, a fiction maintained simply by God's continued maintenance of it in his mind's eye (for 
want of a better, less anthropomorphic expression. ) 
All this provides an opportunity to elucidate the Edwardsian argument for imputation, and in the 
process point out why Chisholm is wrong. We pick up from where Helm left off- 
(6) The unity between Adam and his posterity is an expression of the divine will, wisdom and 
justice. 
(7) God may constitute a unity where there are temporally scattered concrete individuals who 
have communicated to them like properties, relations and circumstances by God. 357 
To this extent, Edwards is still following a broadly Lockean scheme, inasmuch as where two 
things share personal identity, 
satisfied himself, by this argument that his being had not a true, intrinsic continuity, and a real, necessary 
identity, in itself ' (p. 339. ) He fails to adequately establish this crude endurantism beyond this assertion. 
... in the terms of the previous discussion of endurantism. and perdurantism, this proposition is an 
Edwardsian take on the problem of Athanasius-type objects (see chapter 5). Like Athanasius, this 
example will require some form of ontological synthesis in the background to its occasionalist 
(perdurantism'. 
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A in 1998 and B in 1999 have a spatio-temporaffy continuous history which links them at 
their respective time indexes, 
(assuming, for the sake of simplicity that this history is uninterrupted). But as we have had 
cause to note earlier in the argument, according to (1) and (2) there is no 'natural' identity 
through time in the endurantist fashion that Locke would have understood it. Tbus, according to 
Edwards' perdurantism expressed in (2), (8) is subsumed under the immediate constitution of 
God, qua (1). 
Like Locke, Edwards uses the notion of an organic unity as a crucial constituent in the identity 
of a thing, such as a plant, whose identity can be traced through successive slices and stages of 
its existence and development. Thus Locke states that, 
being then one Plant, which has such an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one 
I Common Life, it continues to be the same Plant as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that life be 
conmunicated. to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant, in a like continued 
358 Organization, confonnable to that sort of Plants. 
And Edwards, using a similarly organic analogy asks, 
who can determine, that the Author of nature might not if it had pleased him, have established such a 
union between the root and the branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral 
whole; so that by the law of union, there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and that the 
heart of every branch should at the same moment participate with the heart in the root, be conformed to it 
and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking of its state, as a part of the 
same thing? Why n-dght not God, if he had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, an union of 
the various parts of such a moral whole, as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, 
according to his sovereign pleasure? And if he might by his sovereign constitution, have established such 
an union of the various branches of mankind, when existing in different places, I don't see why he might 
not also do the same, though they exist in different times. 359 
Edwards understand this union along perdurantist lines. Thus moving from a perdurantist 
account of the persisting individual spacetime worm, Edwards claims that as a plant grows but 
is one individual aggregate of its temporal parts, so Adam and his progeny are an aggregate of 
temporal parts viewed as such by the ordination of God. There is the same spatial and temporal 
358 Locke Essqv, 11: XXVH: 4, p. 331 Nidditch edition, cited in Helm, Faith an Understanding, p. 172. 
359 YE3: 405-406, n. 6. 
178 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
continuity through a succession of moments from Adam to all his progeny in a sequence of 
contiguous slices, such that identity can be traced along these lines. '60 But this identity does not 
involve a diachronic causal nexus. Instead it involves a rather specialized form of what can be 
traced from Adam's progeny to back to Adam himself. None of these parts cause the existence 
of the next according to Edwards' occasionalistic conservation argument, but God takes each 
temporal slice together with the previous one in a nexus existing in his mind, thereby 
constituting a new metaphysical unity which is ontologically real. Adam and his progeny in 
perdurantist terms are, as we have already noted, as real a spacetime worm as any other number 
of gerrymandered metaphysically real constructs are, a point echoed by Edwards in this 
passage. 
But this only raises Chisholm's question once again: why should any unity that God establishes 
have a 'sufficient qualitative identity' for God to treat them as one, and what does such identity 
I consist in? If Adam and his posterity are, on a perdurantist account of persistence through time, 
as real as any other hunk of matter, why should God privilege certain hunks over others? 
We have already seen that Chisholm is right to point out that the constitution of Adam and his 
posterity as a unity is arbitrary, and that Edwards' argument suffers from the arbitrariness 
problem. This means that those properties communicated to different objects for the purposes of 
constituting them a unity in imputation (qua (7)), are themselves arbitrarily constructed by God. 
There are no metaphysical facts to which Edwards can appeal at this point (nor does he do so, as 
Helm claims). In other words, the constitution of certain objects as a unity does not depend on 
them sharing certain properties which means God may treat them as one. God may treat Adam 
and his posterity as one because they share certain properties, which make such an arrangement 
appear more metaphysically viable than other gerrymandered objects without such common 
properties (the biscuit-fossil-locomotive example, say). But he need not do so, since for 
Edwards, the attribution of these properties is due simply to divine convention, 
For if same consciousness be one thing necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's 
sovereign constitution, it will stiff follow, that personal identity depends on God's sovereign constitution. 
And, 
360TIIiS could be understood in terms of DNA (as per the plant analogy), but it could also be understood 
more general in ternis of the 'like properties, relations and circumstances' that Heim cites. 
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When I call this an arbitrary constitution, I Mean, that it is a constitution which depends on nothing but 
the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing but the divine wisdom. In this sense, the whole 
course of nature, with all that belongs to it all its laws and methods, and constancy and regularity, 
continuance and proceeding, is an arbitrary constitution. 361 
And this,, of course, is Chisholm's point. The fact that God does constitute Adam and his 
posterity a unity is simply arbitrary. 
However, as was pointed out at the end of chapter 5, Edwards qua perdurantist need not 
subscribe to a view of gerrymandered objects as all deserving the same status. It does not follow 
that because Edwards is a perdurantist, he must endorse a view of ontological synthesis that 
means all hunks of matter, however gerrymandered, are as 'natural' as each other. It may be that 
God deems it more 'natural' or more 'suitable to his purposes' to divide the world in certain 
ways at the level of objects, and perhaps of properties too (as (7) suggests). It may also be that 
the constitution of Adam and his posterity as a unity is one such 'fitting' object, whereas the 
biscuit-fossil-locomotive is not. 362 This does not mitigate the arbitrary nature of the divine 
constitution of things. But it does mean that there may be certain ways of carving up matter 
which are more fitting for divine purposes, and therefore privileged in a way that other, equally 
arbitrary objects like the biscuit-fossil-locomotive are not. God need not, on Edwards' scheme, 
act in an egalitarian way towards every hunk of matter. 
This needs some further development. But before turning to consider how Edwards might 
develop this line of response to Chisholm's attack, we need to dispose of another, related 
problem. The account thus far still leaves open the question raised by Chisholm's attack, to do 
with the kind of relation established by God in the unity instituted between Adam and his 
posterity for imputation. What sort of relation does Edwards have in mind and how does it 
work? 
Helm, in an (as yet) unpublished paper on the subject, has pointed out a helpful category that 
may be applied at this point contra Chisholm (he himself does not make the connection with 
363 
Chisholm in the course of the argument). The unity instituted by God between Adam and 
humanity means that each individual can be described as 'genidentical', that is, made identical 
with some non-identical part in a chain that goes back to Adam. So Dean at Q and Wayne at tI 
are genidentical with Dean at tI and Wayne at t-1 going all the way back to Adam. However, 
361 YE3: 399 and 403-404. See also 405. Author's emphasis. 
362 Discussion of so-called 'natural objects' and whether there are objects which are more natural, than 
others, in a perdurantist world, can be found in Katherine Hawley's How Things Persist pp. 90 ff. 
363 Helm, "A Forensic Dilemma: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on Personal Identity", p. 17 ff. In 
Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming. ) 
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the use of genidentity here is peculiar since, as has already been pointed out, in Edwards' 
occasionalistic perdurantism, it cannot involve immanent causality in a densely ordered 
diachronic nexus. Instead, the causal agent is God alone. Consequently, Wayne at tl is made 
one with Adam (by God) via Wayne at t- I and so on. That is, Wayne (and Dean) are made one 
with Adam via an immediate activity of God who views all of the spacetime worm Wayne and 
all of Wayne's ancestors going back to Adam as part of an organic whole, just as a plant 
existing in seed form and at its full flowering across a temporal duration is a spacetime worm all 
of whose temporal parts make up one plant, and all of whose branches and chloroplasts are parts 
of a spacetime worm. 
The difference, in Adam and his progeny, are that they are temporally dispersed over a much 
greater area. But, as Edwards points out, this is merely a quantitative, rather than qualitative 
distinction. Once the perdurantist ontology has been granted and amalgamated with Edwardsian 
immediacy in his occasionalism, the whole fits together and Adam and his posterity can be 
treated as a unity by God precisely because they actually are such a unity in the mind of God. 
And, for Edwards the idealist, nothing could be more ontologically real than that. But this 
notion of being 'made one' that Edwards uses is not a mere conventionalism. It really is the way 
things are, according to Edwards. This unity in the mind of God is ontologically real. 
A second point made by Heim in his paper, is that the relation which exists between Adam and 
his posterity is not transitive. He says, 'Adam has been made one with Peter at tI and Paul at t I, 
but it does not follow that Peter at tI and Paul at tI are identical with each other. Not strictly 
identical, and not genidentical either, because God has chosen not to communicate "like 
properties, relations and circumstances" to Paul at tI and Peter at tl. i 364 
We may pass over Helm's reference to 'like properties, relations and circumstances' . 
36' The 
important point that Helm touches upon here, is that in Edwards' argument, Adam and his 
progeny share a relation, namely, that Adam has been made one with his offspring. But this 
does not mean that any two or more of Adam's offspring are identical with each other simply 
because they both happen to share a relation of identity with Adam. That is, though Adam has 
been made identical with Dean at tI and Wayne at t2, this does not mean that Dean and Wayne 
at tl and Q are therefore themselves identical with each other. The relation at work in the 
spacetime aggregate that is Adam and his progeny is unidirectional. Simply because Adam is 
made one by God with both Wayne at t2 and Dean at t I, does not mean that Wayne at Q and 
364 Ibid., p. 17-18. 
365 1 have already dealt with the arbitrariness problem and Helm's misreading of it, at the end of chapter 
5. 
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Dean at tI are therefore made one with each other. They remain distinct for all other purposes 
other than the unity specifically constituted by God in imputation. 
But all this does not overcome the fundamental question of why God cannot impute the sin of 
one individual to another, or another group of individuals in a whimsical fashion. For if 
Edwards' occasionalistic perdurantism. leaves him entirely at the mercy of the divine ordering of 
temporal slices into a contiguous whole, and if on this basis God can, and has constituted a 
unity in Adam and his posterity, then why cannot God do the same with Chisholm's vice- 
president of yesteryear, me yesterday and you today? There appears to be no reason other than 
the divine will., since there is no secondary causation and no possibility of existence without the 
immediacy of divine intervention. And, on a perdurantist ontology, there is no metaphysical 
reason to deny Chisholm any gerrymandered aggregate of temporal slices he wishes to 
assemble. 
1 (7. - 2) Contra Chisholm: Edwards' 'federal' occasionalism 
I have already indicated that one line of response to this criticism might be to claim that all 
things simply have to rely upon the immediate conservation of God, and ordering according to 
his divine will. It could be argued that there is nothing about this that is incoherent, although it 
might smack of a voluntarism gone mad (more on this line of attack at the end of chapter 8). But 
perhaps one could argue that if God is the sole cause of all things, and if all things consist and 
have their being solely through the immediate conservation of God, then it is only a short step to 
claim that all things consist as they do because God has brought them into being in that way. If 
it is then asked, what makes the present constitution of things any more or less gerrymandered 
than any other possible state of affkirs, the answer would have to he (for Edwards at least) in the 
character of God. For Edwards, God constitutes things as they are because they best reflect his 
glory and his character, which being perfect and ordered, seeks to represent that order in 
creation. So, it is true for Edwards that God does do aU that he does for his own glory and 
according to his own divine precepts, which reflect his character as God. 
However, there may be another solution to this problem that utilizes elements of a more 
federalist interpretation of Edwards, which understands federalism in a way that compliments 
the argument of chapter 5. '66 C) 
366 Here as in chapters 4 and 5, what is being examined is that aspect of covenantal theology as it pertains 
to the federal imputation of Adamic sin. We have already argued that Edwards' theological views on 
imputation were more subtle than has often been acknowledged, and that he endorsed a modified, 
idiosyncratic view of imputation which was neither properly realist nor federalist. But it was federal in 
that it was firn-fly rooted in a foedal or covenantal theology. Edwards made the traditional Puritan 
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On this second line of exposition, Adam and his posterity constitute a unity unlike that offered 
by Chisholm because of Adam's unique position as the father of the race. And surely this is the 
point of Edwards' argument: that Adam and his posterity can be looked upon as such a unity 
because of Adam's unique position as the first human. Consequently, Adam's sin can be 
imputed to his posterity in a way that my sin cannot be imputed to, say, Dr. Crippen in the 
nineteenth century, or Prof. Hawking in the twenty-first century. As has already been pointed 
out in chapter 5, at the beginning of OS and subsequently at the beginning of his discussion of 
imputation, Edwards points out Adam's unique position as the father of humanity in a way 
which can only be construed as broadly 'federalist'. 367 But under the terms of Edwards' 
discussion of the union established by God in imputation found in his perdurantism, this 
'federalism' should be construed, not in the traditional Calvinistic nomenclature in which 
Edwards had been schooled, but under the terms and conditions of the occasionalism that he has 
set oUt. 36' This should not be taken to be a denial or modification of the overarching tenor of 
Edwards' Calvinism. It is simply to say that Edwards reconceived what that meant in terms of 
imputation, in ways that utilized the Early Enlightenment thinking of Locke and Malebranche. 
It is certainly the case that Edwards' theology had a place for federalism in his doctrine of the 
covenants, a fact that has been well documented in the recent literature . 
369But it is not the case 
distinction between the Covenant(s) of Redemption (God's eternal covenant with Christ to save 
humanity); Works (God's covenant with prelapsarian Adam); and Grace (Christ's covenant with his 
church to salvation. ) Carl Bogue's treatment of this theme in Edwards' theology has established that 
beyond reasonable doubt. See Jonathan Edwards and the Covenant of Grace (New Jersey: Mack, 1975), 
especially chapters 6-10. 
367 YE3: 259,260 and 389. This point has already been argued over at some length as the prolegomena to 
the present philosophical discussion in chapter 4 and 5.1 shall assume that the reader has understood the 
srificance of the flow of the argument up to this point to avoid unnecessary repetition. 3 3 Although, it must be admitted, there are times when Edwards does sound disconcertingly traditional, 
particularly in his early notebooks. See, for example, Miscellany 35, where he says, 'There have never 
been two covenants [viz. The covenant of works and grace], in strictness of speech, but only two ways 
constituted of performing this covenant: the first constituting Adam the representative andjederal head, 
and the second constituting Christ the federal head; the one a dead way, the other a living way, and an 
everlasting way. ' YE 13: 219, emphasis added. 
369 See, for example, I H. Gerstner's Rational Biblical Theology, Vol. II, chapter XVL especially p. 89; 
Carl Bogue's Jonathan Edwards and The Covenant of Grace, particularly chapter 10; Gerald R 
McDermott's One Holy and Happy Society, The Public Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 13-14; Anri Morimoto's study, Jonathan Edwards and 
the Catholic Vision of Salvation which suggests that Edwards' picture of justification reflects his 
commitment to federalism and covenantal theology, (pp. 77-8); Cherry's The Theology of Jonathan 
Edwards, chapter VII; and Stout's chapter, "The Puritans and Edwards" in Hatch and Stout (eds. ), 
Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience. There, on p. 143, he says Edwards, 'was every bit the 
federal theologian that his Puritan predecessors were. ' And, on p. 157, 'The federal covenant - unlike 
questions of epistemology, psychology, and moral philosophy - was not a philosophical problem for 
Edwards, but part of the taken-for-granted reality in which New England society grew and took shape. In 
fact, no eighteenth century established minister dared to deny the federal covenant and New England's 
attendant identity as a special people with a messianic destiny. ' 
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that Edwards was simply reiterating a standard position on federalism (as we have already had 
cause to note). His theory of imputation is ample evidence of this. Edwards was concerned to 
vindicate the inviolability of God's nature in imputing Adam's sin to his posterity, and to do 
this he utilized a perspective which diverged from traditional federalism in his conception of the 
unity established by God. 
So to return to Chisholm's point with this in mind: the significant difference between Adam and 
the vice-president, or, indeed any other individual we care to name, is that no other human 
could take Adam's place in the divinely instituted perdurantist unity without taking on his role 
as homo p? lmus. 
Chisholm could seek to buttress his argument with the claim that Adam's place as father of the 
race is purely an arbitrary one, and that any individual could have been that person. And 
although that is true, and God could have constituted Dr. Crippen (or the Vice-President) as 
I father of the human race in a counterfactual Garden of Eden, such a state of affiLirs has not 
obtained. And if it had, the result would, according to Edwards, have had the same outcome 
viz., the fall, and thence the same for the 'arbitrarily' constituted unity of Crippen and his 
posterity. Crippen would have fallen just as Adam did (though perhaps not at the same time or 
place, or even for the same reason), and God would still be able to constitute the conjunction of 
Crippen and his posterity a unity, and impute original sin to his posterity accordingly. 
In other words, the problem is not with the 'arbitrary' nature of the divinely constituted unity 
between the first human and their progeny (whoever that first human actually was). 'ne 
problem actually lies in the relation that exists in the mind of God between the father of 
humanity and their progeny. Adam's importance is in the place that he held in the mind of God, 
as the father of humanity, not in the fact that he happened to be called Adam. '70 God could have 
All this stands in stark contrast to the weight of thinking in the mid-twentieth Century, when Perry Miller 
dismissed anything covenantal in Edwards' theology. This was followed up in the work of (amongst 
others) Peter De Jong in The Covenant Idea in New England Theology, 1620-1847 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1945), where, as Gerstner points out, 'De Jong in his Covenant Idea made a mountain out of 
Miller's relative mole hill. He found Edwards to be the chief underminer of New England covenant 
theology' (Rational Biblical Theologýv, Vol, U p. 85. ) Gerstner's indictment of a number of Edwardsian 
scholars on this score, including Cherry (! ), is worth noting. He seems to view it as a subdivision of the 
larger debate on the legitimacy of doctrinal development in Calvinisin. This debate appears to have been 
resolved in recent scholarship in favour of doctrinal development from Calvin onwards (and, for our 
purposes, of Edwards in particular), contrary to the work of those, like Miller (in the context of Edwards) 
and R. T. Kendall (in the context of Calvin), who believed in a sharp disjunction between Calvin and his 
successors, especially after Beza. For a critical comment on Kendall's thesis Calvin and English 
Calvinisni to 1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) in this regard, see Helm, Calvin and the 
Calvinists (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1982. ) 
370 Clearly the biblical creation and fall narratives in Genesis 1-3 intend the reader to understand that 
there is something important about the name, 'Adam' in its etymological identification with the earth 
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constituted that unit differently so that Crippen, or anyone else held that position. The net result 
viz. the fall would have been the same given Edwards' belief that the fall happened as a result 
of God's withholding confirming grace from Adam. 
So whether the federal head is Adam or Crippen, or the Vice-President, the issue remains the 
same: that God constitutes tile homo primus and his progeny a unity for the sake of the 
imputation of sin. And he treats Adam and his progeny as one unity, privileging it above other, 
gerrymandered unities, because this unity comports with his design in creation and redemption. 
This is an arbitrary decision. In that respect, Chisholm is correct. But it is based upon a 
relationship that God specifically constitutes with regard to humanity, a relation which is rooted 
in an ontological link which has been established by divine fiat between Adam and his progeny. 
Such a link cannot be carried over to Chisholm's argument, since it is peculiar to'the theological 
context for which it was instituted (the imputation of sin. ) Hence, although Chisholm is right in 
his accusation of arbitrariness, he is wrong to think this commits Edwards to the belief that just 
I any old conjunction of matter is as fitting for the purpose of imputation, as any other. Chisholm 
and Helm overlook the importance in Edwards' scheme, of a non-egalitarian carving up of 
matter. God privileges certain objects over others, not because they are more C natural' but 
because they are more to the divine purpose. And since God has constituted Adam as homo 
primus, it is simply not the case that the sin of any person, at any time, can be imputed to 
anyone else. That could have been the case (the arbitrariness element). God could have 
constituted matter this way. But he does not do so, because it does not suit the purposes of 
divine wisdom to order things so. 
This line of defence need not be in conflict with what was said under the rubric of the 
theological pedigree of Edwards' views on original sin viz. his significant modification in parts 
of the federalism of the Reformed tradition (chapter 5 above). The point there was that Edwards 
withheld from endorsing the traditional Reformed position as a complete explanation of the 
formal cause of the imputation of original sin. This he does, as has been evident from the 
argument thus far. But it is far from clear that he believed that there was no sense in which 
Adam's office as homo ptimus set him apart, so that the fate of his posterity lay in his own 
from which he is formed (and the concomitant literature this has spawned regarding the status of the 
supposed 'P' and 'J' accounts of creation in Genesis I and 2 respectively). So, for example, Westermann 
spends some time on this issue in his commentary, Genesis 1-11 (trans. ) II Scullion (NIUnneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1994), on pp. 35-38. Tliat aside, Adam's theological importance, especially from the 
Pauline perspective in the New Testament, is as the representative of humanity before God in his 
supralapsarian state (see, for example Romans 5 and 6 in this regard, and comments on this by, amongst 
others, Herman Ridderbos in Paul an Outline ofHis Theology, (trans. ) Richard John De Witt (Nfichigan: 
Eerdmans, 1975), pp. 61 and 97-8. ) It is this 'federal' strand of thinking that Edwards is drawing upon, 
and thus, it is Adam's office as honio primus which is crucial rather than the actual concrete individual 
Adam who contingently occupied this office in this world. 
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behaviour. And in this he could be seen to be developing a strand in Calvinian thinking that the 
later federalism was not fully cognizant of 
171 
Thus, Helm's analysis of Edwards presents a useful analysis of the nature of the occasionallstic 
structure of Edwards' perdurantism and the way in which God constitutes Adam and his 
posterity a unity. But, in his chapter on this subject in Faith and Understanding, he does not 
take seriously enough the federalist residue in Edwards' defence of original sin in general and in 
the development of his occasionalistic argument in particular, and as a result appears to have no 
response to Chisholm's argument. More seriously, he misrepresents Edward' argument on the 
question of arbitrariness, since there simply are no 'facts of the matter' apart from what God 
wills is the case. By drawing upon the federalist strand of Edwards' argument and the non- 
egalitarian nature of Edwards' perdurantism, Chisholm can be rebutted and Edwards' argument 
reinstated. '72 
(7. - 3) Expounding Edwards' 'perdurantist' occasionalism 
Earlier, in chapter 5, it was noted that perdurantists believe their ontology offers a rich means of 
ontological analysis and synthesis. In other words, there is a two-way traffic in the perdurantist 
ontology: from familiar commonsense objects to a conception of concrete individuals as a 
complex of temporal parts. In the examples utilized above, this direction of ontological traffic 
was exemplified by Dean, a concrete individual who, on the perdurantist ontology is an object 
whose parts extend across the length of a temporal continuum that he inhabits. Each index along 
that continuum represents a part of the whole object, and each part is as ontologically real as 
any other. So unlike endurantism, there are no ontologically privileged temporal slices that are 
371 See, for example David Weddle's article on Edwards, "Jonathan Edwards on Men and Trees, and the 
Problem of Solidarity" p. 162, note 15, where he points out that Calvin's rejection of the older, Traducian 
picture of the transmission of sin led him to espouse a version of transmission which sounds at points 
quite Edwardsian: 'For the contagion does not take its origin from the substance of the flesh or soul, but 
because it had been so ordained by God that the first man should at one and the same time have and lose, 
both for himself and for his descendants, the gifts that God had bestowed upon him. ' Institutes H; 1; 7, (p. 
250, Battles trans. ) Calvin also uses organic examples as metaphors for ft-ansmission. Like Edwards, he 
talks of 'rotten branches' coining forth from a rotten root, 'which transmitted their rottenness to the other 
twigs sprouting from them', ibid. But it was his more traditional definition of original sin which set the 
tone for later federal thinking: 'Original sin, therefore, seems to be a hereditary depravity and corruption 
of our nature, diffused into all parts of the soul, which first makes us liable to God's wrath, then also 
brings forth in us those works which scripture calls "works of the flesh" [Gal 5: 19]. And that is properly 
what Paul often calls sin. ' Institutes 11; 1; 8, p. 25 1. 
372 By way of an aside, this understanding of Edwards' view of imputation also silences theological 
detractors like Robert Dabney who claimed that, 'I will venture the opinion that no man, not even 
Edwards ifimself, ever satisfied himself, bv this argument, that his being had not a true, intrinsic 
continuity, and a real, necessary identity, in itself 'Lectures in Systematic Theology, p. 339. 
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real because present. This is part of perdurantist eternalism about time, and gives a rough 
description of ontological analysis. 
The opposite flow of ontological traffic in the perdurantist scheme, ontological synthesis, moves 
from a disparate conglomeration of temporal parts (including in many cases, parts of existing 
concrete individuals) to the postulation of objectively real material particulars which occupy a 
certain portion of filled spacetime. Such objects, uncovered through ontological synthesis, are a 
second kind of metaphysical object. In the examples used earlier, a paradigm of this method 
was postulated in the object which, following Loux, was cafled Athanasius. The perdurantist 
position at this point broadens its ontology to take in any number of objectively real material 
objects that occupy a region of spacetime that is filled with matter. These objects are real, 
inasmuch as they are parts of spacetime, which may be given metaphysical status, since on the 
perdurantist ontology spatial indexicals have no more privileged status than temporal parts. 
Both temporal and spatial parts can be understood in tenseless terms. Thus, spatial parts are 
subject to a similar kind of dissection from the perdurantist as temporal parts. Furthermore, the 
perdurantist is able to cut up the filled region of spacetime in any number of ways to postulate 
any number of ontologically real, material particulars. 
This application of ontological synthesis to things made up of disparate temporal and spatial 
parts like Athanasius, has an interesting application for Edwards' thinking. This can be divided 
into three aspects. First and foremost, it offers a weak perdurantist underpinning of the kind of 
Edwardsian argument that has been offered so far in light of the readings of Edwardsian 
perdurantism by Helm and Chisholm. Second, this process can be taken a stage further, offering 
a stronger perdurantist reading of Edwards' argument. Third, utilizing the occasionalistic aspect 
of Edwards' developed argument in OS, the occasionalism of Edwards' perdurantism can be 
drawn out. This third option represents the state of Edwards' mature thoughts on his ontology of 
imputation read through a perdurantist lens. The first two conclusions, whilst not explicitly 
endorsed by Edwards himself (that is, not in the nomenclature of perdurantism at least), may 
offer a account of imputation which avoids the problems that Edwards' peculiar brand of 
occasionalism throws up for his metaphysics, whilst remaining broadly Edwardsian in its aims 
and solution to the metaphysical obstacles thrown up by imputation. We shall see that there are 
strong reasons (regarding the coherence of the arguments in question), for thinking that if an 
Edwardsian understanding of imputation is to be endorsed, then a form of the strong or weak 
perdurantist argument is to be preferred to his occasionalistic development out of these. 
For the sake of simplicity of argument, let us assume that when perdurantism is referred to in 
what follows, this concept includes the following constituent parts, 
187 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(D 1) eternalism, comprising: 
(D I a) ontological analysis, 
(D I b) ontological synthesis, and 
(D2) that all concrete particulars are temporal aggregates who are four-dimensional spacetime 
worms 
A L, As a consequence of this simplified version of perdurantism, we may assume that any region of 
spacetime filled with matter can be delimited to pick out a material object (from (D 1) and 
(D I b)). Given this, there are grounds for utilizing perdurantist ontological synthesis to come up 
with a spatio-temporal aggregate of Adam and his posterity which make up a temporally 
scattered object that shares certain morally significant properties and can be constituted a 
complex individual by divine fiat. This individual we shall term Perdurantist Humanity' 
(hereinafter, PDH). This whole is made up of an aggregate of all and only those parts that 
constitute Adam and his posterity. Together, they form a new, temporally and spatially scattered 
whole, which is as ontologically real and objective as Dean, Athanasius, or Crippen (or 
whatever) . 
373This ontological unity is constituted for the specific purpose of imputing original 
sin. And since this new metaphysical unity is a real object, (given (DI), (Dlb) and (D2) in 
conjunction with our adaptation of Helm's rendition of Edwards' argument), not only is God 
justified in viewing PDH as a whole for certain harmartiological purposes, but His doing so 
involves the delineation of a new metaphysical entity, PDH (on the basis of perdurantism). 
Thus, this perdurantist version of an Edwardsian imputation argument not only gives 
metaphysical weight to the previous Helm. -Chisholm-Edwards argument, it also takes the 
Edwardsian agenda a step further, into the stronger version of the Edwardsian argument for 
persistence through time. And in so doing, it defends the Edwardsian persistence thesis in a way 
that constitutes PDH, not as a metaphysical expedient (qua Quine's version of persistence), but 
as an objectively real, ontological aggregate. This can be expressed more clearly in the 
following fashion: 
373 Thus, PDH is not like the parts of a board game, say, the tiddly-winks, the shaker and the board, which 
together are treated as one game. The reason being that Edwards' ontology is not a matter of convention, 
but of how things really are. God does not just gerrymander Adam and his posterity into PDH, as one 
might the part of the board game. He actualizes them in such a way that this is the metaphysical fact of 
the matter: Adam and his posterity just are PDH. Does this mean that God may cut any old bits of matter 
up into a unit and call it a unit for some whimsical purpose? Not necessarily. The crucial thing for 
Edwards is that PDH share the significant moral properties that they do and that say, a bit of shoe, a 
locomotive engine and a star cluster do not. 
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(1) Any region Of spacetime filled with matter can be cut up into constituent parts to pick out a 
material object on the basis of ontological synthesis (following (D I) and (Dlb)) 
(2) such an ontological synthesis comprises: 
(2a) spatially and/or temporally scattered constituent parts, and 
(2b) spatially and/or temporally scattered constituent properties (From (D I)-(D2)) 
(3) God constitutes Adam and his posterity an ontological synthesis, PDH (conjunction of (1) 
and (2)) 
(4) PDH is an objective, ontologically real metaphysical unit (via ontological synthesis) which 
is a material object (from (D 1), (D I b), (D2) and (3)) 
Ll-- - from this argument the following conclusions can be drawn which reflect Edwards' stronger 
view of imputation outlined earlier: 
1 (5) God treats PDH as a unity, privileging them on the basis that they share common moral 
properties in a circumscribed region of spacetime, and 
(6) God, by constituting PDH effects a new metaphysical spacetime worm, which comprises all 
and only those parts and properties that constitute PDH. 
(5) is an adapted version of the conclusion reached in the previous, Helm-Chisholm-Edwards 
argument(s), whilst (6) is a hard perdurantist proposition which uncovers new, and considerably 
stronger grounds upon which God may justifiably impute sin, since PDH is an objectively real 
entity which can be treated as such by God. And if it can be treated as an object made up of 
spatially and temporally scattered parts, then God may still impute sin to the whole object. 
This represents a stronger argument than that offered against Chisholm and Helm since what 
was said there assumed only conditions similar to (5). That is, God has a metaphysical warrant 
in constituting PDH a unity for the purposes of imputing original sin, and this sequence of 
reasoning follows a form of perdurantism, with a doctrine of temporal parts, where Adam is the 
father of the race. (6) is compatible with this reading of Edwards' perdurantism, but is not 
entailed by it; the two propositions are distinct. This is the case because (6) is not simply 
allowing that God may treat PDH as a unity for the sake of certain metaphysical transactions. 
Instead, it is saying that PDH is a metaphysical unit. God does not simply create Adam and his 
posterity and then gerrymander them into some unity for tile purposes of imputation. It is not as 
if Adam and his posterity are really distinct perduring objects, but God treats them as if they 
were one object, PDH,, for his own purposes in imputation. Instead, Adam and his posterity are 
themselves perduring objects, but together they are parts of a larger perduring object, PDH. 
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PDH is as ontologically real as Adam or any other member of the human race, on a perdurantist 
ontology. 
Thus (6) provides a strong support to Edwardsian imputation. Edwards himself was assuming 
some kind of metaphysical unit similar to that postulated by contemporary perdurantism as 
evidenced in OS. There he first appears to put forward a position similar in strength to (5), 
I wn persuaded, no solid reason can be given, why God, who constitutes all other created union or 
oneness, according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects he pleases, may 
not establish a constitution whereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the 
buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as one with him, for the derivation, 
either of righteousness and communion in rewards, or of the loss of righteousness and consequent 
corruption and guilt. 374 
I 
Before adding a footnote (which we have already had cause to note in passing) to the effect that 
God could have constituted PDH a unit in a way similar to, (but not the same as) (6), 
who can determine, that the Author of nature n-dght not if it had pleased him, have established such a 
union between the roots and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral 
whole; so that by the law of union, there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and that the 
heart of every branch should at the same moment participate with the heart of the root, be conformed to it 
and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as a part of the 
same thing? 375 
Edwards goes on to underline the fact that he has no qualms about God constituting such a unity 
from temporally, as well as spatially scattered objects. 376 
So. it appears on the basis of both the Helm-Chisholm-Edwards arguments strengthened by the 
homo primus reading of Edwardsian imputation (where Adam is the father of the race), and on 
perdurantist grounds independent of, but congruent with Edwardsian imputation, that Edwards 
is able to make a metaphysical case for his position. (And, indeed, that there may be grounds 
374 YE3: 405. 
371 Ibid., p. 405-6, note (6). 
376 Ibid., where he says, 'I know not why succession, or diversity of time, should make any such 
constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity of place. The only reason, why diversity of time can 
seem to make it unreasonable, is, that difference of time shews, there is no absolute identity of the things 
existing in those different times: but it shews this, I think, not at all more than the difference of the place 
of existence. ' 
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stronger even than those which Edwards takes his stand upon which could be defended through 
an Edwardsian reading of imputation. )'77 
Taken on their own, (5) and (6) could be used to defend an Edwardsian understanding of 
imputation without the occasionalist paraphernalia which Edwards insists upon deploying in his 
argument. However, it is clear that Edwards believed that the occasionalism he did deploy was 
important in his overall metaphysical schema. But the addition of this occasionalist strand to 
Edwardsian perdurantism invokes an argument that is stronger than even (6) is. On the 
Edwardsian occasionalistic scheme, there is no continuity involved in persistence through time: 
any object such as Dean is as illusory in its apparent perdurance as an Athanasius, since both 
depend entirely upon God as sole cause of their continued existence. And this causation is based 
entirely upon God's arbitrary choosing: no part, spatial or temporal, exists for anything more 
than a moment, so that the constitution of Dean is as arbitrary as that of Athanasius, or PDH. 
This is radical occasionalistic 'perdurantism'. It appears that, as far as Edwards is concerned, 
the perdurantist distinction between ontological analysis and synthesis serves an heuristic 
purpose only: it has no metaphysical payload, since analysis and synthesis are both as arbitrary 
(that is, dependent upon the will of God moment-by-moment, ex nihilo) as the other. The 
concept of ontological analysis has no more purchase in metaphysical reality than ontological 
synthesis has: both are equally arbitrary (dependent upon God's will), although the former is 
apparently more real than the latter to the pre-philosophical mind. 
So the constitution of PDH, Athanasius, or Dean, or whatever, is purely a matter of divine 
ordering according to God's will, nothing more, since there is no place for secondary causation 
in occasionalism, for the simple reason that all causes are merely the occasions of God's 
actions. 378 Consequently, (6) as it stands, is not strong enough as a description of Edwards' 
37' This is an important point not least because it has eluded at least one of Edwards' more recent 
interpreters. C. Samuel Storms in his Tragedy in Eden, concludes his treatment of Edwardsian imputation 
with this note: 
'My conclusion is that there is no commonly communicated "stuff" whereby an individual may be 
reckoned as one with Adam to which Edwards may appeal. God simply reckons it so. In other words, 
Edwards is left saying no more than that posterity are born with the guilt and corruption of Adam's sin 
because God determined to treat them together as one acting, willing person. There is no "stuff ' or 
substantial basis, be it material or immaterial, which Adam and posterity share by arbitrary divine 
constitution that would lead us to believe they are one. God simply says that as far as he is concerned he 
has deten-nined to treat them or look upon them as one' p. 255-6. 
But the notion of some kind of metaphysical 'stufF of which Adam and his posterity are made, is beside 
the point once the perdurantist nature of Edwardsian imputation is made plain. Adam and his posterity, on 
a perdurantist ontology, are made of the same stuff as the rest of the universe: matter. What is important 
is that Edwards is interested in a metaphysical unity, not in any bogus 'substratum' of which Adam and 
his posterity are made. And once that is clear, the force of Edwards' argument is apparent. 
378 We have already had cause to note this in Edwards, but it is worth reproducing the point here: 'It will 
follow from what has been observed, that God's upholding created substance, or causing its existence in 
each successive moment is altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing, at each 
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occasionalistic 'perdurantism'. The force of the occasionalistic requirement of Edwards 
thinking here can be expressed as follows: 
(7) God constitutes PDH according to an occasionalist ontology. This means that, 
(7a) the ontological structures of Edwards' metaphysics are entirely dependent upon God's will 
(arbitrium), 
(7b) consequently, no metaphysical object is any more or less gerrymandered than another 
smce,, 
(7c) all metaphysical objects are called into being moment-by-moment ex nihilo by the mind of 
God. 
(7d) Moreover, PDH, Athanasius, Dean (or whatever) are thereby causally dependent upon 
God moment-by-moment, and 
(7e) PDH (or whatever) cannot and do not persist or perdure. Their apparent perdurance, and 
the apparent perdurance of any metaphysical object is (strictly speaking) an illusion. 
In this context, the word 'illusion' means only that the perdurance of a particular object is 
unreal, not that the object itself is unreal. That was certainly not a position that Edwards would 
have countenanced. The point here is that if a objects are re-created moment-by-moment in the 
mind of God, then their perdurance is indeed an illusion which is perpetuated by the ordering by 
God of all things in a way that reflects his perfection and beauty. This aesthetic strand to 
Edwards' metaphysics can be found, for example, in his notes on The Mind, where he says, 'if 
the world had been created without any order or design or beauty, indeed all species would be 
merely arbitrary. ' However, in point of fact, God has created the world such that things do 
agree, 'either as to their outward appearance, manner of acting, the effects they produce or that 
other things produce on them, the manner of their production, or God's disposal concerning 
them, or some peculiar perpetual circumstances that they are in. P379 
The net result of this examination of Edwards' position on imputation is that (7) entails (5) and 
(6) (assUMIng (7e) can be read along weak or strong perdurantist lines); (6) could subsume (5), 
but does not necessarily entail (5); but both (5) and (6) seem to work as expressions of an 
Edwardsian approach to imputation without the need for (7). However, it is precisely (7) that 
Edwards insists upon in his discussion of imputation in OS. It may be that (7) needs to be 
moment' and, 'there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the arbitrary constitution 
of the Creator; who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these successive new effects, that he 
treats them as one, by communicating to them like properties, relations, and circumstances; and so leads 
us to regard and treat them as one. ' YE3: 402-3. 
379 YE& 366, entry 47. 
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discarded as unworkable, whilst (6) and/or (5) can be retained in such a way that the view of 
imputation which Edwards expresses may be salvaged without the unfortunate repercussions 
which his occasionalism involves (albeit transposed onto a contemporary perdurantist 
framework. ) 
(7: 4) Heller on Chisholm on Edwards 
There is yet another aspect to this Chisholmian attack on Edwards. Mark Heller in his 
perdurantist study The Ontology ofPhysical Objects, seems to understand an earlier critique of 
the Edwardsian doctrine of temporal parts by Chisholm as presupposing the three 
dimensionality of endurantism rather than the four-dimensionality of perdurantism expounded 
thus far in the present thesis . 
3'0 He appears to countenance the notion of an endurantist doctrine 
of temporal parts. On his reading of Chisholm on Edwards, as with the argument above, 
temporal parts can be divided into durationless slices, which exist in a contiguous series by 
divine convention alone (the occasionalistic element to the Edwardsian ontology). Heller 
comments, 
Our conventions allow us to act as if there are enduring wholes; they allow us to treat certain momentary 
objects as if they compose an enduring whole, but the world itself does not contain any enduring objects. 
This is the sort of view that would be expected from an account of temporal parts that is formed against a 
background supposition of three-dimensionality. Someone might believe that no object can really exist 
for more than a moment If one of these instantaneous objects could exist for longer it would be a three- 
dimensional enduring object. But there are no such enduring objects. Instead there are collections of these 
instantaneous objects added together (by convention) to form the objects that we typically talk about. 
Someone holding such a view would be reasonable to accept the Edwardsian conception of temporal 
parts. But I do not accept the background supposition of three-dimensionality. 381 
It is not entirely clear whether Heller is accusing Edwards of holding an endurantist doctrine of 
temporal parts, or Chisholm of mistakenly believing that Edwards holds to such a doctrine, 
since Chisholm's criticizes Edwards' doctrine of temporal parts from an endurantist point of 
view. But that ambiguity can be left to one side. What is important is the idea that someone 
could hold both endurantism and a doctrine of temporal parts understood in Edwardsian (that is, 
380 Heller, The Ontology Of Physical Objects, pp. 21-22. Heller cites Chisholm's 1971 essay, "Problems 
of Identity" in Identity and Individuation, (ed. ) Milton K. Munitz (New York: New York University 
Press, 197 1. ) 
381 Ibid, p. 22. 
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occasionalistic) terms. ff that is possible, is that Edwards' own view? In other words, has the 
present discussion proceeded on the basis of a false reading of Edwards as a perdurantist, when 
he is in fact an occasionalistic endurantist? 
Let us lay out the issues with care here before showing why Edwards' ontology, even as per (7) 
above, better comports with a version of perdurantism than endurantism. 
For the occasionalistic endurantism to work, it requires that endurantism be compatible with a 
dense view of time. Earlier in chapter 5, we drew attention to the fact that the majority of 
perdurantists hold to dense time and the endurantists to discrete time, citing Swinburne as an 
example of the latter, and Heller of the former. ff Edwards holds to occasionalistic endurantism, 
he will still endorse a view of dense time. And there is evidence that might point to Edwards 
holding an endurantist view. 382 However, it is more natural to read his ontology as being 
perdurantist. Heller is right to draw attention to the fact that on Edwards' occasionalism, nothing 
lasts long enough to perdure or endure if one reads Edwards along the lines of (7). But does 
I Edwards presuppose a three-dimensional view of time such that, if anything were able to persist 
through time, it would endure rather than perdure? 
Both views of Edwardsian ontology have the following common elements: (a) a doctrine of 
temporal parts; (b) a dense (or eternalist) view of time; and (c) occasionalism. The conflict 
arises when the assumption which grounds these three aspects of Edwards' thought is brought 
into view. Does Edwards presume, (d) a three-dimensional endurantism, or (d') a four- 
dimensional perdurantism? Edwards' discussion of imputation appears to assume a perdurantist 
ontology of filled spacetime, and it would be difficult to see how the line he takes in developing 
this could be read as a species of endurantism. This is particularly evident in his repeated 
articulation of an organic analogy for persistence through time that he takes from Locke, but 
alters to better fit a four-dimensional view of persistence: 
So the body of man at forty years of age, is one with the infant body which first came into the world, 
from whence it grew; though now constituted of different substance, and the greater part of the substance 
probably changed scores (if not hundreds) of times; and though it be now in so many respects exceeding 
382 1 am thinking here is Edwards' comments in The Mind where he says of duration, ' "Pastness" if I may 
make such a word, is nothing but a mode of ideas. This mode is perhaps nothing else but a certain 
veterascence attending our ideas. When it is, as we say, "past", the idea after a particular manner fades 
and grows old. When an idea appears within this mode, we say it is past, and according to the degree of 
this particular inexpressible mode, so we say the thing is longer or more lately past. ' YE6: 372. However, 
on closer examination, this seems to be an attempt to reinforce aspects of his immaterial realism, where 
all notions of duration are ideal, or 'modes of ideas. ' This comports perfectly well with a form of 
perdurantism, provided one lays out an argument (which to my knowledge, Edwards nowhere does) to the 
effect that the mental concepts of duration which inhabit the pre-philosophical mind are not necessarily 
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diverse, yet God, according to the course Of nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has caused, 
that in a certain method it should communicate with that infantile body, in the same life, the same senses, 
the same features, and many the same qualities, and in union with the same soul; and so, with regard to 
these purposes, 'tis dealt with by him as one body-'383 
From this passage it is clear that Edwards thought that, to use the current nomenclature, a 
particular body was a spacetime worm which exists as an aggregate of temporal parts, and that 
this state of affairs was ordained by divine convention. He does not endorse the classic 
endurantist ontology, which maintains that a body persisting through time exists wholly and 
completely at each different time index (as per (d) above). Edwards' position better comports 
with perdurantism than endurantism. ((d')), and his ontology should be read with that in mind. 
Heller's intriguing aside does not seem to reflect what Edwards actually maintained. Tbus, the 
findings of chapters (5) and (6) regarding the nature of Edwards' ontology in this respect, 
remain intact. 
congruent with how things actually are. In other words, linguistic conventions are no certain guide to 
metaphysical realities. 
383 YE3: 398. 
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(8) Adversus Edwards: Wainwright and the concept of inherited guilt 
Richard Swinburne has drawn attention to the fact that in a traditional understanding of original 
sin there are three constituent parts: explaining the proneness to sin in humanity as a whole 
(usually through the fall); identifying and dealing with the cause of this proneness to sin (in the 
person of Adam); and defining how the fault accruing to this original sin is Passed down the 
generations in inherited guilt . 
384ThuS far in the discussion we have seen how Edwards tried to 
outline and defend the first two of these central strands of a full-orbed doctrine of original sin. 
The first he spent the majority of his time defending in OS against Taylor and the 'Arminians'; 
the second, he dealt with in his peculiar brand of imputation. It was Edwards' concern in OS to 
defend the first, general thesis, and develop a formula by which he might ensure that the second, 
more particular thesis was rationally defensible. But there is still the third aspect of the full- 
orbed doctrine of original sin, to be dealt with: the concept of inherited guilt. We take this 
I notion up in a second line of attack upon Edwards' doctrine of imputation that has been made in 
the literature by William Wainwright. In an essay entitled simply "Original Sin", in the 
symposium Philosophy and the Christian Faith, "5 he seeks to draw out Edwards' reasoning in 
this area, and in so doing, concludes that it fails to satisfy. 
(8: 1) The defensibility of inherited guilt 
To begin with, Wainwright claims that Edwards does not establish that the doctrine of inherited 
guilt is scriptural. He does demonstrate that the New Testament concept of redemption 
presupposes a prior state of sin'86 and that salvation which is solely through Christ presumes 
that humanity is in need of salvation because they are trapped in a state of sin. 387 But according 
to Wainwright, the texts Edwards advances do not show that Adamic guilt is passed on to his 
descendents. He distinguishes between the following claims, which may be construed from a 
biblical presentation of original sin, 
(1) because of Adam's sin humanity is subject to death 
(2) because of Adam's sin human nature has been vitiated 
384 See Responsibility andAtonement, chapter 9. Swinburne's conclusions regarding these three parts to 
original sin are illuminating, although in a very different theological vein to Edwards: 'My conclusion on 
this third part of the full doctrine of original sin, added to my conclusions on the other two parts, puts me 
in a position with respect to the full doctrine close to that of the liberal Greek-speaking theologians of the 
early Christian centuries, and far away from Augustine and his Protestant successors. ' p. 146. 
385 Philosophy and the Christian Faith, (ed. ) Thomas V. Morris (Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988), pp. 31-60. 
386 In YE3: 3 61-7 1. 
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(3) because of Adam's sin humanity IS gUilty388 
It appears that (1) is clearly taught in the Bible, whilst (2) and (3) could be extrapolated from 
Romans 5. However, according to Wainwright, Edwards' examination of the issues does not 
render a sufficient warrant for (3), and it is this claim that is important in his discussion of 
imputation. Nevertheless, whether Edwards' provides a sufficient scriptural warrant or not for 
the doctrine he goes on to develop, there is stiff a question to be answered about whether the 
species of (3) which Edwards seeks to maintain is in fact rationally defensible . 
389And it is to 
this issue that Wainwright seeks to address himself 
He distinguishes two strands of argument in Edwards' defence of imputation. The first involves 
the legal and moral bond that exists between Adam and his progeny such that his fault is 
accounted as the fault of humanity as a whole. Wainwright correctly places this aspect of 
Edwards' thinking within his appropriation of federalism . 
390 The second strand of argument 
refers to Edwardsian perdurantism (although Wainwright himself does not use that term). These 
distinctions inform the argument which Wainwright develops against Edwards' version of 
inherited guilt. 
(8: 2) The legal and moral bond involved in inherited guilt 
On the question of the legal and moral bond which exists between Adam and his posterity, a 
distinction needs to be made between feeling a sense of shame at the actions of another, and 
being guilty because of the actions of another in which we are somehow implicated, or share 
responsibility, and as a consequence, blame. Edwards needs to establish this latter sense of guilt 
for his argument to work. Taking five case studies of situations in which people are held 
responsible for the actions of another, Wainwright sets about putting this question into some 
kind of philosophical context. In each case, he finds the emerging concept of guilt to be too 
ineffectual, or insufficient for effectual transposition onto a doctrine of original sin. '9' 
387 In YE3: 353-359. 
388 Wainwright, "Original Sin7', p. 58, note 21. 
argument for (3) sound. 389 However, at least one other philosopher has recently pronounced Edwards' 
See philip Quinn "Disputing the Augustinian Legacy: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on Romans 5: 
12-19" in The Augustinian Tradition (ed. ) Gareth B. Matthews, p. 246. There, in the context of an 
elucidation of Edwards' biblical argument for original guilt (qua (3)), Quinn says, "I myself find his 
[Edwards'] arguments against Taylor's interpretation of Romans 5: 12 -19 persuasive. ' 390 , Original Sin", p. 42. 
nberg in 
391 Wainwright's analysis of these five case studies seems to owe much to the work of Joel Fei 
his article, "Collective Responsibility" in Philosophy 23 (1948). 
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The first of these cases involves a situation in which members of a society commit actions 
which are wrong, but are approved of by popular mores. Here, every person in the society who 
has not deliberately disassociated themselves from such sins, could be said to share some blame 
for remaining silent in the face of such crimes. This is the case even if they did not have a hand 
in the perpetration of the crimes, and had no knowledge that they were being committed at the 
time. Clearly, this model is inadequate for several reasons. First, Adamic sin is not passed down 
to his progeny because each generation approves of the mores of his original sin. His sin is not 
an expression of such mores, but their cause. Second, it is not clear that in a situation similar to 
the one outlined, the members of that society would be to blame for the sins of others. For 
example: take the national situation in Germany on the late 1930s. One might assume that the 
majority of the German populace approved of the measures taken by the National Socialists 
against the Jews at that time. Those German people who remained quiet in the face of this evil 
may be morally culpable for their inaction, in failing to speak up against the mores of their 
society, since in so doing they (inadvertently) contributed to the climate that led to the rampant 
anti-Semitism which resulted. But this does not mean that those same Germans were guilty of 
the actual deeds committed against the Jews by others, since they did not actually commit those 
crimes, other people did. Thus, this model fails to demonstrate how the fault of one person can 
literally be that of another. 
The second case distinguishes between the guilt of organized and unorganized groups (the 
former referring to such collective entities as governments and countries; the latter referring to 
392 
things like a crowd at a station) . 
Guilt is not distributive in the first case, but is in the second. 
This is because in the first group, the guilt accruing to the organization does not mean that the 
individual (say, the individual citizen in a communist state) is guilty of the crimes of their 
government. But the member of a crowd at a station who fails to intervene when they see a 
bystander being stabbed, is guilty of allowing it to happen as are all the other members of that 
crowd who stood and did nothing. This better tracks the kind of responsibility envisaged in 
original sin, since humanity is not normally understood to be an organized group. Yet, on this 
view, it could have a collective responsibility for Adam's sin that is distributive. That is, the 
responsibility for Adam's sin devolves upon the individual members of the human race. 
But this also fails, for several reasons. First the distributive concept at work in these examples 
refers to the whole group who together are guilty, whereas original sin postulates that humanity 
is 911flty of the sin of one individual. No such group action is possible or even called for in the 
case of original sin, for humanity is scattered through spacetime and cannot act together in this 
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way. Second, if Adam is the federal head of humanity in some way (such as the conception of 
his role as homo primus developed in chapter 7), then humanity is a community, not an 
unorganized group, since Adam is the federal head of humanity in such a way that his decisions 
are the decisions of humanity as a whole. But third, and most important, this model fails to 
substantiate how one person can be actually guilty of the sin of another person, rather than 
simply partially responsibility for the actions (or inaction) of the group to which they belong. 
Hence this model fails to account for the place of guilt in imputation as does the first position. 
The third case details a situation where every member of a particular group shares the same 
fault,, but only one member's fault leads to any harm (though their fault is no greater or less than 
the other members of their group). Wainwright gives the example of a group driving home from 
a party drunk. Only one of that group hits and kills a pedestrian, although people hearing of the 
accident and its circumstances might well want to allocate some blame to the others who also 
drove home drunk. But like the other two examples, this one fails to substantiate how the sin of 
one person can be imputed to another. All those who went home drunk were responsible for 
their actions, and share a common guilt in being drunk whilst driving. But they are not therefore 
guilty of knocking down the pedestrian. 
T'his model could show that all humanity who reach the age of maturity are, like Adam, guilty 
of sin and therefore blameworthy in a way similar to Adam, just as the drunk-drivers are all 
guilty of breaking the law by driving home drunk, and are therefore individually culpable for 
being inebriated as the driver who hit the pedestrian is. But this is a far weaker model than 
Edwards is willing to countenance. Hence this understanding of guilt fails as an adequate model 
for imputation as well. 
Tle fourth and fifth cases differ from the first three, in that the kind of guilt modelled, means 
that each individual is liable for the fault of another. 
In the fourth case, Wainwright argues that there are at least three instances where vicarious 
liability is apparent. They are: when a person has been authorized to act as the agent of another; 
where one person is under the command or in the employ of another; and where one person has 
undertaken to be surety for another. In each, the liability assumed is voluntary and for the 
benefit of the other. 
This has parallels with a federalist understanding of imputation, which Edwards picks up at the 
beginning of his discussion of imputation in OS . 
393 Although Adam was not authorized by his 
progeny to act upon their behalf, God has ordained that he act on their part, and that this is a 
392 This distinction is drawn by Wainwright from an article by Virginia Held, entitled, "Can a Random 
Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible? " in Journal ofPhilosophy 67 (1970): 47148 1. 393 See YE3: 395-7. 
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beneficial arrangement. This is because Adam acts in his capacity as homo primus, and as such, 
has a greater motivation to act in a way which will have a happy outcome for his posterity. He 
also has the advantage of having been in a complete state of manhood when his trial began. 
Moreover, Edwards maintains that God could have commanded complete and perpetual fidelity 
to his commands for Adam and his posterity with no prospect of a future reward, but instead, he 
offered Adam and his offspring eternal life. God has gone beyond what was required of him by 
simple justice in his offer to Adam and his seed. Hence the arrangement is a beneficial one to all 
humanity through Adam. Though Adam's posterity did not authorize his peculiar privileges as 
homo primus, that is immaterial since they did not exist at that time to offer authorization (pace 
Augustine). And even if they had existed at that time, their acquiescence to the arrangement 
would have been reasonable, because beneficial. 
In the final case, Wainwright argues that there may be situations where collective liability for a 
particular sin obtains, providing that the group in question has a sufficient degree of 'solidarity' 
to be treated in this fashion. Such solidarity presumes that the group has interests which include 
one another, and which together form a community of interest, which is mutually beneficial and 
advantageous. Wainwright gives the example of a feudal neighbourhood group from medieval 
Europe, where each member of that neighbourhood was assigned the responsibility of ensuring 
the conduct of the others in an interdependent community of interest. If one member committed 
a crime and was not offered up to the authorities for punishment, a fine was levied from each of 
the rest of the neighbourhood who were his surety, and were sometimes liable for compensation 
too. This was advantageous, because it produced an efficient professional policing of the 
conduct of members of one's group, on the basis of a felt solidarity within a neighbourhood. 
Once more, this appears to echo an important element in Edwards' understanding of imputation. 
Original sin assumes that each member of a group (humanity) is liable for the fault of one of its 
members, Adam,, such that the punishment he deserves is distributed among the members of the 
group as a whole. Thus, God institutes a kind of 'collective liability arrangement' between 
Adam and his progeny. This seems reasonable. It also appears to be beneficial, since the 
members of the group represent a community of interest, where the interests of his seed are 
included in the set of interests which Adam has, and a definite good and evil are at stake in 
terms of the eternal destiny of humanity through Adam. 
However, these last two paradigms also fail to adequately model the kind of liability 
arrangement necessary for inherited guilt, since the crucial distinction between liability for the 
fault of another and guilt for that particular fault are not clearly distinguished. In other words, 
each case presumes that the person(s) under consideration in each group are liable for the fault 
of one of the other members of that group, either as a kind of vicarious liability arrangement for 
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some specific task or duty, or in a community of interest which possess an antecedent solidarity. 
But in both examples, this can only mean that the person(s) are liable for the fault of their agent 
or representative. They are not guilty of the actual fault themselves, since they cannot be 
culpable for something they did not do. A father can feel some responsibility or shame for his 
child, and may even be liable for their faults if the child is a minor and in his care. But that is 
not the same as the father committing the fault. And it is precisely this idea of fault that is 
required in the concept of inherited guilt. So, 
liability must be distinguished from guilt. Although it is sometimes reasonable to hold a person liable for 
the deeds of another, our legal and moral practice provides no situation in which a person can reasonably 
be judged guilty of another's offence ... 
Thus, even though liability can be transferred from one person to 
another, guilt cannot. Adam's posterity cannot be guilty of Adam's fault unless Adam's act is somehow 
literally their own. 394 
This contention is pivotal to Wainwright's argument. If guilt is non-transfcrable, then Edwards' 
argument for inherited guilt cannot work (and, one presumes, the same goes for any defence of 
imputation that includes this concept). Furthermore, since the concept is a crucial constituent of 
Edwards' defence of imputation, this raises a question mark over the whole programme of OS. 
(8: 3) The perdurantist element to Edwardsian inherited guilt 
Returning to the second strand of Edwards' argument, Wainwright outlines three theses, which 
form the heart of Edwards' perdurantism as it bears upon inherited guilt. These are, 
(W I) God is the author of criteria of identity (through time). 
(W2) Edwards believes that personal identity depends upon sameness of consciousness. 
(W3) God constitutes Adam and his posterity PDH for the purposes of imputing 
gUiit. 395 
These three criteria need some fleshing out: According to Wainwright, (WI) is ambiguous. 
Edwards appears to mean different things at different times (or perhaps includes different things 
at different times under the same rubric, but without making this entirely clear). So at certain 
394 wainwright, "Original Sin", p. 47. 
395 'Mese propositions have been altered slightly. Wainwright does not talk of 'PDH', for example. The 
modification is superficial, and purely for the purposes of continuity of argument. 
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times he means that God determines what the various criteria of identity will be for different 
kinds of things. But at other times he seems to want to make the weaker claim that God brings it 
about that certain things meet this criteria. Wainwright thinks that Edwards needs both of these 
aspects for his version of imputation. They can be taken together with the strong conservation 
thesis that Edwards advocates,, stipulating that physical laws determine kinds, and kinds 
determine criteria of identity. The laws are themselves established by God who institutes the 
criteria of identity through them as his instruments. 
The Lockean criterion of identity supplied by (W2), coupled with (WI), means God brings 
about sameness of consciousness according to his sovereign decrees. And if the criteria for 
personal identity are dependent upon God's ordering, then he can bring it about that Adam and 
his progeny are constituted a whole such that Adam's guilt is passed on to his descendents. But 
this too involves a problem: 'That x can inherit y's guilt is not in itself a criterion of identity, but 
a logical consequence of the fulfillment of certain kinds of criteria of identity. ' '96 In a situation 
where x is culpable for the sins of y this must mean either, x is identical with (or is the same 
person as) y, or x is part of the same corporate entity as y. And as Wainwright goes on to point 
out, 'Even if God constitutes these criteria, he does not constitute the fact that if these criteria 
are fulfilled, and x is therefore the same person or corporation as y, y's sins can be imputed to 
x. This fact is a logical fact and Edwards nowhere suggests that God constitutes facts of this 
kind. -) 397 
(W3) is the crucial proposition, since if it works, the first two are redundant, and, as we have 
already had cause to note, it is this argument which Edwards seeks to outline in defending 
imputation. Therefore, it is in terms of this argument that the consistency and intelligibility of 
Edwards' doctrine of inherited guilt must either stand or fall. Edwards needs to establish that the 
kind of identity constituted by God in PDH entails inherited guilt. Wainwright's argument 
against Edwards' position can be expressed thus, 
(1) God constitutes Adam and his posterity PDH (following from the argument in 
chapter 7) along perdurantist lines. 
(2) (1) means that if Adam sins then the whole of humanity sin, since PDH constitutes a 
unity for the purposes of imputation (or perhaps is a unity viz. hard-perdurantism). 
(3) Hence, if Adam is guilty of original sin, then his posterity is also guilty by virtue of 
a similar transference of guilt in imputation (following (2)). 
396 WainVMgllt, ;, Original Sin", p. 51. 
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11- 
Here is the problem: 
(4) faults committed by a person do not ordinarily distribute to their parts. 
For example, if a man looks lustfully at a girl, it is the man as a whole who has committed the 
act. That does not mean that every part of him has committed the act or is guilty of it. His eye 
did not commit the act, nor is it guilty; it was merely instrumental in the action being carried 
out. So, it is the whole person who is guilty of the act. This has a clear application to Edwards' 
position: if PDH exists then the fault of Adam is the fault of the whole of humanity. But this 
does not mean that it is the fault of his descendents (since they are only parts of the whole 
PDH. ) 
Can Edwards' perdurantism. overcome (4)? He could respond along the lines of, 
(5) given (1)-(3) each member of PDH is literally affected as Adam is affected, 
consenting to and concurring with his sin and guilt. '9' 
But, as Wainwright points out, though God could have so ordered things, is this actually the 
state of aff4irs in the world? If it were, then it would mean that each individual making up PDH 
would be literally affected as Adam was, and would literally consent to and concur in, Adam's 
act. This line of argument appears to have proved too much: not even Edwards would agree that 
every member of PDH is literally affected as Adam was (according to Wainwright). 
Moreover, Wainwright claims that Edwards is guilty of conflating corrupt inclinations and 
guilty choices, thereby obscuring the distinction between the transmission and effects of 
Adamic sin (inclinations and nature), and the guilt pertaining to Adam's particular first sin (his 
choice). We may be inclined to act as Adam did because we share a vitiated nature passed on in 
imputation, but this does not mean that our participation in the effects of his original sin upon 
our natures is the same as our participating in the guilt belonging to Adam's choice. The two are 
separate issues. T'hus, concurring with Adam's sin is not the same as consenting to it, just as 
having a tendency to being a kleptomaniac is not the same as consenting to someone else's 
theft. 
Edwards appears to attempt to outflank this line of criticism in the following, 
397 Ibid. 
398 This is precisely what Edwards does argue in YE3: 391. 
203 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(6) PDH would have consented to Adamic sin if they had been present with Adam (or 
had known about it). 
But we ordinarily do not condemn someone who would have done a thing were he there to 
commit the act, though in fact he was not! As Wainwright observes, 'What is needed is an 
actual consent of concurrence which is given at the moment one comes into being. Nothing less 
will show that we are born. guilty of Adam's fault. "'9 Clearly this is not possible, since from the 
moment of birth we are not moral agents conscious of Adam's fault. This is underscored by 
Swinburne who argues that, 'no-one can be guilty in a literal sense for the sins of another, 
unless he had some obligation to deter that person and did not do so. Since none of us today 
could have had the obligation to deter the first sinner fTom sinning, we cannot be guilty for his 
sins. '400 
So Edwards fails to distinguish the difference between inclination and choice in the 
I transmission of sin and guilt in imputation. Consequently, he fails to show inherited guilt to be 
part of the equation. At best, in Wainwright's estimation, he manages to show that, 
(a) we can be held liable for Adam's failure (with regard to the legal consequences to human 
nature). 
(b) Adam's fault is (in some sense) the fault of the whole species (PDH). 
But he has not shown that, 
(c) Adam's fault is the fault of each of his descendents. 
Therefore, according to Wainwright, he has not shown how Adam's progeny share in his guilt. 
(8: 4) Assessing Wainwright9s argument 
An initial assessment of Wainwright's argument might lead one to conclude that it has severely 
damaged the credibility of Edwards' claim to be defender of a fall-orbed doctrine of original sin 
with reference to inherited guilt. However, this is not entirely the case. Much of the force of the 
criticisms brought by Wainwright against Edwards depend upon a particular understanding of 
Edwards' doctrine of imputation which is at odds with the picture of Edwards developed thus 
far in this thesis - 
In particular, Wainwright seems to have underplayed the truly radical nature of 
Edwards' argument, which has implications for some of the more damaging aspects of his 
attack upon Edwards. 
399 Wammright, "Original Sin", p. 53. 
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In the foregoing argument, Wamwright made four central assertions that need to be dealt with. 
These were, 
(1) that Edwards' position on inherited guilt is not biblically substantiated. 
(2) that liability must be distinguished from guilt. Liability is transferable; guilt is not. 
(3) that faults committed by a person do not distribute to their parts. 
(4) that Edwards conflates (corrupt) inclinations with (guilty) choices. 
We shall argue that (2) and (3) do not refer to the actual position Edwards holds, and that (3) on 
a perdurantist ontology, is false; (1) is moot, and as a consequence we shall pass over in silence; 
and (4) points out a real problem with Edwards' conception of volitions (picked up in more 
detail in FOW. ) 
I First, to Edwards' argument for imputation in OS40' He begins his discussion of imputation by 
rejecting one conception of inherited guilt, and embracing another. The notion that people are 
born with a double guilt, pertaining to the guilt of Adam's sin and the corruption of their own 
hearts is, according to Edwards, misconceived. The two are in fact one and the same, (although 
in what sense they are one and the same he does not specify. But presumably it is to do with the 
notion that they share all and only the same properties, viz. arising from and being sustained by 
participation in the sin of Adam). However, there is a sense in which inherited guilt is in two 
parts. For Edwards, there is a guilt accruing to the first inclination to sin with which all 
humanity is bom post-Adam, as an effect of sharing in Adam's vitiated nature. It is a 
402 consequence of the 'extended pollution of that sin' . 
But there are further grounds for guilt in 
it becoming a confirmed principle in the lives of humanity after birth. Edwards' believes that 
this was the case with Adam in his first sin and is the case for all his posterity after his fall. It is 
at this point that Edwards begins to bring to bear his view on inclination and act, which 
Wainwright makes the substance of criticism (4). According to Edwards, the act of sinning is 
not distinct from the disposition to sin formed in Adam's heart. Inclination and choice are parts 
of a single whole in volition. (We shall return to this point in due course. ) 
Inherited guilt, then, accumulates because of the extended pollution in spacetime as a result of 
humanity being somehow identified with Adam's sin. As branches of a tree or members of a 
body participate in the whole, so humanity participates in the guilt of its head, Adam, in full 
400 Swinburne, Responsibility andAtonement, pp. 144-45. 
401 what follows draws on YE3: 3 90-9 1. 
402 YE3: 391. 
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gconsent and concurrence' with Adam's first sinful act. This means that the sinner has a 
disposition to approve of Adamic sin 'as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed 
iC Edwards goes on to explain that this depraved disposition is not a consequence of 
imputation, any more than Adam's inclination was the consequence of his first sin. It is prior to 
it in the order of nature. 'The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the 
consequences of that established union: but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, 
and the charge of guilt consequent; as it was in the case of Adam himself. '40' Thus far, 
Wainwright's exposition appears secure. 
However, if we turn back to Edwards' perdurantist arguments, it becomes clear that there may 
be grounds upon which Wainwright's reading of Edwards may be challenged. Let us begin with 
the difference between the soft-perdurantist reading of Edwards and the hard-perdurantist 
reading distinguished in chapter 7. If Edwards is understood to be defending a soft-perdurantist 
I thesis,, then he is not claiming that Adam's sin is literally mine. He is only claiming that Adam's 
sin might be imputed to me through a metaphysical arrangement whereby the whole of 
humanity is treated as one unit for certain metaphysical purposes in the divine plan. This 
understanding of Edwards, though not precisely that expressed by Wainwright, comports with 
the substance of his argument, outlined thus far. 404However, it does not appear to take 
sufficient account of what Edwards says about the 'consent and concurrence' of PDH with 
Adam in his sin that we have just cited. On the other hand, if Edwards is defending a hard- 
perdurantist thesis (argued for in chapter 7), then this is not the case. A hard perdurantist 
reading of Edwards seems to agree with what he says at the outset of his defence of imputation 
about this issue of 'consent and concurrence'. Wainwright's reading of Edwardsian 
perdurantism seems to be cogniscent of the soft-perdurantist option only. As a result he seems 
to have overlooked the truly radical implications of Edwards' perdurantism (especially when 
coupled with his occasionalism. ) For on a hard-perdurantist reading of Edwards, he is saying 
that Adam and his posterity are one metaphysical unit in the mind of God, which is why he can 
403 Ibid. 
404 It is also not that far from the position espoused by Thomas Aquinas. Davies observes that 'The 
solution Aquinas therefore adopts is to say that the guilt of original sin is not a matter of individual 
responsibility. It is guilt which follows from the fact that the will of Adam runs through his successors. In 
political thinking, he says, people belonging to a state are considered to be members of one body, and all 
of them together are deemed to be one person. In the same way, he adds, Adam's descendents can be 
regarded as one body with Adam as their head or soul. On this basis they are implicated in Adam's sin as 
the limbs of human beings are involved in the will by virtue of which they act voluntarily. ' The Thought 
of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 256. The same point is taken up by 
Timothy McDermott in Summa Theologiae, A Concise Translation (London: Methuen, 1991), p. 223. 
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'impute' Adamic sin and guilt to the whole of humanity. They form one corporate spacetime 
worm, such that Adam's guilt is transmitted to his posterity immediately, though consequent to 
the imputation of his sin. (Of course, if this is the case, then the notion of 'Imputation' seems 
rather empty. There can be no imputation - as that notion has been traditionally understood in 
Christian theology - on this view, since there is no duration from the time of Adam's first sin to 
the time at which God constitutes PDH. )40' 406 
If this is an important aspect of the position that Edwards is defending (and it seems that it is), 
then the second and third criticism leveled by Wainwright can be met and defeated. The second 
of these states that liability is transferable, whereas guilt is not. But if Edwards' is defending a 
hard-perdurantism, then there is no transference of guilt from one person to another as in all the 
examples cited by Wainwright, since in the hard-perdurantist model, the spacetime worm PDH 
is one concrete particular. It is not that God treats the whole of PDH as if they were one thing 
for certain metaphysical purposes. Rather, PDH is actually one entity, such that God can 
reasonably 'impute' the sin of Adam to the rest of PDH without violating the principle of the 
non-transferability of guilt outlined by Wainwright. 
The third thesis can also be met in principle once the second is dealt with. In the third thesis 
Wainwright claims that faults are not distributed to the parts of a concrete particular (as with the 
analogy drawn earlier between a man lusting after a girl and his eye lusting after her. The man 
may be said to lust and incur guilt, the eye cannot. It is simply instrumental in the act of 
lusting). But if Edwards is defending a hard-perdurantist argument, then he is not claiming that 
the guilt of the person of Adam distributes to his parts in his posterity, since both are one 
metaphysical whole in PDH. 407 
However, this is not without its problems. If Edwards is claiming that the primal sin is 
committed by Adam alone (not PDH as a whole), but the guilt of that sin accrues to PDH as a 
Unfortunately, Aquinas' use of a bodily analogy for imputation appears to fall foul of the distinction 
Wainwright makes between the possible transference of liability and guilt. 
405 This has not gone unnoticed in the literature. Anri Morimoto at one point claims of Edwards' view of 
imputation that, 'Although he [Edwards] does not forget to use the standard terminology of federal 
representation, what is implied by it is somewhat untraditional: there is no imputation of Adam's sin to 
his descendants. Imputation does occur, but it is the imputation of one's own guilt to oneself. ' Jonathan 
E&vards and the Catholic Vision ofSalvation, p. 8 1. This is partially true. As we have already seen in the 
Hcln-ýian response to Chisholm's critique of Edwards ontology of imputation (chapter 7), the fact that 
God constitutes Adam and PDH one spacetime object does not mean that Trevor's sin is Dean's sin too. 
But if God creates PDH such that when Adarn sins this immediately infects the rest of the scattered 
aggregate PDH (since they are simply temporal parts of one object), then the notion of imputing the sin of 
one person to another seems to have little content beyond the metaphysical change to PDH. 
406And incidentally, this understanding of imputation (inadvertantly? ) gives credence to Augustine's 
realist view of the relation between Adam and his posterity. 
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whole (not Adam alone) then he seems only to have reconstituted a species of the problem 
which Wainwright raises, in perdurantist language. 
But this difficulty can be overcome, once it is recognized that Wainwright's third criticism 
appears to be guilty of committing the fallacy of equivocation. That is, Wainwright is guilty of 
assuming that the parts which he refers to are the same as the parts which Edwards has in mind. 
They are not. A distinction needs to be made between the physical parts of a person-stage at a 
particular time index, and temporal parts of a concrete particular in toto. Consider the example 
of Trevor. At tI Trevor has all his bodily parts. That is, he has suffered no loss or defect to any 
of his bodily parts. At Q Trevor stabs Dean with a kitchen knife over luncheon. At 0 Trevor 
loses his right (stabbing) hand in a farming accident. Who is guilty of the crime at t2? Surely it 
is Trevor (not his right hand. ) Trevor is the concrete particular involved here; his hand is a 
spatial part of Trevor, and one which is not mereologically essential to him (we know this since, 
at t3, he loses his hand, but remains Trevor). 40' 
But if it is Trevor who is guilty at Q, is Trevor still guilty at t3? And was he the same Trevor 
who was going to be guilty at tI of the crime committed at t2? The answer to this question for 
Wainwright, appears to be in the affirmative. The individual, Trevor, is guilty, not any physical 
part which he has at an earlier but not later time index (such as his right hand at t2 and stump at 
0. ) The same is true for the perdurantist. According to perdurantism, the spacetime worm 
Trevor is the concrete particular who is guilty of the crime at t2. It is not Trevor's hand that is 
guilty of the crime according to the perdurantist, any more than it is for Wainwright. Though 
Trevor commits the act at a particular time slice, t2, it is Trevor as the spacetime worm who is 
guilty, not any physical part of Trevor at that particular index. 
Let us assume in this thought experiment, that the perdurantist in question is an 
eternalist/detenser, since that is the position that Edwards is defending. If the Trevor-part at Q is 
guilty of the crime at t2, then Trevor the spacetime worm is guilty, was and will be the one 
guilty of the act of that Trevor-part at Q at all times. Expressed tenslessly, 
Trevor is guilty of stabbing Dean during luncheon at t2. 
407 C. Samuel Storms deals with the issue of Edwards' defence of inherited guilt at some length, and in a 
fashion not inimical to the present chapter, but he fails to draw out the problems which Wainwright's 
account manages to unearth. See Tragedy in Eden, pp. 228 ff. 
408 This might seem to be question begging - on what basis do we know that this really is the same 
Trevor? - but this has been dealt with earlier. The assumption 
is that the reader is familiar with what has 
gone before to avoid useless repetition. See the brief discussion of mereological essentialism in chapter 5 
above. 
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If this is timelessly true, then all temporal parts of Trevor participate in this truth. To put it 
another way, the proposition stating Trevor's guilt at t2 is always true at all times, for all 
moments of Trevor's existence. That is not the same as saying that the above proposition states 
a timeless truth about the physical parts of Trevor at all temporal indexes. That would be 
patently absurd. To illustrate: If I was always going to fail my exam, then that truth of this 
failure, expressed propositionally, will always be true of me, whenever it is articulated in this 
particular world. But the fact that my right hand wrote the wrong answer does not mean that it 
was the guilty part of me, and that it was not my fault that I failed, but the fault of that particular 
physical part of me instead. Were I to maintain this, I would be a laughing stock. 
So, Temporal and spatial parts, though equally important on perdurantist ontology, have 
different properties that describe different ontological roles. Temporal parts, being parts or 
person stages of one whole person act differently from spatial parts. Thus, to return to Trevor, 
he is still the same spacetime worm, through all the changes that take place between t 143, even 
though he has different spatial parts (especially after 0), as well as different temporal parts at 
each time index. But Trevor is guilty as a spacetime worm of actions in a way that his spatial 
parts are not. Why? Because if that were not the case, we should have peculiar situations arising 
where Trevor at tI was not guilty of the crime; Trevor at t2 was; and Trevor at t3 was not either 
(on the principle which Wainwright sets forth, that the guilt of a person does not distribute to his 
parts. ) So Wainwright's criticism of Edwards must be referring to spatial not temporal parts, 
whereas Edwards himself, in his version of imputation, is actually referring to temporal not 
spatial parts. Once that is established, the idea that Adam commits original sin at tl, and is 
guilty of it, and that that guilt is 'imputed' to PDH at all subsequent time indexes is perfectly 
reasonable, providing that both Adam and his posterity are together temporal parts of the whole 
aggregate object, PDH, which, on hard-perdurantism, is the position Edwards appears to be 
defending. Hence, Wainwright's third criticism of Edwards is sidestepped. For once that is clear 
then original sin is committed by Adam alone (not PDH as a whole), but the guilt accrues to 
PDH as a whole (not Adam alone), since both Adam and his posterity are temporal stages of the 
one object, PDH. And guilt does distribute to temporal parts in a way that it cannot do with 
spatial parts. To put this another way, Adam sins at one time index, but he is only one part of 
the whole object PDH which extends through spacetime. Just as the Trevor at Q who commits 
the crime is only one temporal part of the whole Trevor as he extends through time, so Adam is 
one temporal part of the whole PDH. 
This leaves the last criticism of Edwardsian original guilt: that Edwards conflates (corrupt) 
inclinations with (guilty) choices. Once it is recognized that Edwards saw guilt as imputed but 
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not inherited, along perdurantist lines, this line of criticism dissolves too. Wainwright claims 
that, 
Once one assimilates inclination and choice [which Edwards clearly does, YE3: 390-91], it is easy to 
assimilate sinful (corrupt) inclinations and sinful (guilty) choices. It is then easy to suppose that since the 
first can be inherited, so can the second. 
He goes on, 
His [Edwards'] assimilation of corrupt inclinations and guilty choices would make it difficult for him to 
see that the transmission of guilt involves a different issue, and that this issue has not been satisfactorily 
resolved. 409 
I 
It may be that Edwards did not see clearly enough that original guilt is a different issue from the 
assimilation of inclination and choice in volition, but whether he did so or not, his position 
works on the grounds that Wainwright sets out. He does conflate inclination and choice as two 
aspects of original guilt, but he does not use that to establish the separate argument from 
imputation to original guilt. The former supplies the content of original guilt as it is imputed to 
PDH,, whereas the latter details the mechanism by which God carries out the action of imputing 
original guilt. Wainwright seems to think that Edwards believed that guilt was inherited in some 
way. Unfortunately, this ends up misrepresenting the Edwardsian position. 
As previously noted, Edwards begins his brief discussion of the subject by pointing out 
that Adam and his progeny share this dual aspect to their guilt before God, since a depraved 
disposition and the subsequent corruption which confirms the initial disposition to evil attract 
double guilt. However, they are not imputed separately to Adam or his PoSterity. 410 As Adam is 
the root of the tree, so the rest of the tree is infected with his guilt as well as his sin. He then 
moves on to deal with how this can be the case, and arrives at the conclusion that original guilt, 
like original sin, is imputed. (Not inherited, and it is important to note that, although Edwards 
himself does not make much of this distinction. For such a distinction does helpfully highlight 
the perdurantism Edwards defends. ) Hence, Adam is an earlier temporal part of the whole PDH 
to whom guilt is imputed as a whole. In the nomenclature of perdurantist etemalism, Adam's 
sin and guilt are a temporal part of PDH such that, 
" Wainwright, Original Sin, p. 5 3. 
410 YE3: 3 90-9 1. 
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Adam's sin and guilt are judicially 'imputed' to PDH 
is timelessly true, since Adam is simply a part of the whole that is PDK scattered throughout 
spacetime. God views all the parts of PDH taken together, and as a whole metaphysical entity 
attributes the action of one part to the whole. 
One further point arises here. For this to work for Edwards, does the action of the one part 
which is attributed to the whole have to be the first part? For instance, suppose that Zechariah is 
the last human being, the race having been faultless up to Zechariah's arrival. Ilen suppose 
Zechariah sins. Could Zechariah's sin be attributed to his faultless ancestors? The answer on 
Edwards' theory would appear to be that it could not. Zechariah's sin could not be backwardsly 
imputed to his ancestors as, conversely, Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity, because 
Zechariah is not in the peculiar position that Adam is in, namely, that he is the first individual 
specimen of humanity. Adam, unlike Zechariah, has progeny but no ancestors. And this, 
I according to the argument outlined in chapter 7, is an important constituent of Edwards' theory 
of imputation. Adam is the father of the race, and thereby occupies a special place in the divine 
plan as homo primus, that Crippen, Hawking or Zechariah cannot occupy, by virtue of being 
created at times later than the homo primus. 
Thus, Wainwright's critique of Edwardsian guilt appears to have failed to give a comprehensive 
account of how Edwards viewed original guilt, and as a result, his detailed criticisms f" wide 
of the mark. 
(8: 5) Why God creates a perdurantist rather than endurantist world 
However, one more area of concern raised by Wainwright's essay remains. The argument 
mounted against Wainwright thus far appears to suffer from a picture of God that is too 
voluntaristic. Why would God create a perdurantist world, where an entity like PDH has to be 
brought into being to account for the 'imputation' Adamic guilt as well as sin (in either the soft 
or hard forms of perdurantism outlined thus far)? It must surely be possible for God to have 
created a more endurantist world such as the one that Wainwright appears to envisage. And if it 
is possible, why create one rather than another? It seems to be somewhat 'arbitrary', to use 
Edwards' phrase. 
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Wainwright himself addresses these issues in an essay on Edwards' doctrine of creation. 411 
There he argues that Edwards' doctrine of creation found principally in his work End of 
Creation, 412 involves the following claims: 
(1) God creates ad extra to display his glory (and glorify himself). 
(2) Edwards takes this to mean, 
(2a) God must create some world or other, and 
(2b) God must create this world. 
Wainwright goes on to argue that Edwards' defence of (1) involves a fairly traditional claim for 
the divine telos of creation, whereas both (2a) and (2b) are rather heterodox (Edwards would, 
quite naturally, have contested such an accusation of doctrinal deviation). Wainwright takes (2a) 
to be defensible, but rejects (2b) on the grounds that it means that God does not have libertarian 
rreedorn,, but only compatibilist freedom. For our purposes, what is important is to ascertain 
whether Edwards' view is coherent, such that he has a rationale for endorsing a perdurantist, 
rather than endurantist concept of this world. If Edwards is committed to both (2a) and (2b) as 
the outworking of (1) as he sees it, then this world has to be as it exists if it exists, and 
voluntarism is removed from the picture (a rather extreme solution to the problem, perhaps). Let 
us examine the argument to this end. 
First, the question of (1). Does God create ad extra to display his glory and thereby glorify 
himself? Edwards seems to believe that God's end in creation was both, 
(1a) his own self-glorification, and 
(lb) the communication of his benevolence to others (created beings) and that, 
(1c) (lb) is subordinate to (1a). 
This operates as follows: 
(3) the exercise of God's perfections is to produce their proper effects. 
(4) God manifests his internal glory to created intellects. 
(5) God communicates his infinite fullness to creatures, and 
411 "Jonathan Edwards, William Rowe, and the Necessity of Creafion7' in Faith Freedom, and Rationality, 
Philosophy of Religion Todqv, (eds. ) Jeff Jordan and Dan Howard Snyder (Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1996), pp. 119-133. The following argument is adapted from here. 
412 The first of Edwards' so-called 'Two Dissertations', to be found in YE8. 
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(6) creatures respond to God in their love, joy, esteem and 'complacence' in God and the proper 
exercise and expression of these holy affections. 
Now, according to Edwards, (3) and (5) are not ontologically distinct. (5) includes (4) and (6). 
Thus, (4) and (6) are parts of (5), which is ontologically of a piece with (3). T'herefore, (3)-(6) 
are one thing in a variety of views and relations. In other words - to recapitulate - (lb) is 
subordinated to (la). 
Another, related argument to this end is provided by Edwards (via Wainwright) in the 
following: 
(7) God prizes his attributes. 
(8) God prizes the exercise of his attributes (assumption). 
(9) If (8), then he also prizes those effects intrinsically connected to the exercise of his 
attributes, 
(10) hence, if God delights in the power to communicate good, he delights in the 
communication of good. 
(11) God delights in created knowledge, love and joy in God, the principal effects of (10). 
(12) Tberefore, God delights in his own glory (conjunction of (10) and (11)). 
Consequently, if God loves himself, he necessarily loves his own glory. (And one might add the 
caveat that if God is maximally perfect, then his desire for his own glory is itself a perfection. ) 
From the foregoing, (1) seems secure. God may create to display his own glory and thereby 
glorify himself, and that creation may include as a by-product the communication of divine 
goodness to creatures. Thus on two counts (lb) can be construed as subordinate to (la). 
Therefore, (1) is coherent. 
What of (2a)? If God loves himself and thereby necessarily loves his own glory, then he will 
find a way to best display his glory, to further the aim of his own self-glorification. Edwards 
believed that this involved the claim of (2a): God must create some world or other. Wainwright 
lays this out as follows, 
(13) It is necessarily true that God has an inclination to diffuse his own fullness. 
(14) It is necessarily true that God is able to satisfy His inclinations. 
(15) It is necessarily true that people satisfy their inclinations when they are able to satisfy them 
and have no reason for not doing so, and that, 
(16) it is necessarily true that God has no reason not to diffuse His own fullness. It follows that, 
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(5) Edwards and the doctrine of temporal parts 
We have spent some time trying to explain the theological views Edwards was defending in his 
doctrine of imputation. Now, with his theological view clarified, we may turn to the 
metaphysical issues that underpin Edwards' theological concerns. Central to these concerns are 
the cluster of issues around the doctrine of temporal parts, to which we now come. This chapter 
is particularly concerned to set forth the philosophical parameters to Edwards' thinking on 
persistence, personal identity and identity through time, before analyzing them in detail in 
subsequent chapters. In order to do so, we shall need to examine these metaphysical issues first, 
before applying them to Edwards' arguments in OS. 
(5: 1) Temporal persistence and identity-through-time 257 
We begin with perdurantism. and endurantism. 258 Perdurantists claim that it is impossible for an 
individual to be numerically identical through time. Instead, a concrete, persisting individual is 
an aggregate of discrete, temporal parts which have some qualitative identity. In this way, 
perdurantists in particular treat time as a fourth dimension alongside the other three dimensions 
of space, leading to talk of spacetime worms, that is, individuals which persists through 
spacetime . 
259By contrast, endurantists claim that a concrete particular can only persist through 
time if it exists wholly or completely at different times, that is, it is numerically the same 
through different times. To illustrate this point, imagine a person named Dean. 'Me endurantists 
claim that the Dean of yesterday, to be considered contiguous with the Dean of today must pick 
out something that makes both Deans the same individual. This, they claim, is possible where 
the name Dean picks out the same concrete individual on both occasions. For this to be the case, 
Dean must persist through time as the same individual thing, possessing substantially the same 
25' The following discussion draws on Nfichael J. Loux's treatment of the issues in particular. See Loux, 
Metaphysics, A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1998), chapter 6. 
258 It was David Lewis who introduced the terms 'perdurantist' and 'endurantist' to the debate in his book 
on the modalities On the Plurality of Worlds, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 202-205. However, he 
attributes the terms perdurantist and endurantist to Mark Johnson. Lewis maintains that endure and 
perdure are terms specific to the two different views on persistence, which is itself, a notion common to 
both positions. 
259 This is not to suggest that endurantists cannot or do not use a similar four-dimensional notion of 
spacetime. It is simply that perdurantism requires it, a point made particularly clearly in Heller's opening 
gambit in his The Ontology of Physical Objects, Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 1. Nor do I mean by this use of time as a fourth dimension 
that only Einsteinian views of spacetime apply. An 'absolutist' view of space and time, such as that of 
Newton, could be used here, and presumably would have been used here by Edwards. 
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properties260 (some endurantists would say, exactly the same number of properties, but at the 
very least those properties which constitute the individual's individuality), 261 at each temporal 
slice. 
By contrast, perdurantists claim that the diachronic sameness of concrete individuality assumed 
by endurantism does not assert literal identity between two temporally scattered instances. For 
the perdurantist, the idea that the Dean of yesterday is one and the same individual as the Dean 
of today, or tomorrow, is a crude misunderstanding. In fact, Dean persists through time as an 
aggregate of temporal parts, or slices. Dean exists yesterday and today; but his persisting from 
one slice to another is not based on his enduring as a complete individual whose properties 
remain intact throughout the period described, rather he persists because he has parts, or phases 
which exist at each temporal index. So the individual Dean exists at 10.00 yesterday, and is 
contiguous with the individual Dean who existed at 10.0 1 yesterday and 10.02, and so on, where 
such an individual picks out someone who has parts at temporally contiguous indexes. (Or, 
I perhaps, temporally scattered indexes, given the perdurantist claim that all temporal worms 
exist in four dimensions, time being the fourth, in which it is conceivable for an entity to be 
scattered. ) 
For the perdurantist, temporal parts are just as much a part of a concrete particular as are spatial 
parts. Dean's existence yesterday and contiguity with his existence today, are just as much a 
part of the individual picked out by the name, 'Dean', as is this individual having a right hand 
on both occasions. Both his physical parts and his temporal parts pick out different properties, 
which properly pertain to one concrete individual, Dean. From this it follows that the Dean of 
yesterday is no more numerically identical with the Dean of the present than is Dean's foot with 
Dean himself. Both his foot and his existence at a previous index are parts of a whole, nothing 
more. But these temporal parts are not mere abstractions. Temporal parts are as concrete and 
particular as the physical parts of Dean. Both are aggregates that make up the whole concrete 
individual. 
This raises a related issue which it is worth pausing to consider, namely, whether whatever parts 
an object possesses are essential to that object (as it perdures/endures through spacetime), or 
whether an object can gain or lose parts over time, whilst remaining the same object. There are 
260 Caveat: depending, of course, on what, in their view, constitutes the bearer of identity. 
261 In his Metaphysics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964), chapter 6, Richard Taylor speaks of the passage 
of an object through time as ýpure becoming', noting that it is possible to speak of a thing passing through 
time without a change in physical properties, but changing in its temporal status (past present and ftiture). 
Thus something can conceivably age without change in its physical parts (although, such a statement is, 
presumably, only an approximation. There will always be subatomic changes to anything which persists 
through time). The present discussion presupposes, with Taylor, that changes through time are real 
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those endurantists who claim that Parts of an object must be essential to that object for the 
object to remain the same object through spacetime. "' This doctrine is usually called 
mereological essentialism. It is the notion that any thing has all of its actual parts essentially, or 
necessarily, not merely accidentally or contingently. Such endurantists take the numerical 
identity of a part of a thing existing at one time, with another part of the same thing existing at 
another time to be a constituent of a thing's persisting through time. However, although this 
argument has been favoured by some endurantists, it does not preclude use by perdurantists. In 
what follows we shall presume that perdurantists have every right to maintain some form of 
mereological essentialism, and that this position is defensible in terms of what Edwards has to 
say on the matter. 263 But this assertion requires justification. 
So, let PD refer to a perduring object, and P and D separately refer to two parts which make up 
that perduring concrete particular. What happens if PD loses one of its parts, say P? Does the 
loss of P mean that PD no longer exists, or that PD has changed its parts such that mereological 
I essentialism is false? The answer to these questions is that if PD loses part P it still has the sairne 
number of parts, which may seem peculiar. But on a perdurantist ontology, the parts making up 
PD may be scattered through spacetime and PD still perdure as a whole without loss. 
To illustrate: if Trevor buys a Ford Capri and leaves it in the garage overnight, but during the 
night, Dean and Wayne break into the garage and steal the wheels from Trevor's car, selling 
them on at the earliest opportunity, does that mean that Trevor's car no longer has the same 
parts that it once did? In a 'loose' or 'pre-philosophical' sense, we might think that it does, since 
the tyres are no longer on the car; in fact they have been sold to someone else and are on that 
person's car instead. But in a 'strict' or 'philosophical' sense, Trevor's Capri still has the same 
parts that it had prior to the theft of the tyres, since the fact that the tyres now make up part of 
another car are - in this strict sense at least - irrelevant. They may be spatially separated from 
the car, but they still occupy a region of spacetime which make up the concrete particular 
'Trevor's Capri'. It is just that the space that they previously occupied has been vacated by 
them. But they are still parts of the concrete particular that we began with. Hence, a perdurantist 
can affirm a form of mereological essentialiSM. 264 
changes (whether of person stages, or spacetime worms), and that time is a concept which has a 
meaningftil content over and against arguments to the contrary by philosophers like McTaggart. 
262 For example, Chisholm in Person and Object (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976). 
263 Notice that we are not making the stronger claim that perdurantists should hold this view, only that 
they may. Similarly, the claim about Edwards is not that he does hold to this doctrine (he does not 
explicitly endorse it to my knowledge since it postdates him), but that the structure of his metaphysics 
allow him to do so, or at the very least, provide no obstacle to doing so. 
264 See Roderick Chisholm's Person and Object, Appendix B, for a discussion of mereological 
essentialism. The terms of reference in the above argument, in particular the notions of the 'strict or 
philosophical' and 'loose or pre-philosophical' persistence of parts have been taken from Chisholm. 
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(5: 2) Dense and Discrete time 
265 
Most perdurantists go on to assert that it is coherent to believe that for a particular individual, 
Dean, that Dean can be divided into a smallest part, namely instantaneous temporal slices of 
three dimensions. 266 Some philosophers, such as Richard Swinburne, have contested that such a 
conception is unhelpful; that the notion of a temporally durationless slice is problematic, and 
should be abandoned in favour of a more endurantist approach utilizing temporal periods 
instead. Thus Swinburne argues that when we ascribe properties to an object, we do so to an 
object over a period of time, and when we do refer to instants, they are usually in the context of 
ascribing to the object properties which the object has over a period of time including the instant 
in question. Hence, 
It is difficult to see what would be meant by an object being green at 2 p. m. although it was not green 
I either before or after 2 p. m. It was green for a period of zero duration, and how could that differ from its 
Nfichael Jubian in his Contemporary Metaphysics, An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), chapter 9, 
section 9.2, p. 160 ff., maintains that the question of whether or not one holds to mereological 
essentialism is a modal issue only. It does not represent a prior commitment to whether things change 
their parts over time, or not. That is, it does not commit the philosopher at the outset to a particular view 
of identity-through-time: 'it would be a very awkward to accept a liberal view of physical objects ... while 
rejecting mereological essentialisn-L It is very important to notice that this does not commit us to any 
particular view about change of parts "over time. " It's strictly a modal principle. The issue, therefore, was 
whether things could have had different parts, not whether things gain or lose parts' (p. 163). 
265 It n-dght be thought odd that I do not discuss contemporary views of the fall in chapter 2, but take 
account of contemporary views of time in this chapter. However, as I pointed out in chapter 2, the idea 
there was to isolate and analyze the traditional conception of the fall, to see whether the philosophical 
problems it raises for theodicy (specifically, how an unfallen, morally responsible individual can fall into 
sin) can be resolved. However, on the matter of persistence through time, it is important to have some 
parameters to the discussion before setting about trying to assess whether Edwards' account represents a 
coherent position. This state of affairs is also a reflection of Edwards' own interests. His concern with the 
fall had to do with the traditional question pertaining to its coherence (he assumed that it was historical 
too, of course). But his interests in scientific questions was far more 'modem' than 'medieval', as 
Wallace Anderson points out: 'In is basic conception, Edwards' theory of the nature of physical world 
belongs decidedly to the modem rather than the medieval age. Throughout his scientific writings, his 
masters were Descartes, Gassendi, Boyle, and Newton, though in most cases he knew their contributions 
through secondary sources. For all his failures to grasp the full ramifications of their theories, to master 
the necessary mathematical tools for modem physics, and to submit his various hypotheses to 
experimental tests ... 
he nevertheless adopted with a whole heart their conception of a scientific 
explanation of the phenomena of nature. ' YE& 47. 
'66 Loux points out that there are those perdurantists who are agnostic about this smallest divisible part of 
a concrete individual - Heller, for example. He says, 'One question about four-dimensional objects is 
whether it is possible to have zero extent along the temporal dimension - Can there be instantaneous 
objects? I do not have a strong opinion about this one way or the other. ' The Ontology of Physical 
Objects, p. 6. It may be that for any temporal part there is a temporally smaller part, as shall be made clear 
in the following discussion. See Loux, Metaphysics, p. 206. In this regard, we could distinguish between 
temporally durationless time-slices, and instantaneous slices. Whereas temporally durationless slices are 
3-D slices of a 4-D temporal worm, instantaneous slices may simply be slices of the smallest possible 
duration. 
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not being green at all? Certainly, things like winning a race or becoming 60 years old can happen at an 
instant. But one becomes 60 at an instant if and only if that instant is the bounding point of a period of 
sixty years during which one has lived. And one wins a race at a certain instant if and only if one has run 
it for a period ending at that instant and there is a final segment of that period (however small) during all 
of which one is ahead of the field. These things apparently happening at an instant are thus analyZable in 
terms of things happening over periods of time. 267 
The distinction being made here turns on whether time is discrete or dense. Swinburne 
maintains a version of discrete time, which means that he thinks time has no smallest instant. 
Instead, there can only be shortest lengths of time. 268 Most perdurantists want to hold a dense 
view of time, where time is composed of instants, such that where there are any two instants 
there is a third between them. This means that for any period bounded by two points, that period 
must have a third point between the two; it must be divisible. Thus, for a period of a second, or 
even a fraction of a second, that time must be divisible still further, to the point of infinity. Any 
given period of time on the dense theory is made up of an infinity of instants contiguous with 
each other in sequence. 
But this raises an important question for the perdurantist: how can a series of durationless 
instants be added together to form a period, however small? To put it another way, the 
perdurantist is claiming that spacetime can be sliced up into zero duration moments (even this 
use of 'moment' is anachronistic in this regard). But this means that no matter how many such 
fmoments' are added together, even an infinite number of them, will only = 0, since none of 
them have any duration and 0=0. Not even an infinite number of these slices can perdure for 
even a nanosecond; so the notion of durationless slices appears to present enormous conceptual 
difficulties. 
'6' The Christian God, P. 72. 
268 Some physicists, who apply the findings of quantum mechanics to relativity in a bid to find some 
common ground between the two, believe that the shortest period of time is 10 to the power -43 of a 
second (the so-called Planck time). Below that smallest period, it is argued, measurements of time may 
well become meaningless. However, those who oppose this view and maintain a dense view of time do so 
on the basis of Einstein's Tbeory of Relativity which seems to imply that there is no shortest interval 
between periods, only instants. The problem, well known and mooted in popular science literature, is that 
these two theories are incompatible, but that both are confirmed by the observational evidence. Until they 
can be reconciled in a 'theory of everything' (pace Stephen Hawking), if such a theory ever arrives, or 
until such time as one or either is superceded by some other, better theoretical explanation, (such as 
super-string theory is attempting) the two theories of time are deadlocked. Until this issue is resolved, it 
appears to be scientifically justifiable to hold either view of time. For the present purpose, it is important 
only to note that the perdurantist tradition, of which I am claiming Edwards is a member, takes up the 
dense view, over and against the endurantist, discrete view of time. 
The modem debate is particularly important for the question of whether time had a point of origin. For an 
accessible introduction to these issues see Quentin Smith and L Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and 
Freedom (London: Routledge, 1995), Dialogues I and 2. 
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The problem lies with assuming that a number of instants can be added together to form a larger 
whole. Any period if it is composed of instants of zero duration, must contain an infinite 
number of such instants. The period between two seconds has an infinite number of instants, as 
does the sixty minutes that make up an hour, or the twelve months which make up a year. In 
dense time a period between tI and t2 is made up of an infinity of instants, but that set of 
instants is not countable. And if it is not countable, then the concept of addition with regard to 
adding up all the instants to make duration, or period, is redundant. The mathematical notion of 
countablility assumes that the number of items to be added together can be placed in a one-to- 
one relation with all the positive integers that exist. But an infinite number of instants over a 
period (of whatever duration) is too great to be placed in such a relation, on the basis that the 
infinity involved in any period of such instants is an uncountable infinity, that is, it exceeds the 
amounts of positive integers in the infinite set of positive integers and as a consequence, cannot 
be put in a one-to-one relation with them to be countable. So such periods cannot be countable 
in principle. 
This requires some explanation. Mathematicians since Georg Cantor-269 speak of different kinds 
of infinity, and this is the distinction upon which the argument hangs. The infinite number of 
positive integers represents a countable infinity. The totality of real numbers is not. The reason 
for this is that the set of real numbers, by contrast to the set of positive integers (1,2,3,4 ... 
), 
includes all those numbers which can be expressed in a decimal form, including irrational 
numbers like 3.1475939... as well as all those numbers which come between any two integers, 
such as 1.11111 L. 3,1.111111121.., 
1.111111131... and so on. The point is that the uncountable 
infinity of real numbers is more numerous than the infinity of positive numbers, though both are 
infinite. And because this is the case, an infinite which is uncountable is more numerous (where 
(more numerous' in this context refers to the fact that an uncountable infinity cannot be put in 
one-to-one correspondence with a countable one) than an infinite which is countable. In a 
similar way, the infinity of moments involved in any period (tI to tn) are more numerous than 
the infinite number of positive numbers. Hence they are uncountable infinities. 
But this raises a further objection: if each interval is made up of an infinite number of instants, 
then each interval (however long or short) must be of the same length. Clearly each interval is 
269 Regarding Cantor (1845-1918), see The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. ) Ted Honderitch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), entry "Cantor, Georg", p. 119. It says this of his work on 
infinities: 'A set has the same number of members as another if each member of either set can be paired 
with a unique member of the other. If a set can be put into such a one-to-one correspondence with the 
integers it is said to be denumerable. Cantor demonstrated the denumerability of algebraic nwnbers ... and 
the non-denumerability of real numbers, numbers whose decimal expansion need not repeat or terniinate'. 
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not the same length (a year is longer than a second). Tberefore, the theory of dense time seems 
to be false. 
In response to this, an analogy can be made with two line segments of unequal length. If a 
person were to ask how many spatial points there are on the shorter line segment, the answer 
would be the same as for the longer line segment (no matter how much longer it is), namely, an 
infinite number. Any line of whatever length can be divided into an infinite number of points 
along that line. In a similar way, there are just as many instantaneous temporal points in a period 
of short duration (a second) as there are for a period of much longer duration (an hour), because 
both are made up of an uncountable infinity of instants. 270 
This problem echoes Zeno's paradox of the arrow, and its solution is in many ways parallel to 
the present problem. 271 Zeno maintained, as a follower of Parmenides, that all change is illusory. 
This has application to motion too, against which his famous paradoxes were directed (of which 
we have only Aristotle's recollection extant). The point of the arrow paradox was to show that 
an arrow at each stage of its flight is at rest. And if it is at rest at each moment (here read 
durationless instant), then it does not move at all; the motion of the arrow through the air is an 
illusion. Aristotle,, who defended a discrete view of time,, complained that this was no real 
paradox, since 'time is not composed of indivisible instants'. 272 However, this is no solution for 
the defender of dense time. Another solution needs to be sought. If Zeno's argument is set out in 
the following fashion: 
(1) At each instant, the arrow does not move 
270 In a similar way Loux comments, 'An intriguing question is whether we can suppose that a temporally 
extended object like me is an aggregate made up exclusively of instantaneous slices. One might think not. 
Here, it is tempting to argue that just as we cannot construe three-dimensional solids as made up 
exclusively of their two-dimensional slices (on the grounds that no matter how many two-dimensional 
slices one "stacks up, " one will never produce a ffiree-dimensional object), so one cannot get a four- 
dimensional object out of merely three dimensional parts. ' This point is also made by Heller in The 
Ontology of Physical Objects, p. 6. However, the idea that one can slice a three-dimensional solid into 
two-dimensional slices is an abstraction. Though logically possible, it is impracticaL But the question of 
whether a period of time can be similarly sliced up into durationless instants is not a simple abstraction. 
For the occasionalist, like Edwards, and for certain defenders of Einsteinian Relativity, such a notion is 
basic to their understanding of how time works, without which their metaphysical superstructure would 
collapse. 
271 It might be thought that this problem better mirrors Zeno's first argument against (Pythagorean) 
motion, that is, the paradox of (crossing) the stadium. However, as Guthrie points out, this is not the case 
since the first two arguments against motion (the Stadium Paradox and Achilles and the Tortoise), 
'depended on the assumption that a spatial length could not be reduced to minimal units but was infinitely 
divisible. This one [The Arrow Paradox], on the other hand, is only effective on the premise that time 
consists of indivisible minimal instants. ' A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), p. 93. It is this problem which has application to perdurantism. 
272 Physics Z9.239b 5, cited in R. M. Sainsbury's Paradoxes, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 2 1. What follows reflects Sainsbury's treatment of these issues. 
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necessarily, God diffuses his own fullness. 
413 
The implication of Edwards' position is that it is fittest and best that God diffuse himself ad 
extra. God's Will is necessarily determined to this end (since it is fittest and best), such that he 
could not not will it. And since God's will is omnipotent, what he wills necessarily happens. 
Therefore, God necessarily diffuses himself ad extra, creating a world in which created minds 
know, love and rejoice in God. However, this understanding of (2a) seems to imply 
parientheism, since it seems to say that God wills to diffuse himself at all times. If he wills to 
diffuse himself at all times,, then he will diffuse himself at all times. But this means that the 
creation in which God diffuses himself must be eternal, since it is always God's will to diffluse 
himself, and his will cannot be frustrated. 
However, this is to confuse God's possession of a property of willing to diffuse himself ad extra 
with the effect of that diffusion. That is, it confuses the fact that a timeless God can eternally 
and necessarily will something to happen, with that thing happening at a particular temporal 
index. This relation can be expressed tenselessly to distinguish between God's willing 
something, and the index at which that willing takes place. God could timelessly will, 
at 11: 40 am, June 20th, 2001 Oliver writes this proposition down 
And there be no conflict with the notion that God timelessly wills this to come to pass. God's 
willing and effecting what he wills are two separate, but related things. Therefore, there is no 
necessity that the diffusion of God's benevolence ad extra be co-terminus with his willing of 
that diflusion. 
But, this still leaves room for a doctrine of panentheism. 414 Wainwright argues that Edwards 
believes the divine attributes are distinct from divine being, and God's self-communication is a 
communication of his love, holiness and knowledge, but not of his being. 415 Presumably this 
means he remains distinct from creation, though he maintains its continued being moment-by- 
413 Numbers prefixing these propositions have been adjusted. Wainwright claims that Edwards is 
committed to (13)-(16), and is therefore committed to (17). See Wainwright, "The Necessity of 
Creation", p. 264, note 204, where (13)-(17) arc laid out. 
414 Panentheism is roughly the idea that the universe is part of God, but that God is greater than the 
universe (a little like a slice of bread is part of the loaf, but the loaf is greater than the one slice). This can 
be distinguished from pantheism, which for our purposes denotes the view that God and the world are 
identical. See H. P Owen, Concepts ofDeity (London: Macmillan, 1971), who says, 'although pantheists 
differ among themselves at many points, they all agree in denying the basic theistic claim that God and 
the world are ontologically distinct. ' (p. 65. ) 
415 "The Necessity of Creation", p. 124-125: 'God's self-communication is a communication of love, 
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moment, ex nihilo (his occasionalism). Thus God communicates the fullness of his real 
properties but not his being or substance. I do not find this plausible as a means of 
circumventing the problem of panentheism, particularly if, as I have argued elsewhere, -416 
Edwards defends a version of divine simplicity. For if God is simple, then how can he 
communicate his properties without communicating his being as well? 
This raises the question of how God's creation can be necessary. If God constantly pursues his 
own glory as his principle end in creation, it must be a voluntary act, not an emanation, 
otherwise it would be parientheistic. But for Edwards, God could not have pursued another end 
than the one he did because his nature is such that he could not will otherwise. He had to pursue 
his own glory in creation. But this is not inconsistent with divine freedom, any more than the 
fact that we cannot help but will happiness is inconsistent with our freedom, providing that 
God's freedom is construed as a species of compatibilism. 
However,, this in turn raises a question about the perfect happiness of God. Is Edwards 
I suggesting that God in having to create ad extra to display his glory would not have been happy 
without creating? Is God's happiness dependent upon his creating a world where he can display 
his glory? If so, then he is not free and independent of the creation, which is a diminution of 
divine perfection. Wainwright suggests a 'way out' for Edwards, which will instantiate (2a) as 
coherent. He claims that Edwards requires a robust concept of 'self' for his argument to work, 
but provided that can be found, it will work. Wainwright defines such a robust version of 'self 
as including the following components, 
(Edwardsian)'self Df. - the self includes the agent, the agent's activities and the effects and/or 
products of those activities which are inseparable from, reflect, or image the agents' perfections. 
This applies to Edwards' defence of (2a) in the following way. Creatures and creaturely love, 
knowledge and joy in God are 'part' of God only in the sense of 'self just outlined, not in the 
common-sense notion of self. That is, creatures are, 
(a) inseparable and dependent on the activity of God which produces them (occasionalism), and 
(b) they express the character and being of their producer (God), thus being part of the producer, 
but not identical with him. 
416 See "Jonathan Edwards on Divine Simplicity" in Religious Studies, (forthcoming). 
215 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
The example Wainwright gives to this effect is that of a song, dance or dream which is part of 
the self in the attenuated sense, but not in a commonsense way. Therefore, God places part of 
his happiness in his saints in the attenuated sense defined above (wherein they are part of 
himself), but in the common-sense fashion the creatures remain something other than God. Thus 
there is room, on this revised definition of 'self for a two-tier understanding of the relationship 
between creator and creatures such that at one level we are part of God and at another we are 
distinct from him. Wainwright claims that this may be unorthodox, but it is defensible. 417 
The third component of Edwards' claim about creation is (2b). If God creates to display his 
glory, and if he has to create some world, does he have to create this world? 
Central to Edwards' argument is the notion that God is free only in a compatibilist sense. He 
acts according to his character and attributes, which are perfect, and timelessly eternal. Hence, 
'choice' is something of a misnomer, since all God's acts are timelessly eternal (or perhaps 
better, God is a timelessly eternal act). He does have a choice in that he has before him the 
counterfactual possibilities to any world he actualizes, but Edwards believed that such a God 
would not only create some world, he had to create this one, since he would necessarily create 
the best possible world (BPW). 
This doctrine has had a somewhat chequered career. But if God creates what is fittest and best, 
arguably he creates a BPW. From there it is one step to the conclusion that he must create this 
world. 418 Wainwright lays out a BPW thesis that might have commended itself to Edwards: 
(18) necessarily, God creates the BPW. 
(19) God has created Charly (where Charly is the proper name of the possible world that 
happens to be actual, namely, this one). Therefore, 
(20) Charly is the BPW (from (18) and (19)). 
417 Once again, this seems dubious to me. I am not convinced that Wainwright does enough to get 
Edwards off the hook with respect to panentheism. But there is not space here to pursue this matter. 
418 Reference must be made at this juncture to Robert Adam's article "Must God Create the Best? ", in 
Morris (ed. ) The Concept of God. There Adams calls the whole BPW tradition into question. He claims 
that God may create a world which is inferior in some respect to a BPW, if it does not violate someone's 
rights, and if it does not manifest a character flaw in the Creator (by not creating the best when he could 
have). Let us pass on the first of these claims, which is not important to Edwards' argument. The second 
is, and needs some, albeit brief, comment. 
Adams claims that God may have reason not to create a BPW if (iff.? ) he creates this world to display his 
grace. Divine grace is usually understood to be integral to divine actions, and God could thereby create a 
less than BPW, if it meant creating some individuals which could not be created in any other world 
(which is itself a big ij). As we shall see, Edwards circumvents this whole argument by arguing that 
God's supreme delight is in his own self-glorification and that this represents the overarching reason for 
his creating this world (or any world, were that possible according to Edwards). So, grace is subservient 
to God's self-glorification. On this basis, it seems to me that Edwards reconstitutes a species of BPW 
argument which outflanks Adam's criticisms. 
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(2 1) Necessarily, Charly is the BPW. (From (20) and the proposition that "being the BPW' is an 
essential property of the world that has it. ) 
It follows that 
(22) Necessarily, God creates Charly. (From (18) and (2 1). )419 
Edwards had no problem with this line of reasoning, since he denied contingency in any shape 
or form, and maintained that even divine freedom involved a form of compatibilism. 420 Ffis 
FOW set out to demonstrate that this is all that can be meant by the notion of freedom. So it is 
no limitation upon God that he has to create a world to display his glory ad extra, or that he has 
to create this best possible world, once a divine compatibilism is accepted. 
Some contemporary philosophers like Swinburne, have maintained that the notion of a BPW is 
incoherent, on the grounds that God has libertarian freedom and therefore there is no single 
BPW open to him to create. Either he actualizes one from a set of possible unsurpassable 
I worlds,, or for every created world there is a better one, since there can be no world which has 
an intrinsic moral optimum which would make it necessary for God to actualise it. Thus 
Swinbume, 
However many persons God made, for example (even if it were an ftTinite number), he could always add 
another one (at a sufficient distance from the others so as not to crowd them out) and then there would be 
a better world. It follows that the objection from the existence of bad states of affitirs to the existence of 
God is not that he did not create the 'best of all possible worlds', for to do that is not logically possible: 
there is no best of all possible worlds. 42 1 
This is a strong claim, but it can be refuted in the following way. Let us assume first, that 
Swinburne's thesis involves the first of our claims, that there are a number of unsurpassable 
worlds one of which God chooses to actualize. This is a fairly weak claim, easily overcome. Let 
us assume, for the sake of argument, that there is an infinite possible set of counterfactual 
worlds which God could actualize. Of this set, there is a sub-set of unsurpassable worlds of 
some number. 422 The problem with this is that if there are a number of unsurpassable worlds, 
419 Wainwright, "The Necessity of Creation", p. 127. 
420 See Wainwright's argument to this effect in "The Necessity of Creation". 
421 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, p. 8. Swinburne makes a similar point in his earlier 
volume, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199 1), pp. 113 -115. 
422 Whether there is an infinite number of such worlds is beside the point- What is important to note is 
that the number of such worlds make up a sub-set of the total counterfactuals open to God to actualize. 
There could, for example, be a subset of unsurpassable worlds wl ch is itself inf te just e me way Ii mi in th sa 
that the infinite set of prime numbers is a sub-set of the infinite set of natural numbers. 
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God would have no reason to actualize one rather than another. For if there is a set of 
unsurpassable worlds, how does God choose which if them he should actualize? Not on the 
basis of merit, since all are unsurpassable. And if each appear to be unsurpassable to the divine 
intellect, then it seems that he would have no reason to actualize one over another such world. 
Second, it might appear that, for any world, if there is one better, then God would have no 
reason for actualizing this one rather than another. And if for any world, there was one better, 
then for any one world, God would have a better reason for actualizing another, better world, ad 
infinitum. And assuming that a reason which God might have for creating one world cannot be 
sufficient where there is another, better world which God could actualize, then, for any world, 
God does not have a sufficient reason for actualizing it over another world. However, it does not 
follow that if there is a better world God could actualise, he should actualise that world over 
another, deontologically less good world. Philosophers who endorse satisficing 
consequentialism, like Michael Slote, deny this kind of argument with respect to moral 
I decisions. 42' Satisficing denotes the pursuit of a satisfactory, but less than optimum result for 
some agent or group. In this context, it might be that all God seeks to achieve in creation is the 
actualization of a world that is satisfactory, rather than maximal. However, though this is a 
possibility, it is hardly an option that Edwards would have countenanced. For Edwards, God did 
all things for his greater glory. The creation of a world which might be deontologically 
satisfactory, rather than deontologically excellent seems hardly to accord with what Edwards 
takes to be the end to which God aims in his creation of the world. 424 (There is also a third 
option, which I shall leave to one side: that there are worlds which are incommensurable. If 
there are such worlds, then the notion of a BPW has no application. ) 
William Rowe has attacked this second argument against a BPW thesis, on the basis of two 
principles. 42' The first assumes that if God creates a world when there is a morally better world 
that he could have created, then it is possible that there exists a being morally better than God. 
The second follows this: If a being is essentially perfectly good, then it is not possible that there 
exist a being morally better than it. Wainwright claims that these two principles may hide a 
third. This is that, ceteris paribus, 'if an omnipotent, omniscient being, A, is willing to settle for 
a creatable world which is less good than the world which another omnipotent, omniscient 
423 See Slote, "Satisficing Consequentialism" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volw-ne LVIII (1984): 139-163. 
424 See End ofCreation in YE8, and Appendix B of this thesis. 
425 The paper in which Rowe lays this argument out is cited in the Wainwright essay (p. 266, note 220) as 
unpublished, and entitled, "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom", (paper presented at the 
Philosophy of Religion Society meeting, San Francisco, 1993). 
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being, B, eCt). 3 426 is willing to settle for, A is less good than B (and hence isn't perB Wainwright 
rejects these claims by Rowe, but they seem to apply to the argument laid out by Swinbume 
provided Swinbume's argument involves the second, rather than the first of the two options 
against a BPW thesis. Moreover, taken along the lines that Edwards sets out in End of Creation, 
they provide a strong thesis against the application of satisficing consequentialism to BPWs. 
Edwards might argue that a being who is excellent and perfect should create the BPW since if 
he does not do so, it is possible there is a being more perfect than he is, who does create a 
morally better world than he does, and is therefore more excellent as a result. 
Leaving to one side the detail of Wainwright's response, it is sufficient for present purposes to 
note that Edwards' endorsement of a BPW thesis is coherent, pace Swinbume, providing that 
divine freedom is understood in terms of a version of compatibilism, and that God is timeless. 
Moreover, if Edwards is right (and that may seem to be a pretty sizeable if), then God does 
create to display his glory, thereby glorifying himself, and he creates out of necessity. Finally, 
given the structure of Edwards' argument, if he has to create some world or other, he has to 
create this world, since such a God would be constrained by his own character to create a BPW, 
(provided the concept of a BPW is not incoherent). We may add one rider to all this in light of 
discussion on original guilt. If God necessarily creates a BPW and this is that world, then it is 
also true that God necessarily creates a perdurantist, rather than endurantist world, since this is 
the world which (in Edwards' view) obtains, and the world which obtains is the best possible. 
Hence, Edwards' God is absolved of the charge of VoluntariSM. 427 
426 Wainwright, "Jonathan Edwards, William Rowe, and the Necessity of Creatiorf', p. 132. It could be 
argued that there simply is no intrinsic maximwn to any possible world, because there are infinite 
possible worlds, and that that is the point Swinbume is making. This means that the whole notion of a 
best possible world is meaningless, because it is logically incoherent. But this argument assumes that 
there is no world-indexed intrinsic maximum, since for any one world there could be an infinitely greater 
set of worlds, a notion which Edwards (and presumably Leibniz) would resist. Besides which, this does 
not answer the question of why it is that God actualizes any world above another if there is no BPW. 
What makes this world so special that God creates it, rather than another, and how could he justify that if 
there are other, better worlds which he could have actualized? (unless, of course, he has actualized them 
all). 
427 It may be that a more direct route to the same conclusion could be provided via an argument that a 
non-perdurantist world (perhaps even a non-occasionalist world), would diminish God's sovereignty. 
However, Edwards does not, to my knowledge, provide such an argument. 
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(9) Adversus Edwards: Quinn and the problem of persisting-through-time 
A third line of attack centres upon the metaphysics of Edwards' occasionalism. There have been 
numerous contemporary treatments of this position which, until recently, had languished in the 
back room of discarded philosophical doctrine. Philip L. Quinn has dealt with this over several 
articles, as have Jonathan Kvanvig and Hugh McCann from a slightly different perspective. 
Alfred J. Freddoso has also done some relevant work in the history of philosophical ideas in the 
same area. 4" But it is Quinn's treatment of the issues pertaining to Edwards' doctrine that is of 
particular interest here. What follows is a critical exposition of Quinn's arguments and his 
critique of Edwardsian occasionalism followed by an analysis of whether the Edwardsian 
doctrine outlined thus far can withstand his criticisms. 
(9: 1) Divine conservation, continuous creation and human action again 
Quinn has devoted considerable amounts of time to the exposition of problems involved in 
creation, conservation and occasionalism. 429He sets out his approach in two distinct sections, 
using terms that echo those we have already utilized in discussing the nature of Edwards' 
occasionalism in chapter 6. His first section outlines a version of conservation that involves a 
strong doctrine of occasionalism. that is parallel in its substance and outcome to that given by 
Edwards in OS. By outlining this argument Quinn hopes to show that, although it appears 
conducive to theism, in fact it causes insuperable problems for personal identity and persistence 
through time, problems that Edwards is unable (or perhaps unwilling) to address. Having 
outlined the argument, and drawn the parallel with Edwards, Quinn proceeds to dismantle it in 
stages. This done, he turns to the construction of a revised doctrine of conservation, one which 
has less intuitive appeal, but which is, according to Quinn, able to overcome precisely those 
problems raised by the first (Edwardsian) argument. It is this first Edwardsian argument which 
is of particular interest to us. 
428 These texts can be found in: The Existence and Nature of God, (ed. ) Alfred I Freddoso chapter 3; 
Philosophical Perspectives 5, Philosophy of Religion, 1991, (ed. ) Tomberlin pp. 587-615; and Divine 
and Human Action, Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, (ed. ) Morris, chapters 1-3. The Kvanvig and 
McCann and Freddoso articles are of more peripheral interest to the specifics of Edwardsian 
occasionalism, since the forms of occasionalism they espouse tend to be less radical than the Edwardsian 
doctrine in their implications for the integrity of human action. 
429 See "Divine Conservation, Continuous Creation, and Human Action" in The Existence and Nature of 
God, chapter 3. Quinn continues to reflect on the issues, but not specifically upon Edwards' views, in his 
later essay, "Divine Consen7ation, Secondary Causes and Occasionalism", in Divine and Human Action. 
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In what follows, as before, T refers to a temporal slice, in this case, one which is defined as a 
durationless instant of time, 'x' refers to individual things, and 'A' refers to (human) actions. 
The argument proceeds as follows: 
1) for all x, if x is contingent, and x begins to exist, then God creates x. 
This is open-ended enough to allow several possible interpretations in line with the definitions 
that Quinn lays out. The first is compatible with deism: 
(Pla) God creates x at tl, but does not actively conserve x after tI, at any subsequent 
temporal intervals 
altematively, (P 1) could be conjoined with, 
(Plb) God creates x at tI, but x exists only intermittently, failing to obtain at certain 
temporal intervals, only to begin existing again at a later interval, such that an x might 
exists at t 1. and t3, but not at t2 in a temporal sequence. 
This is compatible with one theistic view of resurrection. The third option is the one that Quinn 
pursues, since it is compatible with occasionalism, 
(P 1 c) God creates x at t 1, but x cannot persist beyond tI without the constant recreation 
of x at times subsequent to tl, such that God continues to create x at t2 and all 
subsequent temporal instances in which x obtains. 
There is a further possibility that makes an unsupported (P 1) problematic. This is, 
(P I d) x is an uncreated contingent. 
This proposition is possible where time has no beginning and contingence is conceived in terms 
of an everlasting temporal continuum with no beginning. Quinn defines his use of the 
proposition 'x is contingent', synthetically. That is, x may or may not obtain in a given state of 
affairs; it is ontologically contingent. Thus, 'x exists at t' serves to demonstrate merely that x 
exists at a certain temporal slice. Quinn goes on to say that (P 1) means that all contingent things 
that begin to exist are created by God. If this is the case, it presumes that time has a first 'instant 
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and that x is created either at that instant, or at a subsequent moment by God. But there is still 
the possibility that all contingents are merely logically contingent, where time has no first 
moment. And since (P 1) does not stipulate in precise terms the view of contingence in use, 
(P I d) is consistent with (P 1). 
It is Quinn's objective to exclude (Pla) and (Pld), and select (PIc) as the most coherent 
understanding of divine creation and conservation, with (Plb) as a potential application of 
(P I c). To this end he amends (P 1) in, 
(P2) for all x, if x is contingent, then God conserves x. 
This represents a strong view of conservation, which excludes the possibility of deism outlined 
in (Pla). It is based upon two definitional schemata. First, that for any x, where x is conserved 
at t by God, x is conserved at t such that 'x exists at t if and only if God at t brings it about that x 
exists at t'. Second, God's conservation of x means that 'for all t, [that is, all times at which x 
exists] at t God conserves x. '4'0 This strong model of conservation, is the natural stepping stone 
to a version of occasionalism. This is supplied in, 
(P3) for all x, if x is contingent and x begins to exist, then God continuously creates x. 
1LY- 
Here an individual x is such that it is instantiated at tI and continues to exist just in case God 
continues to recreate it at subsequent points in a temporal sequence, t2, O. An. This picks up the 
occasionalistic tone of (P I c), making it explicit. 
Quinn believes that this also has the advantage of explaining the Cartesian idea that the only 
real difference between a strong view of conservation (P2) and occasionalism (P3) is a 
distinction of the reason. For, 
[t1he only difference between conservation and continuous creation has nothing to do with God's activity 
or a contingent individual's dependence upon it; it is merely that a continuously created individual, being 
created, has not previously existed. We think of a created individual as being produced by God after not 
previously having existed, and we think of a conserved individual as being produced by God even if it has 
previously existed. The difference lies, not in the divine power at work at the instant when God acts, but 
430 (ýWnn, "Divine Conservation, Continuous Creation, and Human Action", p. 6 1. 
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in how we conceive of the temporal antecedents of the individual whose existence God's activity then 
431 
produces . 
The problem with (P3) is that it sets up considerable obstacles to persistence through time for 
any x, and therefore offers considerable difficulties for a doctrine of personal identity. Let us 
call these initial problems the problems of persistence through time and the problem of 
personal identity respectively. If x persists for a single durationless moment, and is then 
recreated at a second such moment by God, it is difficult to see how the particular x can be said 
to be the same x that existed at the previous moment. For even if the x that exists in a 
reconstituted state at t2 is the same as the x that existed at tI in all of its properties, one can still 
legitimately ask whether this new x is actually the same x, or merely an exact replica of the 
original tl x. Whichever it is, there are considerable problems about how there can be an 
identity between two x's that exist at two sequentially adjacent durationless moments, (one 
version of the so-called identity of indiscernibles). For, if the x of t2 is to be identified with the 
x of tl, how is that x to be understood to be an object persisting through time? After all, it is 
being recreated at each moment, and therefore by definition cannot be said to persist. Hence the 
two problems that (P3) faces. 
Now these two difficulties alone, without other related problems that could be raised, are 
usually taken to be enough to call the whole argument into serious question. But as Quinn 
points out, Edwards in OS appears to welcome this outcome without the slightest 
embarrassment. To this end, Quinn cites the passage from OS that deals specifically with this 
question in light of the imputation of Adamic original sin. Here Edwards does appear to take a 
view strikingly similar in tone to that advanced in the above argument. He says, 
God's upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether 
equivalent to an immediate proceeding out of nothing, at each moment because its existence at this 
moment is not merely in part from God, but wholly fTom. him; and not in any pan, or degree, from its 
antecedent existence. 432 
431 Ibid., p. 62. This 'Cartesian' view is in sharp contrast to the Scotist position, which Quinn takes up and 
develops in the second half of this essay. Unlike the Cartesian position outlined here, Scotus maintained 
that creation and conservation are clearly distinguishable events, which are not equivalent Creation is the 
first moment of existence, whereas all subsequent moments of existence are conserved (by God. ) So they 
are conceptually distinct entities. See Scotus, God and Creatures: the Quodlibeta Questions, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 276. cited in Quinn, ibid., p. 67. Edwards makes a similar point to 
Quinn, that creation and conservation are not "properly distinct works'. See The Works of Jonathan 
Echvards VoL II, p. 503, Sect. 24. 
432 Cited in Quinn, ibid., p. 63, from YE3: 402. 
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What is more, Edwards endorses a view which delights in the fact that a particular x does not 
and cannot be said to persist beyond tn. without being recreated at that instant by God, 
If the existence of created substance, in each successive moment be wholly the effect of God's 
immediate power, in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first 
creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect; and simply and 
absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and follows it according 
to a certain established method. And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the 
arbitrary constitution of the Creator; who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these successive 
new effects, that he treats them as one, by communicating to them like properties, relations, and 
circumstances; and so leads us to regard them as one. 433 
So for Edwards,, the non-persistence of x through time reinforces the absolute sovereignty of 
God over the creation and removes any scope for secondary causes in the process of 
conservation. But this means that any notion of the diachronic sameness of x from tI to t2 is, for 
Edwards,, an illusion. Edwardsian occasionalism, as I have already argued, represents a strong 
version of perdurantism. That is, for any x (where x is understood to be a concrete particular), to 
be x, that x consists of a certain number of temporal parts the character of which may change 
through time, as they are recreated each moment by divine power. The perdurantist view 
postulates x as an object which exists in four dimensions, the fourth being time itself Hence the 
perdurantist designation of an x as a spacetime worm. For Edwards' view, as for Quinn's 
Edwardsian occasionalist argument, the doctrine of temporal parts in use stipulates that any 
spacetime worm retains identity only because God continues to keep it as an idea in his mind. 
Tbus the temporal parts involved are the arbitrary recreation of God, not the mutability of the 
properties of x. 
This has very serious consequences for human action. Human action involves at least some 
embodied acts which take time. For instance, if I decide to bludgeon Wayne with a cudgel, this 
action is diachronically indexical: I can separate it out into temporal slices all of which 
contribute to the accomplishment of the act, and all of which are necessary parts of the action. 
But this takes time. It cannot happen instantaneously, since I am an embodied person, and 
embodied persons cannot act in an instantaneous fashion. And if it does take time, then it must 
be that something that is recognizably x endures from tI to t2, such that the whole action that 
takes place over this temporally bounded sequence is recognizably that action of one concrete 
individual, x. Something that is recognizably me must endure throughout the act of bludgeoning 
433 YE3: 402-3. 
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Wayne for the bludgeoning to actually take place. But this is precisely what Edwards denies is 
possible. On Edwards' view, and that outlined by Quinn, I could not actually be said to 
bludgeon Wayne, if by that statement is meant the proposition that, 'x, in bludgeoning Wayne 
persists through time from the moment he conceives of the action and takes up his cudgel until 
the time that the action is complete and Wayne lies in a crumpled heap on the floor. ' This is 
because on the Edwards-Quinn accounts, such a view involves a version of endurantism that 
neither argument can admit of. So, Quinn's criticism of his first 'Edwardsian' argument is an 
example of an endurantist perspective: x can exist wholly and completely at each of several 
different times in a diachronic sequence, and for Edwards to deny this, he must produce a 
perdurantist view which overcomes the apparent problems with his occasionalism. This problem 
we shall designate the problem of the integrity ofhuman action. 
One possible solution to this would be to endorse a view of contingence similar to that outlined 
in (P I d). This would mean that human beings (and other contingent things) do not begin to exist 
at a certain time, they have always existed. But this, as Quaim points out, is contrary to theistic 
orthodoxy, which means it is hardly a solution that Edwards is likely to endorse even if it were 
possible. 
Quinn also mentions what he describes as the 'charming irony 434 of Edwardsian occasionalism 
in OS. It was an attempt on the part of Edwards to overcome problems raised by his doctrine of 
imputation, whilst upholding divine sovereignty in the situation. The net result - that God treats 
the temporal worms in a diachronic sequence as discrete, temporally non-extended objects 
which require his recreation at each moment to 'persist' - is regarded by Edwards as an 
'arbitrary' act of the will of God (viz. as previously, arbitrium, or 'will' of God). Thus, God 
arbitrarily identifies Adam with the whole human race, because of his actions in the Garden. 
But, Adam could not have eaten the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil, since he did not 
persist through time to do so. Hence Edwards not only cuts the ground away from his own 
argument, but is left trying to show how God is not directly responsible for the evil that Adam 
generated. Hence, Edwards destroys the very doctrine his whole occasionalistic argument was 
employed to defend. His argument is susceptible to a kind of tu quoque, which ends up in a 
reductio of Edwards' position. We may designate this the problem of Edwards 'charming 
irony'. 
So, on the basis of Quinn's analysis we are left with several problems for an Edwardsian 
occasionalistic argument. Tliese may be organized in order of strength (the strongest being first 
and the weaker, in descending order, to the last and least), 
434 Quinn, "Divine Conservation, Continuous Creation, and Human Action", p. 66. 
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(i) Persistence through time 
(ii) the integrity of human action 
(iii) personal identity, and 
(iv) Edwards' 'charming irony'. 
It should be clear that (ii) is a version of (i). 435 Together with (iii) they form a group of 
arguments which challenge the coherence of Edwards' view. This is a first order problem, such 
that (iv) only arises if (i)-(iii) can be solved. This is because (iv) deals with the internal 
consistency of Edwards' thinking, which only arises once the problems of coherence are dealt 
with. (iv) could refer to the argument of OS in defence of the doctrine of original sin in 
particular. In addition, it may also imply that the Edwardsian argument is incompatible with 
Edwards' thought as a whole, and the main structures within it (such as free will). Both aspects 
I of (iv) will have to be dealt with, after dealing with (i)-(iii). 
(9: 2) Edwards on perdurance, human action and personal identity 
By way of re-capping what Edwards' position on identity-through-time actually was, he states 
his position on persistence-through-time baldly in the following passage, 
Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created 
objects, existing at different times, but what depends on God's sovereign constitution. 436 
In this section Edwards is dealing with an objection to his strong version of occasional 
4: perdurantism' which stipulates that God cannot make Adam and his posterity into one 
metaphysical unit, since they are not in any recognizable sense a unity. They are made up of 
innumerable individuals all created by God as particular beings. For Edwards, this is built upon 
a false hypothesis, because all things which exist, do exist because God has ordained it that 
way. That is, 'divine constitution is the thing which makes truth, in affairs of this nature. -)437 
This objection presumes that there is a oneness in identity-through-time which is independent of 
and prior to divine constitution, which Edwards cannot admit is the case. He allows that there 
are varieties of identity such as Locke permits in his account in the Essay, and that every kind of 
"' This is the case since the questions raised about human action by Quinn, are part of the greater 
onestion about the integrity of the perdurantist position Edwards' argument assumes. 
4Y6 YE3: 404. 
226 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
identity is regulated, limited and circumscribed by divine constitution so that all things work 
according to divine purposes and metaphysical ordering. This applies to his appropriated usage 
of the Lockean criteria of consciousness as well as habits and dispositions that Edwards 
understood to be the common elements of discussions of personal identity. He goes as far as to 
state that, 'all communications, derivations, or continuation of qualities, properties, or relations, 
natural or moral, from what is past, as if the subject were one, depends on no other foundation. ' 
438 
Tbus far, Edwards seems to be saying what is compatible with the weak version of 
perdurantism, developed in chapter 7. But he develops this position, such that the radical 
implications of his position for personal identity are made manifest: 
I know not why succession, or diversity of time, should make any such constituted union more 
unreasonable, than diversity of place. The only reason, why diversity of time can seem to make it 
unreasonable, is, that difference of time shews, there is no absolute identity of the things existing in those 
different times: but it shews this, I think, not at all more than the difference of the place of existence. 439 
As has already been established earlier in chapters 5,6 and 7, Edwards sees personal identity as 
entirely dependent upon the constitution of God. But what is more important, as the previous 
analysis has demonstrated and as Quinn points out, Edwards' position ends up denying the 
ontological reality of persistence-through-time. It is a metaphysical chimera. All such 
ontological constitutions depend entirely upon God. Earlier, in chapter 7, we developed three 
possible ways in which an Edwardsian conception of imputation might be understood. T'he first 
two were species of perdurantism that did not necessitate occasionalism as part of their 
ontologies: 
(5) God is metaphysically justified in treating PDH as a unity since they share common 
moral properties in a circumscribed region of spacetime, and 
(6) God, by constituting PDH effects a new metaphysical spacetime worm which 
comprises all and only those parts and properties which constitute PDH. 
But the third was an occasional perdurantist version of Edwards' thinking that probably best 
comports with the stronger version of Edwards thinking in OS: 
437 Ibid. 
438 Ibid., p. 405. 439 Ibid., p. 406. 
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(7) God constitutes PDH according to an occasionalist ontology. This means that, 
(7a) the ontological structures of Edwards' metaphysics are entirely dependent upon 
God's will (arbitrium), 440 
(7b) consequently, no metaphysical object is any more or less gerrymandered than 
another since, 
(7c) all metaphysical objects are called into being moment-by-moment ex nihilo by the 
mind of God. 
(7d) Moreover, PDH, Athanasius, Dean (or whatever) are thereby causally dependent 
upon God moment-by-moment, and 
(7e) PDH (or whatever) cannot and do not persist or perdure. Their apparent 
perdurance, and the apparent perdurance of any metaphysical object is (strictly 
speaking) an illusion. 
It should now be clear that the argument Quinn attacks corresponds to something like (7), and 
indeed, Edwards appears to have no adequate response to this attack, since (7) is predicated 
upon the notion that nothing perdures at all (given Edwards' occasionalism). 441 Thus, Edwards 
fails to overcome the problem of persistence-through-time as Quinn outlines it. And, since the 
problem of the integrity of human action is a subdivision of the problem of persistence, he fails 
to adequately account for this difficulty as well. Furthermore, since personal identity is 
constituted in the mind of God and the occasions of his actions, identity itself becomes 
dangerously arbitrary (in the non-Edwardsian sense of that word. ) 
Edwards might respond that this is simply to complain that God ordains all things according to 
his own pleasure and will, which is ludicrous if God is an absolute sovereign in the way in 
which Edwards conceives him. For that amounts to complaining that things are as they are 
440 This depends on whether it is a necessary truth in Edwards' ontology that anything that is contingent 
and exists, does so for only a moment. If this is Edwards' position, then ontological structures are not 
entirely dependent upon God's will. Edwards does not, to my knowledge, claim that this is a necessary 
truth. All he seems to say is that this is the way things are constituted by God, (one might add, in this 
particular world). 
" This raises another question about the coherence of Edwards' doctrine. If he is defending a radical 
occasionalistic thesis (which he is), and if this entails that nothing actually perdures for more than a 
moment (which it does), then in what sense can he be said to be endorsing a perdurantist thesis on 
persistence-through-time? If nothing perdures, then perdurantism itself is redundant for there is no thing 
which can, properly speaking, perdure long enough to have a history in spacetime. Perhaps Edwards 
could be understood to be using a form of perdurantism as a kind of useful approximate model, but even 
this seems to be at odds with his stated aims in OS. At the very least, this should underline the fact that 
the occasionalisfic version of his argument is indeed far more radical than critics like Wainmright give 
Edwards credit for. 
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rather than any other way which we care to conceive of, and God is not subject to human 
whimsy. Nor should the divine ordering of the metaphysics underpinning the world be 
questioned, since humans do not have the epistemic access by which they might cast doubt upon 
God's ontological ordering of things. (Moreover, one might retort - in a more Leibnlzian frame 
of mind - that if God does all things perfectly, according to his benevolent character, then the 
actual state of affairs that obtains is the best state. ) But, of course, this is not a sufficient 
response, since it conflates divine sovereignty with occasionalism. One is not a requirement of 
the other. Edwards could have preserved both a strong version of divine sovereignty with his 
peculiar defence of imputation without recourse to occasionalisn-i, as has already been 
demonstrated in (5) and (6). (6) in particular appears to advocate a position not far from 
Edwards' final view but without its unfortunate consequences for divine and human action or 
perdurance. 
This leaves Edwards in a rather difficult position. It appears that his reconstruction of 
imputation along perdurantist lines fails precisely because his obsession with safeguarding 
divine sovereignty leads him to move beyond what is necessary to his perd-urantisrn, into an 
occasionalism which undermines the very notions of persistence-through-time and personal 
identity which he had sought to defend. But perhaps an 'Edwardsian' reading of his argument 
along the lines of (6), or even (5), would result in a version of perdurance that would suffice to 
shore up his view of imputation without the occasionalistic baggage. 
One final issue remains from Quinn's critique of Edwards' argument for imputation, namely, 
the repercussions these problems in Edwardsian metaphysics have for the very view of 
imputation which he was seeking to defend. Is Edwards guilty, in the words of Quinn, of 
committing himself to a 'charming irony' in his account of the action required by Adam to 
perpetrate original sin? 
The simple answer to the criticism Quinn levels against Edwards at this juncture is that he has 
no sufficient response. If Edwards' defence of imputation is read according to (7), then he has 
indeed cut the ground from under his own metaphorical feet, viz- the need for Adam to persist 
for long enough to commit the first act of sin leading to human corruption in the first place. But 
if, as Quinn points out, Edwards leaves no room for perdurance of any kind, then Adam could 
not persist long enough to do any action let alone eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil. Hence, Edwards succeeds in sinking his own argument through pushing it into 
occasionalistic realms that cannot subsist with his own ostensibly perdurantist ontology. 
Howpver, there may be more mileage in construing a more modest form of Edwardsian 
perdurantism, as per (5) or (6), such that at least one strand of the Edwardsian argument, taken 
without the occasionalism evidenced in (7), could overcome this difficulty. Let us examine how 
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(6) might overcome this probleni, since it appears reasonable to assume that if (6) succeeds, 
then so should (5), since (6) is a hard-perdurantist version of a (5)-type soft-perdurantist 
argument. 
A simple model of the fall, which takes account of persistence-through-time, will suffice to 
elucidate this point: 
(a) God constitutes a state of affairs at t 1, where Adam exists in Eden with Eve. 
(b) At t2 Eve offers Adam the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 
(c) At 0 Adam takes the fruit. 
(d) At 0 Adam eats the fruit, thereby sinning. 
(e) At 0 God actualizes PDH and imputes Adam's sin to all and only those members of 
PDH. 
According to (6) (and, by extension (5)), this position stands (given a literal reading of the fall 
account of Genesis 3), since, 
(f) (6) does not entail occasionalism 
all it does involve is a hard-perdurantism, coupled with etemalism, and this entails that objects 
such as PDH can and do perdure. Therefore, (6) is compatible with (a)-(e). This happy result 
encompasses the problems of the integrity of human action and personal identity too (given the 
non-occasionalistic flavour of the perdurantisin of (6)), so that (6) renders a non-occasionalistic 
version of Edwards' argument for imputation, which overcomes the issues that Quinn raises. 
As a consequence of all this, Edwards' argument fails to overcome the issues that Quinn raises 
about its coherence. However, a milder form of Edwards' argument (either (5) or (6)), both of 
which can be found in parts of what Edwards says in his defence of imputation, would resolve 
these difficulties, but at the considerable cost to Edwards metaphysics of removing 
occasionalism from the equation. This raises a question about the legitimacy of such a trade-off 
and whether such an 'Edwardsian' reading of the argument in OS can work. It certainly appears 
to safeguard Edwards central contention that God may impute Adam's sin to his posterity, 
either because he is able to regard Adam and his posterity as one metaphysical unity for certain 
purposes (the soft-perdurantist argument), or because he has constituted things such that PDH is 
an ontological entity (the hard-perdurantist argument. ) Either way, the theological issue that 
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Edwards was seeking to secure against critics like Taylor, can be safeguarded without resorting 
to occasionalism, within a perdurantist ontology. 442 
(9: 3) Summary: The coherence of Edwardsian imputation 
On the basis of chapters (5)-(9), it should be clear that the argument which Edwards develops 
over the course of OS is a subtle and carefully nuanced defence of original sin understood from 
within the Augustinian tradition, but along lines peculiar to Edwards in several important 
respects. These idiosyncratic lines of argument largely devolve upon the notion of imputation 
that Edwards deploys in defence of his doctrine in Part IV of the treatise. They fall into two 
groups: those aspects which can be shown to be supportive of Edwards' position; and those 
whose metaphysical ramifications end up undermining central aspects of Edwards' thought. In 
the first group is his careful tracing of problems in the doctrine of imputation to problems with 
the way it has traditionally been conceived under the aegis of the realist-federalist continuum. 
Edwards' reformulation of the theological structure of the doctrine is insightful and useful for 
the metaphysics of imputation which he goes on to develop. 
Alongside this, there are difficulties with Edwards' notion of the ontology of imputation which 
have been raised by Chisholm (via Helm). Chisholm's problems with the ontology of 
Edwardsian imputation can be overcome through a more federalist understanding of the 
theological ontology which informs his metaphysics. Edwards' 'perdurantist' occasionalism, 
coupled with his federalism offer a way out of Chisholm's critique. There are also apparent 
difficulties with the notion of inherited guilt that Edwards defends, outlined in Wainwright's 
essay. Wainwright believes that Edwards does not provide either a sufficient biblical warrant for 
his view, nor a metaphysical argument which is sound. However, Wainwright's understanding 
of the nature of Edwards' doctrine seems to be at fault regarding the occasionalistic flavour to 
his notion of inherited guilt. 
In the second group of arguments are those aspects of his metaphysics that undermine Edwards' 
defence of imputation. This involves those issues associated with the radical nature of Edwards' 
occasionalism, and in particular, how a person's actions can be truly their own. Quinn's 
442 This may work for the argument of OS, but Edwards' thinking was carefully integrated. An adjustment 
to his thought in this respect to safeguard his argument in OS, would have consequences for other aspects 
of his thought which further complicate matters rather than clarifying them. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to deal with this implication of a revision of Edwards' thinking. Suffice to say that as it stands, 
Edwards' occasionalism does not appear to work; any revision of his thought which could retain the 
philosophical kernel whilst jettisoning the unhelpful metaphysical husk at least means that Edwards' 
central contention may be rehabilitated. I am aware that this is contentious. Perhaps all that can be done is 
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criticisms have shown that Edwards' response to concerns about his doctrine of temporal parts 
and how this informs his understanding of the integrity of human action, results in 
consequences that can only be described as incoherent. This points to another, subsidiary 
problem: the so-called 'charming irony' that Edwards' doctrine falls into as a result of his 
oversight on human action. For if nothing persists for more than a moment, and if all that 
persists is constituted this way by God alone (to the exclusion of all other agents or causal 
factors), then Adam himself cannot have persisted long enough to have committed the original 
sin of which he stands accused in Christian theology. And if Adam did not persist long enough 
to commit this sin, , and if his progeny cannot persist long enough to act in any way either 
(whatever the moral payload), then Edwards has not so much defended original sin as 
undermined it (at least, in the form he sought to defend). 
One possible way of retaining Edwards' central insight into the metaphysics of imputation 
without resorting to the use of occasionalism,, involves a reconstruction of Edwardslan thinking 
I along more mainstream perdurantist lines. This could be achieved with an argument similar in 
tone to either the weak or hard versions of perdurantism offered in chapter 7, (that is, arguments 
(5) or (6) reiterated above). Either of these arguments could be used to retain Edwards' insight 
regarding the ontologically synthetic nature of imputation, without the problems associated with 
his occasionalism. This presents a partial solution to Quinn's critique. It is partial because, 
although it solves the difficulties raised in Quinn's article, it does so by rejecting the very 
occasionalism that raised the issues in the first place. 
Edwards appears to have considered this occasionalism crucial to the substance of his 
metaphysics. From the reconstruction of his argument for imputation along perdurantist lines 
offered here, it appears that he was mistaken in this regard. His argument could have been 
constructed in such a way as to avoid the extremes of his occasionalism, whilst delineating a 
perdurantism which maintained the defining aspects of his argument. 
Thus the metaphysics of imputation which Edwards seeks to develop in the fourth part of OS 
fail to adequately account for the kind of problems regarding identity-through-time and human 
action which Edwards sought to overcome. However, where the occasionalism of his developed 
position fails, a perdurantism sans occasionalistic paraphernalia, could still provide a broadly 
Edwardsian response to Quinn, which is in sympathy with the intentions which lie behind the 
main structures of his argument for imputation. 
the extraction of those parts of Edwards' metaphysics which may have an ongoing use, in a more 
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(10) Conclusion: The coherence of Edwardslan hamartiology 
We began this thesis by outlining the central structures of a doctrine of sin. These central 
structures were (a) the problem of accounting for the first (human) sin, (b) the question of the 
authorship of sin, (c) the origin of a proneness to sin (the doctrine of original sinfulness), (d) the 
problem of the imputation of sin and (e) the question of original guilt. The question posed in 
light of these structures was, can the metaphysics Edwards' harnesses to articulate his version 
of (a)-(e), provide a coherent account of sin that might be able to support his contentions about 
human depravity? We are now in a position to assess the coherence of Edwards' doctrine of sin. 
We have seen that Edwards defends a theologically traditional, pre-Enlightenment view of the 
fall, using the tools of early Enlightenment philosophy. This view of the fall is internally 
consistent, but it is not externally consistent with other aspects of his metaphysical thinking. We 
also saw that, on the question of the fall, he is unable to resolve the problem of the authorship of 
sin,, without implicating God in the process. In both of these areas of theodicy, Edwards' 
metaphysics of persistence-through-time, and his occasionalism have a bearing upon the failure 
of his account of hamartiology. For this reason, we have taken considerable time analyzing 
these issues in his metaphysics, drawing upon recent work in metaphysics to describe Edwards' 
position. Then, we have honed this picture by reference to critiques of several crucial aspects of 
Edwards' views on temporal parts, persistence-through-time, occasionalism, and their 
application to his views on original sin and its imputation. The picture that emerges is a bold, 
but philosophically incomplete articulation of the metaphysics of sin. 
I have argued that Edwards' commitment to occasionalism was the single most important factor 
in rendering his views on this subject incoherent., because the version of occasionalism he 
espouses fatally undermines the very doctrine of the fall he set out to defend. In this respect, 
Quinn's diagnosis of the fatal flaw in Edwards' occasionalism has application beyond the 
question of the integrity of human action to the very theological foundations of Edwards' 
theological anthropology. Had Edwards taken a more cautious approach to persistence-through- 
time, and endorsed a version of perdurantism (rather than going beyond perdurantism to 
occasionalism), it may be that he would have been able to present a picture of the metaphysics 
of sin that was not so susceptible to the kind of argument mounted against him by Quinn. A 
species of perdurantism would have been able to do all the metaphysical work Edwards 
demanded of it with respect to his doctrine of sin, and would have been compatible with his 
other metaphysical commitments, such as his idealism, and his theological views about the 
pieceincal fashion. 
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absolute sovereignty of God. In addition, a perdurantist version of his theory of imputation 
would provide a real alternative to the two traditional theological views of realism and 
federalism. It also provides a means of assuaging the problems presented by the arbitrariness 
problem, since on a perdurantist ontology, although numerical identity is denied, there are still 
metaphysical facts to which God may apply to explain why he 'Imputes' sin to humanity (they 
share certain properties and relations, perhaps). Thus, Edwards' views on imputation do yield a 
real via media between the two traditional positions on this subject. But they only yield a 
coherent via media without his occasionalism. 
Finally, even if he had seen the problems his occasionalism posed for his theistic metaphysics, 
and in particular his doctrine of the fall and imputation of sin, his detenninistic thesis would 
have still have entailed that God is the author of sin. And on that question Edwards simply has 
to bite the bullet. 
234 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
Appendix A: The imputation of Christ's righteousness 
In the process of answering questions about the imputation of Adam's sin, a related question 
arises regarding the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Edwards did not write about this at 
any length in his published writings. 443However, in the context of his account of the AP 
question, he does make reference to it. 444There, he deals with what a 'course of nature' means 
in the context of the will of God in imputing sin to Adam, and righteousness to the elect in 
Christ. His point is that Adamic sin passes to his posterity as much because God institutes a 
certain course of nature,, as because there is a continued corrupt disposition imputed to Adam + 
PDH as a result of original sin: 
For Adam's posterity are from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according to an 
established course of nature, from the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree; or... "just as the acorn is 
derived from the oak. " 
To make clear what he means by a 'course of nature', he goes on, 
Where the name "nature" is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method and 
order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom. 445 
However,, such a construal of the course of nature ordained by God, poses problems regarding 
the asymmetrical nature of imputation. An asymmetry in the ordering of the 'course of nature' 
arises where the lack of original righteousness (and thereby a vitiated nature), is communicated 
to PDH, whilst 'principles of holiness' are not. Adam's sin passes to his posterity, but Christ's 
righteousness cannot be passed on in the same way. It involves only the individual to whom 
Christ's righteousness is imputed, not to that individual's offspring, relatives or descendents. 
"' That is, works published in his lifetime. The Yale edition of the Miscellanies, still in production, will 
soon put into the public domain two entries that do address this issue, Nos. 1185 and 1237. However, 
neither of these Miscellanies affect the present argument in detail, since both are largely references and 
exerpts from other writers (Dr. Williams and Skelton), something that Edwards was doing a lot of in the 
later Miscellanies. For instance, Nliscellany 1185 reads, 'Concerning the reasonableness of the doctrine of 
the RvIPUTATION OF CHRIST"S RIGHTEOUSNESS, see Dr. Williams fourth volume of sermons, pp. 
88-94. ' In this reference, Dr. Daniel Williams defends a Calvinistic understanding of forensic imputation. 
I am grateful to Prof. Kenneth Minkema at Yale University for his help with references and transcripts of 
these two importantMiscellanies. 
444 YE3: 385-386. 
445 Ibid. 
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It may be asked whether this construal of the metaphysics of imputation is actually to the point. 
The relationship between the Christian and Christ is not a natural one (being metaphysically 
constituted by the will of God). If this is the case, then afortiori, neither should it be presumed 
that the Christians' relatives and descendents will have a relationship to Christ that is a natural 
one either. Hence the problem folds. However, a similar case can be made out for the 
imputation of sin. Edwards believes that God carves up all those temporal slices that incorporate 
PDH and constitutes them a single unit, as we have already seen. This is not a 'natural' 
relationship. Adam + PDH have in common those moral properties pertaining to original sin 
that are attributed to all their parts across spacetime. Tbat, on Edwards' view, is what it means 
to impute sin to Adam's posterity. So the imputation of the lack of original righteousness that is 
imputed to Adam + PDH is as metaphysically non-natural as the non-imputation of Christ's 
righteousness to the whole of Adam + PDH. If this is the case, then the asymmetry that exists 
between the imputation of the vitiated nature to Adam + PDK and the non-imputation of 
Christ's righteousness to the whole of Adam + PDH in a similar manner, (either along 
perdurantist, or occasionalistic lines), needs primafacie, some explanation. 
Edwards' initial reply is that this is simply the way that the divine mind is pleased to dispose the 
metaphysics of the matter. However, in the course of this explanation, he hints at another, more 
satisfactory response: 
Grace is introduced among the race of mankind by a new establishment; not on the foot of the original 
establishment of God, as the Head of the natural world, and Author of the first creation; but by a 
constitution of a vastly higher kind; wherein Christ is made the root of the tree, whose branches are his 
spiritual seed and he is the head of the new creation; of which I need not stand now to speak 
particularly. 446 
Though he does not elaborate on this, the continuity with the previous organic analogy with 
respect to Adam and his posterity is not accidental. I suggest that an Edwardsian argument can 
be (re)constructed on this basis that explains why there is an asymmetrical relation between the 
imputation of Adamic sin and Christ's righteousness, utilizing the tools of perdurantism 
deployed in previous chapters. Adamic PDH is treated by God for the purposes of the 
imputation of sin, as one hunk of matter (on the basis of ontological synthesis). The 
'imputation' of Adam's sin to his posterity is really the treating of Adam as homo primus and 
the rest of PDH as a scattered spacetime worm whose parts (temporal and spatial) are one unit 
for the purposes of sin. That is, Adam + PDH are one unit as far as the imputation of sin is 
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concerned. They are not - for this gerrymandered metaphysical purpose - discrete individuals to 
whom the sin of one man, and the guilt thereof passes. And God may do this, since, on a 
perdurantist metaphysic; (or one like perdurantism that entails a strong doctrine of temporal 
parts), this simply is the way things are: God can cut matter up any which way he chooses. 
Now,, with respect to the imputation of Christ's righteousness, an analogous model applies, but 
with important qualifications. (Qualifications which will solve the asymmetrical problem 
Edwards poses himself in the passages cited above. ) God treats the elect according to his eternal 
decree, just as he treats the reprobate according to the second fork of the same decree of 
election, to reprobation and damnation. But this means that for the purposes of imputing 
Christ's righteousness, God treats the elect as one metaphysical unit with Christ as a second 
homo Primus (as per Romans 5: 12- 19). 447 The righteousness of Christ, is "Imputed' to 
Perdurantist Elect Humanity (PEH). That is, God gerrymanders a certain hunk of matter, that 
includes all and only those persons who are to make up PEH according to his divine decree. 
I They, like PDH, are treated by God as one metaphysical unit for the purposes of imputation. So, 
though they are scattered through spacetime, as PDH are, as with PDH, this makes no difference 
to the metaphysics of the situation: God is able to gerrymander any hunk of matter to form a 
particular spacetime worm, with particular properties and parts (for the detail of this 
448 
perdurantist argument, I refer the reader to the discussion in chapter 5,6 and 7) . 
To put it another way, if Adam + PDH is one domain, Christ + PEH is another, such that 
members of the domain comprising Christ + PEH overlap with Adam + PDH just in those areas 
where members of PDH are also members of PER That is, where members of Adamic posterity 
are at-one-and-the-same-time members of the elect. So members of PEH are also members of 
PDH, but not conversely. The relation involved here is soteriologically asymmetrical (God 
imputes original sin to all humanity in PDfL infta lapsus (temporally, though not, perhaps 
446 YE3: 386. 
447 In his exegesis of Romans 5: 12-19, Edwards is very much within the federal tradition, as Philip Quinn 
has recently shown in his " disputing the Augustinian Legacy: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on 
Romans 5: 12-19" in Matthews (ed. ), The Augustinian Tradition chapter 13. We have seen that this 
adherence to federalism is qualified by Edwards' idiosyncracies with respect to imputation. Nevertheless, 
he is unquestionably a defender of a version of federal theology. 
448AIthough, strictly speaking, on Edwards' occasionalistic argument PDH will not be a spacetime worm, 
since the individuals which make up the body of Christ in PEH are interrupted temporal slices. Instead, 
we must say something like, PEH, like PDH, appears to be a spacetime worm, all of whose parts are 
gerrymandered by God to form this one unit (PEH). However, in fact, it is constituted of interrupted 
temporal slices. It is not a spacetime worm, but a unit made up of an infinitely dense continuum of 
discrete scattered spacetime temporal slices, all of whose parts are treated, for the purposes of imputation 
(which, on this view, must also be reinterpreted in like manner) as one unit to whom the same moral 
properties can be attributed. That is, the properties involved 
in 'imputing' Christ's righteousness. 
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logically). ' But only those persons who make up the number of the elect are simultaneously 
members of PEH and PDH). 
This has the happy consequence of enabling Edwards (or, In this case, the 'Edwardsian') to 
rebut the criticism with which we began. God establishes the asymmetrical relation between the 
elect and the reprobate in imputation according to consistent metaphysical principles (which we 
have elaborated using perdurantist terms in keeping with the foregoing discussion. ) The reason 
that God does not allow the established 'course of nature' to communicate the 'principles of 
holiness' to PEH as he appears to do with PDH, is because he does so in neither case. Contrary 
to appearances, PDH does not have Adamic sin imputed to it through some realist method, nor 
strictly, through a simple federalist notion. Instead, both PDH and PEH are metaphysical 
constructs, hunks of matter that God has gerrymandered (in the perdurantist sense of that word) 
for his own divine purposes, and to which he 'imputes' those properties that are the peculiar 
preserve of PHD and PEH (and for those members of both groups, PDH&PEH 
I simultaneously) . 
45' And if we press Edwards for some reason why God gerrymanders matter in 
this way, rather than another, his response is that this is the most fitting way that God could 
pursue his end in all his works, namely, his own glory: 
The great and last end of God's works which is so variously expressed in Scripture, is indeed but one; and 
this one end is most properly and comprehensively called, "the glory of God"; by which name it is most 
commonly called in Scripture ... those things, which are spoken of 
in Scripture as ultimate ends of God's 
works, though they may seem at first view to be distinct, all are plainly to be reduced to this one thing, 
viz. God's internal glory or fullness extant externally, or existing in its emanation. And though God in 
seeking this end, seeks the creature's good; yet therein appears his supreme regard to himself. 451 
449By that I mean, God may impute sin or righteousness infta lapsus, at a particular time index - say, at 
all those moments after the initial time slice in which Adam commits the first sin (leaving aside when that 
actually is, whether when he picks the fiuit, or when the desire to rebel takes hold of his heart). But it 
may be that God has already ordained the sin of Adam and subsequent imputation of original sin and/or 
righteousness, 'from eternity past' as theologians say. That is, before the creation of the world. This could 
mean God ordains the sin of Adam and subsequent imputation supra lapsus, but imputes sin to Adam and 
PDH infta lapsus. The point being made here is twofold: the index at which sin is imputed is distinct 
from the question of the logic of the divine decree that ordains that act God could do so according to 
infralapsarian theology (after the fall), or supralapsus (before the fall). But second, the fact that God 
imputes sin infira lapsus, at a particular temporal index says nothing about whether the decree to do so is 
itself infra or supra lapsus, though I am inclined to think that supralapsarianism is the simpler, though 
perhaps initially less appealing, of the two. 
"0 The group comprising all and only those members of PEH who are not also members of PDH is 
probably an empty set. Although, had Adam and Eve had a child that was stillborn, or died in infancy 
before the first sin, then presumably such a person would be a member of such a group. Children who die 
in similar circurnstances infra lapsus do not enjoy the same privileges, at least not according to classical 
theology. It may be that such persons are joint members of PDH&PEH. They are not, on a realist, 
federalist or Edwardsian ontology, only members of PEH exclusive of PDH. 
451 End of Creation in YE8: 530. 
238 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
A r% Appendix B-. Was Edwards an infTalapsarian? 
There has been some debate about whether Edwards endorsed a supra, or infralapsarian 
position with respect to the doctrine of predestination. This appendix seeks to ascertain which of 
these two positions (if either), Edwards actually opted for. This is particularly important as it 
bears upon two related problems that we have encountered in the course of this thesis: how 
Adam sinned and the origin ofsin, the subjects of chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 
We shall proceed through four stages to a conclusion. The first sets out the problem at issue. 
The second offers a reading of Edwards' views on the matter. The third section seeks to analyze 
whether Edwards' solution is viable,, in light of two recent accounts of Edwards' position on the 
divine decrees and election. The fourth section sets out Edwards' argument and shows that, as it 
stands, Edwards' argument is fatally flawed. In its place, I suggest that Edwards would have 
been more consistent if he had defended a purely supralapsarian position. 
(B: 1) Distinguishing supra and infralapsarianism 
For the purposes of the present argument, I shall take it that supralapsarianism deals with 
whether the decree to redeem the elect and damn the reprobate is followed by the decree to 
permit the fall. By contrast, infralapsarianism, is the notion that God decrees creation, the 
permission of the fall and election and reprobation in that order. Both these notions involve 
problems about the ordering of the divine decrees. Both are concerned with the priority of 
certain decrees in the election and reprobation of humanity over others. But whether one decree 
is antecedent to another involves a logical, not temporal discrimination. This is an important 
distinction for what follows, which can be demarcated in the following way. 
A logical distinction seeks to tease out the different logical connections there are in a particular 
issue, and allots priority to those aspects of a problem which are antecedent to those which anise 
as a result of, or are consequent upon them. So, for example, a syllogism has a major and minor 
premise, and conclusion. The order of the argument is logical (the premises are antecedent to 
the conclusion, from which the conclusion arises). Nevertheless the whole argument exists all at 
once, temporally speaking. If I read it in a textbook, the premises and conclusion are all present 
before my eyes, because they do not exist as discrete temporal events. By contrast, if I were to 
utter the premises and conclusion of a particular syllogism in, say, a debate with a friend in 
defence of my views, I should be expressing the parts of the syllogism in a way that had a 
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chronological (that is, temporal), as well as logical order. For my uttering the major premise 
(whatever it might be), and the minor premise, and the conclusion takes time, each being a 
temporal event that follows in a chronological sequence. The major premise is uttered at tl,, the 
minor premise at Q and the conclusion at t3. 
With respect to the divine decrees, it is the logical sequence, and priority of the decrees with 
respect to election and reprobation that are the subject of what follows. The question of whether 
one decree follows another chronologically as a temporal event, is a secondary issue. 
The logical sequence of God's predestinating decrees is itself a fascinating and important 
question, particularly as it bears upon the issue of sin. The question before us is this: did God 
ordain the election of the redeemed and the reprobation of the damned before the fall, or after 
the fall? 452 If before, then this raises several significant problems for a concept of God. It seems 
to mean that God ordains evil, raising the question of the AP once again. It also calls into 
question the character of the God who ordains this sin, for whom the fall is merely the 
I consequence of his logically prior decree. But if God ordains reprobation post-fall, other, 
equally grave questions are raised about the divine nature: Does God have to somehow 'react' 
to the sins of his free creatures, putting the incarnation and passion of Christ in place as a kind 
of fall-back measure because of the fall? If so, what does this say about divine omniscience and 
wisdom? 453 
The logical structure of the traditional supralapsarian view of the divine decrees proceeds on the 
basis of the maxim (taken up by Edwards), 'what is first in design is last in accomplishment'. 
This means that the first proposition in the divine decrees with respect to his creation/creatures 
is the end in view, to which all other propositions are the means. This yields the following 
logical sequence of decrees : 454 
(1) The decree of divine self-glorification in, 
(a) the salvation of the elect as a manifestation of divine grace and mercy, 
(b) the reprobation of the damned as a manifestation of divine justice and wrath. 
452 As Turretin points out, these are not the only options available. It could be that God ordains 
reprobation, in lapsu, that is, in the fall, 'and maintain that man as fallen was considered by God 
predestinating. ' Inst. Elenc. 1: IV: IX, p. 341. However, this is not a position that Edwards favours, so we 
shall pursue it no further here. 
453 It may well be that such a view entails a version of Molinism. However, nothing in the argument of 
what follows depends on this. 
454 This, and the infiralapsarian sequence is adapted from Berkhof, 
Systematic Theology, p. 120. 
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The constituents of (1a)&(Ib) exist potentially, as ideas in the divine mind, not actually in the 
real world (though, of course, for Edwards, the real world is ideal). 4" 
(2) The decree to elect (la) and reprobate (lb). 
(3) The decree to permit the elect and reprobate to fall. 
(4) The decree to justify the elect and condemn the non-elect. 
By contrast, infralapsarians have traditionally suggested the following order that, as they see it, 
better fit a biblical chronology: 
(F) The decree to create man holy and complete. 
(2') The decree to permit man to fall by the self-determination of his own will. 
(3') The decree to save a certain number of humanity. 
(4') The decree to pass over the remainder of humanity for the purposes of salvation, punishing 
them for their sin instead. 
The difference between these two conceptions of the divine decrees should now be clear. With 
this in mind, we can turn to a consideration of Edwards' views on the matter. 
(B: 2) Edwards on election and reprobation 
Edwards does not set out a systematic presentation of his arguments on this issue. What he does 
say has to be gleaned from several Miscellany entries, specifically numbers 292,700 and 704, 
and related work in his dissertation on the End of Creation . 
456 It is to these sources that we now 
turn in order to ascertain Edwards' position on this matter. 
455 It is not clear what position Edwards took with respect to property attribution. Whether he would have 
understood potential ideas according to a substratum theory, with the divine mind, and other minds as the 
substrata, and ideas as clusters of properties attached to such substrates, or whether he would have 
endorsed a bundle theory of sorts, where there are no bare particulars, only bundles of properties, or, 
indeed, some other theory, is an open question. 
456 The Miscellanies can be found in YE13 (numbers a-500) and YE18 (numbers 501-832). The End of 
Creation can be found in YE8. There is a section in the 1834 two-volume edition of Edwards' works 
(reprinted in The Works of Jonathan E&ards Vol. II, chapter X, Remarks on Important Theological 
Controversies, entitled Concerning the Divine Decrees. This is a fair. but not entirely accurate 
conglomeration of Edwards' Miscellanies on the subject, transcribed (and 'improved upon') by his son, 
Dr. Jonathan Edwards Jr. Since the Yale edition of these Nfiscellanies is available, I have ignored these 
earlier transcriptions, since they are inaccurate in points of detail. See the bibliographical note appended 
to the Bibliography at the end of this thesis for more on the question of the relation of older editions of 
Edwards' works to the Yale edition. 
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(B: 2: i) Miscellany 292.457 
As Edwards sees it,, the dispute about the divine decrees and the fall concerns (a) whether the 
creation and fall of humanity are appointed for the salvation of some and damnation of others 
respectively; (b) whether salvation and damnation are the end for which the creation and fall of 
humanity are the means; and (c) whether creation and fall are appointed as means to that end. 
According to Edwards, the 'what is first in design is last in accomplishment' principle is true 
with respect to the end and means to that end in God's decrees, but not with respect to every 
prerequisite condition for that end. 45' This sounds as though Edwards is trying to avoid the 
fallacy of division. This fallacy can be expressed in the following way: if the constituents (A, B, 
C, D) are together the means to the end of (E), it does not follow from this that each individual 
constituent of the group (A, B, C, D) is by itself the means to (E). So A is not by itself the 
means to (E), nor B, to (E), nor C to (E) and so on. What needs to be distinguished is, 
that man's creation and fall were intended last with respect to his last end, but not with respect to his 
subordinate ends; because they are proper means of the last end, but not [of] his third or fourth or fifth 
end - for at this rate, man was created for this end, that he might repent! But we are to conceive of things 
in this order; that that is first in execution is last in intention with respect to the ultimate end; that that is 
second in execution is last in intention with respect to the next end, etc. 459 
There seem to be three 'ends' in view here: the last, subordinate and ultimate. We can express 
this as three principles: 
(1) The ultimate end of a thing - an end valued for its own sake, such as God's self- 
glorification. 
(ii) The last end of a thing - what is aimed at throughout a sequence of events, such as the 
redemption of the elect. 
(iii) Subordinate ends of a thing - stages towards that last end. These are the proper means 
of that last end, but not of the other subordinate ends, such as regeneration. 
Edwards does not clearly define (i) in the text of Miscellany 292, but he does do so in End of 
Creation, to which we shall come in a moment, and from which the working definition (above) 
457 What follows is taken from the text of Afiscellatýy 292 in YE13: 383-384. 
458 "Tis said that that which is last in execution is first in intention; which is true with respect to the end 
18 and all the proper means, but not with respect to every prerequisite condition. ' YE 3: 33 
459 YE13: 383. 
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is drawn. 460 Nor, in the text of Miscellany 292, does he clearly distinguish between (i) and (11). 
He seems to use them interchangeably. Once again, it is in End of Creation that he differentiates 
these two ends with more care. 
Nevertheless,, we can apply these three principles to God's purposes for his creatures, in the 
context of Miscellany 292. Regarding humanity (including, of course, our everyman, Trevor), 
creation is for the ultimate end of God's glory, for which creation is the means. All subordinate 
things decreed of man, including conversion, are towards this goal, because all such subordinate 
ends are the means to that last end. So the fall is a subordinate end to the glorification of God, 
the last end of all things. To return to Trevor, if his creation is the means to the greater glory of 
God (the last and ultimate end), then the intermediate end of Trevor's conversion along the way 
to this last end, is a subordinate end. As a subordinate end it is the proper means of the last end 
(God's glory), but not of other intermediate, or subordinate ends, such as being born, or dying, 
or whatever. Nor, from what we have seen of Edwards' tacit appeal to the fallacy of division, is 
a subordinate end a separate means to an ultimate end, but only one of a co-ordinate set of 
means to that end (as (A, B, C, D) are the co-ordinate set of means to the end of (E), but not 
individually separate means to (E)). This means that Trevor's creation, birth, development, 
conversion and so on, are together the means to the end of God's greater glory. But it is not the 
case that each of these constituents is by themselves the means to this end. Trevor's 
development is the means to his understanding the Gospel, which is the means to his conversion 
and so on. It is only taken together that they are the means to the end of God's glory. So, God 
does not intend Trevor's conversion prior to intending his creation, although his conversion is 
later in execution, and, on a permissive application of the 'what is first in design is last in 
accomplishment' principle, would appear to mean this. In fact, creation is not the proper means 
of the conversion of Trevor, nor did God create Trevor to be converted. He created Trevor for 
his own greater glory. Hence, the 'what is first in design is last in accomplishment' principle, 
has a restricted, rather than permissive application, as per (i) (and, if he is using (i) 
interchangeably with (ii)), (ii), but not (iii)). As Edwards has it, 'that that is first in execution is 
last in intention with respect to the ultimate end; that that is second in execution is last in 
intention with respect to the next end, etc. '461 
460 See End ofCreation in FE8: 407, for Edwards' understanding of what an ultimate end is. 
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(B: 2: ii) End of Creation. 
We turn now,, for clarification about the 'ends' to which Edwards refers in Miscellan: v 292, to 
Edwards' discussion of 'ends' in his dissertation on the End of Creation. 462 What he has to say 
in End of Creation about different kinds of 'ends' that inform particular tasks, and God's work 
in creation in particular, considerably augments the discussion of Miscellany 292: 
A distinction should be observed between the chief end for which an agent or efficient exerts any act and 
performs any work, and the ultimate end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same 
signification; and though the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a 
chief end. A chief end is opposite to an inferior end; an ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end. 46' 
From this, and the passage that follows it, we can set out taxonomy of different sorts of 'ends'. 
There are chief ends and ultimate ends. Chief ends are always ultimate ends, the opposite of 
which arc inferior ends. But ultimate ends arc not always chief ends. The opposite of an 
ultimate end is a subordinate end. On clarifying what he means by chief and ultimate ends, 
Edwards says that chief ends are what are most valued, whilst ultimate ends are that end most 
valuedfor its own sake. This initial characterization can be developed in two ways in particular. 
First, two different ends may both be ultimate ends, but not chief ends. This could occur where 
two different ends are both valued for their own sakes, (that is, are not subordinated to each 
other, or one to another, in some way), but one is more valued than another. Edwards gives the 
example of a man going on a journey that has two ends in view: to see a new-fangled telescope, 
and to acquire a bride. Both of these 'ends' are ultimate according to the principles he has set 
out; neither is subordinate to the other, and both are distinct ends in view of which he sets out 
on his journey in the first place. But the chief end of the trip is to get his bride, whilst the 
inferior end is the visit to the telescope (though, of course, some dedicated bachelor- 
astronomers might dispute this ordering of ends). 
A second amplification of his distinction between chief ends and ultimate ends, is that an 
ultimate end is not always a chief end because some subordinate ends may be more sought after 
than some ultimate ends. Here, the example given is of a man going on another visit with two 
distinct, non-subordinated purposes. The first is to visit some friends. The second is to claim an 
inheritance. The claiming of the inheritance is a subordinate end only. This is because the 
money this man stands to gain out of the inheritance is not sought after in and of itself, as an 
461 Miscellany 292 in YE 13: 383. 
,f 
462 In I-E 
, 8. 
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end in itself, but only as a means to the end of a more plutocratic lifestyle. It is this lifestyle that 
the inheritance promises to facilitate, that is the ultimate end In view In this instance. Yet getti Ing 
the money from the inheritance may be a higher, more sought after 'end', than seeing the man's 
ffiends, even though visiting them is valued by the man on its own account, and not on account 
of something else, thereby fulfilling the criteria for being an ultimate end. So 'in this second 
amplification, the subordinate end of getting the inheritance is more sought after than the 
ultimate end of seeing the ffiends. 464 
However,, Edwards immediately qualifies this by saying, somewhat paradoxically, that a 
subordinate end is not more valued than the ultimate end(s) to which it is subor&nate. 46' What 
he seems to mean is this: though a subordinate end may be more sought after than an ultimate 
end, that ultimate end is what gives the subordinate end value, since it is subordinated to the 
ultimate end that it is directed towards. So though a subordinate end may be more sought after 
than an ultimate end, it is still subordinated to that ultimate end, such that that ultimate end is 
the end to which the subordinate end is directed. 
-Ly- 
He concludes the final chapter of End of Creation, by showing that God's chief (most valued) 
end is the sum of his ultimate ends in creating, and these ultimate ends (valued for their own 
sakes) are jointly his one chief end. In other words, the apparently different ultimate ends that 
are mentioned in Scripture that God has in view in creating (divine self-communication in 
revelation, of truth and of grace, for example), differ in sense, but not reference. They all refer 
to the same chief end. This end is, of course, God's self-glorification: 
Thus we see that the great and last end of God's works which is so variously expressed in Scripture, is 
indeed but one; and this one end is most properly and comprehensively called, "the glory of God"; by 
which name it is most commonly called in Scripture. 466 
From this, it seems that Edwards' use of ultimate/last and subordinate ends in Miscellany 292 
has matured by the time he comes to write End of Creation. In End of Creation, the term 'last 
end'. as the end that is aimed at throughout a particular sequence of events still has a place as a 
463 YE8. - 405, author's emphasis. What follows is taken from this introductory section to the dissertation, 
pp. 405-415. 
464 Edwards goes on to claim that there are two kinds of ultimate end: the original end of a thing, and the 
consequential end of a thing. But this need not detain us here. 
465 YE8: 408. 
466 YE8: 530. 
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kind of generic term for a supreme end in view. 467 But it is the chief end of all God's works, and 
the ultimate ends(s) that culminate in this chief end that are the particular focus of the work: 
To avoid all confusion in our inquiries and reasonings concerning the end for which God created the 
world, a distinction should be observed between the chief end ... and the ultimate end. These two phrases 
are not always precisely of the same signification. 468 
Taking into account his use of chief and inferior ends in End of Creation, and Edwards' 
conclusion regarding the chief (ultimate) end of all God's works, we may apply this to the 
supra-inftalapsarian problem in the following manner. The decree to elect some of humanity to 
salvation is a subordinate means to the ultimate end of redemption. The decree to redeem is 
ultimate inasmuch as it involves the end (valued for its own sake), of displaying divine grace 
and mercy (to which end election is directed as a subordinate means). This can be seen from 
what Edwards says in Miscellany 993, 'the greatest work of God & the end of all other works, 
and all God's DECREES [are] contained in the Covenant of REDEMPTION'. 469 By contrast, 
the decree to reprobate the rest of humanity is a means to the ultimate end of glorifying his 
holiness and greatness. This can be clearly seen in Miscellany 704: 
God's glorifying his justice, or rather his glorifying his holiness and greatness, has the place of a mere 
and ultimate end. But his glorifying his justice in punishing sin (or exercising vindictive justice, which is 
the same) or by any other particular means, is not to be considered as a mere end, but a certain way or 
470 
means of obtaining an end . 
The decree to glorify divine holiness is ultimate inasmuch as it involves the end (valued for its 
own sake), of displaying a central divine attribute: holiness. It is for this very reason that 
vindictive justice is, according to Edwards, emphatically not an ultimate end. It is not an 
attribute,, but a means to the display, or expression of an attribute of God: 
Vindictive justice is not to be considered as a certain distinct attribute to be glorified, but as a certain way 
and ineans for the glorifying an attribute ... The considering the glorifying 
[of] vindictive justice as a mere 
end, had led to great misrepresentations and undue and unhappy expressions about the decree of 
reprobation. Hence, the glorifying of God's vindictive justice on such particular persons as has been 
467 YE8: 410, 'if any being has but one ultimate end in all that he does, and there be a great variety Of 
operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his supreme end. ' Author's emphasis. 
468 YE8: 405. 
469 Unpublished Mscellany entry cited by Holmes in God Of Grace and God of Glory, p. 13 1, n. 21 
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considered as altogether prior in the decree to their sinfulness; yea [to] their very beings. Whereby it 
being only a means to an end, those things that are necessarily presupposed in order to the fitness and 
possibility of this means obtaining the end, must be conceived as prior to it. 471 
Both of these ultimate ends stand under the chief end of all God's acts, his own self- 
glorification. Redemption is the means by which God is glorified in his grace and mercy, whilst 
reprobation is the means by which God is glorified in his holiness. Both ultimate ends serve the 
chief end of God's self-glorification through glorifýýg different aspects of his divine character. 
Much in Edwards' account of these different ends depends on the asymmetry of the decrees in 
election and reprobation as Edwards understands them. This is made clear in two further 
Miscellany entries, 700 and 704. 
(B: 2: iii) Miscellany 700. 
Here, Edwards takes up the general outline of Miscellany 292, and develops it in line with the 
asymmetry we have referred to. He begins by showing that the decree of election, unlike the 
decree of reprobation, is ordained before foresight of an individual's works: 'God, in the decree 
of election, is justly to be considered as decreeing the creature's eternal happiness antecedent to 
472 
any foresight of good works' . 
T'his means that in election the following proposition is true, 
(E 1) God decrees creaturely eternal happiness antecedent to, and independently of, any 
foresight of good works pertaining to those creatures. 
This forms part of the traditional Reformed understanding of election. God elects according to 
his inscrutable will, (among the reasons for which are) not according to the good works that any 
concrete individual will commit at some point in the future. Thus, salvation is according to 
divine grace via the decree of election, not according to what an individual is able to contribute 
to their salvation (which, on the Reformed scheme, is zero). 
But the same structure does not apply to propositions which capture the decree of reprobation, 
as Edwards goes on to point out in the same passage: 'he [God] does not,, in reprobation, decree 
the creature's eternal misery antecedent to any foresight of sin: because the being of sin is 
supposed in the first things in order in the decree of reprobation, which is that God will glorify 
470 Miscellany 704 in YE18: 316. 
471 Ibid. 
472 YE18: 282-283. 
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his vindictive justice; but the very notion of revenging justice simply considered supposes a 
fault to be revenged. 
473 So, 
(E2) it is not the case that God decrees creaturely eternal misery antecedent to, and 
independently of, any foresight of sinful works pertaining to those creatures. 
For clearly, in reprobation, what a particular concrete individual has done is the crucial factor in 
their being damned. This, says Edwards, is because the existence and being of sin is assumed in 
the decree of damnation. God will glorify his vindictive justice in damning some, but this very 
notion of such justice and its exercise presumes a fault that needs to be punished. The same is 
not the case with the decree of election. This is because God's glory is the sole consideration in 
his decree of election, not the works of any particular individuals. Otherwise, his election is not 
dependent upon his grace alone. Nor, says Edwards, does the exercise of divine grace require 
I faith and works. Grace is the communication of divine happiness, not of faith and works. It just 
so happens, as a contingent matter of fact, that God has ordained this happiness to the 
communicated via faith and works. 
474 
So, it seems that according to Edwards in Miscellan 700, (E I) is ordained supra lapsus, Y 
without regard to the faith and works of the persons concerned, but presumably, with regard to 
the evil works of these persons, because qua elect, they are the objects of divine redemption. 
But (E2) is ordained infra lapsus, taking account of the sin and evil acts of those to whom it is 
directed. 
Edwards is aware of the problems this poses for his Calvinism. If God decrees reprobation infra 
lapsus, then it seems as if his decree is dependent upon what creatures will do, in a way that his 
decree to elect is not. If Trevor is elect, but Wayne is reprobate, Trevor's election is supra 
lapsus, without regard to anything that he might do in the future, but purely because of God's 
arbitrary choice to redeem him (hence the need for Trevor's evil works as a necessary condition 
of his redemption). But Wayne's reprobation does take account of his future sin, and he is 
reprobated on the basis of his being a sinner in future. However, Edwards is at paMS to point out 
that the (E2) decree does not depend on the sinful acts of creatures in the same way as the 
Arminians claim is the case: 
473 YE18: 283. 
-174 'It don't necessarily follow from the very nature of grace, or God's communicativcricss of his own 
happiness, that there must be good Nvorks. This is only a certain Nvay of the arbitrary appointment of 
God's wisdom, wherein he NNA bring men to partake of 
his grace. ' YE18. - 283. 
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But yet God is far from having decreed damnation from a foresight of evil works in the sense of the 
Arminians: as if God in this decree did properly depend on the creatures sinful act, as an event the 
coming to pass of which primarily depends on the creature's determination; so that the creature's 
determination in this decree is properly to be looked upon as antecedent to God's determination, and 
475 [that] on which his determination is consequent and dependent . 
For the Arminians' position involves this kind of reasoning: God decrees the reprobation of 
some of fallen humanity. God foresees the sin of this number. This sin is libertarian in nature 
(that is, his foresight is of contra-causally free decisions, over which God has no control). 
Therefore, God's decree is dependent upon the contra-causally free decisions of this reprobate 
number. The problem with this, which was raised in another guise in chapter 3, is that if God 
creates libertarian creatures, how can he foreknow what they will actually choose until they 
have chosen it? (For if their choices are contra-causal, then it is difficult to see how God can 
foreknow them with certainty. A person may do one thing rather than another; but he may not. 
There is no compulsion involved, no sense in which he must do one thing rather than another. It 
seems that all God can know is the probability that a person will opt for one thing rather than 
another, up to the point at which that person makes the choice they actually do. ) 
Clearly, Edwards' compatibility thesis will not admit this. So, although Edwards endorses an 
(E2) decree infra lapsus, it is not to be taken with the libertarian thesis that is part of the 
Arminian solution to the freedom and foreknowledge dilemma. What then does the divine 
decree of (E2) depend upon? Edwards does not say. But presumably, his point is that unlike the 
Arminians,, who believe that 'God in this decree did properly depend on the creature's sinful 
act, as an event the coming to pass of which primarily depends on the creature's 
determination', 476 he believes that (E2) depends upon the sovereign ordination of God alone. If 
this is the case, then it cannot be contingent upon the foresight of the libertarian sinful acts of 
those who are reprobate, since God would then be ordaining his decree on the basis of the 
libertarian actions of his creatures that he foresees, but over which he has no control. Instead, 
their damnation is according to the inscrutable will of God, which ordains reprobation for all 
those not elect according to (E I), that is (for (E I)), before the actualization of the creation. But 
what is more, God also ordains their sin. Their damnation is ordained in light of the foresight of 
their sin, as (E2) assurnes, but this should be understood in a compatibilist sense. That is, God's 
'foresight' of sin, is, strictly speaking, no foresight at all, since it is not simply that God sees 
what the sinner will do and punishes them accordingly with reprobation. He ordains the sin they 
475 YE18: 283. 
476 lEl8: 283. 
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will commit. The Arminian appeal to contra-causal freedom in the decree to reprobate simpl" 
cannot obtain on Edwards' determinism. God foresees sin,, but this sin is 'permitted' by God's 
ordination. The point at issue is whether, in foreseeing damnation and ordaining reprobation on 
this basis as per (E2), God's decree is dependent on the choices of his creatures, which he has 
no power over, or whether his decree is merely dependent on sinful choices foreseen,, but 
permitted (here read 'ordained') according to his hidden will. Edwards' opts for the latter of 
these two options. As I have argued in chapter 3, this does not enable him to avoid the charge of 
the AP (the motivation behind this manoeuvre), since God is ultimately still the one who 
ordains the sins that his creatures commit, and whom he then damns for his own greater glory. 
Edwards has to bite the bullet on this,, whether he likes it or not. 
(B: 2: iv) Miscellany 704. 
On the matter of the eternal decrees, this Miscellany states: 
both the sin of the reprobate, and also the glory of divine justice, may properly be said to be before the 
decree of damning the reprobate. The decree of damnation may properly be said, in different respects, to 
be because of both these; and that God would not have decreed the damnation of the sinner, had [it] not 
been for [the] respect he had both to the one and the other. Both may properly be considered as the 
ground of the decree of damnation. 477 
rff- 
He goes on in the same place to make his views regarding the asymmetry of the divine decrees, 
and his own mediating position on the matter, absolutely clear: 
Hence God's decree of the eternal damnation of the reprobate, is not to be conceived of as prior to the 
fall, yea, and to the very being of the person; as the decree of the eternal glory of the elect is. 
This is because, as Edwards goes on to say, unlike the decree to reprobate, the decree to elect is 
prior to the very being of the subjects in question. God's desire to glorify himself is his chief 
end in all his works, and is therefore more than a mere ultimate end (where, as we saw in End of 
Creation,, there could be more than one such ultimate end). His decree to elect is based in the 
desire of God to communicate his glory by his love and goodness. And this divine goodness 
supplies the being of the elect creature, as well as its happiness. So election is prior to 
reprobation because election is part of the chief end of God, reprobation being (by implication) 
an ultimate end only: 
477 YE18: 315. 
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For God's glorifying his love and communicating his goodness stands in the place of a mere or ultimate 
end, and therefore is prior in the mind of the eternal disposer to the very being of the subject, and to 
everything but mere possibility. The goodness of God gives the being as well as the happiness of the 
creature, and don't presuppose it. 478 
Edwards saw the decree of election as devolving upon the following sequence of divine 
ordination: prior to all other decrees is the decree to divine self-glorification, God's chief end, 
as End of Creation puts it. Then there is the decree to communicate the fullness of divine 
goodness and love to the creature. This stands in the place of an ultimate end, and divine 
goodness and love are the vehicles by which God delivers being and happiness to his creatures, 
as we have just seen. But divine goodness and love are expressed in terms of God's grace and 
mercy only after the fall. This has to be the case, since grace and mercy presuppose a sinful 
object requiring the exercise of these two divine attributes (otherwise there would be no need 
for their exercise). This grace and mercy is delivered to the elect, who are redeemed from the 
state of misery into which they have fallen infra-lapsus: 'A decree of glorifying God's mercy 
and grace considers man as being created and fallen, because the very notion of such a decree 
supposes a great sM and misery. '479 
Moreover,, 
God's decree to glorify his love and conununicate his goodness, and to glorify his greatness and holiness, 
is to be considered as prior to the creation and fall of man ... the 
designing to communicate and glorify his 
goodness and love eternally to a certain number, is to be considered as prior in both those mentioned 
respects - to their being and fall - for such a design in the notion of it presupposes neither. But nothing in 
the decree of reprobation is to be looked upon as antecedent in one of those respects to man's being and 
fall, 480 but only that general decree that God will glorify his justice, or rather his holiness and greatness, 
which supposes neither their being nor sinfulness. 
41 
From these citations, it is clear that, on Edwards' scheme, there is an asymmetry involved in the 
way the decrees to elect and reprobate particular individuals work out. 
478 YE18: 317. 
479 YE, 18: 317. 
480 It is clear that when Edwards refers here to the fall, he intends the reader to understand the decree to 
permit thefall. Elsewhere in the same passage, he writes, 
'those decrees ben't to be considered as prior to 
the decree of the being and permission of the fall of the subject, and the decree of election, as it implies., 
YE18: 317, emphasis added. 
481 YE18: 317. 
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In light of what Edwards has to say on the matter, and taking into consideration the prior supra- 
and infralapsarian arguments of (1)-(4) and (1')-(4'), we can sum up Edwards' argument. The 
decree of election is supralapsarian in the sense laid out in (1)-(2) and (El), but not according to 
(1')-(4'), the infralapsarian position. By contrast, the damned are reprobated infra lapsus, 
according to that aspect of (1')-(4'), pertaining to (E2), which excludes (1)-(4). Plus, our 
analysis has shown that Edwards takes up the supralapsarian view regarding election, and the 
infralapsarian view regarding reprobation, in an attempt to forge a middle way between these 
two positions. However, it should already be apparent that this via media is fatally flawed. But 
before analyzing how it is flawed, a few words about other recent understandings of Edwards' 
position. 
(B: 3) Appraising Edwards' argument 
I There have been several recent attempts at classifying Edwards' argument into one of supra- or 
infralapsarianism. John Gerstner makes the case for Edwards' being an infralapsarian. He does 
this principally because he thinks this fits best with Edwards' concerns over the AP: 'One 
incidental proof that Edwards did not believe God to be the author of sin is his 
infralapsarianism. According to the supralapsarian view, God rejects the reprobate when 
considered as unfallen, homo creabilis. Edwards will have none of this, as it seems to make God 
the author of sin in a sinless creature. -3482 However, from the foregoing assessment of Edwards' 
argument it should be clear that this is a misunderstanding on Gerstner's part. 483 Edwards' 
views on this matter are part of a debate in the tradition, where equally prestigious thinkers have 
taken quite opposite sides. Edwards himself cites two of these in this regard: Turretin and 
484 Mastricht . 
As we have seen, Edwards is better understood as taking a mediating position, 
where God's decree of election is seen supra lapsus, whilst his decree of reprobation is infra 
lapsus. Thus, Gerstner's reading of Edwards is at fault. 
However, there have been those in the literature who have discerned the subtlety of Edwards 
position. Stephen Holmes, in his recent monograph on Edwards '48' recognizes that Edwards is 
engaged in forging a middle way between two traditional approaches to this question (the supra- 
482 Rational Biblical Theology, Vol. 11, p. 152. 
483 Stephen Holmes has recently pointed this out in God of Grace and God of Glory, pp. 126-13 1. 
484 In Miscellany 292 in YE 13: 384. Interestingly, Turretin advocates an infralapsarian position, whilst 
Mastricht attempts to steer a middle course between supra- and infralapsarians. He, 'places predestination 
before creation and fall but makes its object inerely the two classes of elect and reprobate, whereas 
election and reprobation proper are of individuals and presuppose man as 
fal len. ' Ibid. 
485 God of Grace and God of Glory. 
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and infralapsarian). And he sees that Edwards advocates an asymmetrical relation in the decrees 
of election and reprobation. 
However, whether Edwards answers the question of why, if redemption is God's first thought 
(logically speaking), the decrees of election and reprobation are asymmetrical in this fashion, is 
another matter. Holmes seems to think that he does address this problem. He says, 'there is a 
sense in which Edwards must be described as uncompromisingly supralapsarian after all [sic]. 
Regardless of the place of the decree of reprobation, God's first thought is emphatically that he 
will redeem,, not that he will create. 486 (He goes on to cite Miscellany 993 as his proof text for 
this view. ) 
I am inclined to think that Edwards' thoughts on the asymmetry of election and reprobation 
depend upon the kind of argument found in his published views on the matter, in End of 
Creation. There, as we have seen, God's chief and ultimate end in all things is his own self- 
glorification. This, it seems to me, must stand first in the logical order of the divine decrees for 
Edwards' position to work. It is only in this context that God can both elect some supra lapsus, 
and reprobate others infra lapsus. The reason being that only on this basis, can Edwards' say 
that God ordains the decrees in the logical sequence he does, for his own glory. If redemption is 
God's first thought, before his thought of self-glorification, as Holmes suggests on the basis of 
Miscellanies like 993, then this will not work. The (logical) sequence of divine ordination 
means that redemption is logically consequent on one of, (a) God thinks of the world he intends 
to create, (fore)seeing the need for creaturely redemption in that world, (supra lapsus) or (b) 
God creates the world he intends to create, (fore)seeing the need for redemption at the point of 
the fall (in lapsu), or (c) God creates the world he intends to creates and ordains the fall, and 
ordains the redemption of his elect creatures on the basis of the fall (infra lapsus). It cannot be 
God's first thought, as Holmes suggests, since then it would have to be before all three of these 
options, which does not make any sense. Moreover, if, logically speaking, redemption was 
God's first thought, then, on the principle that 'what isfirst in design is last in accomplishment', 
Edwards' would be committed to the view that redemption was the chief and ultimate end to 
which God directed all his decrees. But, according to End of Creation, this is simply not the 
case. (Nor, I might add, does it make much sense eschatologically speaking. Surely the glory of 
God comes before redemption, since it is the need to safeguard the perfection of the divine 
glory that gives rise to the impetus to redeem, and the object of everlasting contemplation and 
praise in heaven, and everlasting horror and revulsion in hell. ) 
486 God of Grace and God of Glory, p. 13 1. A similar thought is evressed by Jenson, -rhe end of God's 
moral govenunent as we have seen, is redemption. 'Mis doctrine determines Edwards' understanding 
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However, this is not what Miscellany 993 actually says (and here, Holmes, reading of Edwards 
seems to be at fault too). The text as Holmes has it, reads: 'the greatest work of God & the end 
of all other works,, and all God's DECREES [are] contained in the Covenant of 
REDEMPTION'. 487 But this does not entail Holmes' view, that God's desire to redeem is 
logically first In order of decrees. What it entails is that God's greatest work, greatest in the 
sense of being the chief and ultimate end of God's works, is contained in the covenant of 
redemption. But this is not a radically new insight at all. Edwards is simply reiterating a 
standard Reformed doctrine. Holmes seems to have equivocated on the difference between the 
doctrine and act of redemption (in the cross of Christ), and the covenant of redemption. This 
covenant concerns the agreement, on the part of the second person of the Trinity with the first 
person of the Trinity, to undergo the humiliation of the incarnation and death on the cross, in 
order to bring about the salvation of the elect. But this does not mean that redemption was 
logically the first of God's decrees. 
I For although this covenant, in Edwardsian language, is the means to the ultimate end of (E 1), it 
is not the chief end of God's decrees. It merely facilitates this chief end, the glonfication of 
God. And this chief end is, as the text of Miscellany 993 suggests, contained in the covenant of 
redemption. It is contained in it in that it is the raison detre of the covenant of redemption. 
Redemption is a means to the greater glory of God and this is entailed by the covenant of 
redemption. Consequently, this important aspect of Holmes' understanding of Edwards' 
resolution to the supra/infralapsarian problem is at fault. Miscellany 993 does not say anything 
different from End of Creation on the matter of the logical order of the divine decrees: God's 
self-glorification is logically prior to all other decrees. 
(B: 4) A fatally flawed argument? 
Gerstner's reading of Edwards is flawed (Edwards was not a traditional infralapsarian). And 
Holmes' reading of Edwards is flawed (God's chief end is self-glorification; redemption is the 
ultimate end to that chief end, it is not the chief end, or the logically first decree). But is 
Edwards' argument flawed? The answer is that it is, and fatally flawed. 
both of the nature or God's historical agency and the general pattern of God's historical plotting., 
America's Theologian, p. 45. 
487 Cited above. 'niis is not the only place that Edwards makes reference to this idea. Cf. Miscellany 702, 
Corol. 1, in YE. 18: 298, 'Hence [it] is a great confirmation that God's commurdcating happiness to the 
creature stands in the place of a supreme end, because we see that that work, even the making the creature 
happy by redemption, is the end of all God's other works. ' See also Uiscellany 762, Corol. 2, in YE18: 
408: 'this wicked act of crucifying Christ [is] ... the greatest of all 
decreed events, and that on which all 
other decreed events depend on as their main foundation, being the main thing in that greatest 
254 
The metaphysics of sin in the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards 
Let us lay out Edwards' argument as we have seen it thus far: 
(F) God decrees his self-glorification (chief end) M all his works. 
(2") God decrees the outworking of his self-glorification in the redemption of the elect (an 
ultimate end). 
The conjunction of (2")&(EI) entails: 
God decrees the redemption of the elect, without reference to the faith and good works of 
the elect. 
This proposition has an implication that Edwards does not appear to be cogniscent of, but 
which,, we shall see, is a significant problem in his argument. It is this: for a person to be the 
object of God's redemptive purposes, that person must require redemption. For instance, I 
cannot decide to buy an item back from a pawn-broker - redeem it - if I have not already 
pawned it. Perhaps I might foresee a situation in which I will pawn my watch and later redeem 
it. But the same condition applies, inasmuch as my watch can only be the object of my 
redemptive purpose if I have pawned it. If I am considering pawning it, knowing I shall later 
redeem it, I am still only in a position to consider the notion of redeeming it as a consequence of 
the notion of having pawned it. So, the decree to redeem the elect in (3 ") requires. that, 
(4") sinful works are a necessary condition of redemption. 
This, we shall see in a moment, is problematic for Edwards. In addition, and as we have already 
seen in Edwards' thinking, 
(5 ") God decrees to permit the fall and sin of humanity. 
Edwards' use of 'to permit' here, may seem disingenuous, given the argument of chapter (3), 
that, when taken in conjunction with Edwards' theological determinism, it does no metaphysical 
work, since it entails something like: 
God decrees the fall and sin of humanity. 
work of God. the work of redemption, that 
[which] is the end of all other works'. 
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However, as Paul Helm has pointed out to me in private correspondence, 488 in order to assess 
the moral worth of an action, one needs a clear and appropriate understanding of the 
'description under which' that action falls. Edwards' use of 'permit' is designed to guide the 
reader into adopting an appropriate description of God's ordering of the fall and away from 
other, potential descriptions, such as (6"), and weaker readings, compatible with, say, an 
Arminian notion of freedom. So. in (5 ") Edwards' use of 'permit' flags up the fact that the fall 
is not something God could have ordained in isolation from the concatenation of events with 
which it is co-ordinated. Taken in this circumscribed sense, the use of 'permit' in (5 ") stands. 
In what follows, we shall assume (5 "), not (6 ") obtains. We may proceed to, 
(7") God decrees the reprobation of the non-elect. 
The conjunction of (7")&(E2) entails: 
(8") God decrees the reprobation of the non-elect taking full account of their sinful works. 
(9") The decree to reprobate the non-elect is the means to the ultimate end of displaying the 
greatness of divine holiness (and thereby the outworking of (I ")). 
(10") Thus, the redemption of the elect and the reprobation of the damned to display divine 
holiness are both ultimate ends in God's decrees (from (2 ") and (9 ")). 
(I I") But both these ultimate ends are subordinate to the chief end of divine self-glorification 
(from (1"), (2"), (9") and (10")). 
The problems with this argument should now be obvious. We shall take them sequentially, in 
order of strength. First, the implication of (4"), viz. the condition of redemption, or the notion 
of the condition of redemption, vitiates (3"). For (4) follows from (3) and is implied by (3). 
Moreover, if (4") obtains, which it surely must for Edwards, since election is a means to the 
ultimate end of redemption (on (2")), then (3") cannot be logically prior to (5"). The reason 
for this is that the concept of redemption requires an object of redemption; something that needs 
to be redeemed. But there can be no redemption where there is no object that requires 
redemption. (3") is logically prior in the divine decrees, on Edwards' scheme, to the fall, 
captured in (5"). But if so, then how can Edwards explain the presence of the concept of 
redemption expressed in (3")? It is not enough for Edwards to claim that God foresees sin and 
48'3 E-mail, dated I Ph December, 2001. 
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decrees (3") on this basis, since the decree of (3") implies (4"), as a necessary condition of 
(3"). This means that Edwards does not seem to be supralapsarian in his decree of election if 
this decree is logically dependent upon the notion of redemption. 
Secondly, Edwards might be able to stabilize his supposed via media, by driving a wedge 
between election and redemption, such that the decree to elect entails an election to glory, with 
redemption as the merely contingent means to that end. On such a picture, Edwards could argue 
something like the following: the elect would have gone to glory even if there were no fall. And 
if there were no fall, presumably, there would have been no impediment to the elect being taken 
immediately to glory, since there would have been no need for redemption. Hence, there is a 
possible world in which (a) the elect exist, (b) the decree of election is a decree to glonfication, 
and (c) there is no fall, and no sin (presumably, for Edwards, no decree to fall and sin). If this 
world is logically possible, then redemption need only be a contingent means by which God 
brings about the glorification of the elect, as per (b). However, Edwards cannot endorse such a 
I construal of the decrees on the basis of the argument we have just set out. In fact, this means by 
which to make redemption contingent upon the world in which election takes place, is quite the 
opposite of Edwards' view. We have already seen that Edwards explicitly states that election Is 
a means to the ultimate end of redemption, not an end in itself (as per (2"), above). According 
to Edwards, election is one aspect of the covenant of redemption. Redemption is not a matter 
that is contingent upon the way in which God construes the decree of election. Rather, election 
is dependent upon the way in which God construes the covenant of redemption. 
The net result of this is that Edwards cannot make a coherent case for his via media approach to 
the decrees. His commitment to (3") materially implies (4") which is fatal to his bid for a 
supralapsarian decree of election and redemption. But, if he were to attempt to restabilize the 
supralapsarian component of his decree to elect, he would have to relegate redemption to the 
means, rather than the end in view of which election is ordained. Thus, his argument is vitiated 
on two counts. 
(B: 5) Supralapsarian after all? 
There is one last issue to address. Edwards appears to believe that one important reason for 
endorsing an infralapsarian view of reprobation is that the decree to reprobate presupposes that 
there are sinful persons who are in a position that requires the exercise of God's vindictive 
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justice in reprobation in the first place. 4" He is right to point out that the decree of (E2) 
presupposes that there is a group of people who are already sinners, in need of redemption. In 
this sense, his infralapsarian position with respect to reprobation is consistent with his 
endorsement of a supralapsarian view of election. But, there is another, consistently 
supralapsanan way to understand the decree to reprobation, that takes into account Edwards 
central contention about reprobation presupposing sin, whilst remaining within a supralapsanan 
scheme. Furthermore, on the basis of Edwards' theological determinism played out in chapters 
2 and 3, it seems to me that this consistently supralapsarian position would better represent the 
general thrust of Edwards' thinking on the doctrine of sin, than his attempt at a via media does. 
Let us examine what such a position would involve. 
It could be, on supralapsarian lines, that God decrees his self-glorification in the salvation of the 
elect as a manifestation of divine grace and mercy, and the reprobation of the damned as a 
manifestation of divine justice and wrath (as per (1)). This need only mean that God 
conceptualizes a possible world, in which he conceives all those parts, persons, properties, and 
other metaphysical paraphernalia that will exist in that world if he creates it. This includes 
conceiving the fact that, if he creates this world, he will create persons with the property of 
transworld depravity490 that will be separated into two groups: those he elects to life, and those 
he damns to hell. Now, all this supralapsarian picture presumes is that God can conceptualize 
such a possible world prior to actualizing it, and on that basis, makes the decrees he does, 
ordaining that such a world be actualized as per (1). It does not presume that there are actual 
persons suffering from transworld depravity as God conceives of such a world. God may 
conjure up the thought of a world populated with such people, elect and reprobate, and conceive 
of how he would allocate their eternal destinies, before ordaining the decree(s) that will bring 
about this thought. And this is still able to incorporate Edwards' contention about reprobation 
presupposing sin, without the need for Edwards' infralapsarian view of reprobation. Edwards, in 
other words, appears to conflate the possible with the actual. It is perfectly possible for an 
imaginative person to conceive of a possible world in which (s)he thinks of placing various 
persons, with various problems, in various situations and states of affairs. That is all that needs 
489 'die being of sin is supposed in the first things in order in the decree of reprobation, which is that God 
will glorify his vindictive justice; but the very notion of revenging justice simply considered supposes a 
fault to be revenged. ' Miscellany 700 in YE18: 283. 
490 This notion of 'transworld depravity' has been lifted from Alvin Plantinga, who uses it as a constituent 
of his Free Will Defence. See The Nature ofNecessity, p. 184ff. However, in an Edwardsian account, this 
would have to be slightly modified to be compatible with theological determinism. As I am using the 
notion, it means that for any possible world in which God seeks to actualize a particular person, that 
person will have a moral nature characterized by moral depmNity. This means that there are no possible 
worlds in which God may actualize this person, and that person not 
have a depraved moral nature. Hence 
transývorld depravity. 
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to be granted to the supralapsarian for their position to overcome the Edwardsian objection that 
the reprobate must exist prior to the decree to damn them, (since such a decree presumes that 
there are persons who are guilty of sin, and stand condemned already for this decree to have 
currency). The distinction can be formalized thus, 
(5) God (fore)sees the sin of the reprobate. 
(6) God ordains the sin of the reprobate (according to Edwards, is the permitter of that sin). 
(7) God decrees the damnation of the reprobate. 
Edwards claims that this demonstrates that for sin to be condemned as per (3), it must be 
already in existence, as per (1). But this does not follow. (5) makes no claim about whether the 
reprobate under consideration are potential or actual beings. That is, God could foresee the sin 
of the reprobate in a possible world, where the reprobate are only potential, rather than actual 
beings, and (5)-(7) still obtain. Tberefore, Edwards' central argument in preference of an 
infralapsarian decree of reprobation does not provide the grounds he thinks it does, for his 
asymmetrical account of the divine decrees. This has two implications. First, since this 
argument is a central plank of Edwards' argument for his asymmetrical position on the divine 
decrees, it does not, as it stands, offer any more promising grounds for a stable via media. 
Taken together with the previous criticisms of Edwards' position, it is clear that Edwards' 
position is fatally flawed. Secondly, Edwards' does not give a sufficient reason to abandon a 
completely supralapsarian position. In fact, his contention about the logical priority of the glory 
of God in the divine decrees in End of Creation, and his strong deterministic thesis outlined in 
FOW (and taken up in the foregoing thesis), suggest that a purely supralapsarian position is 
more consistent with the central structures of his metaphysics. 
(13: 6) Conclusion 
Edwards' doctrine of the order of the divine decrees in predestination has been misunderstood. 
We have seen that two recent readings of Edwards' views, that of Gerstner and Holmes, both 
fail to adequately account for aspects of Edwards' argument. Gerstner tries to fit Edwards into a 
purely infralapsarian position, believing this will help him in his theodicy. But we have already 
seen in chapters 2 and 3 that this hope is vain. More importantly as far as the present discussion 
is concerned, this is simply not an adequate account of the carefully nuanced position that 
Edwards' attempts to formulate with respect to the predestinarian decrees. Holmes' reading of 
Edwards is more adequate. He sees the central thrust of Edwards' position lies in his attempted 
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asymmetrical account of a supralapsarian doctrine of election, with an infralapsarian doctrine of 
reprobation. However, his reading of Edwards fails to recognize that redemption is an ultimate, 
but not chief end in the divine decrees. This means that he privileges redemption over God's 
self-glorification, as the chief end of God's works. As a result he misunderstands the logical 
sequence of the divine decrees. 
We have also assessed the success of Edwards' asymmetrical argument for the predestinarian 
decrees. A careful analysis of his argument shows that the asymmetrical position he defends is 
fatally flawed on two counts. First, his supralapsarian decree of election carries a material 
implication that vitiates the supra-infralapsarian distinction that Edwards trades on. For his 
position implies that a necessary condition of supralapsarian election is sin. This means that 
Edwards' supralapsarian decree looks distinctly like an infralapsarian decree after all. But 
secondly, if Edwards is to make his via media work, he has to distinguish between election and 
redemption in a way that undoes a central aspect of his doctrine of the supralapsarian decree, 
making redemption contingent upon election, rather than, as Edwards sees it, election as a 
means to redemption, an ultimate end. 
Finally, I have suggested that the force of Edwards' argument, seen in the wider context of his 
theological determinism, is better understood as purely supralapsarian. It may well be that 
Edwards deliberately avoided such a doctrine because he saw the unpleasant consequences that 
would have had for his theodicy: God would be entirely responsible for sin. But this, as I have 
already argued, is an inescapable implication of his other metaphysical commitments. 
Consequently, Edwards' attempted middle way between supra and infralapsaxianism fails. 491 
"' I am grateful to Dr. John Bombaro for some very helpftll comments about the doctrine of the divine 
decrees in Edwards' thought. 
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